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

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
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**OF**

**SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.**

**PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH**

**BY**

**JOHN VEITCH, M.A.**

**PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW**

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE following Memoir was undertaken at the request of the family of Sir William Hamilton. I have been furnished by them with the private letters and documents of which use has been made in this volume. I am also mainly indebted to the members of the family for the facts relating to Sir William's private life as here recorded. To the same source, especially to Mr Hubert Hamilton, I owe numerous suggestions, which have served to make the Memoir more complete than it would otherwise have been.

To others besides the members of Sir William's family I am under obligations for materials supplied. These will be found duly acknowledged in the course of the Memoir. Where it appeared fitting, I have given narrative and description of facts and circumstances in the language of those communicating them, believing that the impressions of a man's personality are usually best conveyed in the words of those who felt them.

The present Work professes to be merely biographical. It was, at the same time, impossible, from the nature

of the life portrayed, to do justice to the man without a general reference to his philosophical opinions. I have also thought it right to point out, in the interest of historical truth, what appear to me to be incorrect representations of certain of Sir William Hamilton's philosophical doctrines. It was, however, no part of my design to expound his Philosophy, far less to attempt a critical estimate of it. I have sought only to portray the man as he lived, thought, taught, and wrote.

J. VEITCH.

THE COLLEGE, GLASGOW,  
*April 1869.*

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ERRATA.

- Page 91, line 19, *for* "Dante" *read* "Boccaccio."  
,, 103, ,, 32, *for* "They" *read* "The Faculty."  
,, 107, ,, 34, *after* "been" *insert* "among."  
,, 135, ,, 13, *after* "was," *delete* comma.  
,, 185, ,, 18, *after* "man," *delete* comma.  
,, 291, note, line 6, *for* "Thompson," *read* "Thomson."  
,, 332, line 32, *after* "~~verbal~~" *insert* colon.

TO HIS MOTHER.

WILLIAM HAMILTON was born on the 8th of March 1788, in the College of Glasgow. His father was Dr William Hamilton, Professor of Anatomy and Botany in the University. Of him we shall presently have occasion to speak at length.

His mother was Elizabeth, daughter of Mr William Stirling, merchant, whose family had for several generations been settled in Glasgow, where they occupied an influential position. They traced their descent from the Stirlings of Bankeir and Lettyr, and through them claimed to represent the distinguished house of Cadder,—oldest of the name of Stirling.



A P P E N D I X.

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# MEMOIR

OF

## SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

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### CHAPTER I.

EARLY PERIOD—BOYHOOD: 1788-1807.

BIRTH—PARENTAGE—GLASGOW OF LAST CENTURY—THE COLLEGE—THE HAMILTONS OF AIRDRIE—DR ROBERT HAMILTON—HIS GRANDFATHER, DR THOMAS HAMILTON—HIS FATHER, DR WILLIAM HAMILTON—HIS MOTHER—BOYHOOD AND EARLIEST EDUCATION—HIS BROTHER, THOMAS HAMILTON—DR DEAN AND SCHOOL AT BROMLEY—ENTERS THE COLLEGE OF GLASGOW—DR SOMMERS OF MIDCALDER—CHARACTER AT THIS PERIOD—NOTICE OF HIS BROTHER—PURSUES HIS ART STUDIES AT GLASGOW—PROFESSORS OF THE PERIOD—LETTERS OF DR SOMMERS—ATTENDS MEDICAL CLASSES—TASTE FOR COLLECTING BOOKS—GOES TO EDINBURGH TO PURSUE HIS MEDICAL STUDIES—LETTERS TO HIS MOTHER.

WILLIAM HAMILTON was born on the 8th of March 1788, in the College of Glasgow. His father was Dr William Hamilton, Professor of Anatomy and Botany in the University. Of him we shall presently have occasion to speak at length.

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William was the eldest surviving child of his parents, a brother and sister having died in infancy. The only other issue of the marriage was a son, Thomas, afterwards Captain Thomas Hamilton, and well known as the accomplished author of 'Cyril Thornton' and other works.

The name which the subject of our memoir received in baptism, and which he continued to use for some time, was *William Stirling*. As he grew up, however, he omitted *Stirling*, and continued to the end of his life to write merely "W. Hamilton." In this trifling circumstance there appears something of his characteristic distaste for the superfluous in expression. In the postscript of a letter to his mother from Edinburgh, 8th March 1807, he says: "You need not direct to me by my full names; you may always omit *Stirling*. It is nonsense having three long names."

The city of young Hamilton's birth, boyhood, and education, had not in 1788 attained to anything like its present magnitude. Though the tide of its commercial greatness had unmistakably set in, Glasgow still retained many of the characteristics of an ancient university town. The "tobacco lords," as its first traders of note were called, from the article they imported, had no doubt developed a great commerce from 1707 until the breaking-out of the American war. They had amassed large fortunes; they occupied a marked place in the social life of the city; and they appeared very conspicuously on the streets in their picturesque costume of scarlet cloak, curled wig, cocked-hat, and gold-headed cane—recalling the princely exclusiveness and splendour of the past days of Venice and Genoa.\* But the University still held its place as the peculiar boast and ornament of the city; and there subsisted much intercourse and cordiality between the citizens and the professors of the College, as was shown by their fusion in the social clubs of the period. Wealthy and important as might be many of the newly-risen commercial aristocracy, the historical lustre of the University was still that by which Glasgow was best

\* See Strang's Clubs of Glasgow, p. 34.

and most widely known ; and in spite of a system of professorial patronage, whose commonest results were nepotism and the preference of the obscure local candidate, the names of its past and existing professors—especially Carmichael, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Moore, Black, Reid, Cullen, Thomas and William Hamilton—had made the University respected in Scotland, and not unknown in England and on the continent of Europe.

The houses in the Professors' Court, in one of which young Hamilton was born—that now marked No. 1—flank the north side of the College, and were built for the most part between 1720 and 1730. To the east of them lay an open space of forty acres, forming the College gardens and grounds, through which the historic Molendinar wended its way. In front is the College itself, commenced in 1632 and completed in 1662—a fine specimen of the modification of classical architecture which prevailed in Scotland at that period, and replete with interesting and inspiring associations. Towards the end of last century it was but partially surrounded by the houses of the city, and to the east commanded views of outlying green fields and rising grounds. The edifice was fresher in appearance, too, than now ; for the eighty years that have since elapsed had not contributed their quota of smoke and atmospheric impurity to dim roof and tower. Its immediate surroundings were also of a different character ; the High Street and the adjoining localities, less densely peopled than now, were the places of business, and even of residence, of many of the principal merchants and shopkeepers ; and from the College to the Cross tower the ancient thoroughfare looked quaint and picturesque, with crow-stepped gables abutting on the line of vision, such as may still be seen along the quays of Antwerp and in the streets of Ghent.

Among the advantages which the College is said to have possessed in 1794 is that of “ local situation, in the *neighbourhood* of an industrious city, and at some distance from the capital, by which it is not exposed to the dissipation arising from a number of amusements, nor too remote from the topics

of speculation, suggested by the progress of philosophy and the interesting business of society." \*

In 1788, and for some years afterwards, Thomas Reid was still alive in a green old age, Professor of Moral Philosophy, though the duties of the Chair were discharged by an assistant. Occupying one of the official residences, the figure of the venerable originator of that line of speculation which William Hamilton was destined to take up, recast, and amplify, was to be met with in the College quadrangle, where his appearance had been a familiar sight for more than a quarter of a century.

Dr William Hamilton, the father—Professor of Anatomy and Botany—was sprung from a good old Scottish stock. He was a cadet of the Hamiltons of Airdrie, near Glasgow; they again were a branch of the Hamiltons of Preston and Fingalton, and the tradition was that since the extinction of the direct male line of that more ancient house they were entitled as its representatives to bear its title and honours. No attempt had, however, been made to prove this claim, which was of the less importance as it did not include the lands of Preston,—these having been disposed of by their last owner. Meanwhile the embarrassed circumstances of the successive proprietors of Airdrie had compelled them gradually to part with the whole of the estate. The head of the family at the time we speak of was Dr Hamilton's cousin, Robert Hamilton, who might have been thought likely to restore it to its former position, having realised a considerable fortune as a merchant in China. This cousin, however, died unmarried on his way home in 1799, and left the bulk of his means to the University of Glasgow. The traditional connection of the family of Airdrie with that of Preston was destined to influ-

\* 'Statistical Account of the University of Glasgow,' attributed to Dr Thomas Reid. "Local situation" is, it is to be feared, not now one of the attractions of the College; but there is a probability that the plea will be again available through the munificence of the citizens, when, with mingled feelings of complacency and regret, the alumni of the University will abandon local associations for present amenity.

ence the imagination of young William Hamilton ; and it was left to him, as we shall see, to trace the precise descent, and assume the hereditary honours, of the historical house of Preston.

The Hamiltons of Airdrie could boast of not undistinguished members. The first of the line, John, second son of Sir Robert Hamilton of Preston, was slain at Flodden ; the third, Gavin, gallantly espoused the interests of the unfortunate Mary, and was engaged in the capture of the King's party in Stirling (1571). Another Gavin, the fifth of the family, accompanied William Duke of Hamilton, and his kinsman, Sir Thomas Hamilton of Preston, in the disastrous expedition into England under Charles II. in 1651, and involved his estate by his exertions in the cause of the Covenant and the King. His second son, William, acquired a high reputation among his contemporaries for theological erudition as Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, and died in the office of Principal of that seat of learning in 1732. His elder son, Robert, sympathising with his kinsman, Sir Robert Hamilton of Preston, in his hostility to the religious persecution of the Government, took part in the western rising of 1679, and was made prisoner at Bothwell Bridge.

This Robert Hamilton was the laird of Airdrie when the extinction of the direct line of the Preston family took place, by the death without issue in 1701 of Sir Robert Hamilton, the Covenanting leader at Drumclog.

Robert Hamilton had a son named William, who succeeded him in the estate, and was minister of Bothwell. The eldest son of the minister of Bothwell—also a Robert Hamilton—studied medicine and graduated M.D. in Glasgow. He rose to be Professor of Anatomy (1742-56), and exchanged this Chair for that of the Practice of Medicine (1757-66). With Dr Robert Hamilton commenced the connection of the family with the profession of medicine and its close relationship to the University of Glasgow, which subsisted down to the end of the century.

The 'Glasgow Journal' of the 4th May 1747, informs us

that, "On Monday last Dr Robert Hamilton, Professor of Anatomy and Botany in the University of Glasgow, was married to Miss Molly Baird, a beautiful young lady with a handsome fortune."\* "I lived this winter [1743-44] in Glasgow," says the Rev. Dr Carlyle in his Autobiography, "in the same house with Dr Robert Hamilton, Professor of Anatomy, an ingenious and well-bred man; but with him I had little intercourse, except at breakfast now and then, for he always dined abroad. . . . After Dr Robert Hamilton's death, which was premature, a younger brother succeeded him in the anatomical Chair, who was very able.† He dying young also, his son was advanced, who was said to have surpassed all his predecessors in ability. They were descended from the family of Hamiltons of Preston, a very ancient branch of Duke Hamilton's family." Some unfortunate speculations in which Dr Robert Hamilton engaged, obliged him to alienate a great part of what still remained of the family estate, and the last fragment of the property was sold during the minority of his eldest son.

Dr Thomas Hamilton, the younger brother here referred to, and grandfather of the subject of this memoir (born 1st October 1728, died 2d August 1781), held the Chair of Anatomy and Botany, afterwards occupied by his son, from 1757 to 1781. His wife was Isobel, daughter of the Rev. Dr William Anderson, at one time Professor of Church History in the University of Glasgow. She survived her husband, and died in November 1795.

The name of Dr Thomas Hamilton is traditionally associated with that of Dr Cullen as one of the founders of the medical school of Glasgow, and one of the great advancers of medical science in Scotland during last century. Joseph Black, and the two Hunters, William and John, were also his intimate

\* Quoted in 'Notices of the Literary History of Glasgow,' Maitland Club Pub. xiv. p. 9; 'Old Glasgow and its Environs,' by Senex (Robert Reid).

† The younger brother succeeded on the appointment of Dr R. Hamilton to the Chair of Practice of Medicine.

friends. He was assumed as a partner in practice by Dr John Moore (the father of the distinguished soldier, Sir John Moore), a man of considerable literary and professional distinction in last century, and still known to those interested in literary history as the author of 'Zeluco' and other works. Dr Thomas Hamilton joined to his capacity for his profession certain liberal tastes and accomplishments. We find his name, along with those of Joseph Black, James Moor, Dr Leechman, and others, in the list of members of a literary society that met weekly in connection with the University.

His genial nature, vivacity, and genuine humour seem, moreover, to have made him as notable socially as he was distinguished professionally. With the rapid influx of commercial prosperity into the city during last century, there arose a fuller tide of social life, which showed itself in the formation of a series of clubs. These clubs, containing generally representatives both of the College and the commerce of the city, appear to have been instituted with a certain vague purpose of literary cultivation, but in the course of their existence they certainly did much more for the worthy end of good-fellowship than for literature. Dr Thomas Hamilton was a foremost member in succession of two of them—the Anderston and the Hodge Podge. The former, which was the oldest and the most distinguished of all, originated with no less a person than Robert Simson, the celebrated Professor of Mathematics, and the restorer of ancient geometry. Simson presided over it until his death in 1758, preserving unimpaired "his ardour in study, his relish for social relaxation, and his amusing singularities of humour."\* The Anderston Club met in a hostelry, in what was then a suburban village of that name, every Saturday at two o'clock, when dinner was served. In such a reunion,—for Simson was a man of high classical culture, and was nearly as familiar with Greek poetry as with Greek geometry,—the banquet of hen broth was no doubt well seasoned with Attic salt. Around the president there

\* Stewart's Account of Reid, p. 10.



assembled weekly such accomplished associates as Dr James Moor, the Professor of Greek ; George Rosse, the Professor of Humanity, "a very Cicero in Roman literature ;" Drs Cullen, Thomas Hamilton, and Adam Smith.

There seem to have been no limits to the topics of conversation and discussion, except the bonds of good-fellowship. The Hodge Podge, which was apparently of a freer and less classical type than the Anderston, was enlivened by the wit and pleasantry of Dr John Moore, then a young man, who, as poet-laureate of the Club, has left us sketches of its character, and a graphic limning of its principal members,—among others of Dr Thomas Hamilton as he appeared in hours of social relaxation :—

"A club of choice fellows each fortnight employ  
An evening in laughter, good humour, and joy ;  
Like the national council, they often debate,  
And settle the army, the navy, and state.

In this Club there's a jumble of nonsense and sense,  
And the name of Hodge Podge they have taken from thence ;  
If, in jumbling verses, this ditty I frame,  
Pray be not surprised if a Hodge Podger I am.

If you choose to know more of this merry class,  
Like the kings in Macbeth they shall one by one pass :  
The man that can't bear with a good-humoured rub,  
I am sure is not worthy a place in this Club.

He who leads up the van is stout Thomas \* the tall,  
Who can make us all laugh, though he laughs at us all ;  
But *entre nous*, Tom, you and I, if you please,  
Must take care not to laugh ourselves out of our fees."

Dr William Hamilton was born on the 31st July 1758. He held the Chair of Anatomy and Botany from 1781 to 1790. He died in 1790, before completing his thirty-second year ; "his constitution, somewhat enfeebled by early and intense application to study, being worn out with the toil of business and thought in which he was continually engaged."† The

\* Dr Thomas Hamilton.

† See Account of Professor William Hamilton in the 'Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1792,' by Dr Robert Cleghorn of Glasgow.

reputation which, at the close of his brief career, Dr Hamilton left behind him, sufficiently shows to what distinction he might have been expected to attain had longer life been granted him. William Hamilton, being but two years old at his father's death, retained only one or two childish recollections of him. We are fortunate, however, in possessing a short sketch by him of his father, drawn apparently from the information of those who had known him, and from a biographical memoir in the 'Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh' for 1792. This fragment was part of a memoir of his brother, which fraternal regard induced him to commence shortly after Captain Hamilton's death, but which was never completed.

"His [Captain Thomas Hamilton's] father, William, was Professor of Anatomy and Botany in the University of Glasgow; who survived the birth of his second son only two months. Though cut off prematurely—almost, indeed, in the outset of his career (he died in his thirty-second year)—no one, perhaps, ever departed more respected and beloved. After pursuing his liberal and professional studies in the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, he completed his medical education in London under the celebrated William Hunter. By this great anatomist he was treated almost with paternal kindness; was received into his house, and intrusted with the care of the anatomical department of his school—but this expressly on the ground of merit; for after the warmest praises of his head and heart, he assures his father that 'he has profited more for the time than any young man I ever knew.' With an ardent love of his profession, distinguished talents, an appearance and manners the most engaging, and supported by the Hunters and others of the highest medical influence in the metropolis, his ultimate success in London, the great field of professional ambition, seemed almost assured. But though London remained always the ulterior goal, he was induced to establish his reputation and commence his professional career in Glasgow, where his connections promised him a more immediate introduction to practice; and, in his twenty-third year, he was nominated

by the Crown to the Chair of Anatomy as his father's successor—William Hunter, who was consulted on the occasion, declaring to the Chancellor that 'it was the interest of Glasgow to give him, rather than his to solicit, the appointment.' Here his success was decided and immediate, both as professor and as practitioner. The medical, and, in particular, the anatomical, school of the University continued steadily to increase; and such, notwithstanding his youth, was the general confidence placed in his prudence and skill that, though he died at a period of life when few, even the most successful, are beyond the first steps of their ascent to medical practice, he had already for years stood at the head of his profession. As an author, besides some occasional papers of great merit, he published nothing, having occupied himself in preparing the materials for those systematic works he had in view."

Dr Hamilton's early and strong predilection for the study of anatomy had been for some not obvious reason discouraged by his father. The enthusiasm of the youth was not, however, to be checked, and he seems to have given himself to the study with an all-absorbing devotion. Dr William Hunter, writing of him in 1778, said,—“Of all the young men I have ever known, he appears to me to be one of the most promising, cheerful, amiable, modest, ingenious, and keen and persevering in the pursuit of knowledge.” All the notices which refer to him point him out as a man who inspired strong affection by his singularly pure, warm, and generous nature, as well as admiration for his remarkable professional skill. A sagacious and most accurate observer, particularly noted for the calmness and skill of his surgical operations; with an extreme sensibility to suffering, which manifested itself in his countenance, and the sympathy and tenderness of his manner towards his patients,—he was drawn to his profession both by a scientific and a human interest. A regular and temperate life enabled him to indulge a marked taste for general knowledge, to which he usually allotted some hours of each day. In the father of the author of 'Cyril Thornton,' we should not omit

to notice that he had inherited no small share of the humour of "stout Thomas the tall,"—a humour so quick and kindly as to present to him only the grotesque side of the small, though often irritating, disagreeables of life, and thus turn them into sources of pleasantry for himself and his friends. The premature death of one who had united so many of the best qualities of head and heart was naturally deeply lamented in the city. When his funeral passed along, many among the crowd, as was noted by an eyewitness, were observed to shed tears.

"As a lecturer," says Dr Cleghorn, "Dr Hamilton was remarkably free from pomp and affectation. His language was simple and perspicuous, but so artless that it appeared flat to those who place the beauty of language in the intricacy of management, or the abundance of figures. His manner of speaking corresponded with his style, and was such as might appear uninteresting to those who think it impossible to be eloquent without violent gestures and frequent variations of tone. He used merely the tone of ordinary conversation, as his preceptor, Dr Hunter, did before him, aiming at perspicuity only, and trusting for attention to the importance of the subjects he treated. These he selected with great judgment. Holding in contempt all hypotheses unsupported by fact, and inapplicable to the improvement of practice—omitting or passing slightly over facts remarkable for curiosity more than utility—he demonstrated with great distinctness and precision those parts which it is necessary to know accurately; accompanying his demonstrations with specimens of morbid parts, and with every remark, physiological and practical, which he was able to collect from extensive reading, and careful reflection on his own part." \*

Dr Hamilton was buried in the cathedral of his native city, where there is a monument to his memory. The epitaph fittingly closes with the words:—

*Heu ! tales terris quod monstrant fata, nec ultra esse sinunt.*†

\* Account, p. 28, 29.

† Altered from Virgil, *Æn.* vi. 869.

William Hamilton was thus, by his birth and immediate descent, closely connected with the life and habits of a Scottish university, and with the profession of medicine,—circumstances which naturally affected the tenor of his subsequent life and studies.

Having lost his father when he himself was scarcely two years old, the charge of his education devolved entirely on his mother. His father left no near relations, but the boy grew up among a large circle of connections on the mother's side, with most of whom he remained intimate during life. Mrs Hamilton was of a family noted for good looks, and her own appearance was handsome and striking. In figure she was stately, with fine eyes, though her face was somewhat spoiled by traces of smallpox. As is not unfrequently the case with distinguished sons, William resembled his mother in appearance, and probably, also, in certain mental peculiarities. She was a woman of considerable strength of character, well read, and of cultivated mind, but with more natural ability than careful early education. She was warmly affectionate, very much attached to her children, and solicitous, even to an extreme, about their education, health, and general welfare. There was withal, in her strong, kindly, even indulgent nature, a degree of severity that occasionally amounted to harshness. The attachment between her eldest son and herself was exceedingly deep, and no son could cherish greater regard or a more loyal affection for a mother than he did through life.

As a child, William took great delight in the natural and graphic picturing of the 'Pilgrim's Progress,' and in the scenes of the Apocalypse—the two books which, above all others, had a charm for him. He read the 'Pilgrim's Progress' in an old copy, with illustrations of what would now be called a *sensational* type. This childish predilection has some interest as indicating a taste for the marvellous and highly coloured in romance which remained with him through life. In subsequent years he would find relaxation from the severity of abstract

thought in the 'Arabian Nights,' and would readily abandon a schoolman for Mrs Radcliffe, and the hard dry precision of the 'Organon' for the weird story of 'Frankenstein.' At a somewhat later period of his childhood he is known to have read with lively interest the 'Ancient History' of Rollin, and the 'Natural History' of Buffon.

The reminiscences of his early boyhood are few, and not in any way singular. There was, apparently, no remarkable intellectual precocity about him; a young lad, with an overflowing, healthy boyishness, loving pets of all kinds—dogs, birds, &c.—intensely; fond of active outdoor sports; given decidedly to practical jokes and fun; and remembered chiefly by a cousin—who, as a girl, was one of the circle of his early associates—for the kindness, protection, and generosity which the strong bold boy used to extend to the little and weak ones among his companions. A youth, in fine, with an untold and ever-increasing amount of vital force about him, which had not yet found a precise outlet, and which its possessor did not very well know how to relieve himself of,—a very difficult fellow for elderly ladies to manage, as his aunts discovered when he and his brother were occasionally left in their charge.

His mother usually at this time divided the year between the country and the town, and his earlier education was thus partly private and partly public. "In the summer," to use Sir William's own words in the notes for a memoir of his brother, "he [Thomas] and his brother [himself], after they had outgrown the control of female discipline, were placed under a domestic tutor. In the winter they also attended the Glasgow public schools."

The elder brother appears about this time to have been at school, under Mr Angus, a well-known teacher of English, in Glasgow. In 1797 he entered the Grammar-school, joining the fourth or lowest class under Mr James Gibson, whose duty it was, according to the arrangements of the period, to carry his pupils through a four years' course of classical study.

The dux of the class in the years 1797 and 1798 was James Watson, afterwards Doctor of Medicine, who still survives. In 1799 and 1800 the dux was Hugh Stewart. The younger brother entered the Grammar-school in his ninth year, and joined the class of the Rev. Daniel Macarthur. William must have made at an early age respectable progress in his classical studies, as he attended the junior Latin and Greek classes of the University when only twelve years old (1800).

In October 1801 both brothers were removed to school in England—William being in his thirteenth, and Thomas in his eleventh year. They were first of all placed in a school at Chiswick, kept by the Rev. Dr Horne, a man of some reputation. Here, however, they remained only till the Christmas vacation, after which Thomas was placed at the school of the Rev. Dr Scott of Hounslow, while William was removed to the school of the Rev. Dr Dean at Bromley. Dr Scott's reputation, more especially as a classical scholar and disciplinarian, was deservedly high. At Hounslow Thomas continued for three years; and "here obtaining what in his earlier career he mainly stood in need of—a firm, steady, and unavoidable control—he made rapid progress in all his studies, particularly in languages."\*

William, the gownsman of twelve, as he himself used laughingly to relate in after years, felt not unnaturally considerable disappointment and indignation at being removed from college and sent back to school. But maternal authority was judicious and inexorable, and there was nothing for it but submission. He remained under the care of Dr Dean at Bromley from Christmas 1801 to Midsummer 1803, when he returned to Scotland, much more capable, no doubt, both from age and attainments, of entering with profit on his university course than when he left home.

Only two of his letters written from Bromley have been preserved. From these we gather that Dr Dean's pupil did not greatly like the school-life there, and was not very well

\* MS. notice of Captain Hamilton by Sir William.

pleased to stay in England. The cause of these feelings was probably in a great measure home-sickness. He writes a great many letters to his friends, recurs fondly to his pet dogs, Cato and Fanny, and is far from being satisfied with Dr Dean's habit of reading the letters he received. The following affords us a glimpse of his school-life at Bromley. In it we have an indication of a constitutional shyness, and shrinking from public appearances, which remained with him more or less through life:—

BROMLEY, 18th November 1802.

DEAR MOTHER,—I hope that you have got my last letter. Public night will be in about a month hence. I intend to ask Mr Dean not to insist on my speaking, as I hate and execrate it. I hope you will let me have the allowance, for I can buy all my own things very well. I hope everybody and everything is well with you. I don't know how it is, but I like to write letters to you. I have written in [all] about ten letters to know if Cato received the collar which I sent to him. Tell me if you have had much fruit in the orchard of Rindmuir. I intend to write this the longest letter I ever wrote. Give my love to Andrew Stirling and everybody else.

I hope Andrew Buchanan is well. I am very anxious to know where I am to stay this Christmas holidays, but pray don't speak about this on any . . . I hate England worse and . . . [part torn off]. I have not heard anything from Tom. Will you write me once a-week, and I will be much obliged to you? I want a box to put things in, and I have a cargo of books which will be spoiled in my desk, as I don't use them; therefore, dear mother, if you would have the goodness to let me have one—it would not cost more than half a guinea; and you also promised me one before you left London, if you remember right. When will you send me Burns's book? . . . I am, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

The tone of dissatisfaction with Bromley, apparent in his letters, brought down on the writer a sharp rebuke from his mother. We find her writing to him, on the 22d January 1803, in these terms:—

“I hope to have the satisfaction to hear that you will attend to all that I have said in my late letters, that you will weigh its import-



ance, and that you will strive more than ever to do your duty, and submit cheerfully to what I require. Do this heartily and cordially, and I shall then perhaps think of seeing you soon in the spring."

At Midsummer 1803 he left Bromley and returned to Scotland, with the view of entering the University of Glasgow. The period that intervened before the opening of the College session was spent at the manse of Midcaldar, a secluded spot near the foot of the Pentland Hills, about twelve miles from Edinburgh. Here he resided under the care of the esteemed minister of the parish, the Rev. John, afterwards Dr. Sommers. During this and the two following summers—the period of the College vacation—he, along with his brother, some of his cousins, and other boys, enjoyed the advantage of the minister's guidance and superintendence in their studies. Dr Sommers was a man of very considerable accomplishments, and of excellent sense and tact in dealing with boys. To his instructions, and the pervading spirit of the quiet country manse, the two youths owed much, both in the way of education and in the general growth of character. To the worthy clergyman "they," says Sir William, speaking of himself and his brother "(in common with his other pupils) remained in after life ever warmly and gratefully attached."\*

The two brothers who were thus placed together in the quiet seclusion of a Scottish manse were contrasted both in appearance and character. The elder, though he had not yet reached his full development, was powerful in frame, while the younger, who grew up an exceedingly handsome man, was of lighter and more graceful make, and rather stooping in figure. The elder, whose character was naturally more fully formed, had greater strength of resolution than his brother, and a certain undercurrent of sedateness. The younger brother was of a highly volatile temperament, and abounded in fun and mischief.

William, however, was not without his dash of genuine boyishness. He is remembered by some who knew him at the

\* MS. notice of Captain T. Hamilton by Sir W. Hamilton.

manse "as a wild boy and fond of sport"—quick-tempered, yet warmly affectionate. His spirits were extremely buoyant—his love of outdoor pastimes unbounded; and speedily the lead among the boys of the manse was spontaneously and cheerfully accorded to him, on account of the generous inspiration which he threw into all the sports of the place, as well as of his indisputable superiority in all feats of physical strength and dexterity—whether running, leaping, swimming in the Calder, or daringly diving into the linn pool of a woodland burn,—“the glory of headers.”

“If touched by him,  
The inglorious football mounted to the pitch  
Of the lark’s flight, or shaped a rainbow curve,  
Aloft, in prospect of the shouting field.”

His interest in the manse and its inmates continued after he ceased to be under Dr Sommers’s care. While in Edinburgh in 1806-7 he made frequent runs out to Midcalder, and he generally spent part of the long vacation there during the Oxford period of his life. He was cherished in the memory of the boys as the soul of the athletic sports of the place, and his arrival was always hailed with the greatest enthusiasm. In particular his feats of bodily strength excited the wondering admiration of the inmates of the manse. One of them relates that Hamilton has taken him upon his right hand, and allowed him to stand upon it as he held it out. Another of them remembers the kindly interest which the Oxonian took in the younger boys and their concerns. His sonorous reading of Homer, on one occasion, entranced a little fellow who knew no Greek. Observing the attention and eagerness of the youngster, who sat spellbound by his side, Hamilton took the trouble to teach him to repeat four or five of the odes of Anacreon.

The following is his first letter from Midcalder to his mother:—

MIDCALDER, 1803.

DEAR MOTHER,— . . . Mother, you have lost your wager, for I asked Mr Sommers and Mr Cruickshanks both, who both were

- astonished at me asking such a question, as any child of ten years old knows that the sun is nearer us in winter than in summer; but to convince you still more, I, when I was looking over a French geography, saw this, which I shall copy to you: "En hiver le soleil est plus près de nous qu'en été de plus d'une million de lieues;" which, for your information—for perhaps you have forgot your
- French—is this, "In winter the sun is nearer to us than in summer by more than a million of leagues." So, if you please, you may enclose the half-crown with the rest in my box, remembering to pay the carriage, for I am growing poorer, having only 11s. I had forgot I wrote Tom with the letter before the last. . . . —
- Your affectionate son, W. S. HAMILTON.

After spending the latter portion of the summer at Midcalder, William, along with his brother, entered the University of Glasgow in session 1803-4. The younger brother attended as a regular student the Arts classes for three winters. "In his academical career," to borrow the words of the MS. notice already referred to, "he was more remarkable for ability than application, and the honours he carried off were in general those won by vigorous rather than continued effort. In the 'Blackstone examination' of his first year he distinguished himself by giving up an unprecedented complement of Latin authors, trusting, it must be confessed, to his general command of the language to carry him over more than one which he had never read. His power of Latin composition, both in verse and prose, which he owed in part to his English education, enabled him to obtain some easy triumphs in the language classes; in that of logic, the excellence and irregularity of his English essays obtained for him both the praise and the reprobation of the venerable professor. At this period he and another able and somewhat idle student were drawn together by a secret affinity of genius, and became inseparable companions. Their different destinations soon divided them, and they hardly ever met again in after life. This was Michael Scott, the author of 'Tom Cringle's Log,' &c."

The inclination of the younger brother was towards the

army as a profession ; but this was opposed by his mother. He accordingly entered a mercantile house, first in Glasgow, and then in one of its branches in Liverpool. But for commercial life he had no taste or aptitude; and after a short trial of it, he was at length allowed to follow the bent of his inclination and enter the army. In 1810 he obtained, by purchase, a commission in the 29th Regiment, and had hardly joined when it was ordered out to Portugal, where he was immediately engaged in active service. In the battle of Albuera in the following May, the most sanguinary engagement which occurred during the war, the 29th was the leading regiment, and suffered in proportion. In this action a musket-bullet passed through his thigh, and for a time his life was in serious danger.\* After being a second time in the Peninsula, and also, on occasion of the war with the North American States, in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, his regiment was sent to France as part of the army of occupation. About 1818 he retired on half-pay, after which he lived chiefly in or near Edinburgh, and devoted himself to literature.

The elder brother having, before his removal to school in England, attended the junior Latin and Greek classes at the University, now, as a second-year student, joined the senior classes in those departments, and also the classes of Logic and Moral Philosophy. The Faculty of Arts in Glasgow at this period possessed several distinguished names. The Latin Chair was filled by Professor Richardson, whose predilection, however, was more towards polite letters than accurate scholarship. According to Captain Hamilton, speaking from his own early impressions in 'Cyril Thornton,' "Richardson's mind was thoroughly imbued with the beauties of Roman literature, and he was happy in the mode of communicating his instructions. . . . In the 'Characters of Shakespeare's Plays' he has left behind him a work which may serve as a model of elegant and philosophical criticism, and which, notwithstanding all that has since been written on the

\* Sir W. Hamilton's notes.

subject, still maintains its place in our literature."\* The Greek Chair was occupied by John Young, a man of fine taste and ardent genius, in whom a verse or phrase of a Greek poet would suddenly enkindle a flame of enthusiastic eloquence. The younger of the two brothers appears to have been wonderfully impressed by the powers of the Greek Professor. Referring to his early enthusiasm for Young, he says: "He it was who made the strongest and most vivid impression on my youthful mind, and it is his image which is still imprinted there the most deeply and ineffaceably. That he was a profound and elegant scholar, I believe, has never been denied. No master ever ruled with more despotic sway the minds of his pupils. None ever possessed the art of communicating his knowledge so beautifully and gracefully, of transferring the glowing enthusiasm of his own mind into that of his audience. . . . Nothing could be more captivating than the eloquence with which he treated of the liberty, the literature, and the glory of ancient Greece, while tears of enthusiasm rolled down his cheeks. He was naturally a great and effective orator; and had his powers been called into action in a different field, he might have added something to our scanty and imperfect records of national eloquence. It has always seemed to me that his mind bore some resemblance to that of Burke. . . . Like Burke, he felt all the influence of the spells he cast on others, and his own heart trembled at the images of dread or beauty which he conjured up from the depth of his imagination."† That the elder brother caught something of Young's spirit, and imbibed from him a taste for the study of the Greek language and literature, we may infer from what he says in his letters from Oxford.‡ The Chair of Logic was occupied by George Jardine, whose teaching, though not dealing much with the proper questions of philosophy, was well

\* Cyril Thornton, vol. i. chap. vii.

† Ibid.

‡ The epitaph on the monument to Professor Young in the Cathedral of Glasgow was, at the request of his family and friends, composed by Sir William Hamilton, in 1824.

fitted to awaken and discipline the powers of young minds, and afford general education and culture. Professor Jardine's careful practical training, especially in the composition of essays and exercises, gave a distinctive character and reputation to the Logic Chair in Glasgow for more than a quarter of a century. Hamilton always referred to Professor Jardine with respect, and acknowledged with gratitude the benefit he had derived from his instructions. When he himself was appointed to the Chair of Logic in Edinburgh, his early class arrangements were, to some extent, professedly modelled on those of his former teacher.\* In the Chair of Moral Philosophy, vacated by Reid in 1796, James Mylne discoursed with clearness and force of a sensational philosophy and an utilitarian ethic. Mylne was an able expounder of the doctrines he taught, and by him Hamilton was first introduced to the theories of Condillac and De Tracy.

In the classes of Logic and Moral Philosophy Hamilton was greatly distinguished, having in each carried off the highest honour of the year, which was then, as now, awarded by the votes of the members of the class.

In the summer of 1804, after leaving College, we find him, as usual, residing at Midcalder. In the following letter of Dr Sommers to his mother, we have a glimpse of the character of the young student, and of the nature and order of the studies which he pursued in the holidays. These seem to have been chiefly supplementary to the work at College:—

MIDCALDER, 21st May 1804.

DEAR MADAM,— . . . As he [Andrew Stirling] is further advanced in figures than William, I am persuaded that it will be a material advantage to make him exert himself to get up with him ; and William has no small share of emulation about him, although I have not yet been able to make him give his whole mind to this study.

In his other studies he seems to have much more pleasure. Andrew and he are, for some time at least, to go on together accord-

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\* See Lectures, vol. i. p. 389.

ing to the following arrangement. From 7 to 9 in the morning they are to read history ; from 10 to 11 translate English into French ; from 11 to 1 write English exercises, and improve themselves in adding and multiplying with facility and exactness ; and from 6 till near 8 in the evening they are to be employed with Mr Cruickshanks in arithmetic, till such time as he thinks they are sufficiently qualified for bookkeeping.

There is one thing I have had occasion to speak about more than once, and that is their extravagance in clothes and needless absurd expenses. You may therefore, if you think proper, say that nothing of that kind will be attended to without my approbation and consent.

They have forgot their French very much, and we have been revising it.

William, I see, is very anxious to become his own master, which has rendered it necessary for me to be excessively pointed and strict in everything I require of them all.

He, in particular, is very much inclined to be idle, although more studious than at first. I have no doubt whatever that in a short time I shall have no reason for complaint on that head. . . .

I remain, most respectfully, dear madam, your most obedient servant,

J. SOMMERS.

Dr Sommers has recorded his final impressions of his young charge in the following letter, written in 1820, on occasion of Sir William's unsuccessful candidature for the Moral Philosophy Chair in the University of Edinburgh :—

“For some time during the early part of his life I was intrusted with the superintendence of his education, both before and after he commenced his academical career in the University of Glasgow ; and it was during the time of his residence with me that he began his first essays on subjects of philosophy, in which, even at that early period, I could not fail to discover striking marks of an acute and vigorous understanding. My expectation of his rising to future distinction in literary attainments was fully realised ; and during the progress of his studies at the University, his efforts were frequently rewarded by his obtaining the first prizes in the philosophical classes at Glasgow. From my intimate knowledge of Sir William's studies

at that period, as well as from my subsequently having had the best opportunities of attending to his progress in literary pursuits, it is doing him no more than justice to say, that I consider his talents and attainments to be of the highest order ; and that for perseverance and depth of research into any subject that has occupied his mind, as well as for ingenuity of conception, I have perhaps never met with any one that equalled, and certainly have never known any one that excelled, him. . . .

“Respecting his moral and religious conduct, so far as I know, it has uniformly been such, even from his earliest years, as would do honour to the purest heart, and such as the most scrupulous could not fail to approve.”

In the winter of 1804-5 he again attended College. He appears now to have commenced a course of medical study ; for to the profession of medicine he was probably destined by his friends, and to it he was himself obviously disposed. The taste, however, for philosophical studies, which was partially awakened at Glasgow, and afterwards greatly quickened at Oxford, finally prevailed over his medical predilections. During the session, besides studying mathematics under James Millar, he attended the class of chemistry under Dr Cleghorn, and set about experimenting for himself. In the summer of 1805 he commenced the study of botany and anatomy, attending the class of Botany. Part of this summer was spent at Midcalder.

In 1805-6 he again attended College in Glasgow, continuing his medical studies, and attending, besides, the classes of Natural Philosophy and Chemistry. In the summer of 1806 we find him studying at the Infirmary, and attending the class of Botany.

In 1804 we have the earliest indications of a taste for collecting books, which gained strength with his years, and issued in the bringing together of one of the most valuable and carefully selected private philosophical libraries in Britain. The books at first purchased by him were neces-



sarily a good deal connected with his medical studies. We find at the same time, however, the names of volumes of a more general interest, both philosophical and classical. As throwing light on his early tastes and studies, we give the names of the principal works purchased at this period. In 1804 we find the following:—Quintilian's *Institutes*, Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Monro on the Bones. In 1805 the taste and expenditure increase. We find him now possessing himself of Carnwath's *Memoirs*, Buchanan's *History*, Irish Heraldry, Udal's *History of Mary of Scotland*, Bacon's *Novum Organum*, Spottiswood's *History*, Millar on Fluxions, Euripides, Prints of Trajan's Pillar, Moore's *Greek Grammar*, Bergman's *Chemical Essays*, Haller's *Physiology*, Tournery's *Chemistry*, Duncan's *Medical Cases and Lectures*, Williams's *Reports*, Coke on Lyttleton, Lee's *Botany*, &c. In 1806 we find Plutarch's *Lives*, Aristophanes, Harrington's *Works*, Wharton's *Works*, Machiavelli's *Works*, Macpherson's *Introduction to Scotland*, Ruddiman's *Grammar*, Livy, Tacitus, &c. In the purchases of those years are to be included a set of mathematical instruments, a botanical case, an electric machine, and chemical apparatus and materials.

The winter of 1806-7 was spent in Edinburgh, and devoted to the study of medicine. The following letters give an account of his habits and occupations at this period:—

EDINBURGH, *Saturday night* [November 1806].

MY DEAR MOTHER,— . . . After walking out to Midcalder, I stayed there till Monday night, when I came in to attend the classes next day. I spent my time very happily there, and, among other things, employed myself once a-day in swimming in the river. I have advised all the boys to continue the practice every day during the whole year. I am convinced if people plunged once a-day into the cold bath, colds and consumptions, and all other complaints of that nature, would be *rare æves in terris*. It is impossible to express the pleasure it gives you after coming out of the water; you feel a glow of heat warming you to the very bones, which is evinced by smoke and vapour arising from the surface of the body. It is

best to stay very short in the water. If I was not so completely engaged in the forenoon, or if there were any water near me in Edinburgh, I should assuredly bathe every day, good, bad, or indifferent. Mr Bell and some of the boys of Midcalder are fully convinced of the utility of the custom, and are determined to persevere. The minister, too, was threatening to begin.

I wholly forgot to remind you in my last letter of the care your duty calls on you to bestow on Vindex; dumb animals are not able to express their wants, and should therefore be more carefully attended to than human animals. I am afraid the sheet won't hold all I have to say, or I should give you a long string of advices on this subject. . . .

I have been buying a good number of books, but chiefly the books I am immediately needing. From nine in the morning till three in the afternoon I have not a single moment to spare—out of one class into another. I keep a regular account of my expenses. I am hesitating whether to enter a member of the Royal Medical Society this year or not. I won't, I believe. They have a most elegant building belonging to it. I wish you would write me soon. I suppose you have been busy moving from your house.

Send me my skates by the first opportunity.

I am, dear mother, your affectionate son, W. S. HAMILTON.

[EDINBURGH,] BANK STREET, *Saturday* [November 1806].

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I don't wish to be introduced to any more people this winter. I shall be pestered to death with invitations, &c., which cannot be done without loss of time. . . . The books necessary for my studies cost me some money; for example, Fyfe's Compend of Anatomy, being a complete set of anatomical plates, cost me five guineas; and even here I save two guineas by taking a plain copy and colouring it myself—the price of the coloured copy being £7, 7s. You may depend on it I will be as little expense as possible. . . . I wish you would give me a genteeler appellation on the back of your next letter. . . .

I shall now bid you farewell.—Your affectionate son,

W. S. HAMILTON, *Esq.* Remember that.

EDINBURGH, *Friday* [20th December 1806].

MY DEAR MOTHER,— . . . I have had nothing to say to you this week past, and have been so busy that I have not been in

bed before two or half-past it for these six weeks, and am up every morning by a quarter-past eight. . . . —I am, &c.,

WM. STIRLING HAMILTON. ;

EDINBURGH, *Sunday* [26th January 1807].

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I yesterday received the parcel and letter, and was very sorry to see Tom had had *cynanche maligna* so ill, though I very much doubt but it was *cynanche tonsillaris*, or common sore-throat, in which there is no danger, though some pain.

The grounds on which my opinion rests are: 1st, That as he complained of much pain attending it, it looks like *cynanche tonsillaris*, or common swelled throat, in which there is no danger whatever; 2d, As from the frequent attacks he formerly had of this common swelled tonsils, he has induced a diathesis or proneness to repeated attacks of the same complaint. On these grounds there is some reason to think that his complaint was mistaken from not knowing his constitutional diathesis. However, so be it he has recovered, they may have it any way they like.

Thank you for your lecture on books in your last; however, to ease your mind I must tell you that my purchases are chiefly confined to medical and classical books which I immediately want. I have bought most of them at a third or half of their shop price. . . .

Remember me to all my friends in Glasgow, and my love to Christy.\*

W. H.

EDINBURGH, *Thursday* [January 1807].

DEAR MOTHER,— . . . I do not know whether it was by intention or neglect you directed to me without any adjunct either before or after my name. You'll please to remember, that if you don't give me all my *dignities*, I shall direct my next letter to you, Elizabeth Hamilton, without any ceremony.—With love to all my friends,

W. HAMILTON.

EDINBURGH, *Tuesday* [April 1807].

MY DEAREST MOTHER,—I just now received your letter, and lose no time in answering it. I am much obliged to you for being so gentle with me, as I had just summoned up all my resolution to bear a hearty scold, which would have been the more ungrateful as I had given you some cause for it. I indeed confess that I find I have spent more money than I should, and would have been very

\* Miss Mackay, a cousin who lived for many years with his mother.

sorry to have laid out so much money on any frivolous or unnecessary articles; but the money has only changed its shape. What was a little ago bank-notes, is now metamorphosed into the more respectable appearance of rare and cheap books; and from the monotonous repetitions, "The Bank of Scot. promise to pay to the bearer on demand," &c., they have now suffered the glorious metamorphosis of being converted into historians, and philosophers, and poets, and orators, and, though last not least, into physicians.

If I am able I shall be very willing to give you any money I can save when I am at Oxford. I saw Mrs Grey to-day, and am going to-morrow with her to the Abbey (not for debt), and afterwards will dine at her house.

Hoping to see you soon, I remain, dear mother, &c.

W. HAMILTON.

These letters, and others which will follow, in themselves of no great importance, have an interest as throwing light on the relation that subsisted between Hamilton and his mother. Though never wanting in filial respect and affection, he writes to her with the familiarity of an equal in point of years, without reserve, and often strongly. Down to this time, indeed, there was no one but herself with whom he was on terms of confiding friendship; and though others were subsequently admitted to a share of his affections, his mother to the last retained the hold which she had acquired over him. She seems, moreover, early to have discerned in him indications of those qualities of mind which became afterwards so remarkable, and to have resolved to give him every advantage of education which lay within her power. This explains the solicitude which, it would appear, she felt that he should go to Oxford—a solicitude by no means shared by some of the members of her family, who saw in young Hamilton a lad of no very extraordinary abilities, and who, we may add, conceived that the training of an English university could be of little use to one destined, as he then was, to the profession of medicine.

## CHAPTER II.

OXFORD PERIOD: 1807-1811.

GOES TO OXFORD AS SNELL EXHIBITIONER—LETTERS TO HIS MOTHER—OXFORD FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES—ALEXANDER SCOTT—JOHN GIBSON LOCKHART—LETTERS OF LOCKHART ABOUT HAMILTON—IMPRESSIONS HE MADE AT OXFORD—MR CHRISTIE'S REMINISCENCES—MR TRAILL'S REMINISCENCES—CATCHES THE TUTOR EAVESDROPPING—THE MULBERRY-TREE EXPLOIT—HIS OXFORD LIFE AND STUDIES—WHAT INFLUENCE THE PLACE HAD UPON HIM—THE LIST OF BOOKS GIVEN UP BY HIM FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION—CHARACTER OF HIS EXAMINATION—AS GIVEN BY DR JENKYN, MR VILLERS, REV. ALEXANDER NICOLL—HIS OWN REFERENCE TO IT.

IN May 1807 Mr Hamilton left Scotland for Oxford, and entered on residence at Balliol College. His distinguished career at the University of Glasgow had secured for him one of the Snell Exhibitions. These Exhibitions, which have served to bring the University of Glasgow into peculiarly close relationship with that of Oxford, were founded in 1677 by John Snell of Uffeton, in Warwickshire, a native of Scotland, and formerly a student in Glasgow. Mr Snell devised to trustees a considerable estate in England for educating Scottish students at Oxford. This provision has enabled many of the most distinguished students of the University of Glasgow to add to the training of their native school the advantages of an Oxford education. The list of Snell Exhibitioners in the last and present centuries embraces many names of distinction, but none that can be placed alongside of William Hamilton, saving only that of Adam Smith.

*In foreign - books  
style - dialectal  
Hamilton, & (see reference)  
Continental reputation  
More remarkable, as  
man than as orig. thinker*

iol, Hamilton con-  
 erruption, until he  
 He took the Bachelor  
 g the period of his  
 vacation in Scot-  
 some time in Wales,  
 and brother. While  
 the habit of carry-  
 val's edition to the  
 e read, and enjoyed  
 later years always  
 time to his mind.  
 le winter of 1809,  
 reading with much  
 a for the degree, in  
 unparalleled distinc-  
 his studies, and his  
 s in his letters from  
 other particulars on  
 sion which he made,  
 character and habits,  
 miniscences of a few

men who either were his contemporaries, or went to Oxford shortly after he had left the University.

The following letters, and extracts from letters, relating to this period, will be read with some interest:—

BALL. COLL. OXON., Wednesday, 13th May 1807.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—You need put yourself in no anxiety about my health, as I was never better in my life, and could not have worn my greatcoat though I had brought it with me in the coach. I like Oxford very well, and find all my lectures very easy to prepare, thanks to my studying Greek so hard in Scotland for these three years.

When I came here first I called on my friends the M'Cauls, and next day was introduced to a tutor, who carried me to the Master of this College; and after reading a number of regulations, and promising to accede to them, I was admitted a member of Ball. Coll.

I was then taken to the Vice-Chancellor's, where I entered my name, and subscribed the Thirty-nine Articles. I also got a cap and gown. No boots are allowed to be worn here, or trousers or pantaloons. In the morning we wear white cotton stockings, and before dinner regularly dress in silk stockings, &c. After dinner we go to one another's rooms and drink some wine, then go to chapel at half-past five, and walk, or sail on the river, after that. In the morning we go to chapel at seven o'clock, breakfast at nine, fag all the forenoon, and dine at half-past three.

There are a great many curious customs which, as they take up time in writing, I shall defer telling of till I see you in Scotland.—  
I remain, dear mother, &c. W. S. HAMILTON.

[OXFORD,] 5th Nov. [1807].

MY DEAREST MOTHER,—I just now received your letter, which I have been expecting for a fortnight, and was beginning to grow uneasy lest something had prevented you writing me. I could not but smile at your idle apprehensions, and assure you they are without the smallest foundation. I was never better in my life. . . . If you have got a letter for Sir Christopher Pegge\* send it off *immediately*, as I want it before the 11th of this month. I will write my aunt as soon as I can command time—it is not for want of inclination. I have nothing new to tell you of. I am going to attend Sir Christopher Pegge. . . .

Give my love to all my friends you see. Tell me soon if you are going west. . . . God bless you.—I am, your affectionate son,  
W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, Sunday, 15th Nov. [1807].

MY DEAR MOTHER,— . . . It [introduction to Sir C. Pegge] was too late for the purpose, as I have introduced myself to him as a medical student, and he was very civil. . . . I am so plagued by these foolish lectures of the College tutors that I have little time to do anything else—Aristotle to-day, ditto to-morrow; and I believe that if the ideas furnished by Aristotle to these numbskulls were taken away, it would be doubtful whether there remained a single notion. I am quite tired of such uniformity of study.

Farewell, my dear mother. I wish you to write me as often as you can.—I am, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. S. HAMILTON.

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\* Regius Professor of Medicine (1801), Professor of Anatomy (1803).

BALLIOL COLLEGE, 27th Nov. 1807.

MY DEAREST MOTHER,—I received your letter of the 22d to-day. I am very sorry to find you were angry at my last letter, and am very sorry if I allowed any things to slip in that might give you uneasiness. I wrote it, I suppose, when I was fagged and tormented with work. I hope you will pardon me, and believe me, my dear mother, nothing was ever farther from my wishes than to see you uneasy, either on my account or any other. I hope, therefore, you will forget what is past. . . .

We have a very nice course of Anatomy here. I will tell you more some other time about these matters. Michaelmas term will end in about a fortnight, and I intend going up to London then for a week or so to visit my uncle. I want to buy some books I require, and a skeleton also, in London. I find Oxford a very comfortable place. I have had very little occasion to use much wine, there being but few men up this term. . . . If you could send the microscope I should like very well. . . . The whole country round Oxford is under its annual overflow. I have famous exercise every day in rowing up and down the river, and shall in a few days have glorious skating, and the safest in the world, the meadows being no more than a foot or so deep. . . .

To put you out of fear as to my health, I must tell you that I am quite well as far as eating, sleeping, and sensation go.—I am, &c.,  
your affectionate son, W. HAMILTON.

BALL. COLL., 19th December [1807].

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I have been so busy with Collections at the end of last term that I had no time to answer your letter when it arrived, and have allowed one thing or another to prevent me doing it since vacation commenced. I hope you do not feel the cold sea air affecting you at this time of year. I always was against your staying there [at Newhaven] in the winter. We have had very fine weather here for a long time. I have at present my whole time to myself, it being vacation. I go up to London for a day or two at Christmas. . . .

I don't think I shall find Oxford more expensive than any other place, with my Exhibition. . . .

I had a letter from Tom, in which he tells me Reekie is dead, and that his books will come to the hammer in a week or two. Tell Tom to send me a catalogue in time to write him back before the sale begins, as I will delay buying some books which I intend tak-



ing up at my examination in hopes of getting them much cheaper there. I never saw to what a price books of classical learning are getting up here and in London. . . . —I am, dear mother, yours, &c.

W. HAMILTON.

LONDON, 5th January 1808.

MY DEAREST MOTHER,— . . . I have applied for a Warner Exhibition.\* I have made some wonderful purchases of cheap books, and, what is more wonderful, just the books I was obliged most to buy. But of all the bargains and curiosities in the book way I ever made, I made t'other day. I paid £0, 4s. 0d. for—oh, incredible!—a MS. volume, which, on my examining it at home, I found to be most beautiful illuminated manuscripts of the Rhetoric and the book on Invention of Cicero, and another MS., at the end of the volume, of Macrobius. . . . Books sell most wonderfully high here. I bought my MSS. in an old shop near St Giles's. The man was completely ignorant of the treasure he possessed. They are at least six centuries old. . . . I can't write here any longer, so many tongues going about me, for I am writing in the drawing-room.—I am, &c.,

W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, 26th January 1808.

MY DEAR MOTHER,— . . . I shall certainly be down in Scotland next long vacation, but we do not break up till July this year, so that we shall have little more than three months. Our next term is very long. It commences the 1st of February. Is Christy with you now? Give my love to her and Mrs Stark, and all my other friends. I wish you to tell Tom to write me soon. My microscope, &c., has arrived safe. I wish I had told you to enclose my thermometer. We have had the most intense frost I ever saw here, and most beautiful weather. Our chief amusement at present is shooting larks and fieldfares. I hope to have another excursion into the Highlands next summer on the Perthshire side. Give my love to all my Midcalder friends. . . .

Since I began this letter I have been at the schools seeing the celebrated Russel, organist of the Foundling, take a Bachelor's degree in music. His compositions for this purpose are accounted very fine. I am no judge of these things.—I am, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

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\* The four Warner Exhibitions were founded (1666 or 1667) by John Warner, Bishop of Rochester, for natives of Scotland. It does not appear that this application was successful.

OXFORD, 17th February 1808.

MY DEAREST MOTHER,— . . . I wish you to tell Tom to write me. I have not seen his signature for this month or more. My love to all my friends, which being premised, I proceed. There was an auction of books (I think I see you beginning to look blue) here t'other day, the property of a Mr Walker, surgeon. . . . I bought some medical works very cheap, at a fifth part of the price in the shops, though quite new. I also bought Dr Reid's Works, in 4to, in two vols., and the celebrated translation and commentary of Mr Murphy on Tacitus, in four vols. 4to—all very cheap. I would not have bought the Tacitus, but as it was a book I take up on my examination, I thought it better to buy it now at half-price than at whole price in six months after.

I am beginning to read very hard at Aristotle, and Pindar, and Sophocles, whose works I intend taking up at my examination, being the most respectable books in Greek, as the most difficult; and as to Latin, I shall take up six or seven of the crampest and longest authors. I intend, however, to begin to fag soon. . . .  
—I am, dear mother, &c., W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, 2d April 1808.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I must beg pardon for having so long delayed writing you. I have been so busy with Collections, which are public examinations, at the end of each term, on all the books we have read during the continuance of the term, before the master and public lecturers. These commonly take us up a few days to review the subjects of examination. This has kept me rather busy for the past week. Our vacation has begun, and continues to the 7th of May. Then two short terms and then long vacation, when I shall have the happiness to see you. . . .

I hope Tom is continuing to do right. I intend to be very busy during the summer. . . . —I am, dear mother, &c.,  
W. HAMILTON.

BALL COLL., 25th April.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I yesterday received your last letter, but was prevented answering it then from some causes needless to name.

. . . Upon my word, I think very little can be done now in the way of commerce; the mercantile interest of the kingdom seems going fast on to ruin. I cannot, therefore, think it would be any loss if Tom were to change his views, and enter into some other line of life than what he at first intended. However, that is

[as] it may be. A gentleman of our College is determined to go to Scotland to spend the summer. I am afraid that I will be obliged to accompany him in a pedestrian excursion to the Highlands, though I had rather stay at home. We shall see, however, when the time comes nearer.

I am certain of being able to live next year at Oxford cheaper than I could anywhere else. It is all nonsense the notion of the great expense, &c., that people have of Oxford. They here repay our Scotch universities by thinking them the hotbeds of infidelity and atheism. . . .

Write me *soon*.—I am, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, 5th inst. [June ?].

MY DEAREST MOTHER,— . . . I wish you would tell me more news about my friends, and how they all are, when you write. Here you cannot expect to hear anything of that kind. You seem to think that I do not tell you that I am quite well: I never was better in my life. For instance, did you ever hear of a sick man eating every morning four eggs, twopence worth of bread, and three cups of tea, which is my general quantum? . . .

Aunt James sent me t'other day the most terrible philippic in defence of the existence of women's souls.

Write me soon; and hoping to see you soon, I am, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, 10th November.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I have been prevented from answering your letter, which I received the day before yesterday, before, on account of business and twenty other things.

I have nothing earthly to tell you, and nothing heavenly. I have bought Crabbe's Poems. If you like I will bring them down next summer. Has the new 'Edinburgh Review' come out? I do not think Tom seems to think the counter an eligible place; and, after all, I don't see so much encouragement to spend so many years in learning it, and with all the chance of getting no settlement after all. I have told him to write you about it. I am afraid that my going up to town in winter will cost some money; but as the exhibitions are to be so much increased, I think I may be allowed to exceed a little in so necessary an expense. I am afraid of being tempted with books, but I am determined not to buy any. I have

only now one or two to make out all the books needed for my studies of these two years. I was never in better health in my life than I have been since I came up. Oxford always agrees with my appetite, and I have been getting up at six ! in the morning for this week past, and I shall continue it all my life through. You will say this was a change devoutly to be wished. I wish I had my manuscript here. I wonder if you could find an opportunity of sending it up.

I must leave off, as I must attack my Greek for lecture in an hour hence ; so I remain, dear mother, your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

OXFORD, 25th [February 1808 or 1809].

. . . I am just going down to the Anatomy School, where the Professor is so kind as to let me dissect. . . .

OXFORD, 25th [1809].

. . . The night before last we were wakened, at the request of the Vice-Chancellor, to go down and give our assistance at Christ Church, which had taken fire. I was working away from one till five in the morning, handing buckets and working at the engines ; and at last the fire was put down, after consuming a great part of the great quadrangle, and the hall was with difficulty saved. . . .

[OXFORD,] Thursday [5th April 1810].

. . . I don't think I can possibly come up to town this vacation. My time has been so miserably spent latterly, that when I look back I can only hope by great attention to make up my leeway. . . .

BALL. COLL. [August 1810].

. . . An answer has appeared to the last number of the 'Edinburgh Review' against Oxford, and Mr Copleston has all the argument on his side. The blunders of the last number are exposed very well, and Playfair cuts the shabbiest figure ever man did. Mr Knight seems to know less Greek than a schoolboy ; and the abuse of Sydney Smith (Copleston's personal enemy) redounds on his own head. . . .

[August 1810.]

. . . I send you up the reply to the Edinburgh Reviewers. It is a very complete answer, and has all the truth on its side. You

must expect not to understand above one-half of it, as the other is on classical niceties. The author is Mr Copleston. Sydney Smith is the reviewer of Edgeworth, and, I believe, of Falconer's *Strabo*; and Playfair is the reviewer of La Place, where he introduces some abuse against Oxford equally illiberal as false, and shows his own thorough ignorance of Greek. Sydney Smith was a fellow of New College, so that his apostasy was the more shameful, as he was the more indebted to *alma mater*.\* . . .

Mrs HAMILTON to Mrs BANNATYNE.

HAMPTON, MIDDLESEX, 5th September 1810.

MY DEAR SISTER,— . . . William has got what he was very anxious to obtain—permission to reside in Balliol during the long vacation. He left us so full of ardour, saying he would study so much when he now would meet with no interruptions, and have the full use of the library, &c.; but his letters describe him quite tired of being alone. . . .

W. HAMILTON TO HIS MOTHER.

BALL. COLL., Friday [1st September 1810].

. . . I believe you are now a letter in my debt. You may think little of a letter from me, for you can hear nothing interesting from hence; but as you are the centre of all my information of any moment, and living this monastic life, every letter I receive gives me not only the pleasure to hear that you are well, but also contributes to ease me of some of that weariness too apt to interrupt the dull happiness of my present life. In fact, I am heartily tired of living by myself, and am now looking forward to the end of vacation with some hope. . . . However dull, I find this life very useful, and go through more now than when interrupted by other inducements. . . .

Around Hamilton, while at Oxford, there gathered a considerable number of associates and friends. The principal of these were:—Mr J. H. Christie, barrister; Mr James Traill,

\* The references in these extracts appear to be to the articles on the 'Méchanique Céleste' of La Place (Jan. 1808); on Falconer's 'Strabo' (July 1809); and on 'A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford' (April 1810).

barrister, and now stipendiary magistrate, London ; Mr Alexander Scott, son of Mr George Robertson Scott, of Benholme ; and Mr John Gibson Lockhart. He was also on terms of intimacy with Mr Alexander Nicoll, a Snell Exhibitioner, who became Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian, and finally Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church. Nicoll was a singularly amiable and unassuming man, and a most diligent and accomplished student of Oriental literature. He died at an early age about 1827. To these should be added the Rev. Dr Hawkins, the present Head of Oriel ; the Rev. William Villers, of Balliol ; and the Rev. James Yonge, Fellow of Exeter. Archdeacon Williams, late of the Edinburgh Academy, and the Rev. G. R. Gleig, Chaplain-General to the Forces, made his acquaintance at Oxford during the later period of his residence.

Of those named, his most endeared friend—beloved as a brother—was Alexander Scott, whose premature death, which took place in 1812, was to him the source of bitter grief.\* Along with Scott, Mr Traill and Mr Christie appear to have been his most chosen companions during the greater part of his Oxford life ; for John Gibson Lockhart, who was some years his junior, did not come into residence till 1809. With Lockhart, after Scott's death, his friendship was more close, and his intercourse more familiar and constant, than with any other man, until about 1818, when, owing to some unfortunate circumstances, a breach that was never healed took place between them.† The following extracts from Lockhart's letters to his father give us glimpses of his friend Hamilton :—

*1st November 1808.*

I don't know how I should have managed here at all had it not been for W. Hamilton. Ever since we met, I am sure he has behaved to me with all the affection of a brother. Since papa left us I have been always with him—or he with me—at breakfast, tea, &c. He makes me carry my book over after evening prayers, and read it beside him all night. His advice has been, I think, of

\* See below, p. 64.

† See below, p. 90.

great use to me ; for he, knowing the characters and dispositions of all the men beforehand, can of course advise me with whom I should associate, and whose acquaintance I should rather decline. He and Hardwick and Hannah are almost the only men in the College I could wish to have much to do with.

. . . To-night there is to be a great ball here connected with the jubilee. The "Penny-farthing Lane" people pressed Hamilton and me much to gallant Miss \*\*\*\*, and some country Jennies they have brought up on the occasion ; but no—no—no—no guineas to be spent either by him or me on any such miserable purposes. I got a Scapula—very good edition—for £2, 10s., and a Herodotus for thirty shillings. Hamilton is a famous adviser in the purchasing of books.

21st October 1810.

Hamilton has been in College all summer—read through Aristotle's Organon, and all the works of Hippocrates. I wish I could say I had done as much, but I hope to make up for my idle summer by my diligent winter.

14th November 1810.

Hamilton is going up for his examination to-morrow. I daresay he will make a fine figure ; but in the mean time he is sadly "funcked," as they call it. You will see him next month, for he intends being in Scotland for some time, as soon as he has kept this term.

26th November 1810.

Our term will now be over in a short time—not quite three weeks. By the by, you will see Hamilton ere that time, for he is going down with his mother very soon. He passed his examination in the highest style imaginable—took up more of Aristotle than ever was done, or is likely to be done again—and I daresay will receive all the honours. I have been asking him about the medical matters, and will be able to write you next time.

13th November 1811.

Hamilton arrived here last night. He intends only to stay for a day or two, and then proceed to London for the winter. His friend Scott is in a very bad way. . . . I wish H.'s stay were to be longer ; but I flatter myself he will be here in spring for some months. His brother is expected home every day.

The impression which Hamilton's personal appearance, character, and habits of study made on the fellow-students with whom he came into contact was very remarkable. The few men now surviving who knew him at Oxford, all concur in testifying to the warm feelings of admiration and love which he excited, at once by the manly beauty of his person, his courteous and agreeable manners, the kindness and gentleness of his demeanour, the force of his intellect, and the extraordinary character of his attainments.

We are fortunate in being able to present two sketches of him at Oxford, drawn from personal recollections. These are given entire, and will be found to afford a picture singularly harmonious in its details. The features noted are such as those who knew him in after years will readily recognise as permanently characteristic; and as the writers had almost no intercourse with him after leaving Oxford, the vividness of their impressions is a proof of the remarkable force and individuality of his character even at this early period of his life.

The following is by Mr J. H. Christie, one of the small number of Hamilton's Oxford friends who still survive:—

“Some time since I was asked to furnish any particulars which I imagined might be useful in the preparation of a memoir which was then projected of Mr John Gibson Lockhart. In the paper I wrote on that occasion I find the following passage:—

“‘But though Lockhart was an excellent scholar, and a man of great and various knowledge, he was not, I apprehend, what would be called a learned man. We had only one learned man in our (in those days) small College—I mean the late Sir William Hamilton. He was already (about 1810) pursuing those studies which ultimately gave him a high place among those who dwell in the higher regions of human speculation. It will give some idea of the extent of his knowledge to mention that, while yet an undergraduate, he was (as I well remember) quite familiar with so obscure a bit of literary history as the authorship, occasion, and object of the *Epistolæ*



Obscurorum Virorum then was. Hamilton's intellectual eminence has been acknowledged by the world, but I do not happen to have met with any adequate appreciation of the qualities of the man. He was, as I knew him, the most noble-minded, the most generous, and the most tender-hearted of men. Lockhart and he were fast friends, and filled with mutual admiration. I know not what miserable provincial differences ultimately broke their friendship. Lockhart more than once began to tell me the story, but the subject was too painful to him, and he always broke off without finishing. Hamilton, as far as I know, was the only friend that Lockhart ever lost; but his admiration and his real affection for him, I well know, never ceased.'

"The above extract will show to what extent the impressions made on my mind fifty years ago by the character of Sir William Hamilton still remain. After I left off residence at College (about the year 1813, I think), I never saw him but once, and that for a few hours only, above forty years ago. The remainder of his life was occupied in studies, the general nature of which is known to the world, while I was too busy with wholly different pursuits to attempt to follow him. The only subsequent intercourse between us was his sending me a pamphlet of a controversial nature. This was after he had been struck by that malady which, I believe, permanently affected his bodily health. In the paper in question I saw no decay of intellectual vigour, but saw, or fancied I saw, a change in the temper of the man. There was something of acrimony, and a tenacity about matters which his noble nature, when I knew him, would have disdained to care for. I notice this because I am not writing a panegyric on Hamilton, but the recollections and impressions in regard to him which rest in my mind. Old men recall the scenes of their early days with mixed emotions. The process is attended with a flush of pleasure, instantly followed by the saddening reflection that they cannot be recalled—that they who gave those hours their gladness are

either in their graves, or by years unfitted to bear the parts they then bore. Hamilton was my senior at College, I think about two years, and my senior in age a few years more. All marks of boyhood had left him, if they ever belonged to him: he was in appearance completely a man, though a young man. The dress of these days showed to advantage his singularly finely-formed limbs. There was an apparent looseness in his figure, proceeding, I think, from a certain carelessness in his gait, and certainly not from any imperfection of form, for he was admirably formed; and still less indicating any defect of muscular power, for he was very strong, and excelled in running and leaping, and all other athletic exercises, to which, moreover, he was much given. I wish I were able to convey a just notion of the singular beauty and nobleness of his most intellectual countenance. His oval face, perfectly-formed features, deep-set black eyes, olive complexion, his waving black hair, which did not conceal his noble forehead, combined as happily to give the result of perfect manly beauty as it is possible to imagine.

"The studies which Hamilton pursued were perfectly in harmony with the Oxford studies of those days; but it so happened that he owed little to the actual teaching of Oxford. He was the only pupil of a Fellow of the College, who was himself a singular, if not a remarkable, character.\* This gentleman lived in rooms in the tower over the gateway of the College, and led the life of a hermit. He never attended hall or chapel, nor held any intercourse with any of the authorities of the College. He was a powerfully-made man, with rather a striking countenance, who appeared to have totally sequestered himself from his fellow-creatures. No one but his servant ever entered his rooms. He walked out frequently, but always alone. He was never seen to speak to any one. It seems, however, that he had accepted Hamilton as a pupil, but the pupil and tutor soon discovered that they were by no

\* His name was Powell. He is sketched by Lockhart in 'Reginald Dalton' under the appellation of Daniel Barton, book ii. c. vi.

means necessary to each other, and in fact, before I came to the College, had ceased to have any intercourse. He must, however, have been a man of some mark, for he had inspired Hamilton (who was not given to overrate men) with respect. It thus happened that Hamilton had no teacher, and was strictly a solitary student; for though it was not unusual for us to join in our readings, Hamilton had no companion in his studies. When, however, the term of his examination for his degree came round, besides the ordinary books which candidates for the first class took up (as the expression is, or then was), including the Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics of Aristotle, he took up the whole works of Aristotle, not excepting, if my memory serves me, the *Zwixñ istoriá*, and also the whole works of Cicero.

“ Though, as I have said, Hamilton was a solitary student, he was far from an unsocial man. When he joined in the festivities and amusements of the place, he did so with buoyant spirits and thorough enjoyment. His manners, though without the slightest taint of coarseness or vulgarity, were brusque, but thoroughly agreeable. I wish I could convey an adequate notion of those qualities, which made a deeper impression on others as well as myself than any of the characteristics I have noticed. It is not always that great intellectual gifts are accompanied by a corresponding elevation of moral feelings: there are many lamentable instances the other way. But it sometimes happens (and Hamilton is not the only case which has fallen in my way) that great intellectual power is accompanied by qualities of the heart raising their possessor still more conspicuously above the average of men. I cannot enter into particulars, but I can say with truth that, considering his means, which I have no reason to suppose were great, I have never known a heart so open to the claims of distress, and with him misery was a sufficient claim when his help was asked. The turn he gave the matter was that he was the party obliged, not the asker of the favour. If any one was depressed by fortune below those who would have otherwise

been his equal, Hamilton was sure, by the most delicate means, to make him as far as possible forget what was painful in his position. Hamilton, as far as I can recollect, was not wanting in the performance of any of the duties which society expects from all its members, but he did not rest there. On many occasions he seemed to me to love his neighbour better than himself."

The following is communicated by Mr James Traill :—

"My first introduction to Hamilton took place in the rooms of Dr Jenkyns, the late Dean of Bath and Wells, who was then the College tutor, to whose charge I was consigned on my entrance, in 1810, at Balliol College, as a Snell Exhibitioner. I had a strong letter of recommendation to Hamilton from his and my excellent friend, Professor Jardine of Glasgow. I had also a letter to Scott from my brother, who had been a schoolfellow with him at Westminster. Hamilton and Scott were very intimate friends, but very dissimilar in many respects. Scott was a man of singular delicacy of frame and of features, and of an almost feminine refinement of mind. He was of the most amiable and affectionate disposition; and I know that Hamilton deeply lamented (as I did) his early death.

"The only Exhibitioners at that time from Glasgow College were Hamilton, Lockhart, and myself. The others had been nominated by Aberdeen University, which had the right of presentation in default of its being exercised by Glasgow. Balliol College, at this time, had not acquired its present high position in the rank of colleges. The Scotch Exhibitioners—including such names as Hamilton, Lockhart, Nicoll, Christie, and Gleig—were, as may be supposed, its most distinguished members.

"Before my meeting with Hamilton I conceived some awe of his vast superiority to myself, and was not prepared for the cordiality of his first greeting. This might be partly owing to the strength of the letter of introduction, but kindness was a marked part of his character, which displayed itself towards

his friends in easy and affectionate familiarity. The day of our first introduction I was addressed by my Christian name ; and, in speaking to Lockhart or myself, it was always John or James, as if we were his younger brothers. His regard for Lockhart—in fact, their mutual regard—was very great. In after days, when both became resident in Edinburgh, the keen air of its politics cast a chill over their friendship ; but I have reason to think the estrangement was the cause of pain to both, and that in the more liberal and diffused intercourse of professional life in London it would not have existed.

“ Dr Jenkyns was, as I have said, the College tutor. Hamilton, however, was the pupil of Mr Powell, a studious, and, I believe, an able man, but singular in his habits of life. His rooms were in the tower over the College gates, where he lived entirely secluded. He might be seen rarely about dusk, taking his solitary ramble. He never appeared in hall or chapel, or in academical dress, nor was he ever seen in company with any one. He was, in fact, an absolute hermit in the centre of a noisy, lively community. For a short time Hamilton and his tutor kept up the formality of an hour's lecture. This, however, soon ceased, and for the last three years of his College life Hamilton was left to follow his own inclinations. Fortunately these all tended to noble objects. A man of less vigour of mind, and less decision of character, might have fallen into ways that might have proved very injurious to his future success. From this period commenced that process of self-education which has placed his name at the head of the men of his generation who have cultivated the science of mental philosophy.

“ At the period of my entrance at Balliol, Hamilton was in the second year of his residence. His habits of study were then confirmed, though somewhat irregular. His manner of reading was characteristic. He had his table, chairs, and generally his floor, strewed with books ; and you might find him in the midst of this confusion studying with his foot on a

chair, poising one great folio on his knee, with another open in his hand. His mode of "tearing out the entrails" of a book, as he termed it, was remarkable. A perusal of the preface, table of contents, and index, and a glance at those parts which were new to him (which were few), were all that was necessary. It was by this facility in acquiring knowledge, and his great faculty in retaining it, that he was able, in the short period of his undergraduteship, to become the most learned Aristotelian in Oxford. In addition to the usual Oxford course of the Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics, and the Politics and Economics, he had studied the analytical, physical, and metaphysical treatises, and the History of Animals, and had consulted all the principal commentators. His reputation as an Aristotelian collected a large audience in the schools at his examination. Few of them were capable of estimating the amount of his learning; and, to judge from their style of examination, the examining masters themselves seemed to feel his superiority. Still his examination, in the Oxford sense of the word, was not a brilliant one. Though a sound and even learned scholar, his was not the kind of scholarship that told in an Oxford examination. His early education in Scotland had not been fashioned after the model of an English public school. He wrote Latin prose with ease and correctness, but he was not in the practice of verse-writing—not that he was without a thorough knowledge of metres and of the niceties of the languages. Taken altogether, his examination, both for scholarship and science, has never been surpassed. His reading was not confined to the ordinary College course; it embraced also the learning of the period of the Reformation, and of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. His attention was at this period turned to medicine as a profession, and the early writers on this branch of science formed part of his study. We may well be surprised when we consider this amount of labour, and remember that it was the spontaneous and unassisted effort of his own mind.

"Hamilton was a great haunter of old-book shops—one, in

particular, in the neighbourhood of Soho Square. It was a low, dark hole, crammed with dust and folios, and in the darkest corner sat the old bibliopole, like a spider in his web, watching his prey. He never spoke, and beyond the price of a book seemed to know nothing. I came across the old man some years afterwards. He had advanced into a strange stage of development, and appeared in the character of a shrewd, active, parish overseer in a country parish, occupying a neat cottage, chatting away, and offering his visitors the hospitalities of his home-baked and brewed. It was a dangerous affair accompanying Hamilton to an old-book shop. He was sure to persuade you to buy some favourite folio, and as soon as you had got it he would comfort you with the assurance that you would not understand a word of it. His own collection was of the most miscellaneous nature. In addition to every commentator upon Aristotle, it included the learned squabbles of the Scaligers, Scioppius, and the authors of the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*. He was fond of controversial writings, and enjoyed the learned railings of the Scioppian style.

“Any account of Hamilton’s Oxford life would be defective that did not notice him in his hours of relaxation, which were equally characteristic of the man. Whatever he did, whether work or play, was done with his whole heart and soul. He had no turn for hunting, shooting, or boating, the usual outdoor *studies* of Oxford; nor would they have furnished the sort of relaxation he required. Gymnastics, as now scientifically practised, would have been exactly the thing for him, and he would have excelled as a gymnast. We were obliged to content ourselves with the simple feats of leaping, vaulting, and the use of the pole. In these our proficiency was by no means contemptible. When tired with work, we started off, pole in hand, to Port Meadow or Bagley Wood, or took a round of the fields and lanes (our home preserves), clearing the gates and fences as we went. On these occasions, to relieve the severity of his study, Hamilton was in the habit of reciting, in his *ore rotundo* manner, passages from favourite

authors. The last lines of the Prometheus of Æschylus, the beginning of the second book of Lucretius, and the concluding sentences of Tacitus's Life of Agricola, were amongst his favourites. Sometimes he would repeat the same line over and over again, when it was sonorous and filled the ear. One of these lines I remember, and mention it as now so applicable to himself. It was from Cowley's lines to Hobbes, in which he addresses him as—

'Thou great Columbus of the golden lands of new philosophies.'

I may add another of his recitations of a list of Irish high-sounding names :—

'O'Hara, O'Mara, O'Morvan, O'More,  
O'Donovan, Ara, M'Millan, Gelore :  
All houses so great, so noble, so bold,  
One drop of their blood were worth ounces of gold.'\*

"Those who have known Hamilton only through his writings and in the later period of his life, can have no idea of his almost boyish sportiveness in his early days, when his animal spirits being set free, seemed to bound up with an irrepressible elasticity. In one of his nocturnal visits to my rooms, whilst we were talking, a mouse crept out of a hole on the hearth. With a view to the advancement of science we strewed crumbs of bread soaked in wine for him, and found that mice and men were very much alike under the influence of drink. Whether, as this was a mouse of a learned university, it was to be considered an exceptional case, we did not fully determine. In College rooms there are no pantries or store of provisions; the food is supplied from the College buttery, and cannot be had after certain hours. Hamilton had nothing of the commissary in him, and often found himself about midnight in a state of destitution, for which the only

\* "O ye heroes so high, and so haughty of yore,  
O'Donnell, O'Hara, O'Mara, O'Moore:  
All houses so noble, so worthy, so old,  
Every drop of your blood is worth ounces of gold."  
—Reginald Dalton, p. 100.



relief was a raid into other men's rooms in search of plunder. In one of these freebooting expeditions we had a narrow escape. We had been foraging for several nights in the rooms of a brother Scot of rather a fiery temperament. He had on this occasion prepared himself with the poker at his bedside to discharge at us. Fortunately he had dropt asleep, and we escaped out of the rooms before the missile overtook us. It left a deep mark on the door, which he showed us as a warning next morning.

"Some of these pranks had a smack of the practical joke. In the course of his anatomical studies he had collected human bones, preparations, and suchlike specimens. One morning at breakfast, with three or four friends in his rooms, there was some chocolate which was much approved of. When it came round to him he looked at it very suspiciously, and asked his scout, Dick Young, how he had made it. 'In the usual way,' Dick replied; 'in the large coffee-biggin.' 'You blockhead!' said Hamilton, 'don't you know that was what I boiled the child's head in yesterday?' This announcement did not increase the relish of the repast. On another occasion two or three of us were in his rooms at night telling ghost-stories. As we were about to go there was a loud single knock at the door; it opened, and a human skull shrouded in a white sheet appeared over the top of the door, gradually rising upwards till it reached the roof of the room, and stretching forth a pair of lean arms towards us. He had stolen out of the room unobserved whilst we were talking; and with a skull, a tablecloth, a long carpet-broom for a body, and a couple of hearth-brushes for arms, had dressed up his ghost in the most artistic fashion. This *argumentum ad spectrum* gave the victory to the ghost-believers.

"These are a few of the illustrations of the remarkable feature in Hamilton's character—the extraordinary energy which he threw into everything he engaged in. Whether he was deep in metaphysics, or pole-leaping in Port Meadow, or watching the vagaries of a tipsy mouse, or foraging for scraps of bread-

and-butter in an undergraduate's room, he *energised* (to use his own word) in everything.

"It may be thought beneath the dignity of the subject to relate these *leves nugæ* of the mind of a philosopher. We must not forget, however, that it is the slight identifying touch that often gives reality to the picture.

"Hamilton had less of the dross of mere human nature than any man I ever met with. The elements were so mixed in him that he was formed to produce a deep influence upon those he lived with. They might not be able to measure the height and depth and breadth of his understanding, nor follow his steps up

'The steep  
Where fame's proud temple shines afar ;'

but they could not fail to feel the influence of his noble character and kind affections.

"My personal intercourse with Hamilton ceased with his residence in Oxford. We met once or twice afterwards, but his residing in Edinburgh and mine in London kept us apart. The last time I saw him was in passing through Edinburgh in 1839, if I recollect right. We rambled together down to Caroline Park, and talked over old times and old jumps, and looked wistfully but timidly at five-barred gates. We also talked of future meetings, and agreed that he should bring his family to meet me and mine at the Lakes or in the Isle of Man. We never met again, but the period of our early intimacy still stands out in my memory—*manet mansurumque est*.

"I have omitted to notice one remarkable trait of Hamilton in his College life—viz., his great prudence and temperate habits. With the most liberal spirit in regard to pecuniary matters, I never knew him troubled by a dun, and I never remember seeing him in a state of intoxication. These were both extraordinary virtues in Oxford life fifty years ago. The only exception to his uniformly temperate habits was on the celebration of St Andrew's Day, which was observed by us Scotsmen

in Balliol with patriotic zeal. Besides our own party we had two out-college guests, Mr Ireland the surgeon, and Mr Leslie the Roman Catholic priest. Mr Ireland was one of the best specimens of the old cut-away coat, lace-ruffle school of practitioners, and was our medical adviser when the disorder was a desire to be excused from lecture and College rules. The worthy old priest was an especial favourite with us all, and a constant guest at our St Andrew's festival. He was the representative of one of the oldest, if not the oldest, family of his name in Scotland. He had resigned his position as eldest son in order to enter the Church, and was as proud of his creed as of his pedigree." \*

We must not omit to add to the reminiscences of this period of life a story which was current at Oxford for many years after Hamilton had left, and which, if not absolutely authentic, may at least be given as characteristic of the way in which the young Scotch undergraduate was likely to rid himself of officious tutorial interference. The story runs that Mr \*\*\*\* the tutor, heard one evening indications of a rather noisy party in Hamilton's rooms. With a view to ascertain who were there, he, in a somewhat undignified manner, stole up the staircase, by this time dark, the lamps having been burnt out, and stood listening behind the door. Hamilton was aware that this espionage was the tutor's occasional habit, and he was on the watch. Hearing a gentle shuffling of feet behind his door, he suddenly opened it, and seized the eavesdropper by the collar. It was perfectly dark, and he was not supposed to have recognised the tutor. Keeping him in his strong muscular grasp, he held him over the stair, giving him a shake such as a Newfoundland dog might give to a terrier. The tutor in his terror revealed himself, when Hamilton immediately replaced him in safety, expressing his sorrow and astonishment that he should have treated the reverend tutor so roughly, protesting that he never could have conceived

\* Mr Leslie was no doubt the prototype of Mr Keith, the old priest described in 'Reginald Dalton,' as Powell the tutor was of Daniel Barton.

it possible that Mr \*\*\*\* could have placed himself in such a situation, and that he supposed it had been a rascally scout !\* Another story has come down from these times, of the truth of which there can, I believe, be no question. It would seem that, while staying in Oxford during the long vacation, the fruit of a famous mulberry-tree, which grew in the College gardens, had attracted the longing eye of the Balliol undergraduate. Bringing into play his favourite mode of gymnastics—leaping with the pole—he scaled the wall at a bound, and alighted close to the mulberry-tree no doubt, but—*horribile dictu*—also right in front of the Master, who chanced to be sauntering quietly past the spot. The premeditated robbery, and the accidental manslaughter which had nearly accompanied it—for the undergraduate was no light weight—were excused on the ground of the wonderful leap !

These reminiscences leave no shade of indistinctness on the features of the Hamilton of the Oxford period. He stands out in entire lifelike reality ;—handsome and commanding in form, with overflowing spirits and abounding physical vigour that delighted and excelled in all bodily exercises ; possessed withal by a fervid, unquenchable, intellectual ambition, the hardest student and keenest intellect of his time—reading so widely that he could offer, without boasting, to give some account of any book, in the languages which he knew, on any subject that was named to him—reading, too, without aid of tutor and usual appliances, leaving all such far behind in his strong self-reliance and love of literary conquest. Admired and revered for his talents and attainments ; possessing unbounded personal influence, and using it nobly ; beloved for his frankness, his friendliness, his tender-heartedness and generosity ; ready to aid the young freshman in the difficulties of his early studies, and seeking carefully to keep him from evil companions ; with but limited means, yet open of hand to men whose circumstances were narrower than his own, and

\* Reminiscences by the Rev. J. Hamilton Gray.

concealing his part in the matter; yielding to no excesses or unworthy solicitations, yet social and ready to relax severer pursuits for the companionship of his chosen friends; sunny and joyous,—we find in him a breadth, force, purity, and elevation of character which have been rarely paralleled. It is not too much to say that, in the figure portrayed in these reminiscences, we see a very near approach to the ideal of the philosophic character as it is typified in the young Theætetus. The words of Theodorus are literally applicable to the young Oxford graduate of 1810:—Εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὧν δὴ πρότερον ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πᾶν πολλοῖς πεπλησίασα, οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην οὕτω θαυμάσας εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλω χαλεπόν, πρότερον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὀντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' εἴην φέμεν γενέσθαι οὔτε ἐρῶ γιγνομένους.\*

The period of Hamilton's residence at Oxford was, no doubt, the time during which his mind became fixed in its characteristic bent towards abstract thinking. His general intellectual character was formed before he quitted the University. In the impressions which he conveyed to his College contemporaries we recognise the mental peculiarities of the author of the 'Discussions.' The ardent, intellectual ambition, which showed itself in almost boundless reading and research, is also apparent. He had laid the foundations, at least, of his marvellous acquaintance with logical science, as represented by Aristotle and the commentators on the Organon. This he himself fully and gratefully acknowledges. Speaking of the comparative efficiency of the Colleges in 1852, he says: "It afforded me great satisfaction to find that Balliol, the oldest College in the University, stands so decidedly pre-eminent in this comparative estimate of the present efficiency of its houses—a College in which I spent the happiest of the happy years of youth, which is never recollected but with affection, and from which, as I gratefully acknowledge, I carried into life a taste for those studies which have constituted the most interesting of my subsequent pursuits."†

\* Theætetus, p. 144.

† Discussions, p. 750—Appendix on Oxford.

Oxford, while the scene of this early development of his tastes, can hardly, however, be said to have afforded more than the occasion either of the speculative habit, or of the acquisition of the erudition. There was, doubtless, a great deal in the past life of the University to influence a young mind so open as that of Hamilton to historical impressions. Oxford had its muster-roll of great names in philosophy, especially in logic. A University which carried the memory back to a period previous to the rise of scholasticism—which had been the theatre of vigorous mediæval speculation—and which numbered among its teachers and writers, Duns Scotus, Crakanthorpe, Bradwardine, and Saunderson—could not fail to stimulate, mould, and inspire an ardent youth of speculative capacity, whose singular historical inquisitiveness was joined to a great reverence for the past of literary history,—for (to use his own favourite quotation)

“The great of old ;  
The dead yet sceptred sovran who still rule  
Our spirits from their urns.”

Whatever influence the past history of the University and its traditions might have over him, there can, however, be no doubt that the actual Oxford of Hamilton's time did very little for him directly. Neither in the selection nor in the mastery of the books which he gave up for the Schools' examination, did he derive any assistance from tutorial or university teaching. What he achieved in philosophy at Oxford, he accomplished for and from himself. This, indeed, the master of Balliol (Dr Parsons, afterwards Bishop of Peterborough) frankly acknowledged when, in 1811, he spoke of Hamilton to Bishop Gleig: “Among other names (of young men) whom the master mentioned with peculiar respect was that of Hamilton. ‘He is one of those,’ said he, ‘and they are rare, who are best left to themselves. He will turn out a great scholar, and we shall get the credit of making him so, though in point of fact we shall have done nothing for him whatever.’”<sup>\*</sup> The University

<sup>\*</sup> MS. Reminiscences by Rev. G. R. Gleig.

having in a great measure been lost in the Colleges, did not afford any course of systematic instruction in logic, metaphysics, or ethics. Beyond to some extent indicating subjects or authors, it gave the student no further aid. He was left to divine the meaning of the author, and to find out for himself what relation the particular branch he was grappling with bore to the general subject of speculative philosophy. Beyond Aldrich, or the *ipsissima verba* of Aristotle, tutorial effort as a rule was helpless.

"The easier parts of Aristotle's system," says Sir William in 1852, having doubtless a vivid remembrance of his own experience, "were indeed still retained; but these might, in the circumstances, have been as well omitted; because, read as fragments, and by minds undisciplined to abstraction, they could neither be understood themselves, nor stimulate the intellect to understand aught else. There was no gradation from the easy to the difficult, from the new to the old. Philosophy was taught, philosophy was learned more by rote than by reason; and an abrupt intrusion of the tyro thinker into the Ethics or Politics of the Stagirite might discourage or disgust even a potential Montesquieu. Logic alone was studied in a modern summary. But here too the unphilosophical character of the Oxford philosophical discipline is apparent. That University having formerly adopted, still adheres to the *Compendium* of Aldrich, not because Aldrich was a learned dialectician, but an academical dignitary."\* "Philosophy," he says in another place, "was taught not as food for speculation, but in the dicta of certain authors as peremptory and decisive; whilst the student's knowledge was gauged, not by his systematic comprehension of a work in its totality, parts, and relations, but only by the accuracy (and that is not to be contemned) with which he might have committed to memory the very terms of its definitions, in the very language of its writer."†

It is obvious that, in these circumstances, nothing but special capacity and taste for the subject could enable a youth

\* *Discussiona*, p. 809.

† *Discussiona*, p. 796.

to attain any real acquaintance with—not to speak of high proficiency in—philosophical studies. That Hamilton passed far beyond the superficial and limited teaching of the period, and reached the vital and catholic questions of speculation, must be ascribed to the native intensity and persistency of his intellectual character.

Further, in the absence of systematic instruction in philosophy, Hamilton experienced no compensating influence in the presence of a living mind of kindred tastes and pursuits, from whom he might have received an impulse in the line of his special studies. There appears even to have been no man then in Oxford who really knew philosophical literature, or possessed a taste for speculative inquiry. There was little but the dreary reiteration of tutorial traditions and commonplace glosses—"the tutors whistling to their pupils the old tunes which, as pupils, had been piped to them."\* It is quite obvious, from the accounts of Hamilton's final examination for his degree, that though he had only reached the age of twenty-two, the examiners were both surprised and puzzled by the extent and nature of his acquirements. It is true that to the first decade of the century, and while Hamilton was at Balliol, we may trace the beginning of a very remarkable impulse to the studies of the University and the general course of fresh thought in Oxford. Edward Copleston, the tutor of Oriel, was already working in what was at first a limited circle, but one which gradually widened until—chiefly through Whately, who became a Fellow of Oriel in 1811, and passed Master of Arts in 1812, two years before Hamilton—the raising of new questions and the stirring of new thoughts was felt by the majority of the rising youth of the University, alike in theology, ecclesiastical organisation, and social economy. The names of J. H. Newman, R. D. Hampden, Senior, Hinds, Pusey, Keble, Arnold, and others, indicate how widely and variously the new spirit worked outwards from the cloisters of Oxford through English thought and life. One department,

\* *Discussions*, p. 760.



moreover, of thought which seemed to have been stereotyped for generations, and which lay much in Hamilton's way, was even then being keenly scrutinised by tutor and pupil; for Copleston and Whately passed their time of recreation, in their walks in the meadows and woods around Oxford, in discussing the principles of the Aristotelic logic;—the result of which was, some years later (1826), the fresh, sensible, and practical (if in no way profound) treatise on logic of Dr Whately. But Hamilton does not seem to have come in any way under the influence of Copleston, or to have known much of the circle that gathered admiringly round the future Archbishop of Dublin, while he talked in the Common Room of Oriel. It is hardly probable, even had Hamilton been of this circle, that men of the keenly analytic but practical stamp of Copleston and Whately would have given any impulse to his studies; for with him truth that admitted of immediate practical application did not hold the first place; and it is clear, from the nature and number of the books he was now reading, that he had already begun to deal with a range of philosophical questions which Whately to the last never touched, and which lay entirely beyond the limits of his intellectual vision and sympathies.

Any influence which the actual Oxford of Hamilton's time exercised upon his intellectual habits, arose probably from the reforms which were introduced into the arrangements of study and examination in the University by the statutes of 1801, 1807, and 1809. The University examinations had previously been a mere form, testing nothing, and affording no stimulus to exertion, because setting up no comparative standard of excellence. By the new statutes honour-lists were instituted, and the attainments of candidates were fairly tested by public oral examination. The examination in the schools thus came to be looked forward to by the undergraduates as the ordeal by which their attainments were to be tried, and the goal towards which their studies must be directed. The candidates were called upon to select and prepare for exami-

nation a series of books in different departments of learning. The subjects were—besides “the Rudiments of the Christian Religion”—“Classics, Rhetoric, Logic, Moral Philosophy, the Elements of Mathematics, and Natural Philosophy.”\* The number, and the difficulty of the contents, of the books were the elements on which the decision of the place in the list turned. A great stimulus was thus given to the studies of the undergraduates, and a wholesome rivalry excited among the colleges. The impulse to study and competition thus arising was not lost on the mind of the young Scottish exhibitor. His natural ardour was greatly quickened, and his intellectual ambition aroused. As the subjects of examination, moreover, included logic and ethics, they led to the study in some degree at least of a portion of the best philosophical authors of antiquity. A direction in the line of philosophical reading was thus given to the studies of an undergraduate; and where, as in the case of Hamilton, there already existed the taste and capacity for this department of investigation, the youth would not rest satisfied with the small modicum of acquaintance with the subject demanded for the simple pass, but would be encouraged by the prospect of the honours to the enlarged cultivation of it. And so it proved in the present instance. The books selected by Hamilton were much more than were required, or had ever been given up, even for honours, and they embraced the best philosophical works of antiquity. The list presented by him was, indeed, thought so remarkable by one of the examiners, Mr Gaisford (afterwards Dean of Christ Church and Professor of Greek), that he took and preserved a copy of it. The following entry in the examiner’s handwriting occurs in a list of candidates for the degree, which, though without date, unquestionably refers to Michaelmas term 1810:—

“Hamilton [The paper given in by this candidate being singular, an accurate copy thereof is made].

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\* See Oxford Calendar for 1810.

## Divinity.

Aristotle's Philosophy of Man.

## Theoretical.

De Anima, &amp;c.

## Practical.

Moral—Ethic. Nic., Eud. Mag., Cic. Op. Ph.

Domestic—Oecon.

Civil—De Republ.

## Instrumental.

Logic—Organon.

Rhetoric—Ars Rhet., Cic. Op. Rhet.

Poetic—De Poetica, Pindar, Æschylus."

This may be regarded as a perfectly authentic list of the subjects and books which Mr Hamilton actually professed. It shows the habit of methodical division and arrangement thus early developed; and it helps us to correct certain exaggerated accounts that have gained currency of the number of the books which he gave up.

The first-class lists for "Term. Mich. 1810" are as follow:—

## "IN LITERIS HUMANIORIBUS.

*Classis I.*

Cotton, Henry, Ch. Ch.

Fletcher, Jacob, Brasenose.

Hamilton, W. Stirling, Ball.

Heath, Robert, Brasenose.

Oakeley, Sir Herbert, Ch. Ch.

Storey, A. M. R., Wadham.

## IN DISCIPLINIS MATH. ET PHYS.

*Classis I.*

Storey, A. M. R., Wadham."

The examiners were R. Dixon, T. Gaisford, G. Rowley, D. Hughes. Two years before, in 1808, the name of "Robert Peel" appears as a double first; that of "Richard Whately"

as second in both classes. In "Term. Pash. 1810," "John Keble" appears as a double first.

Hamilton's coming forward as a candidate for the Moral Philosophy Chair in the University of Edinburgh in 1820 gave occasion for a special record of his appearance at the examination for the degree, and generally of his studies while at Oxford. The following extracts from his testimonials on that occasion throw light on those points.

Dr Jenkyns, the Master of Balliol, thus writes: "I may indeed truly assert that, during fourteen years as tutor and public lecturer of the College over which I have now the honour to preside, I have seldom met with an individual who so happily as Sir William Hamilton combined a clear and vigorous intellect with an ardent and indefatigable zeal in literary pursuits; and certainly never knew one who more successfully directed his mental powers to profound researches into the systems of modern as well as ancient philosophy. Of this he gave the strongest proof in his public examination for his degree, when he was prepared in a much greater number of abstruse and difficult books than is usually the case, and, by his knowledge of them, obtained the highest distinction the examiners could bestow. In addition, however, to such attainments as seem more peculiarly to qualify him for the very honourable situation to which he now aspires, he was, during his residence in Oxford, universally respected and beloved for the correctness of his conduct, and his open and gentlemanly manners."

From Mr Villers of Balliol, who was resident at Oxford during the greater part of the time in which Hamilton studied there, and who was present at his examination, we learn that this ordeal was continued for the exceptional period of two days, and occupied in all twelve hours. In fourteen of his books on the abstruser subjects of Greek philosophy he was not questioned, the greater part of these being declared by the masters to be too purely metaphysical for public examination. "In the department of science,"

says Mr Villers, "his examination stood, and, I believe, still stands, alone ; and it certainly argued no common enthusiasm and ability for philosophical pursuits, that in a university like Oxford, where the ancient philosophers are the peculiar objects of study and admiration, and the surest passports to academical distinction, his examination should not only remain unequalled for the number, but likewise for the difficulty, of the authors. Besides other subjects less immediately connected with a professorship of morals, it contained every original work of antiquity, difficult or important, on logic, on the philosophy of the human mind, on ethics, politics, and other branches of practical philosophy, on rhetoric and poetical criticism ; and after a trial of many hours, besides the honours of the University, he received the thanks and the public acknowledgment of the examiners, that he had never been surpassed either in the minute or the comprehensive knowledge of the systems on which he had been examined."

Testimony to the same effect was borne by the Rev. Alexander Nicoll of Balliol, another of Hamilton's college friends. "His attention," says Mr Nicoll, "which had been previously applied to philosophical speculation in a Scottish university, was enthusiastically and principally directed to the most minute and extensive study of the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans. . . . He allowed himself to be examined in more than four times the number of philosophical and didactic books ever wont to be taken up even for the highest honours ; and those, likewise, authors far more abstruse than had previously been attempted in the schools ; while at the same time he was examined in more than any ordinary complement of merely classical works. Since that time, I can affirm with the fullest confidence, that there has been no examination in this University which can be compared with his in respect to philosophy."

It is curious to compare these impressive, but, I believe, unexaggerated, accounts of Mr Hamilton's appearance on this occasion with his own passing reference at the time to the

same matter. In a letter to his mother, 16th November 1810, he says: "This morning I received your pleasing letter, which gave me the happiness to hear that Tom was so well. I was just going to the Schools when I received it, and am not plucked."

Whether, with all his distinction, Hamilton aspired to a Balliol fellowship or not, cannot be now determined. That he did not hold one is certain. To a notice put up on Balliol, advertising a fellowship, Lockhart appended the significant intimation, "No Scotchman need apply." Whether the tone of feeling here indicated had anything to do with Hamilton's failure to reach that dignity and its accompanying emolument, I know too little of the spirit of the times to be able to determine.

## CHAPTER III.

EDINBURGH PERIOD—AT THE BAR: 1811-1820.

ABANDONS MEDICINE FOR THE LAW—VISITS TO OXFORD—ILLNESS AND DEATH OF HIS FRIEND A. SCOTT—NOTICE OF SCOTT—RESEARCHES INTO HIS OWN CONNECTION WITH THE FAMILY OF PRESTON—PASSES ADVOCATE—ASSUMES THE BARONETCY OF PRESTON—SKETCH OF THE HOUSE OF PRESTON—HIS EXPERIENCE AT THE BAR—KNOWLEDGE OF LAW—AMOUNT OF EMPLOYMENT—LITERARY TASTES—THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY—POLITICAL VIEWS—STATE OF SCOTCH POLITICS—'EDINBURGH REVIEW'—HIS RELATIONS TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE TIMES A BARRIER TO PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT—EDINBURGH SOCIETY IN 1812 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS—THE OLD AND THE NEW LITERARY IMPULSES—SIR WALTER SCOTT—FRANCIS JEFFREY—HIS RELATIONS WITH JEFFREY—DR THOMAS BROWN—SKETCH OF HAMILTON'S APPEARANCE AT THIS TIME BY DE QUINCEY—HIS INTERCOURSE WITH STRANGERS—INTIMACY WITH LOCKHART—'BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE'—HIS BROTHER, CAPTAIN THOMAS HAMILTON—FIRST VISIT TO GERMANY, 1817—THE NOTED POODLE HERMANN—SECOND VISIT TO GERMANY, 1820—SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF GERMAN COMMENCED—ZEAL FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ADVOCATES' LIBRARY—LETTER ON THE SUBJECT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY.

HAVING now completed his course at Oxford, it was necessary that Mr Hamilton should determine finally on his profession in life. He had hitherto, both at Edinburgh and Oxford, pursued the study of medicine with the view of entering that profession. His prospects of success, moreover, in this line were excellent. Dr Baillie, the eminent London physician, who had been a friend of his father's, and on terms of intimacy with many of his other relations, had

promised to start him in the metropolis. He had now, however, to some extent changed his mind on the subject of his profession, and the following letter to his mother shows that his thoughts were turned in the direction of the Scottish Bar. At the time when it was written he was living in London, at Elm Cottage, Brompton, with his friend Alexander Scott:—

*Wednesday, 20th [Dec. 1811].*

MY DEAR MOTHER,— . . . I have taken lodgings at Brompton in the same house with Scott. His father is in town at present, and I have had some conversation with him on my views of being an advocate. When I first told him of my thoughts of changing my profession, he said he was very glad to hear it, and advised me strongly to go to the Scotch law. I can pass advocate in a year's time from this, and if I say two years it is nothing to the length of time necessary for medicine. He says that for the first few years I may make a hundred or two, and that I am fully too young. I have, however, determined nothing. If I determine on this plan, I shall come down to Scotland in a month or two, and pass my civil law trials. There is no occasion of studying civil law there. I wish you would write me what appears to you. It is evident that I can never expect to make a large fortune by the law, but it is a more sure subsistence, and sooner than physic. I have also great advantages by having been at Oxford; for when I take my Doctor of Laws degree, I could practise in the English Admiralty, Ecclesiastic, and Chancery Courts, and the same knowledge of civil law stands in both the Scotch Court and there. . . . Write me soon. All our friends are well here. I shall write you very soon again, and remain ever your affectionate son,

W. H.

His time from this date up to March 1812 was spent chiefly with Mr Scott at Brompton. He went occasionally for a short period to Oxford, a certain amount of residence there being necessary to entitle him to retain the Snell exhibition, and to enable him to take the Master of Arts degree, which he did in April 1814. His appearance at Oxford was always most welcome to his old friends, and the occasion of more than usual social hilarity. "The time when he paid his annual visit to Oxford," says one of his friends of that period, "was always a most agreeable one,—walking expe-



ditions to Godstow and the Isis were our great source of enjoyment,—the leading purpose being to dine in a village inn, on spitchcooked eels, with the appendages of ham, eggs, potatoes. The usual party were Hamilton, Lockhart, Williams, Traill, myself, and an odd character called Jack Ireland, a Scotchman who had been an apothecary in Oxford, and had retired from business with a handsome competency. . . . On arriving at Godstow, the first step was always to see the eels taken alive out of the boxes with holes, in which they were kept in the river. After that, till all was ready, we usually had a match at leaping, standing, and running, and at vaulting over gates. Hamilton was the best at almost all these trials. After our repast, we indulged in pipes, with excellent shag tobacco, and capital village ale. Jack Ireland exhibited the exploit of inhaling the tobacco-smoke by the mouth and expelling it by the ear: . . . Another great amusement was bathing-parties, the favourite spot being an angle of the river Charwell. . . . Hamilton and Lockhart were excellent swimmers.”\*

Both at Oxford, and after he settled in Edinburgh, his swimming powers were famous. “We used sometimes,” says his friend Mr George Moir, speaking of him between 1820 and 1830, “in the evening to go down to Granton to bathe in the Firth of Forth, and on the first occasion I was amazed and somewhat alarmed to see him stretching out to sea to the distance of about a quarter of a mile.”

In a letter to his mother in March 1812, he mentions being detained in London by the illness of his friend Mr Scott. Mr Scott’s health was at no time robust, and this illness speedily took the form of an attack of consumption, which proved fatal in the autumn of the same year. Scott and Hamilton first knew each other at Balliol. Scott was Hamilton’s junior by only one year. Between them there had sprung up an affection as of brothers. During the latter

\* MS. *Reminiscences of Eminent Persons*, by the late Arthur Connell, Esq. Advocate, Professor of Chemistry, St Andrews.

period of Hamilton's course at Oxford, he and his friend were the closest companions, apparently living together whenever they had an opportunity. In general temperament and character the two youths were in many respects unlike. They appear, however, to have found in each other those complementary qualities, which often form the basis of an intense and enduring attachment. It would seem that Scott's gentle and refined nature found rest and support in the stronger and more ardent character of his friend ; while Hamilton's tenderness—for this he had not less than strength—and his sympathy with a true and pure nature, bound him not less closely to Scott. There can be no doubt that each exercised a powerful influence on the life of the other. Mr Scott's lingering illness served but to make his character appear in greater force and lustre. The chastened spirit that had lived on earth so loving and beloved, passed away in the possession of a hope and peace which had sprung out of trial, and grown to strength amid bodily sufferings. Hamilton grieved for the loss of his friend with a long and bitter grief. The interest with which he dwelt on every incident of his last days, led him to copy with his own hand the greater part of a journal which Mrs Robertson Scott had kept of her son's illness. Many years afterwards Hamilton named a son, who died in infancy, after his early friend.

The following letter refers to a matter of much interest to him at this time—his connection by birth with the family of Preston. Upon his cousin's death in 1799 he had become the head of the Airdrie family, and thus the traditional claim to the Preston baronetcy now rested with him. Though the family belief in its validity was strong, the claim had been suffered to lie in abeyance for a hundred years ; and so, before it could be established, it was necessary to present an array of legal evidence on all the points involved. This it was now difficult to do from lapse of time. The degree of uncertainty, however, and the need for exertion to establish the alleged right, only made it an object of greater inter-

est to Mr Hamilton. The task, too, was in itself congenial to his tastes, and he was resolved that it should be undertaken and carried through by himself. Of inquiries in this direction we have hints in the correspondence with his mother during his undergraduate life at Oxford. The following tells of further progress made:—

ELM COTTAGE, 7th Jan'y. 1812

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I am wearying to hear from you. Why do not you write me oftener? I shall be in Oxford about a fortnight or three weeks from this, and in a month after I shall be on my way down. I have little if any news to tell you. All our friends are well here, and I am still going on only in the common order of business, without anything of novelty to say. I have lately got a book called 'Faithful Contendings,' which will, if anything, prove that Robert Hamilton succeeded his brother in the baronetcy. It contains the journal of the proceedings of the United Societies of Presbyterians after the defeat at Bothwell. It consists of letters written by them to their commissioners in Holland, &c. Robert Hamilton was one, his brother-in-law Earlston the other. The book is written by Shields, who was the secretary of these societies, and who lived after the Revolution for many years.\* Herein before the end of the year 1688 he is called only Mr Hamilton, but at the end of that year, in which his brother died, he is always spoken of as Sir Robert. There are a number of original letters of Sir Robert in the volume, and some private anecdotes of his sisters. That he could not have been created a knight is too evident to require proof;—and that a contemporary in intimate habits of acquaintance with him should always call him Sir Robert without his being entitled to it, is absurd to suppose. It therefore remains that he succeeded to his brother. His brother is never mentioned through the whole book, though they must have been in Holland together. I rather think they had quarrelled, for Sir Robert is as bigoted an idiot as could well be,—in fact, he is a frantic fanatic, and the style in which his letters are written shows that he would live in no habits of intimacy unless with one no less furious than himself. King Charles thought him an object suffi-

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\* Faithful Contendings displayed, collected, and kept in record by Mr Michael Shields, &c. Collected and transcribed by John Howie. Glasgow, 1780.

ently worthy of his requesting the United Provinces to give him up; and he seems to have had a good deal of interest in the Provinces, and had introductions to some foreign princes, with whom, however, he quarrelled, on finding them of different opinions from himself.  
 . . .—Ever your affectionate son, W. HAMILTON.

In the following, he announces his final determination regarding his profession:—

ELM COTTAGE, *Monday*, [22d *January*] 1812.

MY DEAREST MOTHER,— . . . I thought I had told you that I have finally fixed on the law. I have been reading in it for some time, and like it very much. If you suppose I am in the Museum for no better purpose than finding out old books on the Covenant, you are much in the wrong. I picked up that book at a divinity shop. I recollected that we had it, but we must have been fools not to have collected more out of it than I can remember to have done. . . .

After his return to Scotland, Mr Hamilton seems to have spent his time chiefly at a small country-house in Lanarkshire, which his mother then occupied. In July 1813 he passed Advocate, and thenceforward Edinburgh was his permanent place of residence. During the winter of 1813-14 we find him, though now a member of the Bar, attending a law class in the University. His leisure at the Bar allowed him ample time to prosecute his researches into the history of his family, and his title to the Preston baronetcy, as appears from the following letter:—

[EDINBURGH,] 37 FREDERICK STREET, *Monday* [24th *Dec.* 1813].

MY DEAREST MOTHER,—I am ashamed that my silence has continued so long. I hope in a few days, perhaps a fortnight hence, to come and see you. Nothing keeps me here but that confounded law class.

I have been working a good deal in the Register Office. This is a very laborious business, and at the same time very expensive—both of money and time. I have accumulated a great mass of curious information about the house of Preston. I have found above a score of deeds establishing the baronetage of Sir William,—three

or four of them *public deeds*,—that is, charters under the great seal,—the oldest in the year 1675; but I have not looked for older, and he may be a year or two before this. I have been also able to prove that Robert, his brother, succeeds him, otherwise it would have been to little purpose to know that he was a baronet, without knowing that the designation was to heirs-male in general. As to the connection of the Airdrie and Preston families, I think I shall in a few days, from the books of Session, which are astonishingly voluminous, make that out by deeds which now only rests on tradition and family histories. There are of these generally two or three volumes to the year; so that, in making searches for thirty years about the 1520, I have to look, perhaps, through forty or fifty volumes of an old, close, difficult hand. I have, however, picked out of the few I have read over some curious anecdotes, and cleared up several descents and marriages.

Have you heard of Tom's leaving Cadiz yet? There is little to be done by a young lawyer. I have not had the apparition of one fee yet. . . .—Your affectionate son,

W. HAMILTON.

These researches occupied a considerable portion of his time during the following three years. In prosecuting them he was fortunate in being aided by the late Mr John Riddell, the eminent antiquarian lawyer, his lifelong intimacy with whom dates from this period. Mr Hamilton's first cousin, Mr William Stirling, and his more distant relative, Sir James Home, Bart., were engaged, at the same time, in making inquiries into the history of their respective families. Besides the zest of an antiquarian hunt, they had the pleasures of co-operation and mutual aid. The routine of Register House research was agreeably varied by raids to places in the country where they expected to light on an old charter or record; still more frequently by supper-parties, at which they met and discussed the plan of their campaign. "John Lockhart," says Mr Riddell, speaking of this coterie of friends, "was also of the party, and being anxious in all points of family history, and possessed of much ready wit, he was hailed as a welcome addition to their social circle."

After much careful research, Mr Hamilton, in 1816, was able to present such a case to a jury before the Sheriff of Edinburgh, that he was by them adjudged heir-male in general to Sir Robert Hamilton of Preston, the head of that house, who died in 1701; and declared thenceforward entitled to bear the name and style of *Baronet of Preston and Fingalton*. In thus vindicating his right to assume the rank which his ancestors had held, although it was now separated from the estates of the family, Sir William was probably not indifferent to the social position which, especially in Scotland, it warranted the holder as possessing. Besides this motive, there was doubtless another impulse much more characteristic of the moral nature of the man—a very strong family and national feeling, which led him to link himself, by a species of formal service, to the past history of his country, and to the noble associations more immediately connected with his own kindred—just as in his intellectual life we find him fascinated by the past, and turning for inspiration to the great thinkers of bygone times.

And certainly the house of Preston was one of inspiring memories; and on the nature of William Hamilton this influence was not likely to be lost. Let us glance for a moment at the history of the family, with every point of which he was thoroughly familiar. The Hamiltons of Preston, Fingalton, and Ross or Rossavon, carry us back through the whole course of Scottish history, and are illustrious in descent, in politics, and in arms. The first of the name in Scotland appears, according to the popular account, to have been a Sir Gilbert de Hamilton in the thirteenth century, the elder of whose sons, Sir Walter, was the founder of the ducal family of Cadzow, while the younger, Sir John, was the immediate ancestor of the Hamiltons of Rossavon, Fingalton, and Preston. The house of Preston is thus the eldest of the junior branches of that of Hamilton. Originally possessed of the lands of the Ross or Rossavon, the family had its earliest seat in an old peel-tower perched on the wooded promontory encircled by the

Avon, where, after a long descent from the upland moors of Drumclog, it pours its tribute into the Clyde. To these lands was soon added the barony of Fingalton in Renfrewshire, and, at a later period, that of Preston in East Lothian. A family of such territorial importance readily formed alliances with the principal houses in the country; and we find, accordingly, that it was connected by marriage with the families of Wyntoun, Somerville, Annandale, Carnwath, Lamington, and Ormiston.

Looking back on the more eminent members of the family, we find its head in the time of Robert Bruce notable for deeds of arms. Again, in the sixteenth century, Sir David, the ninth representative of the family, was greatly distinguished for his courage, wisdom, piety, and moderation. He was an early and steady adherent of the doctrines of the Reformers, and a prominent member of the Parliament by which the Reformation was established (1560). On the other hand, he stood by the cause of the queen in her extremity, and suffered attainder for his share in the battle of Langside. The attachment to civil and religious liberty which was manifested by Sir David,—blended, as far as circumstances would permit, with devotion to the throne,—remained a marked feature of succeeding representatives of the family. In this cause they spent blood and treasure for many generations, until, indeed, the family estates were exhausted.

The life of George, the tenth of Preston, forms a quiet episode in the hurrying activity of the family history. At first an active partisan of the queen's faction, he subsequently withdrew from the bustle of military service, and set himself to promote the interests of religion and learning in his town of Preston. In this work he was greatly aided by Mr Alexander Davidson, a theologian of great note in his time. Davidson became the first minister, and Alexander Hume, "the most celebrated grammarian of his age and country," the first schoolmaster of Preston on the new foundation. In

a poem of David Hume of Godscroft inscribed to George Hamilton occur the following lines :—

“ Patre pio proles, patrisque pii pater idem ;  
 Fota patri, prolem fovit et ipse pater.  
 Ille dedit ludoque locum temploque perennem,  
 (Hospitium Musis, hospitiumque Deo).”

In the person of his son Sir John, the head of the house of Preston is once more found taking an active and memorable part in national politics. With unflinching firmness, and at great personal risk, he withstood the aggressions of the Crown on civil and religious liberty in the reigns both of James and Charles. As a Lord of the Articles, he resisted single-handed the preliminary approbation of the *Five Articles of Perth*, and spurned the intimidations of the Court, by which it was attempted to obviate his opposition to their final ratification in Parliament (1621). During the troubles that arose when Charles sought arbitrarily to impose a form of religious worship on the country, Sir John stood by the popular cause, and lent it important aid. He died in 1644.

The wonderful hereditary energy of the family was not yet exhausted. There are still three names of note among its heads. Sir Thomas, the twelfth of Preston, maintained the political and religious principles of his house, and was at the same time a “constitutional cavalier.” A very distinguished soldier, he commanded a body of horse at the battle of Dunbar ; after which his estates were ravaged and the Castle of Preston was burnt. Abandoning the extreme party among the Covenanters, he afterwards accompanied his kinsman William Duke of Hamilton in his expedition into England, and led with great gallantry that nobleman’s troop of horse at the disastrous battle of Worcester.

Sir William, his son, was created a Baronet of Nova Scotia in 1673. After suffering exile in Holland for his political opinions, he returned to England in the expedition of the Prince of Orange, but died suddenly at Exeter on the march to London.



The last and most popularly known of the family was Sir Robert, the brother of the preceding, who was born in 1650. Thoroughly imbued with the deep religious fervour of the time, and possessing the impulsive character of the popular leader, Sir Robert became the head of the Scottish Presbyterians, when, goaded to desperation by misrule and oppression, they rose in arms against the Government. At the head of their forces he gained the battle of Drumclog, and suffered defeat at Bothwell Bridge. He then fled to Holland, to escape the consequences of his part in the rising. Identified in opinion with a very narrow orthodoxy that was intolerant of all beyond its pale, brave without prudence or much capacity, inflexible in his convictions, and uncompromising in action, Sir Robert was the idol of the extreme party among the Covenanters. He returned to Scotland after the Revolution of 1688, but, disapproving of the freedom of the latitudinarian principles on which it was conducted, refused to acknowledge the king, as being "an uncovenanted sovereign of these covenanted nations." Even after the Revolution, his extreme political views brought him into trouble. He was, however, finally left to an unmolested protest against the universal declension of the times, and died in 1701.

With the death of Sir Robert, who was unmarried, closed the main line of the house of Preston, and the family fell to be represented by Robert Hamilton of Airdrie, fifth in the male line from John, second son of Sir Robert Hamilton, the seventh of Preston, who died before the year 1522. Robert Hamilton of Airdrie, as has been mentioned, did not assume the baronetcy, and his claim to the inheritance of what remained of the Preston estates had been cut off by settlements made by Sir William, the first baronet, on his daughters, in preference to the remoter heirs-male. It was as representing the laird of Airdrie that Sir William Hamilton claimed and obtained the family honours of Preston, being the twenty-fourth head of that house, and the twelfth male representa-

tive of the family of Airdrie.\* The old tower of Preston, with a small piece of ground surrounding it, was acquired by purchase by Sir William in 1819.

Sprung from such a stock, and the heir of so many notable names, it is no mere prompting of fancy which leads us to recognise in the late distinguished representative of the house of Preston a certain summing up of many of the greatest qualities of his ancestors. The courageous high-souled men who manifested a lifelong resistance to courtly aggression, who risked their lives and stood unblenched in most of the great battle-fields of Scottish history, found a worthy successor in the ardent speculator of the nineteenth century—who, though spending his strength in a sphere of activity unlike theirs, had yet as manly a soul as any of them, a spirit as independent, courage, energy, and devotion to high and ennobling pursuits as great, and who, it may be added, in his unsparing polemical dialectic, dealt as heavy a home-thrust as any Cavalier or revolutionary Whig, and showed as keen a blade as the sword that gleamed at Langside, Worcester, or Drumclog.

And yet with all these claims to “long descent,” may not we say of the representative of the Prestons what Heinsius said of Joseph Scaliger, after noticing his traditional connection with the Princes of Verona:—

“Plus tamen invenies quicquid sibi contulit ipse,  
Et minimum tantæ nobilitatis eget?”

After passing at the Bar, Sir William naturally had his permanent residence in Edinburgh. In 1815 Mrs Hamilton removed to Edinburgh, where, during the rest of her life, she had her home along with her elder son. They occupied houses successively in Hill Street, Howe Street, and finally in Great King Street. Soon after Mrs Hamilton had settled in Edinburgh, a young niece, Miss Janet Marshall, came to live with her, and during the next ten years generally formed one of

\* The authority chiefly relied on in the foregoing notice of the Preston family is Anderson's ‘Memoirs of the House of Hamilton.’ The account of the Preston family appears to have been revised by Sir W. Hamilton.

the little family circle. Miss Marshall afterwards became, as we shall see, the wife of Sir William. His life under his mother's roof was one of simple and even tenor—of quiet domesticity—divided between his books, his profession, and a certain amount of social intercourse with his friends and the more eminent literary men of the period.

After passing as Advocate, his experience of the profession proved no exception to the usual unfeud career,—the dull waiting for something to do, of the young Advocate. Writing to his mother (20th November 1813), he says: "I have had my time sadly consumed in pacing these vile Parliament House boards—nothing to do—which I am not sorry at in the present state of my legal acquirements."

Sir W. Hamilton's career at the Bar was not a brilliant success, nor was it an absolute failure. His general legal acquirements were far from being inconsiderable;—even a very ordinary amount of application of such powers of mind as he possessed to law was certain to give him a fair hold of it. As might have been expected, however, he was attracted by the more recondite and less trodden departments of the profession rather than by the more immediately useful and profitable. He acquired a very thorough acquaintance with civil law. His opinion in antiquarian and genealogical cases was highly thought of, and he was well versed in the subject of teinds. His unwearying habit of research, power of luminous arrangement, and acuteness, stood him in good stead in the drawing up of legal papers. Certain papers of his on fishery cases were regarded as exceedingly remarkable. Altogether, his capacities as a lawyer were of good repute. On the other hand, he was not, and constitutionally could not be, a ready and fluent speaker. This operated against him in some measure, though, from the extent to which written pleadings were then in use, not so decidedly as it would now. Further, his fastidious temperament was never satisfied without elaborate study and preparation, whatever might be the subject in which he was engaged. This element in his character was connected

with—in fact, partly the cause of—a want of regularity and punctuality in the performance of his work, which was really one of the main drawbacks to his success at the Bar. There is no doubt, moreover, that his interest in legal studies was subordinate to his zeal for learning. The study of the technicalities and minutiae necessary to direct and successful practice was distasteful to him. “His mother,” says a friend, himself a member of the Scottish Bar,\* “has frequently told me, that he could not bring himself to attend to the paltry trifles which must occupy the attention of every young lawyer who tries to get into practice.” Law was, in fact, but a secondary pursuit with him. His ardent intellect, insatiable intellectual curiosity, and cultivated tastes carried him far beyond the limits of a professional study. His real interest lay among the problems of abstract thought and in the wide domain of liberal literature. With his well-known intellectual pursuits and his scholarly repute, he was not likely to attract the attention and favour of the agents, who have in a measure the making of the young Advocate; and though his practical sagacity was really not injured by his speculative tendencies, he had certainly little or none of those worldly aptitudes and practical habits which go a great way to secure success at the Bar. The result was, that his legal employment, though considerable, was not extensive; and his name came to be associated rather more with researches in the Advocates’ Library than with practice in the Courts. The library contained a collection of books, in nearly all departments of literature, which was not surpassed, if equalled, by any other in Scotland. At this period, moreover, many of its choice treasures lay entombed in dark and hidden places that had been undisturbed for generations. These, in particular, were the nooks of Hamilton’s daily resort and peculiar interest. The wearisome pacing to and fro of the great hall of the Parliament House was abandoned, and with it the best chance of a brief, for those underground recesses

\* Rev. J. Hamilton Gray.

of forgotten lore, with their dust-covered schoolmen, musty German theses, and rare editions of classical and historical authors, which were sought out with the avidity of the book-hunter, and conned with the ardour and intelligence of the student.

His political views, again, and his relations to the political parties of the time, excluded him from any share of those legal appointments which are open to the Advocate, and are legitimate objects of his ambition. Though practically an unobtrusive politician, his views were not those of the party in power during his more direct connection with the Bar. Sir W. Hamilton was a Whig, and that during the period of the Melville and Tory ascendancy in Scotland. How much was implied in this ascendancy, politically and socially, it is very difficult for the present generation to realise. Such was the state of things, that Dugald Stewart confessed to despair for his country. The whole of the first thirty years of the century, particularly the period dating from the cessation of the Continental war, was a time of special conflict between the old and the new political tendencies—of conservation and of change. The dread shadow of the French Revolution lay heavily on the minds of those in power, and party interest and existence were identified by them with the maintenance of the constitution. Every change was therefore deemed revolutionary, and every novelty dreaded as a fatal innovation. The political spirit which in other times had issued in civil war, found outlet and relief in bitter personalities, social hatred, and exclusion.

“Corruption and arrogance,” says a writer whose political leanings may probably have added a little intensity to the description, “were the characteristics of the party in power—in power in a sense of which in these days we know nothing; a cowering fear covered all the rest. The people of Scotland were absolutely without voice either in vote or speech. Parliamentary elections, municipal government, the management of public bodies,—everything was in the hands of a few hundreds of persons. In Edinburgh, for instance—and the

capital was even too favourable an instance—the member of Parliament was elected and the government of the city carried on by thirty-two persons, and almost all these thirty-two took their directions from the Government of the day or its consul . . . . Efforts at reform and liberation were suppressed either by an abuse of the law, as in the cases of Muir, Gerrald, and others, or more generally and effectively by a rigorous social prosecution; the man who questioned whether all things were for the best was socially, professionally, and commercially discredited. The Whig landed gentry, a small but powerful body, and a brilliant band of Whig lawyers, almost alone maintained a good testimony.” Through the efforts chiefly of this band of young lawyers—conspicuous among whom were Brougham, Jeffrey, Cranstoun, Thomas Thomson, Murray, Cockburn, and others—the cause of liberalism in politics gradually progressed. In the period between the establishment of the ‘*Edinburgh Review*’ in 1802 and the resignation of the editorship by Lord Jeffrey in 1829, religious toleration had been advanced in the removal of disabilities alike from Protestant Dissenters and from Roman Catholics; the severity of the penal code had been mitigated; and the way had been prepared for the extension of the franchise in 1832. But these triumphs were gained very gradually, and amid the bitterest political strife—a state of feeling which existed, if possible, in greater intensity in the metropolis of Scotland,—where office-holders and their opponents met face to face,—than in any other part of the kingdom.\*

Sir William was to some extent associated with this band of lawyers, and so identified with the political party of which several of his forefathers had been zealous members, and which had received the adherence of most, if not all, of his predecessors in the path of Scottish speculation—especially Hutcheson, Smith, Ferguson, Reid, and Stewart; for one practical fruit

\* See Cockburn's *Memorials*, chaps. iv. v.; *Life of Lord Jeffrey*, vol. i. p. 248, 297.

of abstract thought in Scotland has been a liberal theory of politics, and the gradual diffusion among the educated classes of liberal principles, both political and economical. Thus, by family history, philosophical antecedents, and personal predilection, Sir William was a man of progress in politics. This was enough to put an arrest on any professional appointment; and it proved strong enough also to bar his election to a University Chair. For at this period, and for long afterwards, the most moderate capacity, or even absolute incompetency, if only joined with political orthodoxy, had nothing to fear from the most eminent abilities and the most transcendent attainments, if these were weighed down by political disfavour.

On the other hand, Sir William had just as little to look for in the way of official promotion, and to the end received as little, from the Whig party to which he belonged, and to which he carried a certain amount of historical prestige and personal influence. His political opinions were, at least before 1820, fully developed, and strongly, even sternly, made up. He took, however, no active or conspicuously public share in the proceedings of his party. He was not, in the received sense of the term, a useful man to his side in politics. Public meetings and public appearances generally were the objects of his extreme dislike.\* The bustle of ordinary political life, its small details and temporary interests—above all, the artifices of party—jarred on his life of abstract thought, and were alien to the wide and lofty interests which absorbed him. In his soul he abhorred all jobbery; he was quite too erect, inflexible, and scrupulous to stoop to the kind of tactics commonly enough employed for the ends of a political party; he

\* On one critical occasion, indeed, he seems to have accompanied Cranstoun to a Lanark county meeting (January 13, 1821), where a successful opposition was made to a motion intended to support the Ministry of the day, who had been active in the prosecution of the Queen. The report of the proceedings communicated to the 'Scotsman' was by Hamilton. This meeting took place the day after the Fox dinner of that year, and a few weeks after the famous *Pantheon Meeting* in Edinburgh (16th December 1820), at which a petition had been adopted praying the King to dismiss his Ministers, and which is referred to as the first great purely political meeting of the century.

would have scorned to give service as a partisan that he might obtain the reward of place. What many men would have looked upon as politically fair, he would have indignantly denounced as dishonourable. In the circumstances of the Whig party at this period, fighting as they were for important interests and against a powerful opposition, Sir William was thus not of any considerable public service to them. They did not, in fact, find it remunerative enough to patronise him. Positions, the duties of which he could have competently, even ably discharged, were, when his party came into power, given to others. And so he was left, in his unpatronised dignity and integrity, to his books and his speculations for five-and-twenty years, until his attainments raised him, in the face of considerable opposition, to the Professorship of Logic in the University, and to the enjoyment of the very moderate competency which that office brought him.

Amid all the political strife and bitterness which prevailed in Edinburgh at this time, and for several years to come, we must not suppose that the city was not, after all, a genial and pleasant place of abode for a man of letters. The first twenty years of this century were the transition period, particularly in the metropolis, between what Lord Cockburn calls "the last purely Scotch age that Scotland was destined to see," and that in which we now live, when the new forces, then only beginning to operate, have developed so many changes in habits, institutions, and manners. "Enough of the generation that was retiring survived to cast an antiquarian air over the city, and the generation that was advancing was still a Scotch production."\* "In 1811 our Edinburgh society still continued unchanged in its general character. Napoleon's Continental padlock still sent us good English youths and families; society and literature adorned each other; the war sparkled us with military gaiety and parade; London had not absorbed the whole of our aristocracy, either of wealth or of rank; and notwithstanding several important emigrations, we still retained

\* Cockburn's *Life of Jeffrey*, i. 160.



far more native talent and reputation than could be found in any other town in the empire except London."\*

All was not as yet squared down to the dead level of modern formality; the raciness, the homeliness, and the flavour of individual character that had grown up in many an old Scottish home in far-away glens, were readily to be met with in the circles of Edinburgh. The native Scottish speech was not extinct, and might be heard from the lips of graceful and refined gentlewomen of the highest rank. Several representatives of the best Scottish families lived at least in winter in the city, and gave a tone to the social life of the place. We were less distant by half a century than now from departed state, and courtly manners, and royal residence. Certain fading gleams of "the old Scottish glory" still lingered on the metropolis.

With all this there mingled a strong regard for the names and persons of the many distinguished men in the University, at the Bar, and on the Bench, who had from the early part of the previous century so markedly advanced philosophy, science, and literature. During that century in Scotland—and nowhere more than in Edinburgh—there had sprung up a wonderful growth of reflective thought and historical literature, which, while thoroughly Scotch in character, was yet catholic in the range of its questions. Hume had gone to the core of all the deep and vital questions of speculative philosophy, morals, and theology. Blair and Kames had investigated with success the first principles of taste and literary criticism. Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart had eloquently discussed the ground principles of ethical and political science. Hume, Robertson, and Henry were distinguished as historians. The stores of native manners and scenery had been newly, though only partially, unfolded by Mrs Elizabeth Hamilton and Mrs Grant of Laggan. These, and others belonging to the Bar and the Church, with literary tastes and accomplishments, had mixed freely in the society of the city,

\* Memorials, p. 264.

and through them the true refinement of letters and culture had served to subdue the somewhat natural roughness of our national manners. There still survived in Edinburgh in 1812, as representatives and upholders of the old traditions and culture, Henry Mackenzie, Sir James Hall, Dugald Stewart, Dr James Gregory, the second Monro, John Playfair, Lord Woodhouselee, Lord Glenlee, and others. At the same time, new impulses in literature and philosophy were represented by Scott, Jeffrey, and Dr Thomas Brown.

Already, in 1812, the greatest literary name in Edinburgh, or indeed in Britain, was undoubtedly that of Walter Scott. He was as yet only famous for his poetry ; but he had struck out a new line, and this was so fresh and pictorial—came home so thoroughly to his country's heart and imagination—as to be the most popular and powerful literary influence of the time. The poetry was the first-fruits in his own fertile mind of the 'Minstrelsy' which he had collected and published in 1802. But the weird and romantic spirit which, born partly of old story and partly of the solitude and pathos of the moorland, communed with him in the Border Land, was destined once more to bear fruit in the imagination of this the last and greatest of the minstrels, and the later growth was even fuller and richer than the early one ; for before 'Waverley' (1814) and its successors that came so copiously for seventeen years even the poetry paled, just as the first spring growths of the braeside and the wimpling burn, however fresh, fair, and fragrant, are not once to be compared with the heather bloom on the Border hills as they flush full in the purple beauty of mid-autumn. Scott, as he now mixed in Edinburgh society, divided the opinion of his admirers, as Lord Cockburn tells us, as to the greater excellence of his poetry or of his rich and racy talk. In the subjects of his poetry and prose there was a region so high above ordinary practical interests, that there at least all his countrymen could meet in harmonious delight,—all wretched political differences having shrunk out of sight.

Though they often met in society, Sir William's personal intercourse with Sir Walter Scott never was more than that of ordinary acquaintance. The fact that Scott used his political influence against Hamilton at the time of the candidature for the Moral Philosophy Chair is not surprising, if we consider the spirit which characterised the times, and the strength of Scott's party feelings. At a somewhat later period, Sir William's brother, Captain Hamilton, became intimate with Sir Walter and his family.

Francis Jeffrey was the other great literary influence of the time. The 'Edinburgh Review,' commenced in 1802, was now in 1812 well established—approaching, indeed, to the meridian of its fame. The brilliant literary criticism of Jeffrey, which was poured out with fertility so remarkable, and which lost none of its sparkle, grace, and fire during the seventeen succeeding years, gave the tone in great measure to the taste of the time. That remarkable outburst of popular literature—especially poetry—which characterised the first quarter of this century, had begun; and Campbell, Crabbe, Southey, Scott, Byron, Moore, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, were all in due course brought to the bar of his critical judgment. Notwithstanding the great value of his example of independence as a literary critic, and much that is elevating and instructive in his criticisms themselves, we can hardly accept his somewhat formal and conventional canons as either the highest or the ultimate laws of taste. The importance of his judgment is much more negative than positive; he repressed licence, but there was high and true excellence which he could not see or feel. Any theory, poetical or æsthetical, that may be deduced from his essay on "Beauty" (1816), with its meagre doctrine of association—or from other writings of the same school (as those of Brown or Alison)—will certainly not yield us principles of literary criticism in which we can rest with satisfaction. And it may be added, that canons of poetical art which could not find room for a full appreciation of the divine utterance of Wordsworth, may be quietly laid aside

as local and temporary—"of the earth, earthy." In Hamilton's lectures on the Feelings,\* there are some hints—not much developed certainly, but still most fruitful—regarding the laws of imaginative action, which, if fully followed out, and conjoined with Coleridge's most suggestive fragments, would yield a more thorough theory of the beautiful than any other course of æsthetical speculation yet pursued in British literature.

Hamilton, though concurring generally in the political principles of the 'Review,' and holding by those principles with thorough consistency, does not appear, somewhat singularly, to have been asked to write for it during Jeffrey's editorship; at least he made no contribution during that period.† The two men had indeed little in common save their political creed, and though latterly well acquainted, do not for some time seem to have known much of each other personally. "Lord Jeffrey," says Mr George Moir, "while admitting Sir William's vast erudition, seemed to know little or nothing of him besides; and used to call him an unpractical person—meaning, in other words, that he kept extremely aloof from party demonstrations of any kind. On the other hand, Sir William, though he admired Lord Jeffrey's abilities as an Advocate, and the grace and polish of his style, had no high reverence for his criticisms. Bred himself in a more catholic school, he thought them frequently narrow and one-sided. I do not know whether he had any great admiration of Wordsworth, but he exceedingly disliked the flippancy and unfairness with which he had been treated in the 'Edinburgh Review.'"

The third great power in Edinburgh, and in Scotland, at this period, was Dr Thomas Brown, who had recently succeeded Stewart, and who, in the Moral Philosophy Chair, was lectur-

\* Lectures, vol. ii., Lect. XLI. *et seq.*

† The name of Sir William Hamilton is incorrectly given by Lord Cockburn in the list of contributors to the 'Review' during the period of Jeffrey's editorship.—*Life of Jeffrey*, vol. i. p. 300.

ing with much brilliancy and acceptance. I am not aware whether Brown and Hamilton were personally acquainted. Every one knows that Hamilton's thinking was in no way formed by that of Brown or his school ; that, on the contrary, it assumed the form of a direct antagonism to Brown's conclusions on such of the fundamental points of speculative philosophy as the latter discussed. We have the example in Hamilton, during the period from 1812 to 1820, of a youthful thinker living in a circle in which certain philosophical dogmas were generally received—for Brown's short and easy method of dealing with the great problems of metaphysics speedily became popular and accepted in Edinburgh—and yet in no degree sympathising with the current of opinion, but silently following a course of study, the result of which was that, at a day not very far distant, he was able wholly to turn the tide of popular conviction regarding speculative subjects.

It was amid political, social, and literary influences of the kind we have described that Hamilton lived and thought—taking on, however, very little from them—not intermeddling much with them—contributing nothing to the busy periodical literature around him—very much in contrast with a good deal of the talk that was going on—reading and thinking alone on questions which, though apparently far removed from concrete interests, are in reality the most human of all.

The new generation of the cultivators of literature and philosophy which began to be known in Edinburgh during the second decade of the century—principally consisting of the friends Lockhart, Hamilton, Wilson, and De Quincey—were no unworthy successors and contemporaries of the three names above mentioned. The torch of letters did not pass from the notables of the previous time into ignoble hands.

It was shortly after passing as Advocate that Sir W. Hamilton and Mr De Quincey became acquainted. The latter has given us a very graphic and characteristic sketch of Hamilton as he appeared at this time among his Edinburgh contemporaries :—"In the year 1814 it was," says De Quincey, "that

I became acquainted with Sir William Hamilton, the present Professor of Logic in the University of Edinburgh. I was then in Edinburgh for the first time, on a visit to Mrs Wilson, the mother of Professor Wilson. Him who, at that time, neither *was* a professor, nor dreamed of becoming one (his intention being to pursue his profession of Advocate at the Scottish Bar), I had known for a little more than five years. Wordsworth it was, then living at Allan Bank, in Grasmere, who had introduced me to John Wilson; and ever afterwards I was a frequent visitor at his beautiful place of Elleray, on the Windermere, not above nine miles distant from my own cottage in Grasmere. In those days Wilson sometimes spoke to me of his friend Hamilton as one specially distinguished by manliness and elevation of character, and occasionally gazed at as a monster of erudition. Indeed the extent of his reading was said to be portentous—in fact, frightful, and to some extent even suspicious; so that certain ladies thought him ‘no canny.’ If arithmetic could demonstrate that all the days of his life ground down and pulverised into ‘wee wee’ globules of five or eight minutes each, and strung upon threads, would not furnish a rosary anything like corresponding, in its separate beads or counters, to the books he was known to have studied and familiarly used, then it became clear that he must have had *extra* aid in some way or other—must have read by proxy. Now, in that case we all know in what direction a man turns for help, and *who* it is that he applies to when he wishes, like Dr Faustus, to read more books than belong to his allowance in this life.”

Of his personal appearance Mr De Quincey says:—

“I was sitting alone, after breakfast, when Wilson suddenly walked in with his friend Hamilton. So exquisitely free was Sir William from all ostentation of learning, that unless the accidents of conversation made a natural opening for display, such as it would have been affectation to evade, you might have failed altogether to suspect that an extraordinary scholar was present. On this first inter-

view with him I saw nothing to challenge any special attention beyond an unusual expression of kindness and cordiality in his *abond*. There was also an air of dignity and massy self-dependence diffused over his deportment, too calm and unaffected to leave a doubt that it exhaled spontaneously from his nature, yet too unassuming to mortify the pretensions of others. Men of genius I had seen before, and men distinguished for their attainments, who shocked everybody, and upon me in particular, nervously susceptible, inflicted horror as well as distress, by striving restlessly, and almost angrily, for the chief share in conversation. Some I had known who possessed themselves in effect pretty nearly of the whole without being distinctly aware of what they were about. . . . In Sir William, on the other hand, was an apparent carelessness whether he took any conspicuous share or none at all in the conversation. . . . In general my conclusion was, that I had rarely seen a person who manifested less of self-esteem under any of the forms by which ordinarily it reveals itself—whether of pride, or vanity, or full-blown arrogance, or heart-chilling reserve.”

Sir William, besides mixing to some extent in the ordinary society of Edinburgh, had a very considerable amount of intercourse with strangers who came to visit the city, and whom his reputation, even at this early period, attracted to his mother's house. Among these, many of whom became his friends, were Baron Schwarzkopf, a young Prussian nobleman; G. H. Bernstein, afterwards Professor of Oriental Literature at Breslau; Mr Edward Everett, afterwards editor of the ‘North American Review,’ and Minister in London from the United States. At a somewhat later period (1826) Count Davidoff (now Count Orloff Davidoff), the representative of a well-known Russian noble family, spent two or three years in Edinburgh with his tutor, Mr Colyar, and was much with Sir William and his brother. The young Count carried with him to his native country very vivid and permanent impressions of Edinburgh social life and feeling, and set him-

self, on his return to his large estates, to ameliorate as far as he could the condition of his numerous serfs. Sir William, in his intercourse with foreigners, habitually assumed the attitude of an inquirer, and thus contrived to obtain a great deal of information regarding the state of foreign literature, politics, and social life. He also continued for a time to have pretty frequent opportunities of keeping up his Oxford friendships. Mr Yonge and Mr Villers were in Edinburgh for a considerable period—Mr Traill came occasionally; but as Sir William never left Scotland, these opportunities gradually ceased through the changes of life, and for many years before his death he had no intercourse with any of these early associates.

One, however, of his Oxford friends had, like himself, settled in Edinburgh as a member of the Scottish Bar. This was J. G. Lockhart. His intimacy with Lockhart was a marked feature in his life, hardly a day passing that they did not meet. Through Lockhart he seems to have been a good deal associated with the set of young men who became connected with 'Blackwood's Magazine.' He has even been mentioned as a contributor to the early numbers of the Magazine, about 1817. Of this—in itself unlikely—there is no proof. There is a tradition that he was one of the memorable party in Mrs Wilson's house (53 Queen Street) when the Chaldee MS. was concocted, and that he even contributed a verse. This is not at all improbable, as both Wilson and Lockhart were his intimate friends, and he figures in the MS. as "the black eagle of the desert." Widening difference of political opinion, however, gradually disengaged him from this connection. Sir William had certainly nothing to do with the Magazine after its political principles were fully and emphatically declared, and no part whatever in the personalities by which the early numbers were disfigured.

About this time Captain Hamilton retired from the army on half-pay, and came to Edinburgh. He walked lamely from a wound in the leg, which, as already noticed, he had



received at Albuera. "But his tall and noble military figure, his finely-cut and expressive features, gave him a distinguished air, to which no one could be insensible. In many things the brothers were contrasted, but there were also many points of resemblance between them. Captain Hamilton possessed the highest sense of the ludicrous, and a power of humour which was irresistible. Sir William was a recipient rather than a creator." \*

Captain Hamilton naturally became acquainted with Lockhart, and thus was associated with the early contributors to 'Blackwood's Magazine,' in which he wrote occasionally under the *nom de plume* of "Ensign and Adjutant O'Doherty." Hogg believed him to have helped Lockhart to deck "The Odontist" in his borrowed plumage. He says:—"I suspect Captain Tom Hamilton, the original O'Doherty, had also some hand in that ploy—at least he seemed to enjoy it as if he had; for though he pretended to be a high and starched Whig, he was always engaged with these mad-cap Tories, and the foremost in many of their wicked contrivances." †

Captain Hamilton was one of the earliest among the Edinburgh literary men who appreciated and sympathised with the poetry of Wordsworth, in opposition to the tone of sneering and superficial criticism with which it was habitually greeted in the 'Edinburgh Review.' In this Sir William agreed with his brother, and was an early reader and admirer of the poet. The merits of Wordsworth formed an occasional subject of discussion between them. Sir William thought he saw traces of an acquaintance with Kant in the magnificent passage of the Wanderer's discourse, beginning—

"And what are things eternal?" ‡

But it would seem that this was a case in which the poet and philosopher had reached the same great truth independently

\* Mr Moir's Reminiscences.

† Hogg's Autobiography, Col. Works, vol. ii. p. 467.

‡ Excursion, Book iv.

and by different approaches. "I asked Wordsworth," says Captain Hamilton, writing from the Lakes, where he resided latterly, "about that passage in the 'Excursion' which William says contains the doctrine of Kant. Wordsworth says he is utterly ignorant of everything connected either with Kant or his philosophy. So that it could not have come from that source, but is a casual coincidence."

Sir William, though an assiduous student of German and Continental literature, paid only two short visits to the continent of Europe. The first of these took place in the autumn of 1817. At the request of the Faculty of Advocates, and accompanied by Mr Lockhart and Mr John Hyndman, he proceeded to Leipsic to examine an extensive library there for sale, which he had recommended the Faculty to acquire. At this time Sir William had only begun to study German, and his acquaintance with it was not very thorough. The party held communications chiefly by means of Latin. At Leipsic he met the learned Godofred Hermann, who was then professor in the university of that city. There is no record of the other places visited.

The party had crossed to Hamburg in a Leith smack. Among the passengers was Major (afterwards Major-General) Mitchell, a distinguished officer, subsequently well known as the author of the 'Life of Wallenstein,' the 'Fall of Napoleon,' &c. The acquaintance which Sir William thus formed with Major Mitchell, continued through life, and was the origin of a close and warm friendship with his father and sisters, who, about 1819, took up their residence in Edinburgh. Mr Mitchell, the father, was a man of unusual intellectual powers, who had occupied influential positions abroad. The ladies of the family were highly accomplished, and from their long residence on the Continent well acquainted with foreign literature. Their society was very agreeable to Sir William, and many a summer evening's walk would end at their tea-table, in the enjoyment of the cheerful intelligent conversation which went on around it. Popular educa-

tion in Germany, in which Sir William took great interest, was, in particular, a subject which he often discussed with them.

It was on this occasion that Sir William brought home a large white poodle-dog, long a companion of its master, which, in honour of the great philologist, he named *Hermann*. Hermann was quite a character—a very knowing dog, indeed—if not the mysterious prodigy of learning and the familiar of Dr Faustus, reappearing in the nineteenth century, which Mr De Quincey hinted he might possibly have been. Hermann knew all his master's haunts, and when seeking him would visit them successively until he was found—going, perhaps, first to the Advocates' Library, and then to the various book-shops which he frequented. Hermann was sometimes put to uses of a grotesque sort. On one occasion the young cousin who stayed in the house confided to Sir William her distress that his mother insisted on her continuing to wear a pelisse and hat of which she was tired. Hermann's master at once hit on a happy device. Hermann was dressed in the pelisse and hat, of which he very speedily made short work, amidst the laughter of the two onlookers, and the mingled delight and fright of the owner at so daring an expedient for securing the desired new dress.

It seems to have been not long after they were together in Germany that the friendship between Sir William and Mr Lockhart came to an end. The breach probably was caused by circumstances connected with 'Blackwood's Magazine,' and by the bitterness of political feeling at that time in Edinburgh. But it is vain to seek to fix more accurately the time or occasion of this unfortunate occurrence; for, in fact, it was a subject so painful to Sir William that he hardly ever spoke of it at the time or afterwards. One thing we know, that those who had been such close friends in youth still retained, in spite of outward coldness and estrangement, warm feelings towards one another. The friendly intercourse which Sir William and Lady Hamilton kept up for many years with Mr

Lockhart's only sister was felt as a link between them. And Mr Lockhart's continued interest was shown, as we shall see, by the anxious inquiries which the news of his old friend's illness called forth from him. Thus, by the death of Scott and the estrangement from Lockhart, Sir William had already lost the two chief friends of his early days—and none ever seems to have come exactly into their place.

Sir William again visited Germany, in 1820, in company with Mr James Mackenzie, son of the author of 'The Man of Feeling,' and Mr Miller, a brother Advocate. The purpose of the journey was to procure evidence in a legal case. They sailed from Leith to Hamburg—remained some days both at Hamburg and Berlin, visiting Wittenberg on the way—and then proceeded to Dresden, their place of destination. Sir William, characteristically enough, spent what of his time was not occupied with the business on hand in the libraries of Berlin and Dresden. While in Berlin he solved a minor, but to him interesting, question in bibliography. A copy of *Bante* had just been sold at the Duke of Roxburghe's sale to Lord Blandford (afterwards Duke of Marlborough) as unique, for £2000. It was surmised that the library of Berlin contained a similar copy; but it turned out that the copy there was of a different edition, and the Roxburghe one was proved a true unique.

During a cessation of the inquiry on which they had been despatched, Mr Mackenzie and his friend Mr Miller took the opportunity of making a run into Bohemia as far as Prague; but Sir William declined accompanying them, preferring the library and picture-gallery of Dresden. The only excursion from Dresden on which Sir William seems to have accompanied his party was a short one into the highlands of Saxony, when they spent a few days at Schandau. The season having broken up early, they returned hurriedly by the route they had gone. Owing to the circumstances of their visit, communications were generally made in English by means of an interpreter. It would appear, moreover, that Sir William's

power of conversing in German at the period of this visit, as on the previous occasion, was but limited. It was probably, indeed, about this time that he commenced the systematic study of that language. He was his own teacher, and his method of studying it or any other foreign language was to take a version of the Bible or some book with which he was familiar in English, and thus quickly make himself acquainted with the vocabulary and construction of the language to be acquired. It was also part of his plan in learning German to read at an early stage of his progress a number of reviews and works of that class, and so obtain at once a knowledge of the language and a general acquaintance with the literature. Sir William was one of a small club which was formed about this time for the purpose of procuring and circulating German periodicals. Among the other members were Dr J. H. Davidson, Mr R. P. Gillies, Professor Duncan, Professor Jamieson, Dr (afterwards Sir) David Brewster, Mr J. C. Colquhoun, &c.

It was through Sir William's exertions that the "Dieterichs" collection of Tracts and Pamphlets was secured for the Advocates' Library. "This extensive series," says Edwards in his 'Memoirs of Libraries,' "comprises a wide range of subjects, and includes many works of Luther, Melancthon, and other leaders of the Reformation, most of them being the original editions. Sir William Hamilton, a most zealous curator, acquired the collection for the library at the trivial outlay of eighty pounds. He estimates its contents as extending to 100,000 distinct pieces. But by some strange oversight, the collection was permitted for several years to lie in a 'damp cellar.' Under the present energetic librarian, Mr Halkett, it has been 'taken out, aired, and dried,' and proves, we are told, to be 'one of very considerable value.'"<sup>\*</sup> The former possessor of the collection—George Septimus Dieterichs—valued the collection highly, and had the half of it catalogued. The preface to his catalogue is dated "Ratisponæ die xvi. Decembris MDCCLX." This series seems to have

<sup>\*</sup> *Memoirs of Libraries*, vol. ii. p. 9, b. iii. c. 19.

been procured for the library by Sir William about 1820. It is not improbable that the purchase was made during his second visit to Germany.

Sir William's zeal for the interests of the Advocates' Library was further strongly shown on occasion of a vacancy in the office of principal librarian in 1820. He addressed a letter to the members of the Faculty, in which he pointed out what he considered to be the prominent defects of management, and the more pressing wants of the library. A well-equipped and well-managed library appeared, to one of Sir William's tastes and habits, to be the greatest of a student's wants. With a view to remedy existing evils, and secure increased efficiency of management, he strongly urged the Faculty in his letter to obtain, if possible, the services of the learned Dr Benecke, then professor and librarian in the University of Göttingen. Dr Benecke had been associated with the great scholar Heyne in the management of the Göttingen library; and its organisation, due in large measure to the latter, was regarded as the most perfect in Europe. Sir William's pleading is exceedingly able and characteristic of the writer. Dr Benecke appears, however, to have declined the proposal to come to this country, and the appointment was conferred on the late Dr Irving, whose attainments as a scholar and bibliographer Sir William in his letter most fully acknowledges.

The letter contains one or two paragraphs of general interest, which merit being preserved. Of competition for literary offices in Germany he says:—"In no other country is the choice among literary competitors so wide, nor the standard of learned eminence so high. Even the civil vices of the constitution have contributed to this. For if the roads to political distinction are few, and have been seldom open but to the ambition of the privileged orders, the paths of literary emulation have thereby become more crowded, and the contest has been more keen. If the separation into petty states has oppressed the industry and sunk the importance of the

nation, it has, at the same time, proved the most effectual means to the encouragement of literature, by the increase in the number, and by the impartial dispensation, of literary rewards. Where every prince maintained his university, no such institution could flourish if not superior to other academies in the ability of its teachers—nor even exist, if not their equal. A useful competition thus arose between the different governments of Germany, in attracting and in retaining men by whom their universities might be promoted; and the emulation of learning was most effectually encouraged when its remunerations, even though small, were always the prizes of honour, and the sure marks of excellence. In this competition the Hanoverian Government has certainly been the most active; and Göttingen, even from its foundation, has been able, by the liberality of the ministry, to maintain its rank as the first university in Europe for the number and celebrity of its professors."

His conception of bibliography—of the comparative state of the science in Britain and Germany—of the qualifications of a librarian, and of what is required of an author in the way of preparatory reading, is thus given:—"Although Britain be anything but inferior to other countries in works of original speculation, and, on some subjects, has been at least their equal in works of profound erudition, still there is one department of learning, however useful and even necessary to any extensive progress in knowledge, that may boldly be said not to have been cultivated amongst us at all. I mean the study of bibliography in its nobler sense, and in its useful application; that is, the science which teaches us what are the books existing on each subject of knowledge, and by each several nation, and what are their nature, contents, and value. Bibliography, on the contrary, considered merely as conversant in literary rarities, typographical curiosities, &c., has been fondly cultivated in England; and we have indigent works on every department of the subject, and pampering every fashion and caprice. Our general ignorance in this pre-

liminary study is seen, indeed, in every branch of our literary labours which supposes an acquaintance with the history of opinions ; and it is seldom that such a publication appears in Britain—whatever may be its other merits—which does not manifest its author to be unprepared in a great part of the literature of his subject. As a concomitant effect of this ignorance, although itself reacting as a most principal cause of its continuance, is the comparatively defective state of all British public libraries, both in their complement of useful books, and in those arrangements which facilitate the use of their collections. . . . In all this the case is precisely reversed among the Germans. In the erudition of that nation the principle seems established, that before a writer can come forward to instruct the world, he ought himself to have learned all that has been already taught upon his subject ; that the surest method of making new advances in knowledge is, first to ascertain what has been previously effected. Accordingly, along with other branches of literary history, the history and science of books, in all their useful application, have been prosecuted in Germany to an extent of which there is no parallel among other nations. Indeed, with the exception of a very few works of some import in France, and of one or two despicable attempts in classical bibliography among ourselves, we owe everything on the subject which exists—and how much does exist !—of any general interest to the labours of the countrymen of Fabricius, Struvius, and Meusel. But the cultivation of the science of books supposes, or rather is identical with, the art of the librarian ; and among a people like the Germans, fondly devoted to the pursuits of erudition, a library is esteemed the most important of all literary institutions. The librarian, with them, is a most important character, and supposes most extensive acquirements. Their libraries are, indeed, always superintended by persons of eminent qualifications ; frequently by men even of the first talents and the most transcendent learning.”



## CHAPTER IV.

AT THE BAR, AND IN THE UNIVERSITY: 1820-1829.

SIR WILLIAM A CANDIDATE FOR MORAL PHILOSOPHY CHAIR—SUPPORTED BY MR DUGALD STEWART—HIS TESTIMONIALS—ELECTION TURNS ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS—LETTER OF LORD A. HAMILTON—PROBABLE CHARACTER OF HIS ETHICAL TEACHING—LETTER OF DR PARR—CHAIR OF CIVIL HISTORY VACANT—APPOINTMENT OF HAMILTON—SUBJECTS OF HIS LECTURES—AT ST ANDREWS IN SUMMER OF 1823—SMALL COMMONPLACE-BOOK—HIS STUDIES AT THIS PERIOD—MODERN LATIN POETS, BUCHANAN, BALDE, AND OTHERS—PAPER READ BEFORE ROYAL SOCIETY ON GREEK VERB—PHRENOLOGY—HIS INVESTIGATION OF ITS PRETENSIONS—CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE CEREBELLUM—ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MESMERISM—HIS FRIENDS—R. P. GILLIES—THOMAS CARLYLE'S REMINISCENCES—CAPTAIN HAMILTON—SIR WILLIAM'S REPUTATION FOR READING, AND READINESS TO IMPART INFORMATION—DEATH OF HIS MOTHER—HIS MARRIAGE.

ON the 2d of April 1820, Dr Thomas Brown, the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, died in his early manhood. Dr Brown, during his brief but brilliant career, had held the Chair as colleague to Mr Dugald Stewart. The latter was now again the sole Professor; but from the state of his health and his advanced age, it was not at all likely that he would resume the active duties of the Chair. The successor of Dr Brown would, therefore, require to discharge the entire work, as Dr Brown himself had done, whether in the capacity of colleague to Mr Stewart or as sole Professor. Mr Stewart, however, before the office was again filled up, had placed his resignation in the hands of the electors.

Among the candidates for the position there appeared,

shortly after Dr Brown's death, Mr John Wilson, Advocate, known as the author of the 'Isle of Palms,' and as a leading contributor to 'Blackwood's Magazine,' then recently established. The public had already received the first-fruits of his fine sensibility, and fervid imaginative genius. He certainly stood out as the young man of the highest literary promise of the time.

Sir W. Hamilton did not appear early in the field as a candidate. This delay arose from a delicacy of feeling regarding the yet unannounced determination of Stewart, who had not formally declared his intention not to resume lecturing. Sir William, however, after communicating with Mr Stewart and his friends, finally declared himself a candidate for the appointment. The circumstances of the case from the first indicated that the contest lay between the two friends, Wilson and Hamilton.

Hamilton prosecuted his candidature under the disadvantage of not having as yet appeared before the public as an author. At the same time, his opponent's writings, whatever their other merits, could not be regarded as indicating the kind of talent or training necessary for an efficient ethical analyst and teacher. The election was in the hands of the Town Council of Edinburgh. In Scotland the bodies intrusted with the university patronage did not at that time, nor do they now, as in Germany and France, take upon themselves the initiative of inquiring into the merits of candidates, with a view to select and call to the office the man they might deem best fitted for it. The due exercise of a function of this sort implied a degree of educated intelligence and special qualification which no municipal body could be expected to possess.\*

\* It is right, however, to state that on this occasion a majority of the Council took the very exceptional step of offering the Chair to Sir James Mackintosh. His friends prevailed on him to decline it. Lord Cockburn, on whose authority this statement rests, adds, speaking of Mr Napier's subsequent candidature for the Chair: "By this time the Town Council had relapsed into its true self. Its invitation to Mackintosh had excited great alarm, and it was soon made plain that that dangerous experiment would not be repeated, and that no Whig need be hopeful."—*Memorials*, p. 370.

The candidates were therefore in this, as in other instances, left to seek the opinions of those understood to be qualified to judge of their pretensions, and to present those opinions to the electing body—the Town Council—in the form of testimonials. Of the relative value of the testimonials, and generally of the merits and character of the candidates, it was the part of the Council to judge.\*

In April Hamilton announced his intention to stand to Mr Stewart, with whom he was then only slightly acquainted. Mr Stewart, in reply (writing from Kinneil, 10th April 1820), stated that his own recommendation was already promised to an old friend (Mr Macvey Napier), “to whom,” he says, “from my perfect conviction of his fitness for the situation, I had myself suggested the idea of his becoming a candidate.” He continues, “This, however, is no reason why you should not bring forward your own pretensions, accompanied with all the testimonials which you can command.” And he adds, “Whatever may be the result of the present competition, I trust that what has now passed between us will give a commencement to a friendship which, for many reasons, it will always give me the greatest pleasure to cultivate.” Mr Napier does not appear to have pressed his canvass for the Chair. After his withdrawal as a candidate, Mr Stewart gave his support, as far as the circumstances of his position allowed him, to Sir W. Hamilton. In a letter, of date 19th June 1820, to Mr James Wedderburn, the Solicitor-General for Scotland, Mr Stewart says:—“I have read with the greatest pleasure the testimonials in favour of Sir William Hamilton. Those from his friends of the University of Oxford are more flattering than anything of the kind I remember to have seen; and when added to the warm testimonies to his learning, talents, and character from some of the most respectable names in Scotland,

\* How our system of application by testimonials is viewed by foreigners may be gathered from the following: “Cette espèce de concours qui, dans l'ordre scientifique, choque un peu nos idées en France, est tout-à-fait conforme aux habitudes Anglaises, et n'y a rien que de très naturel.”—Peisse, *Fragments de Philosophie*, Préface, p. 71.

cannot fail to make a strong impression on the public mind. In reading them I could not help regretting that I had not an earlier opportunity of forming his acquaintance, as I have no doubt that I should have profited greatly by his assistance in the prosecution of my favourite studies. Indeed, I am already indebted to him for much curious and valuable information about the later philosophers of Germany, whose merits and defects he seems to me to have appreciated with great candour and discrimination; and I look forward with peculiar satisfaction to my future connection with him, if, fortunately for the University, he should succeed in obtaining the object of his present ambition." \*

That the superiority of qualifications was on this occasion on the side of Hamilton, will hardly be disputed by any one who dispassionately considers the previous training and habits of study of the two candidates, or the evidence presented by them. Of force of intellect, philosophical culture and learning, special attainments in the study of intellectual and ethical philosophy, Hamilton adduced the most ample and conclusive testimony. We have seen what was Mr Stewart's opinion of his testimonials. When they were shown to Mr Cranstoun (afterwards Lord Corehouse), then at the head of the Scottish Bar, he exclaimed, "I would rather have failed with such credentials than have gained with any others." Of his honourable and elevated character, his self-respecting dignity, and his delicacy of feeling, there never was any question. His opponents tried hard to make him out politically unsafe; and of course he was suspected by the usual tribe of weak and noisy alarmists of theological unsoundness. But both of these suspicions he was able satisfactorily to put down. The Master of Balliol, Dr Jenkyns, unhesitatingly supported Hamilton on the ground of his superior claims; and his Oxford contemporaries testified in the most emphatic manner to his habits of philosophical research, his well-grounded reputation for learning, and his unparalleled

\* Testimonials in favour of Sir W. Hamilton, Bart. 1820.

appearance at the examination for the degree. He had the hearty support, moreover, of Drs John Barclay and John Thomson, Drs Thomas M'Crie and Samuel Parr, and of Francis Jeffrey. But the truth is, there was little need of adducing evidence as to philosophical attainments or special fitness for the office. The temper of Edinburgh was at that time too violently political to allow a calm consideration of the real merits of candidates, even for an office so catholic as the Chair of Moral Philosophy. The Town Council showed that it did not possess the virtue and intelligence necessary to raise it above party feeling, and enable it to exercise its function of election purely with the dignity of a sacred trust. The two elements of Whig and Tory came into play. Hamilton, though a very unobtrusive politician, was yet a Whig. His opponent was a Tory, and one who thoroughly secured the support of his party. The Tories were in the majority in the Council, and the result of the election, accordingly, was that Wilson was appointed to the Chair. The state of the vote was twenty-one to eleven.

It may be proper here to add that, to the credit of both the rival candidates, nothing in the course of the canvass or in the result of the election was allowed to interrupt their friendly relations. To the close of life Wilson and Hamilton retained a cordial regard for each other.

How completely the election on this occasion was determined by political considerations is proved by an overture made to Hamilton in the course of the contest, to which he thus refers as late as the year 1840, in showing the sacrifices he had made for his political convictions:—"I had the best prospects of success (however worthy my opponent) provided the contest were not made a political one. In these circumstances, it was intimated to me from a most influential quarter that if I would allow it simply to be said that I was not a Whig—not a political opponent of the then dominant party—the election would be allowed to take its natural course. I refused; and in refusing I knew that the

Chair was lost, for the Tory electors were to the Whigs as three to one, and every individual voted according to his party."

And so high philosophical talent, patient investigation, and profound research—animated by love and enthusiasm,—failed of their public reward. The possessor of these qualities had yet to wait for sixteen long years ere he found a befitting sphere for the exercise of his powers.

The following letter from Lord Archibald Hamilton expresses the opinion entertained at the time, at least by Sir W. Hamilton's friends and supporters, regarding the character of the election for the Moral Philosophy Chair:—

PANSHANGER, 13th August [1820].

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I received your letter of the 29th ult. just as I was leaving London for the interval of Parliamentary proceedings, and have neglected to acknowledge it longer than I intended or can justify.

The flattering way in which you mention my letter to Mr Stewart in your favour is indeed highly gratifying to me ; and that that letter expressed my real opinion, you can have no doubt, from the circumstance that it was not intended by me that you should know of it at all. I am much pleased, too, that you followed Mr Stewart's advice in excluding me and my letter wholly from your testimonials. My name would probably have been hurtful to your pretensions : my authority would have been of no benefit, and the appearance of either among such learned company would have been deemed, perhaps, unwarrantable intrusion. But here my satisfaction ends. I regret the result most sincerely, and nearly as much on public as on private grounds, because it has been proved, in this instance at least, that political feelings can supersede all other motives in the disposal of an honourable and important trust, at the place where of all others merit should exclusively prevail. This impression, however, abates somewhat of the regret I should otherwise feel on the score of your comparative failure. In all competitions for honourable distinction, the parties may derive honour from the merits of each other, except where the judges decide under some sinister influence, in which case success ceases to be victory, and failure ceases to be defeat.

In hopes of meeting you in the autumn, I remain, my dear Sir William, with regard and esteem, most truly and faithfully yours,  
ARCHD. HAMILTON.

It is somewhat idle to speculate regarding the probable effect on the course of Hamilton's studies, had the result of the election to the Moral Philosophy Chair been different. The tendency of his mind was unquestionably more to the abstract side of philosophical questions than to the concrete—more metaphysical and logical than ethical or practical. And probably this natural bent would not have been markedly checked by close and special attention to ethical studies, though it might have been rendered less exclusive and predominant.

To himself the chief advantage of the appointment would have been that it would have afforded a field for his powers of dealing with young minds while he was yet comparatively youthful and fresh, and thus more ready to accommodate himself to the practical work of teaching than he possibly could be at a later period of life. It would also have given him an immediate stimulus to studied composition—an effort which he was always prone to defer in the interest of research and reflection, and to which, from his fastidious habits and temperament, he felt a positive repugnance.

So far as the interests of the Chair were concerned, there can be no doubt that Hamilton would have supplied certain of the deficiencies in the treatment of moral philosophy in the Scottish universities. He would have given to the science a more definite sphere than had been assigned to it in our teaching and literature, and would thus have checked the diffuseness of treatment which has so greatly enfeebled its growth. Above all, he would have looked at ethical questions in the light of their history—linked on to the past of ancient Greece and Rome the isolated and exclusive efforts of Scottish inquirers—and given them scientific completeness and vitality, by setting both questions and solutions in the light of modern Continental speculation.

This latter point did not escape the sagacity of the learned and philosophic Dr Parr. "Will you pardon me," he says, writing to Mr Stewart about Hamilton previously to the election, "for telling you my own judgment? In my opinion Sir W. Hamilton is exactly the man who should follow you and Brown. He is a man who will supply what is wanting, and what you and your successor had no opportunity of stating with the precision which the subject required. Your attention was necessarily confined to modern systems of philosophy, and you have left very few gleanings. We now look for a man who should unlock the stores of ancient metaphysics, and that man is presented to you in Sir W. Hamilton." \*

Before the contest for the Moral Philosophy Chair took place, the appointment of a colleague to Mr William Fraser Tytler, the Professor of Civil History, had been spoken of. For this office Sir William had thought of becoming a candidate; and he had then, for the first time, formally declared his attachment to Whig principles.

The Chair finally became vacant through the resignation of Mr Tytler early in 1821. The subject of this professorship was congenial to Sir W. Hamilton's tastes, and had fallen within the scope of his multifarious studies. It was known that Sir William would not be indisposed to accept the office, though he never actually became a candidate for it. The appointment lay virtually with the Faculty of Advocates. His political views, which had been so fatal to his success in the contest for the Moral Philosophy Chair, might here, too, have been expected to stand in his way; for Whig principles were far from being in the ascendant in the Parliament House. To the honour of the Faculty, however, his politics were not allowed to overweigh his indisputable qualifications for the office. ~~They~~ appear even to have virtually secured for him the appointment.

The mode of procedure in the election to this Chair was for the Advocates to choose a leet of two candidates, and

\* Testimonials in favour of Sir W. Hamilton, Bart. 1820.



forward it to the Town Council, who appointed one of the number—generally the first on the leet. At a meeting of the Faculty held March 7, 1821, “it was moved by Mr William Erskine, and seconded by Mr Pringle, that the motion made by Mr Solicitor-General at the meeting on the twenty-first day of February last be put—viz., that Sir William Hamilton be first on the leet, along with Mr Fraser Tytler” (the retiring Professor). The motion was carried by a large majority. The Faculty further intimated to the Town Council that they gave their consent and authority to the joint-nomination of Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Tytler, with a right of survivorship, if the Council should see fit to adopt this course. The Council made the appointment in terms of the recommendation of the Faculty.

The office to which Sir William was now nominated did not bring with it great remuneration, or imply very onerous duties. The class formed no part of the course of study for the degrees in Arts, and attendance on it was not required by any of the learned professions. The number of students was accordingly very limited. In fact no previous professor had succeeded in forming a regular class. Under a predecessor of Sir William’s, indeed, the History class gained the distinction of having reached the absolute minimum of attendance, for in one session there was but one pupil; and professor and student very judiciously agreed to discuss the subject of the lecture in a walk round the Meadows in preference to the class-room. The salary attached to the Chair was only £100 a-year, payable out of a local duty on ale and beer. Owing to the embarrassments of the city, even this pittance was not paid with uninterrupted regularity during Sir William’s tenure of office.

The circumstances of the Chair were thus hardly of a nature to stimulate its occupant to much exertion. The Professor’s inspiration had to spring entirely from interest in the subject which he was called upon to teach. Fortunately of this Sir William had no lack, and so, after a little of his habitual procrastination in the work of composition, he set himself

energetically to prepare a course of lectures. The subject which he discussed, after an introduction on the sphere of history and the advantages of its study, was the modern history of Europe down to the outbreak of the French Revolution. This he viewed as commencing with the formation of a system of states connected with each other on the principle of the balance of power. Accordingly he devoted several preliminary lectures to developing the causes through which, about the close of the fifteenth century, the previously isolated states of Europe came to constitute such a system. Among the causes specified were the decline of feudalism and the simultaneous rise of towns and of a middle class, the decline of the Papal power, and the concentration of national authority in the hands of the kings. He next proceeded to give an account of the fundamental principles and historical origin of the system of the balance of power, which he compared with two other plans for adjusting international relations—viz., the theory of a universal monarchy, and the theory of an international confederation and congress. He then entered upon the history which formed the proper subject of his lectures. This he divided into two periods—the first extending from the end of the fifteenth century to the majority of Louis XIV. (1492-1661); the second, from the latter date to the commencement of the French Revolution (1661-1789). Regarding the general system of the European states as consisting of a northern and a southern, he divided the history of the southern system during the first period into four intervals. Under the second of these there were lengthened remarks on the Reformation and its influence. In showing how it acted as a powerful stimulus to the energies of Europe, he stated its effects on the organisation of society as follows: 1st, A change in the condition of the clergy and in the relation of the ecclesiastical to the civil authority; 2d, That religion now became formally established as a basis of the political constitutions; 3d, The extension and consolidation of monarchical authority. He took a general survey of the his-

tory of the northern system of states during the first period, and then, proceeding to the second, carried on the history of both systems separately till about the middle of the eighteenth century, when, by the rise of Prussia under Frederick the Great, he regarded them as blended into one. The course terminated with an account of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, and of the partition of Poland. To the history of each period was annexed an account of the colonies of the different European states.

In addition to the above, Sir William was in the habit of giving a short course on the history of European literature, which embraced the following topics: General characteristics of modern literature as compared with that of antiquity; influence of events on its course; remarks on national literature; history of the literature (chiefly poetry) of Italy, Spain and Portugal, France, England and Scotland, Germany.

Occasionally, also, he delivered detached lectures on the political economy of the ancients, Aristotle's analysis of the forms of government, the theory of an original civil contract, the political institutions of the ancient Germans, the feudal system, the Papal supremacy; also on the literature of the middle ages, &c.

Sir William seems to have intended to deliver a course of lectures on ancient history, consisting of "general speculations, and of discussions on interesting and obscure points of historical research;" but probably there was not sufficient encouragement to induce him to carry out this design.

The number of loose papers preserved in connection with this course, and their contents, show with how much diligence and zeal he entered into the historical and political subjects which fell within the range of the professorship.

The first course of the lectures on history was composed chiefly in the summer of 1822, at Burntisland. "Comparatively few, however," Lady Hamilton tells us, "were fully written out before the commencement of the session, and many were not composed till the night before they were delivered,

Sir William's mother and myself acting as amanuenses, either writing to dictation or copying, according as preparation had been made. Sir William was very much dissatisfied with the lectures, and when, on the opening of the class, a number of his brethren at the Bar wished to attend the course, he endeavoured to exclude them by positively declining to give them tickets of admission—at least, which was tantamount to the same thing, to accept of a fee; and all who attended the first year as actual students were invited to return on the same ticket the following year, by which time the lectures had been to some extent added to and improved."

In the Chair of History Sir William attracted for some years what, in the circumstances, was a very considerable class, numbering, as it did, from thirty to fifty. Several of his auditors were of course non-professional students, while others had already gone through the usual curriculum. After a few years the numbers appear to have diminished. Latterly Sir William delivered lectures only in alternate years; and when the salary ceased to be paid, through the bankruptcy of the city, he did not lecture at all. Though this was not the sphere in which he was destined to achieve a high or general reputation, he yet made on the few who listened to him a very powerful impression. "In 1829," says Mr Archibald Russell, writing from New York in 1864, "I attended his course of lectures on History, and still remember the earnestness with which he described the Thirty Years' War and the changes of public opinion in Germany." "The most distinguished students of the University," said Professor Wilson, "spoke with enthusiasm of the sagacity, learning, eloquence, and philosophical spirit of those lectures."

In the same year in which he was appointed to the History Chair, Sir William was elected a Foreign Member of the Society for the Study of the German Language at Berlin. This seems to have been the first of the many honours which he received from foreign countries.

A portion of the summer of 1823 was passed at St Andrews.

In those days the ancient city had not become a place of fashionable resort in summer. Access to it was not so easy as now. It was the old university town—primitive in character—with a society peculiarly its own. Modern improvement, in the form of excellent pavements and the demolition of historical monuments, had fortunately not yet come near it. Sir William's delight in the relics of the past and their associations was there fully gratified. During his stay he was, moreover, deeply immersed in the study of the poetry and life of his favourite author, George Buchanan ; and we may imagine the special interest which the residence and place of teaching of the great Scottish scholar had in his eyes.

It does not appear that he took any part in the exciting pastime of the links, but he had an opportunity of gratifying his marked taste for a fine expanse of sea and coast-line. In the very agreeable society connected with the University, Sir William found several congenial spirits, with whom ever afterwards he kept up friendly relations. The usages of this society were no less primitive than the appearance of the old town. The dinner-hour was four o'clock, the evenings were generally spent in playing *long commerce*, which was pretty often kept up till midnight, after which there was the walk home along the unpaved street with *the lass and the lantern*, varied on rainy evenings by the transport in succession of the ladies of the party in the solitary sedan-chair which the city then boasted.

The library of the old University held out for Sir William a powerful attraction. It contained certain folios not readily, or even at all, to be met with elsewhere in Britain—among others, Durandus on the Sentences. A rare schoolman was to him simply irresistible ; and thus the greater part of his time was spent in the library in the engrossing study of a commentator on Peter Lombard, or in an arduous hunt through the various works of John Major. A commonplace-book of this period, formed on no very definite principle, contains the fruits of his researches during the summer. The chief

topics investigated appear to have been the scholastic doctrine of Species, and the distinction of Intuitive, Representative, and Abstractive Knowledge, as given by Durandus and other schoolmen; a notice of traces of Idealism in the older philosophers, and of those philosophers who held an intuitive and representative knowledge of external objects. It is interesting to find in this commonplace-book distinct evidence of his having already thought out that doctrine of Intuitive Perception which was given to the world seven years afterwards in the 'Edinburgh Review' of April 1830. The other points touched upon are the Infinite, Common Sense, and Beauty. The jottings on these subjects are probably of later date.

The study of Buchanan, which he prosecuted with so much interest at St Andrews, had begun even in his Oxford days, and was continued during his lifetime. Buchanan was, indeed, only the favourite author in a line of reading to which he was enthusiastically devoted, and to which about this time especially he gave much attention. This was the Latin poetry of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Sir William's collection of the poets of this period was both ample and rare, and his acquaintance with them very thorough. There are in the library upwards of two hundred volumes of the modern Latin poets, including individual authors and collected editions. With Buchanan he was peculiarly conversant. He has left an annotated copy of Ruddiman's quarto edition of his works, which, for the number and quality of the illustrative quotations and references to ancient and modern Latin poetry, is a monument worthy of a classical scholar of the highest distinction. The materials which he gathered, with a view to a life of the poet, were also very ample. These labours were expended in pursuance of the scheme of a complete edition of Buchanan's poems. The work was never finished; but the portion overtaken is very great, and, with a little careful revision and superintendence, would, if published, form a valuable contribution to the poetic literature of that period. Visitors at Great King Street will remember the

excellent portrait of "old George"—so he was spoken of in the family—which hung on the wall of the library. It was an early purchase of Sir William's—the only one of the kind he ever made—and was considered by him as an original picture.

Another favourite Latin poet was James Balde\* (born 1603, died 1668) — the "Vates Boiorum," the Horace of Alsace—eulogised by Herder and A. W. Schlegel. Herder's enthusiasm for Balde breaks out in the strongest manner: "Starke Gesinnungen, erhabene Gedanken, goldne Lehren, vermischt mit zarten Empfindungen fürs Wohl der Menschheit und für das Glück seines Vaterlandes, strömen aus seiner vollen Brust, aus seiner innig bewegten Seele."† "Highly as Sir William admired the grace and beauty of Buchanan's lyrics, I almost think," says Mr George Moir, "that the racy vigour of Balde was more in harmony with his own masculine tastes. How often have I heard him recite with enthusiasm the noble stanzas on the death of Pappenheim (killed at Lutzen, 1632, just as he was bringing his celebrated corps into action to the aid of Wallenstein against Gustavus Adolphus):—

'Jacet ille magnus  
Qui cadit magnus; celebrat ruina,  
Non premit fortem; titubatique pulchra  
Truncus in ira.  
Vulnus armatum decorat cadaver,  
Comit hoc rupti sacer oris horror;  
Et cicatrices et adhuc ferocis  
Rudera vultus.'‡

In addition to Buchanan and Balde, Sir William seems to have had a marked preference for the three authors—"the famous triumvirate"—who adorned the first half of the sixteenth century, an epoch distinguished for its Latin poetry.

\* Balde (Jacobi) *Poemata*, 2 vols., Coloniae Ubiorum, 1660. *Opera Omnia Poetica*, 8 vols., Monachii, 1729. *Carmina Selecta* (ed. J. C. Orelli), Zurich, 1805. *Carmina Selecta* (ed. Rohn), Viennæ et Cremisæ, 1824. *Carmina Lyrica* (ed. Müller), Monachii, 1844. The above are all in Sir William's library.

† See Müller's edition, 'Herder an den Deutschen Leser.'

‡ *Carmina Lyrica*, l. i. od. 19.

These were Sannazarius, Vida, and Fracastorius. Sannazarius (1458-1530) has a high repute for the purity of his Latinity and the harmony and variety of his versification. These characteristics, apart even from his purely poetical power, were congenial to Sir William's tastes. The 'De Partu Virginis' of Sannazarius is regarded as one of the most finished of modern Latin poems. Mr Hallam says of his Piscatory Eclogues "that they seem to breathe the beauty and sweetness of that fair bay they describe," and that "his Elegies are such as may compete with Tibullus." \* Vida of Cremona (1480-1566), who took Virgil for his model, has left us, among other pieces, the 'De Arte Poetica' and the 'Eclogæ'.† In the former he treats of the education of the poet, of invention, and of elocution. The 'De Arte Poetica' has been frequently translated into other languages, and has influenced the views of the French critics on the subject of epic poetry. Mr Hallam says of Vida that, "notwithstanding some brilliant passages, among which the conclusion of the second book 'De Arte Poetica' is prominent, he is far inferior to Sannazarius." The third of the triumvirate is Fracastorius‡ (1483-1553), distinguished by the universality of his attainments and the rare vigour of his intellect. Critics are divided in opinion as to the relative superiority of the two great works of Sannazarius and Fracastorius. Fracastorius, in Mr Hallam's opinion, is "the greater poet;" Sannazarius "the better author of Latin verses."

Besides the names already mentioned, Sir William relished the racy invectives against the Church of Baptista Mantuanus,

\* Literature of Europe, i. p. 597. The library contains Sannazarii (Actii Sinceri) Opera Latina, omnia et integra, Amstelodami, 1689. There is also the edition of Broukhusius, Amstel., 1728. The 'Arcadia' of Sannazarius passed through sixty editions in the sixteenth century. Tiraboschi speaks of it in terms of high encomium.

† Vidæ (Marci Hieronymi) Poemata (ed. Tristram), Oxonii, 1722. De Arte Poetica, libri iii. (ed. Klotzius), Altenburgi, 1766.

‡ Fracastorii (Hieronymi) Syphilis sive Morbus Gallicus (ed. Choulant); Lipsiæ, 1830. Also the second and third Juntine editions of his Opera Omnia.



once very celebrated, but now nearly forgotten.\* Janus Douza,† Owen‡ (in Latin Audoenus, 1560-1622, of New College, Oxford), and the two Scaligers§ were also favourites.

Sir William's proficiency in the department of learning of which we have now been speaking, is shown in a characteristic way in the following anecdote. Dr Parr, when in Edinburgh, some time before 1820, met Sir William at the house of Dr John Thomson, the distinguished Professor of Pathology in the University. "Sir William astonished the colossal philologist by evincing a range and accuracy of scholarship not inferior to his own. The erudite doctor, probably in gracious condescension to the society in which he found himself, had at first discoursed of Greek philosophy, his knowledge of which was certainly extensive, but finding he did not achieve any decided superiority in this chosen walk, betook himself to an obscurer field of learning, where he naturally expected to reign alone; he led the conversation towards the later and less known Latin poets, with their imitators at the revival of letters, and in still more recent times, but he soon discovered that even here his companion was at home; until at length, finding that, turn where he would, the young Advocate before him could not only follow step by step, but was actually able to continue his quotations and correct his references, his imperturbable superiority gave way, and he

\* The poems of Mantuan were first collected and published about the end of the fifteenth century. In Sir William's library, among other editions, is Mantuani (Baptistæ) Opera Omnia, 4 vols., Antverpiæ, 1576.

† Douzæ (Jani) Poemata pleraque selecta (ed. Scriverius), Lugd. Bat., 1609.

‡ Oweni (Joannis) Epigrammata, Vratislaviæ, 1680. The library contains also the Basle edition, with MS. notes, 1766; Renouard's edition, 1794; and that of Ebert, Leipsic, 1824. Owen's epigram against the simony of the Court of Rome, which cost the author his uncle's estate, is worth quoting:—

"An fuerit Petrus Romæ sub iudice lis est;  
Simonem Romæ nemo fulasse negat."

§ Scaligeri (Jul. Cæs.) Poemata Divina, In Bibliop. Commeliniano, 1600. Poetices, libri vii., 1617. Scaligeri (Jos. Justi) Poemata Omnia, ex Museo Pet. Scriverii; Ex offic. Plantin., Raphelengii, 1615.

was startled into the sudden inquiry, 'Why, *who* are you, sir?' The doctor, as afterwards appeared, did not forget Sir William Hamilton, nor lose the impression his extraordinary acquirements had made upon him."\*

Besides modern Latin poetry, the various points in the theory of Greek and Latin grammar had a special attraction for Sir William; and this study he prosecuted, as usual, with great historical thoroughness. A special nook of the library contains his collection of grammarians, ancient and modern—an exceedingly rare and curious one. His interest in the subject was quickened about 1823 by the ingenious speculations of the late learned Principal Hunter of St Andrews, which were communicated to the Royal Society of Edinburgh (20th January of that year), and published in its Transactions under the title of "Conjectures on the Analogy observed in the Formation of some of the Tenses of the Greek Verb." Sir William, in two papers read before the same body, reviewed the grounds of Dr Hunter's opinion under the title of "A Theory in regard to the original approximation of the First and Second Aorists of the Greek Verb." Coinciding generally in Dr Hunter's view, he yet criticised with great learning and acuteness the steps of the Doctor's reasoning in refutation of the hypotheses of other grammarians and in support of his own doctrine. The papers are characterised by the author's usual nicety and refinement of distinction, and prodigality of reference to authorities. He cites the grammarians from Apollonius Dyscolius of the second century, down through Herodian, Zonaras, Eustathius, Macrobius, Priscian, Sanctius, Lascaris, Linacer, to Matthiæ and Hermann—most of them "*nomina non prius audita*" in Scotland, and particularly in the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

The pretensions of phrenology commenced shortly before 1820 to attract attention in Scotland, especially in Edinburgh, through the zealous efforts of Mr George Combe. Sir William

\* *Edinburgh Essays*—Sir W. Hamilton; by Professor Baynes.

was led, through his interest in anatomy and physiology—the studies of his youth—and through his views of psychological science, to sift carefully the claims of the new doctrine of mind, and method of investigating the mental phenomena, propounded by Gall, Spurzheim, and their followers. It had been not uncommon to meet the phrenological doctrines by reasoning to their supposed consequences, and seeking to show these to be hurtful to the interests of morality and religion. Sir William had too just an appreciation of scientific method to admit the legitimacy of such a procedure. “That the results of phrenology are repugnant to those previously admitted, is but a sorry reason for not inquiring into their foundation. . . . This doctrine professes to be founded on sensible facts. Sensible facts must be shown to be false, not by reasoning, but by experiment; for as old Fernelius has well expressed it,—‘*Insipientis arrogantia est argumentationis necessitatem sensuum testimonio antepondere.*’” He set himself accordingly, with characteristic zeal and care, to examine the alleged grounds of fact on which the new science was based. He addressed himself to the investigation of its principal general doctrines—particularly those respecting the function of the cerebellum, and the existence and extent of the frontal sinuses. This was the first thorough scrutiny of the science on its proper grounds which was made in this country. His observations and experiments, which were carried out with his own hand, were conducted in a singularly careful, sagacious, and methodical manner. They resulted in conclusions that are entirely subversive of the phrenological allegations on the points at issue; in the correction of certain prevailing physiological errors; and in discoveries of very considerable importance both in physiology and anatomy. His conduct of these researches shows very conclusively, that if he usually gave but little attention to the investigation of physical phenomena it was not from want of capacity, but because of his stronger interest in other pursuits.

The first results of his researches on this subject were given in a paper which he read before the Royal Society in December 1826, under the title of "Practical Consequences of the Theory of the Functions of the Brain of Dr Gall." This was followed by another paper in 1827. He also read two lectures on the subject in the Chemistry class-room of the University, before a crowded audience of supporters and opponents of phrenology. "They sparkled," says one who heard them, "with fine irony, and abounded in facts which a goodly array of real skulls fully confirmed."\*

Sir William was recognised at this period as the most formidable opponent whom the phrenologists had to encounter. Nor was it only in public that he was called upon to combat phrenology. "I was invited," says Archdeacon Sinclair, "by a zealous phrenologist, Mr Hamilton, to meet at dinner Sir William and the celebrated George Combe. 'I hope,' said Mr Hamilton, 'to have a great phrenological field-day, by securing an equal number of phrenologists and anti-phrenologists to back these two champions, Sir William and Mr Combe. You must come to support Sir William. I can easily bring together as many well-informed phrenologists as I please to support Mr Combe; but I can hardly find a single anti-phrenologist who is not wholly ignorant on the subject.' I accepted the invitation. The discussion lasted the whole evening, and was extremely interesting. Sir William, as our host apprehended, had not his full quota of supporters, but he had at his command a surprising battery of arguments and references which never failed him."

The papers read before the Royal Society led to a controversial correspondence with Mr Combe, and afterwards with Dr Spurzheim, on his visit to Edinburgh in 1828. Dr Spurzheim was desirous of a public oral discussion on the points at issue, with a view to obtain a decision upon them by the vote

\* He afterwards gave the substance of these papers as lectures in the class of Logic and Metaphysics.

of the audience. Sir William very decidedly declined both the discussion and the tribunal.\*

His final conclusion regarding phrenology is forcibly expressed—probably in his own words—in the following statement of his friend Mr George Moir, who first became acquainted with him about this period:—"So tolerant was Sir William of all opinions, that I may say phrenology was the only doctrine he could not tolerate. He had studied it with care, and mastered very completely the anatomy of the brain. . . . The result was, he had come to look on phrenology as a mischievous humbug."

The physiological and anatomical inquiries thus commenced in connection with phrenology were continued for many years subsequent to 1826, and extended to points which Sir William had not originally intended to embrace, such as the weight and relative proportions of the brain in man and animals under varying circumstances. The results of his inquiries were published at different times in Dr Monro's 'Anatomy of the Brain' (1831), 'Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal,' vol. xlviii. (1850), 'Medical Times,' 1845.† On the subject of the cerebellum and the brain generally, his researches were most careful and extended. "It was certain discoveries," he tells us, "which I made in regard to the laws of development and the function of this organ [the cerebellum], and the desire of establishing these by an induction from as many of the species as possible of the animal kingdom, that led me into a more extensive inquiry than has hitherto been instituted by any professional physiologist. . . . My tables extend to above 1000 brains of above 50 species of animals, accurately weighed by a delicate balance."‡

\* See a voluminous correspondence between Hamilton and Combe, &c., in the *Phrenological Journal*, vol. iv. p. 377-407 (1827), and vol. v. p. 1-82 (1828).

† Collected and reprinted in *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. Appendix.

‡ *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. Appendix, p. 408.

His conclusions regarding the development and real function of the cerebellum are curious and important. He held it to be "the intra-cranial organ of the nutritive faculty," and "the condition of voluntary or systematic motion." \*

He conducted his numerous experiments with his own hand—sawing open skulls, dissecting, and testing the weight of brains. His juvenile friends, of whom he had always an attached following, were employed in scouring the fields for animals on which to experiment; and the yard of his house at Manor Place was filled with rabbits, poultry, &c., which ate, slept, and moved about with their heads transfixed with needles in different directions, in defiance of phrenological and physiological predictions that these functions must thereby be instantly arrested. "There was," says Lady Hamilton, "a constant succession of young animals about the house, for the purpose of being experimented on. Pins or wires were passed in various directions through their heads by Sir William, and the consequent effects on their powers of motion, sight, taking of food, &c., were not only considered by him scientifically valuable, but sometimes were so comical as to afford us much amusement,—indeed to watch these vagaries was a favourite diversion of Sir William's. When we made a visit in the country, he took his instruments with him, and would get hold of fowls and chickens, which he left with wires sticking in their heads, and which were sometimes sent to him months afterwards to show how well they had thriven, notwithstanding this unusual treatment."

While opposed to phrenology, he was much interested in animal magnetism, and disposed apparently to believe in the more general facts on which it is founded—at least to regard them as matter for careful scientific investigation. To one who was indisposed to accept the apparent phenomena of mesmerism, he remarked, "Before you set aside the science of the mesmerist, you ought to read the evidence in its favour

\* See Lectures, vol. i. Appendix, p. 410.

given by all the greatest medical authorities in Germany.' "Sir William had no doubt," says a friend, "of the power of mesmerism in nervous temperaments to produce sleep and other cognate phenomena; but he utterly disbelieved *clairvoyance*: and when Mr Colquhoun used to bring forward instances to that effect, he would remind him of the story of the £1000 bank-note which had been lying sealed up for years, ready to be delivered to any clairvoyant who, without opening the envelope, could read its contents."

Sir William had frequent experiments at his house in mesmerism, along with the friend just mentioned, Mr J. C. Colquhoun, a brother advocate, and for many years Sheriff of Dumbartonshire. Mr Colquhoun was the author of '*Isis Revelata*,' a work which contains a singularly extensive collection of facts and testimonies on the subject of animal magnetism. He had studied at Göttingen, where his interest had been excited in the subject of his book, and where he had laid the foundations of a wide acquaintance with German literature. This degree of community in their interests helped to foster the constant and affectionate intimacy which subsisted between him and Sir William.

Another of Sir William's friends at this period was Mr R. P. Gillies. Gillies was a man of talent and considerable accomplishments, thoroughly familiar with the lighter kinds of German literature. His poetical ability was respectable. He contributed to '*Blackwood's Magazine*,' from its commencement up to 1827, a series of papers entitled "*Horæ Germanicæ*" and "*Horæ Danicæ*." These were the means of first making known to the British public the works of Müllner, Grillparzer, Houwald, and others. In 1826 appeared his '*German Stories*, selected from the works of Hoffmann, De la Motte Fouqué, Pichler, Kruse, and others.' With all his attainments Gillies was eccentric to the last degree. Sir William did every justice to his talent. He considered the '*German Stories*,' as translations, fully equal to anything done by Carlyle. But he had at the same time an exceed-

ingly keen perception of Gillies's absurdities, and thought him, as he said, "a kind of inspired idiot." \*

The following extract from the 'Memoirs of a Literary Veteran,' published by Gillies in 1851, throws light on Sir William's habits at this period:—"Among impressions of this epoch [1823-25], few are more pleasant in retrospection than those of long pedestrian excursions, in company with two near neighbours, numbered still among the few surviving friends who have not changed their conduct towards me during the chance and change to which I have been subjected—I mean Sir William Hamilton and Mr J. C. Colquhoun. Dissimilar as were the members of this *petit comité*, there was, at all events, one point on which we quite agreed—namely, in a hearty liking for long walks out of town, reckless whether the season was that of wintry storms or summer sunshine. Numberless were the subjects broached in these rambles, and numberless as the changes in Dr Brewster's kaleidoscope, the lights and shades which they assumed under our desultory discussions. Sir William Hamilton's researches in literature generally, but especially in that of the middle ages, had already been almost unprecedented, and I suppose have continued to progress up to the present date. But the conclusions at which he arrived (if such they could be called) were somewhat eccentric, for according to him, all that might now be projected had already been; there was mutation without any real progress. In his estimation, the *châteaux en Espagne* of which I dreamed had woefully little chance. They were scarcely allowed to have their poor transitory being among the clouds. It was impossible to table any literary plan which he did not immediately smother by numberless references and citations, to show how much had been already done towards it without effect, his purpose seemingly being to evince that nothing of any real importance could be effected. In reality, perhaps, his object was very different. At all events, the consequences were very pleasant

\* Mr George Moir's notes.



and profitable; for by a merciless application of the principle of contradiction (*Satz des Widerspruchs*), topics religious, political, ethical, and æsthetical, were discussed and investigated in a manner of which otherwise there would have been no chance. Many animated debates yet linger on my remembrance, of which the objective matter was too serious to be fitted for these hasty pages. I think Sir William Hamilton was (and perhaps is) as much inclined as the late Malcolm Laing to use the said principle of contradiction—this being necessary towards the conclusions of logic as well as of mathematics. In those days, having leisure time, he derived much amusement from the prevalent rage at Edinburgh for the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim, and, for pastime, he entered into a series of experiments, measurements, and dissections, to prove how erroneous were their *dicta*. I remember how heartily he was diverted one morning, when, on comparing Voltaire's head with mine, he found by his craniometrical process that the stupid dolt, who never uttered a *bon mot* in his life, nevertheless possessed a bump of wit much more *prononcé* than that of the far-famed Frenchman." \*

The following reminiscences by another of Sir William's associates at this period will be read with much interest. The name of Thomas Carlyle is identified, more than that of any man now living, with the best and freshest intellectual and moral influences of the last thirty-five years. And amid certain outward differences of form, there may be traced a real unity in the characters and life-aims of Hamilton and Carlyle. Both stand out in the history of those past years conspicuous for fervour, simplicity of purpose, noble-heartedness, and a resolute adherence to their respective self-chosen, somewhat isolated, tracks of thought and conviction;—sustained alike by the unwavering belief that, whatever the world around them might think, the best thing for it was the sense of the absolute worth—the absolute inconvertibility with any other earthly good—of a love of truth as truth, in thought and action.

\* *Memoirs of a Literary Veteran*, vol. iii. p. 93-95.

"I have in my memory nothing that is worth recording about Sir William Hamilton; pleasant as all my recollections of him are, they cover but a small space, and that not in the conspicuous or famous portion of his life; and can have nothing new to those that had the honour of any acquaintance with him. Here, nevertheless, they are, *tales quales*.

"Well onward in my student-life at Edinburgh—I think it may have been in 1819 or 1820—I used to pass, most mornings, on my way college-ward, by the east side of St Andrew Square, and a certain alley or short cut thereabouts called *Gabriel's Road*, which led out to the very end of Princes Street, directly opposite the North Bridge—close by the place which afterwards became famous as *Ambrose's Tavern*. Both Gabriel and Ambrose, I find, are now abolished, and the locality not recognisable; but doubtless many remember it for one reason or another, as I do for the following.

"Somewhere in Gabriel's Road, there looked out on me, from the Princes Street or St David Street side,\* a back window on the ground-floor of a handsome enough house; window which had no curtains; and visible on the sill of it were a quantity of books lying about, gilt quartos and conspicuous volumes, several of them;—evidently the sitting room and working room of a studious man, whose lot, in this safe seclusion, I viewed with a certain loyal respect. 'Has a fine silent neighbourhood,' thought I; 'a fine north light, and wishes to save it all.' Inhabitant within I never noticed by any other symptom; but from my comrades soon learned whose house and place of study this was.

"The name of Sir William Hamilton I had before heard; but this was the first time he appeared definitely before my memory or imagination; in which his place was permanent thenceforth. A man of good birth, I was told, though of small fortune, who had deep faculties and an insatiable appetite for wise knowledge; was titularly an

\* There is an inaccuracy here respecting the locality of the house. At this period Sir William was living in Howe Street.

advocate here, but had no practice, nor sought any; had gathered his modest means thriftily together, and sat down here, with his mother and sister (cousin, I believe, it really was), and his ample store of books; frankly renouncing all lower ambitions, and indeed all ambitions together, except what I well recognised to be the highest and one real ambition in this dark ambiguous world. A man honourable to me, a man lovingly enviable; to whom, in silence, I heartily bade good speed. It was also an interesting circumstance, which did not fail of mention, that his ancestor, Hamilton of Preston, was leader of the Cameronians at Bothwell Brig, and had stood by the Covenant and Cause of Scotland in that old time and form. 'This baronetcy, if carried forward on those principles, may well enough be poor,' thought I; 'and beautifully well may it issue in such a Hamilton as this one aims to be, still piously bearing aloft, on the new terms, *his* God's-Banner intrepidly against the World and the Devil!'

"It was years after this, perhaps four or five, before I had the honour of any personal acquaintance with Sir William; his figure on the street had become familiar, but I forget, too, when this was first pointed out to me; and cannot recollect even when I first came to speech with him, which must have been by accident and his own voluntary favour, on some slight occasion, probably at *The Advocates' Library*, which was my principal or almost sole literary resource (lasting thanks to it, alone of Scottish institutions!) in those obstructed, neglectful, and grimly-forbidding years. Perhaps it was in 1824 or 1825. I recollect right well the bright affable manners of Sir William, radiant with frank kindliness, honest humanity, and intelligence ready to help; and how completely prepossessing they were. A fine firm figure of middle height; one of the finest cheerfully-serious human faces, of square, solid, and yet rather *aquiline* type; a little marked with smallpox—marked, not deformed, but rather the reverse\* (like a rock rough-hewn,

\* This impression is not correct. Sir William's face had no marks of smallpox.

not spoiled by polishing); and a pair of the beautifullest kindly-beaming hazel eyes, well open, and every now and then with a lambency of smiling fire in them, which I always remember as if with trust and gratitude. Our conversation did not amount to much, in those times; mainly about German books, philosophies and persons, it is like; and my usual place of abode was in the country then. Letter to him, or from, I do not recollect there was ever any; though there might well enough have been, had either of us been prone that way.

"In the end of 1826 I came to live in Edinburgh under circumstances new and ever memorable to me: from then till the spring of 1828—and, still more, once again in 1832-33, when I had brought my little household to Edinburgh for the winter—must have been the chief times of personal intercourse between us. I recollect hearing much more of him, in 1826 and onward, than formerly: to what depths he had gone in study and philosophy; of his simple, independent, meditative habits, ruggedly athletic modes of exercise, fondness for his big dog, &c. &c.: everybody seemed to speak of him with favour, those of his immediate acquaintance uniformly with affectionate respect.

"I did not witness, much less share in, any of his swimming or other athletic prowesses. I have once or twice been on long walks with him in the Edinburgh environs, oftenest with some other companion, or perhaps even two, whom he had found vigorous and worthy: pleasant walks and abundantly enlivened with speech from Sir William. He was willing to talk of any humanly-interesting subject; and threw out sound observations upon any topic started: if left to his own choice, he circled and gravitated, naturally, into subjects that were his own, and were habitually occupying him;—of which, I can still remember animal magnetism and the German revival of it, not yet known of in England, was one that frequently turned up. Mesmer and his 'four Academicians,' he assured us, had *not* been the finale of that matter; that it was a

matter tending into realities far deeper and more intricate than had been supposed;—of which, for the rest, he did not seem to augur much good, but rather folly and mischief. Craniology, too, he had been examining; but freely allowed us to reckon that an extremely ignorant story. On German bibliography and authors, especially of the learned kind—Erasmus, Ruhnken, Ulrich von Hutten—he could descant copiously, and liked to be inquired of. On Kant, Reid, and the metaphysicians, German and other, though there was such abundance to have said, he did not often speak; but politely abstained rather, when not expressly called on.

“He was finely social and human, in these walks or interviews. Honesty, frankness, friendly veracity, courageous trust in humanity and in you, were charmingly visible. His talk was forcible, copious, discursive, careless rather than otherwise; and, on abstruse topics, I observed, was apt to become embroiled and revelly, much less perspicuous and elucidative than with a little deliberation he could have made it. ‘The fact is,’ he would often say: and then plunging into new circuitous depths and distinctions, again on a new grand, ‘The fact is,’ and still again,—till what the essential ‘fact’ might be was not a little obscure to you. He evidently had not been engaged in *speaking* these things, but only in *thinking* them, for his own behoof, not yours. By lucid questioning you could get lucidity from him on any topic. Nowhere did he give you the least notion of his not understanding the thing himself; but it lay like an unwinnowed threshing-floor, the corn-grains, the natural chaff, and somewhat even of the straw, still unseparated there. This sometimes would befall, not only when the meaning itself was delicate or abstruse, but also if several were listening, and he doubted whether they could understand. On solid realistic points he was abundantly luminous; promptitude, solid sense, free-flowing intelligibility always the characteristics. The tones of his voice were themselves attractive, physiognomic of the man: a strong, carelessly-melodious, tenor voice, the sound of it be-

tokening seriousness and cheerfulness ; occasionally something of slightly remonstrative was in the undertones, indicating, well in the background, possibilities of virtuous wrath and fire ; seldom anything of laughter, of levity never anything : thoroughly a serious, cheerful, sincere, and kindly voice, with looks corresponding. In dialogue, face to face, with one he trusted, his speech, both voice and words, was still more engaging ; lucid, free, persuasive, with a bell-like harmony, and from time to time, in the bright eyes, a beaming smile, which was the crown and seal of all to you.

“ In the winter 1832-33, Captain Hamilton, Sir William's brother, was likewise resident in Edinburgh ; a pleasant, very courteous, and intelligently-talking man, enduring, in a cheery military humour, his old Peninsular hurts, and printing his Peninsular and other books. At his house I have been of literary parties,—of one, at least, which I still remember in an indistinct but agreeable way. Of a similar party at Sir William's I have a still brighter recollection, and of his fine nobly simple ways there ; especially of one little radiancy (his look and his smile the now memorable part of it) privately addressed to myself on the mode of supping I had selected ; supper of one excellent and excellently-boiled potato, of fair size, with salt for seasoning,—at an epoch when excellent potatoes yet were. This evening was altogether pleasant, the talk lively and amusing : the Captain, I remember, quizzed me, and obliquely his brother, in a gay good-natured tone on Goethe's ‘ Last Will ’ : the other Edinburgh figures I have entirely forgotten, except a Mr \* \* \*, newspaper editor, author of some book on the *Highlands*, whom I otherwise knew by sight and rumour (called at that time ‘ Captain Cloud ’ from his occasionally fabulous turn), and who died not long after.

“ I think, though he stood so high in my esteem as a man of intellect and knowledge, I had yet read nothing by Sir William, nor indeed did I ever read anything considerable of what has sent his name over the world ;—having years before,

for good reasons of my own, renounced all metaphysical study or inquiry, and ceased altogether (as a master phrases it) to 'think *about thinking*.' One evening I recollect listening to a paper *on Phrenology*, read by him in the Royal Society; in deliberate examination and refutation of that self-styled science. The meeting was very much larger than usual; and sat in the deepest silence and attention, and, as it gradually appeared, approval and assent. My own private assent, I know, was complete; I only wished the subject had been more important or more dubious to me. The argument, grounded on cerebral anatomy (osteology), philosophy, and human sense, I remember, went on in the true style of *vires acquirit*; and the crowning finish of it was this: 'Here are two skulls' (or rather, here *were*, for the experiment was but reported to us), 'two noteworthy skulls; let us carefully make trial and comparison of them. One is the skull of a Malay robber and cut-throat, who ended by murdering his mistress and getting hanged; skull sent me by so-and-so' (some principal official at Penang); 'the other is George Buchanan's skull, preserved in the University here. One is presumably a very bad specimen of a nation reckoned morally and intellectually bad; the other a very good, of a nation which surely reckons itself good. One is probably among the best of mankind, the other among the worst. Let us take our callipers, and measure them bump after bump. Bump of benevolence is so-and-so, bump of ideality,—and in result, adding all, and balancing all, your callipers declare the Malay to transcend in goodness the Buchanan, by such and such a cipher of inches. A better man, in intellect and heart, that Malay, if there be truth in arithmetic and these callipers of yours!' Which latter implement, it seemed to me, was finally closed and done for. I said to Sir William next time we met, 'Were I in your place I would decline to say another word on that subject. Malay cut-throat *versus* Buchanan; explain me that; till then I say nothing.'

"In April 1833 we left Edinburgh; next year went to

London; and I think Sir William and I never met again. For the next thirty and odd years I rarely came to Edinburgh, and then only in transit, and usually at a season when all my friends (of whom he surely was among the chief there) were out of town. From time to time there passed little mementos between us; sometimes accidental, unintentional, and of a mute nature, which to me were very precious, from a fellow-soldier whom I took to be on the same side with me, and always well assured of my regard as I was of his. In Fife once or twice I heard with regret that his health was failing; once that he *had been* lately within reach of where I now was, but had left and was gone. We were to meet in this world no more."

"CHELSEA, 19th February 1868."

The following characteristic letter from Mr Carlyle to Sir William was written shortly after the date at which these personal reminiscences terminate:—

5 GREAT CHEYNE ROW, CHELSEA, LONDON,  
8th July 1834.

MY DEAR SIR,—The hope of ever seeing you at Craigenputtock has now vanished into the infinite limbo. We have broken up our old settlement, and, after tumult enough, formed a new one here, under the most opposite conditions. From the ever-silent whinstones of Nithsdale to the mud-rattling pavements of Piccadilly there is but a step. I feel it the strangest transition; but one uses himself to all.

Our upholsterers, with all their rubbish and clippings, are at length handsomely swept out of doors. I have got my little book-press set up, my table fixed firm in its place, and sit here awaiting what time and I, in our questionable wrestle, shall make out between us. The house pleases us much; it is in the remnant of genuine *old* Dutch-looking Chelsea; looks out mainly into trees. We might see at half a mile's distance Bolingbroke's Battersea; could shoot a gun into Smollett's old house (at this very time getting pulled down), where he wrote 'Count Fathom,' and was wont every Saturday to dine a company of hungry authors, and then set them fighting together. Don Saltero's coffee-house still looks as brisk as in Steele's



time ; Nell Gwynn's boudoir, still bearing her name, has become a gin-temple, not inappropriately ; in fine, Erasmus lodged with More (they say) in a spot not five hundred yards from this. We are encompassed with a cloud of witnesses, good, bad, indifferent.

Of London itself I must not begin to speak. I wish you would come and look at it with me. There is a spare bed here, ample room and verge enough ; and, for welcome, I wish you would understand that to be for you infallible at all times.

Literature seems dying of thin diet and flatulence, but it is not quite so near dead as I had calculated. In all human things there is the strangest vitality. Who knows how long even bookselling may last ? Ever, too, among these mad Maelstroms swims some little casket that *will* not sink. God mend it !

Mrs \* \* \* often speaks of you, but seems to have no recent news. She has got much deeper into the vortex than when I saw her last ; dines with Chancellors ; seems to sit berattled all day with the sound of door-knockers and carriage-wheels, and the melody of drawing-room commonplace, perennial as that of the spheres : for the rest, a most lovable loving woman, to whom I could wish a better element.

There is some uncertain talk here about founding a new periodical, on another than the bibliopolic principle, with intent to show Liberalism under a better than its present rather sooty and ginshop aspect. I was asked whether your co-operation might be possible. I answered, Possible. If it go on, you will let me write to you farther about it.

Meanwhile, I am actually going to write a book, and perhaps publish a booklet already written : the former is my enterprise till perhaps spring next. Wish me well through it.

Will you ever send me a sheet of Edinburgh news ? It were *very* welcome from your hand. Pray tell Moir also where I am, and give my hearty love to him. Think kindly of me ; there are few in Scotland I wish it more from.

With kind regards to Lady Hamilton, in which my wife, were she here at the moment, would cordially unite, I remain, my dear Sir William, yours most faithfully,

T. CARLYLE.

Captain Hamilton, who had married in 1820, lived, during the years referred to in this chapter, at least in winter, in Edinburgh or its neighbourhood. Sir William was much with his brother and his wife, the latter of whom was a

person of very pleasing manners and accomplishments. Captain Hamilton resided for several summers at Chiefswood, a villa near Melrose, on the Abbotsford property, which he rented from Lockhart, and where his intercourse with Scott was very constant. Sir William would occasionally make a raid on Chiefswood, along with one or two friends. "On one occasion," says Mr George Moir, "Sir William and I started from Edinburgh in company with Gillies, who left us at Abbotsford, his object being, I believe, to try to enlist Sir Walter Scott as a contributor to the 'Foreign Quarterly Review,' which had just been started under the auspices of Gillies as editor. We went on to Chiefswood, and I was charmed with the quiet and beauty of the place. Before dinner we walked to Melrose Abbey, where Sir William pointed out to me the inscription which so deeply interested Washington Irving, 'Here lies the race of the House of Yair.' Sir William sympathised with the feelings of the accomplished American on the subject."

It was at Chiefswood that the greater part of 'The Life and Manhood of Cyril Thornton' was written. It appeared in 1827, and was most favourably received. The sketches of college, military, and civic life are drawn with great vividness. The portraiture, in particular, of former Glasgow manners, is, whether overdrawn or not, one of the raciest bits of writing in the language. "With little of plot—for it pursues the desultory ramblings of military life through various climes—it possesses a wonderful truth and reality, great skill in the observation and portraiture of original character, and a peculiar charm of style, blending freshness of movement with classic delicacy and grace."\* Another work, 'Annals of the Peninsular Campaign,' appeared in 1829.

In 1829 Captain Hamilton went to Italy, where his wife died at the end of the year. He then visited America, and the result of the observations made in his travels was given

\* Notice of Captain Hamilton in 'Blackwood's Magazine,' February 1843, understood to be by Mr George Moir.

to the world in 'Men and Manners in America,' which was published in 1833. Its author had anything but sympathy with either the manners or the government of the Americans, and is occasionally exceedingly caustic. "Of this work," says Mr Moir,\* "one French and two German translations have already appeared,—a work eminently characterised by a tone of gentlemanly feeling, sagacious observation, just views of national character and institutions and their reciprocal influence, and by tolerant criticism."

Though Sir William had hitherto published nothing, his reputation for wide and varied learning was now well established in Edinburgh; and the amplitude of his attainments was only equalled by the generosity with which he imparted his stores to all comers. His readiness to aid the humblest seeker in any department of learning, and that in the simplest and most unassuming manner, was indeed one of the most striking and interesting features of the man. When consulted by any one—be he friend or stranger—on a literary, historical, or philosophical point, for the subject mattered little, such applications found him always prepared; "nor," as Mr De Quincey remarks, "did it seem to make any difference whether it were the erudition of words or things that was needed." His friends, indeed, looked upon him as a kind of living encyclopædia, to whom resort might at any time be made for information on any subject, literary, philosophical, or theological. If the books he recommended for reference were not readily to be obtained, his own copies were at once placed at the disposal of the applicant. One would have imagined that a knowledge of Etruscan history and antiquities was tolerably wide of his range; yet we find Mrs Hamilton Gray saying:—"I went to the great scholar in fear and trembling, believing, in the first place, that he would ridicule the undertaking [the proposed History of Etruria], and, in the second, that he would not give himself trouble upon a woman's account. I received from him the most cordial greeting and

\* Blackwood's Magazine, February 1843.

the most careful attention. He asked me many questions as from an equal to an equal, and then said that he would think the matter over and give me his advice. Upon a second interview he pointed out to me how much the knowledge upon so obscure a subject must be inferential, derived from hints in Latin or Greek history—from the evidence of Etruscan commerce, coins, relics—or from words and customs adopted from other nations or imported to them; and then he recommended to me several historical and critical works, all German, and all of which he lent me. This he continued to do for a series of years, placing his rich library at my disposal. . . . It is easy to conceive how flattered I felt at the encouragement of my undertaking by such a man. Without his help I do not think that I could have pursued it."

A literary consultation was the occasion of the commencement of the warm and lifelong friendship which subsisted between Sir William and Mr George Moir. In 1824 Mr Moir, then a young man preparing to pass advocate, was engaged on an article for the 'Edinburgh Review' on the ancient ballad poetry of Spain, and was encouraged by a mutual friend, Mr Thomson of Banchory, to apply to Sir William for information on the subject, and on the numerous books that had appeared in Germany in reference to it. It was arranged that Mr Moir should meet Sir William one morning at the Advocates' Library. "I confess," says Mr Moir, "the interview appeared to me beforehand rather a formidable one. I had heard of Sir William's almost unequalled examination at Oxford, and of his universal erudition both in philosophy and languages. There was something also in his appearance which had powerfully impressed me. When in repose, indeed, his look was somewhat stern. The massive though well-cut features, the firm, compressed mouth, and the eagle-looking eye, of which the whole pupil was visible, created a feeling akin to awe. But in proportion to this apparent sternness was the charm of his smile, and of his whole manner when animated. To myself he was most indulgent; and I had not

been ten minutes in his company when my anxiety vanished, and I felt an assurance that, however little I might deserve it, we were destined to become not merely acquaintances but friends—an assurance which I rejoice to think was verified by the event. He not only took a warm interest in my review, but, as I did not then understand German, explained to me the meaning of passages in the German works bearing on the subject.”

When Mr Moir, some years later, was engaged on his translation of *Wallenstein*, Sir William kindly “revised and corrected the sheets with as much patience and care as if they had been his own composition, till the illness of his mother obliged him to give up the task when nearly completed. His advice always was: translate as literally as possible—avoid periphrastic expression; even roughness is better than any departure from the original.”\*

To consult Sir William about a book that was meditated was frequently easier than to follow his advice or meet his criticisms. His friend Archdeacon Sinclair was preparing a work on *Episcopacy* (afterwards published in 1836). He consulted Sir William on the subject. “When I had explained to him,” says the Archdeacon, “my line of argument, he said: ‘Besides the ordinary English authorities on *Episcopacy*, you must get *Petavius* on the one side, and *Salmasius* and *David Blondel* on the other. To read *Blondel’s* treatise “*De Sententia Hieronymi*,” in some few hundred closely-printed pages of dry Latin, will make no bad beginning. When you think you can refute *Blondel*, bring your essay to me and I shall be glad to hear it.’ Some time elapsed,” continues the Archdeacon, “before I had sufficiently executed the prescribed task, to be ready for the proposed argumentation. At length, however, having satisfied myself, I spent two evenings in *Manor Place*, reading my essay and hearing all his comments and objections. The result was that I had no small difficulty in devising fresh arguments and collect-

\* Mr Moir’s MS. notes.

ing fresh authorities. But I made my base of operations more secure."

The kind of impression which he made on educated foreigners, many of whom came to visit him even before his contributions to the 'Edinburgh Review' made him generally known abroad, may be gathered from the following notice of him by Dr Albert Von Scheel, Gentleman of the Bedchamber to the King of Prussia, who met him in Edinburgh in 1827:—

"I must say it gave me considerable surprise to meet in Scotland a gentleman of Sir William Hamilton's peculiar talents and acquirements. 'Can any kind of genius or acquirement be surprising in the country of Sir Walter Scott?' you will ask. . . . Of a high order as Sir Walter Scott's talents are, yet they are peculiarly Scottish; they are fed and matured and exercised on Scottish objects, and most commonly applied to them. This is not the case with Sir William Hamilton. Born in Scotland, but educated at Oxford, and afterwards prosecuting his studies on his journeys on the Continent, he has collected a greater store of knowledge than most men I ever met with either in Great Britain or elsewhere. His reading is immense, for he has considered no branch of science entirely foreign to his pursuits, and his memory is admirable. He undoubtedly is one of the first classical scholars living in Great Britain, and one of the few now living in that country who in Germany would be considered as eminent ones. With a singularly good taste and choice he has studied our own literature, and he is perfectly well acquainted with all that there is best and most solid in it, and, in particular, with our most eminent philosophers. He perhaps is the only Briton who can claim any acquaintance with them at all. After such a description you will conceive that my surprise at meeting with such a gentleman in Scotland was not ill founded. His views are bold, comprehensive, original, like those of a German, yet his judgment clear, and his discourse refined, like that of an Englishman. Every respectable German who arrives in Edinburgh has a home in

his house, and even in intellectual respects he here feels himself at home." \*

In January 1827 Sir William's mother died. His home had always been under his mother's roof, and since 1815 they had lived together in Edinburgh. The home-circle, with his mother as the principal figure, had been one that well suited him, and round which his affections had gathered with a peculiar tenacity and interest. Keen student as he was, he could never at any time bear a solitary life. An outlet in the higher regions of abstract thought was a necessity of his nature, and here he was indifferent to the sympathy of his fellows—the more remote, indeed, from the ordinary beat and from commonplace interests was the line of inquiry, the more thorough was his intellectual enjoyment. But the deep social nature of the man yearned for perpetual companionship and sympathy in practical life; and even in his studies he liked to be with his home-circle, and to have its members aiding him in the mechanical subsidia of fetching books or copying, and performing the numerous offices which affection finds to do for the assiduous scholar who chances to be both revered for his power and loved for his gentleness. With the breaking up of his home-circle there was a severance of the quiet continuity of his past life. To a nature like his—so truly social, and at the same time so keenly sensitive, with little self-dependence, moreover, or tact in matters of practical routine, and accustomed to lean on others in this particular,—the blow he now experienced was a very severe one—for a time, indeed, overwhelming. The two years that immediately followed his mother's death were doubtless the unhappy period of his life. Writing of himself at this time he says :—

[*No date, but probably May 1827.*]

Things here go on as usual. I feel the horrors of solitude with daily-increasing bitterness. I suppose I will get accustomed to my fate by degrees, at last. . . . I dine at General Cuninghame's to-day, and was last night at Mrs Fitzmaurice's to a dance. I shall

\* Reise in Gross Britannien im Sommer, 1827. Berlin, 1829.

get quite gay again, for I cannot feel happy by myself ; and all is melancholy in its associations about me in this house. . . . Tom and Annette go off at the beginning of next week for Chiefswood. I shall then be far more forlorn.

16 GREAT KING STREET, 3d June 1827.

Once dining out was the greatest of all bores ; now it is a refuge from the recollection of happy days, and the sad contrast of the present with the past.

So greatly was he prostrated by his mother's death that for some time he appears to have been without energy or spirit to make any exertion. Contrary to his usual methodical habits, he even neglected to return his books to their shelves, or to keep them in any sort of order. The result was, the necessity of a somewhat ludicrous emigration from room to room of the house ; for an accumulation of confusion ensued in one apartment, from which he could free himself only by taking refuge in another. This in like manner was abandoned when it had reached a similar state of disorder. At length he established himself in a large room in the upper story of the house, which commanded a view of the opposite coast and of the Fifeshire hills. He thought it less dismal than any of the usual sitting-rooms, associated as they were in his mind with more cheerful days. In the following year (1828) he removed to a smaller house in Manor Place, in which he continued to reside until 1839. Mr De Quincey, who was in Edinburgh at this period, used kindly to break in on Sir William's evening solitude, accompanied generally by his eldest son and daughter, children of about eight or ten years of age. While the two philosophers discoursed till the small hours of the morning, the two children would be lying asleep on a chair.

Two years after his mother's death—on the 31st March 1829—Sir William married his cousin, Miss Marshall, who, as has been noticed, had been an inmate of his mother's family during the last ten years of her life. On this event the character of his subsequent life, and in many respects the



moulding of the inner nature of the man, turned in a way and to an extent which those only who knew husband and wife can understand. From the first, Lady Hamilton's devotion to her husband's interests was untiring, and her identification with his work complete. Her rare practical ability was her husband's never-failing ally. This was shown in a power of guidance and counsel, in the womanly tact which can thread its way through difficulties where mere intelligence is baffled, and in the extent to which she relieved her husband of the practical concerns that would, as a matter of course, have fallen to him, but for the details of which he lacked patience and capacity. To the labour involved in this and in the ordinary duties of her position, which she admirably fulfilled, was added the nearly constant work of amanuensis to her husband ; for there was hardly, even from the first, anything of importance that Sir William wrote that had not also to be copied by Lady Hamilton. The number of pages in her handwriting—filled with abstruse metaphysical matter, original and quoted, and bristling with propositional and syllogistic formulæ—that are still preserved, is perfectly marvellous. Everything that was sent to the press, and all the courses of lectures, were written by her either to dictation or from a copy. This work she did in the truest spirit of love and devotion. She had a power, moreover, of keeping her husband up to what he had to do. She contended wisely against a sort of energetic indolence which characterised him, and which, while he was always labouring, made him apt to put aside the task actually before him, sometimes diverted by subjects of inquiry suggested in the course of study on the matter in hand, sometimes discouraged by the difficulty of reducing to order the immense mass of materials which he had accumulated in connection with it. Then her resolute and cheerful disposition sustained and refreshed him, and never more so than when, during the last twelve years of his life, his bodily strength was broken, and his spirit, though languid, yet ceased not from mental toil. The truth is, that

Sir William's marriage, his comparatively limited circumstances, and the character of his wife, supplied to a nature that would have been contented to spend its mighty energies in work that brought no reward but in the doing of it, and that might never have been made publicly known or available, the practical force and impulse which enabled him to accomplish what he actually did in literature and philosophy. It was this influence, without doubt, which saved him from utter absorption in his world of rare, noble, and elevated, but ever-increasingly unattainable ideals. But for it the serene sea of abstract thought might have held him becalmed for life, and in the absence of all utterance and definite knowledge of his conclusions, the world might have been left to an ignorant and mysterious wondering about the unprofitable scholar.

## CHAPTER V.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EDINBURGH REVIEW: 1829-1836.

PERIOD AFTER MARRIAGE—FRIENDS—PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS—EDINBURGH REVIEW AND ITS NEW EDITOR—FIRST ARTICLE CONTRIBUTED TO THE REVIEW, ON THE 'COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE' OF M. COUSIN—GENERAL AIM AND CHARACTER OF THE CONTRIBUTION—M. COUSIN'S INTEREST IN THE AUTHOR—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COUSIN AND HAMILTON—ARTICLE ON PERCEPTION—LETTER OF THE AUTHOR REGARDING IT TO M. COUSIN—ARTICLES ON LOGIC—ON THE 'EPISTOLÆ OBSCURORUM VIRORUM'—ON THE STATE OF THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES IN 1831—SUBSEQUENT ARTICLES—ON OXFORD—ON RIGHT OF DISSENTERS TO ADMISSION INTO THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES—ON PATRONAGE AND SUPERINTENDENCE OF UNIVERSITIES GENERALLY—INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION OF ARTICLES ON OXFORD—LORD RADNOR AND HIS BILL IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS—OXFORD COMMISSION OF 1850—TESTIMONIES OF REV. S. H. JOHNSON, REV. A. P. STANLEY, REV. F. D. MAURICE—ARTICLE ON THE PATRONAGE AND SUPERINTENDENCE OF UNIVERSITIES—ITS INFLUENCE—FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REVIEW—REVIEW OF COUSIN ON GERMAN SCHOOLS—ON THE STUDY OF MATHEMATICS—LETTER OF MR NAPIER—MADE SOLICITOR TO TEIND COURT—LETTER FROM PROFESSOR MYLNE—PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS.

AFTER their marriage Sir William and Lady Hamilton lived for some years in Manor Place—a sunny, pleasant row of houses, then at the extreme west end of Edinburgh, which looked into the grounds of the old manor-house of Coates, and afforded easy access to the country. Sir William's quiet student-life and habits continued as before. The great problem of keeping his books and papers in order, which, as we have seen, he himself had given up in despair, was now grap-

pled with in a highly practical, energetic fashion, as we may gather from the following :—

“Before his brother and sister-in-law left town, in 1828,” says Lady Hamilton, “they assisted Sir William to remove his library, and settle himself in his house in Manor Place. But the arranging of the books was a matter in which no one could give him much help, and to himself it was a very tedious occupation, both because it required a great effort to set himself to the labour, and because he was very apt, when about to place a book on the shelf, to open it, and, being attracted by something on which his eye lighted, to continue its perusal (frequently standing all the while on the steps of the ladder); and thus the work of putting the library in order, being often interrupted, advanced very slowly. His young friends, Francis and John Russell, who often tried to assist Sir William in putting his books in the shelves, used to describe the progress made, after perhaps several hours had been devoted to the work, as so small as to be altogether without effect in diminishing the confusion—‘for either Sir William begins to read, or he tells us about the author, which again leads to his speaking of something else, till it is time for us to leave.’

“This being the state of matters with regard to the arrangement of the library, when we arrived at home after our marriage (1829) I found the house in a sad state of disorder (as, indeed, I had been warned would be the case); and for the first week there was nothing for it but to set energetically about the business of reducing the confusion. As soon, however, as some progress became visible, and room after room began to assume a more comfortable appearance, Sir William—who was essentially orderly, and, in particular, liked to have his library well arranged—now relieved from despair, worked diligently at placing the books on the shelves. They were all minutely classified and arranged according to size and subjects. The progress of the work was often retarded by books requiring to be mended, or washed, or varnished.

“When we returned to King Street in 1839, the same labour in arranging the library had, of course, to be repeated, and on a larger scale, the books having become much more numerous in the interval. After their removal from the one house to the other had been accomplished, they lay for a long time piled up in confusion while the bookcases were being prepared for their reception. This was a task after Sir William’s own heart, and he entered into it *con amore*. He superintended in general, and planned the arrangement of cases such as would best suit the economy of the library. There were a number of ingenious contrivances in the construction of the shelves, which were of his devising; and all such work as fastening on curtains to protect the books, he executed with his own hand, after a very elaborate fashion.

“It may be noticed, generally, that with Sir William every fit of hard study was succeeded by a fit of manual work, both by way of relaxation and in order to provide for the due arrangement of the MSS. which had come into being.”

As his friends Mr Riddell and Mr Colquhoun resided in the immediate neighbourhood of Manor Place, they were much with him. A walk on Sunday afternoons with Mr Colquhoun was a regular practice for many years. In this they were frequently joined by Mr George Moir and Captain Hamilton, who, both before and after his visit to America in 1830 and 1831, spent a considerable time in Edinburgh, generally living in his brother’s house.

A walk into the country was frequently with Sir William a means of relief after intense and long-continued study. On these occasions he liked to have a companion, but the conversation was usually rather scanty, at least on his part—the train of thought in which he had been engaged continuing apparently to occupy him. The truth is, it was rather his way when on a walk with the more intimate of his friends, to set them off on their respective hobbies—it might be genealogy or mesmerism—while he himself, though putting in his word now and then, followed the bent of his own thoughts.

He would then be seen walking considerably in advance, or on the opposite side of the road from his companion—perhaps repeating aloud to himself some Greek, Latin, or English verses, quite unconscious of what he was sounding forth. Some lady friends who often met Sir William and his companion returning in this fashion from their stroll, would naturally enough ask whether the two had had a quarrel.

Sir William's friendship with the late Rev. Dr Welsh commenced when the latter, on his appointment to the Chair of Church History in the University, settled in Edinburgh in 1831, as it happened, close to Manor Place. They had not known each other before this time; and on two of Sir William's strong points—Dr Brown and Phrenology—they were entirely at variance. But the intimacy of Lady Hamilton and Mrs Welsh, and the genial nature and refined intellect of Dr Welsh, soon drew Sir William to him. They became very warm friends, esteeming each other highly, and, with all their differences of opinion, taking constant pleasure in each other's society. Mr Leonard Horner and his family spent some years in Edinburgh, and were a most agreeable addition to the little coterie of friends among whom Sir William and Lady Hamilton found themselves settled in Manor Place. About this time also, Mr J. W. Semple, the translator of Kant's 'Metaphysic of Ethics,' Mr J. H. Burton, Mr George Moir, and Mr Patrick Fraser Tytler, were frequent visitors at Manor Place. Mr Ferrier, then a young man, was first attracted towards Sir William at this period, and soon came to be very intimate with him.

At this period Sir William mixed a good deal in society, in which he took real pleasure when it was not merely formal. He had no pretensions to shine as a talker—in fact, would have despised such a *rôle*. Whether he spoke much depended on a subject being started in which he felt an interest. Then he became animated and fluent. If a question were asked him and he were in the vein, he would pour forth a stream of information—one thing suggesting another, and

calling forth the wonderfully comprehensive and minute knowledge which he had stored on almost every subject of his reading.

He did not by any means accommodate himself to the prevailing opinions of the company; but rather took delight in running atilt against them in a good-humoured way. He had great pleasure in stating and defending some paradox or startling opinion (of which he would perhaps afterwards make a joke), not because it exactly represented his own opinion, but sometimes merely for the sake of argument, and more frequently with the wish to uphold the unpopular side of a question under discussion. The prevailing opinion on a subject, when strongly put, had a tendency to arouse in him a feeling of opposition, which led him to present quite as strongly that side of the case which he thought unfairly dealt with or overlooked. As might have been expected, in Edinburgh society these novel opinions frequently related to theological and ecclesiastical topics. "He was exceedingly jealous," says Archdeacon Sinclair, "lest I should not do justice to the opinions of Roman Catholics, Neologists, and other parties opposed to the Church of England; and would frequently demand, What have you to say to this argument of Dr Wiseman? or to that quotation from Semler, Paulus, or Wegscheider?"

It was, however, in a limited circle of friends—above all, in a two-handed discussion—that his social character and conversational powers were fully displayed. A certain natural diffidence and reserve disappeared, and he spoke freely, at least before his illness had impaired his power of utterance. Owing to his wonderful range of reading, few topics could be started with which he was unacquainted; and on subjects in which he took a special interest his talk was fluent, copious, and impetuous. So thorough and accurate was his reading, that he was a match for most men even on subjects which they had made matter of special study. We have already seen how he surprised Dr Parr on the Doctor's chosen theme of

Modern Latin Poetry. The following is a case of a similar kind:—Shortly before Dr Abercrombie published the second edition of his ‘Intellectual Powers,’ Sir George Sinclair invited him and Sir William to dinner. “There was no other company,” says Archdeacon Sinclair, who was present, “and the Doctor naturally related to us all the anecdotes of insanity, spectral illusions, vast powers of memory, &c., which he was about to introduce in the next edition of his book. He added other interesting illustrations; and, under the circumstances, might have been expected to enjoy a monopoly of the conversation. But Sir William was not at all disposed to be a mere listener. On the contrary, throughout the evening, he was ready to exchange anecdote for anecdote, and illustration for illustration, as if he had been studiously preparing himself for the occasion.”

At another time he would astonish a controversial opponent by the extent, readiness, and aptness of his references to theological and ecclesiastical authorities. To excursions into this province he was through life addicted; and his acquaintance with the history of the Church and of theological opinions, especially in the less-trodden departments, was very considerable. In Scotland, certainly, he was entitled to rank as a learned theologian. Quotations from Fathers and Councils came so freely in the course of a debate, that these might almost appear to have been his special study. The period of the Reformation was a choice *morceau*, and he was always ready to marshal his authorities at a moment’s notice.

There was frequently in his manner of conversation an authoritativeness which amounted to dogmatism. This, however, was so obviously the natural outcome of the strength and honesty of the man, and of the fulness of his knowledge, that it did not offend. Open, straightforward, and generous, he spoke his opinions and feelings strongly, because he thought and felt strongly. And no one was more ready than he to acknowledge his ignorance on a point to which he had not given his attention.

The following sketch from the pen of the authoress of the



'History of Etruria'—Mrs Hamilton Gray—gives a graphic picture of him, as he appeared in a congenial circle, while still in his vigorous prime:—

"I first saw Sir William Hamilton at a small party about the year 1832. His name was already celebrated all over Europe as one of the greatest metaphysicians ever produced by metaphysical Scotland; and therefore I was aware of the mental standing of the illustrious guest whom I was about to meet. Presently he entered the room, and he was in my eyes the handsomest and grandest figure there—tall of stature and strongly built, with a large, noble-looking head, a firm mouth, and magnificent black eyes. His brow was massive and heavy, producing upon me something of the same effect as Walter Scott's when perfectly quiet. His mouth, too, had a little touch of satire and severity about it which sometimes held me in awe; but all the severity and all the heaviness vanished when once he began to speak, dispelled by the fire of his eye and the kindness of his smile. I never enjoyed an evening more, from the perfect ease of his conversation. Sir William's language was fluent, his manner energetic, and his humour irresistible. I laughed heartily at the *fun* of the great lion of the evening, and the more so, perhaps, that he struck me at first as solemn and imposing.

"It shows how deep must have been the impression then made upon me, that after the lapse of so many years I am able to recall the two leading topics of that evening's conversation—the heresies of Edward Irving, and the questionable reality of mesmerism. In connection with the former I well remember the animation with which Sir William declared, 'There is no great and voluminous theological author whatever out of whose works you may not substantiate any heresy you please, if you will only separate extracts from their context, and both from your knowledge of the man's principles and character.' The other discussion, that about mesmerism, interested me extremely. The subject, as in any degree a serious one, was new to me, and I expected to hear Sir William dismiss it with

contempt. Quite the reverse. 'What mesmerism is,' he said, 'I do not know; but there is a reality in it which deserves far more investigation than it has hitherto received at the hands of men of science. It appears to be a phase of the imagination, or an influence upon the nerves, so subtle and so powerful as for the time to absorb and overcome every mental power. In the strength of its illusions it has all the force of madness, without in any way leading to it. And it seems only to affect certain constitutions; for though multitudes are amenable to it, multitudes are not. Nervous people are more liable than others, but it is by no means confined to them, and some very nervous people are not impressible at all. It is rife at this moment in Germany, and a very curious book has recently been published upon it, called "Die Seherin von Prevorst,"\* by Dr Kerner, a man of high reputation amongst his brethren, and of unblemished honour.'

"In all the intercourse I ever had with Sir William Hamilton," adds Mrs Gray, "his kindness, his simplicity, and his apparent unconsciousness of his own superiority, were the leading characteristics. I *knew* his supereminence, but I never *felt* it."

Sir William, with all his multifarious reading and thinking, had as yet given none of the results of his reflection to the world. The truth is, that although, under compulsion, he could write with great rapidity, he took up his pen with the utmost reluctance, and required an outward stimulus to engage him in composition. This peculiarity had been for some time matter of regret to his friends. A sufficient inducement was now, however, to come into play, arising partly from the need which he felt, after his marriage, of doing something to add to his limited income, but still more from the very strong pressure put upon him by the new editor of the 'Edinburgh Review,' Professor Macvey Napier. Mr Napier had from early life been distinguished by the interest which he took in questions of speculative philosophy; and now that he occupied the position of editor

\* Stuttgart, 1829. A translation by Mrs Crowe appeared in 1845.

of the 'Review,' he sought at once to gratify his own taste and to do justice to subjects which appeared to him to have been too much neglected in that leading periodical. He accordingly applied to his friend Hamilton for a philosophical article, to appear in the first number of the 'Review' under his editorship. The subject suggested was the introductory book of the 'Cours de Philosophie' of M. Cousin, then in the midst of a very brilliant career as Professor in the Faculty of Letters at Paris, and the head of the new philosophical movement in France which, inspired from Scotland, had begun early in the century under the auspices of Degerando and Laromiguière, and been sustained by Royer Collard and Jouffroy. Sir William, as he tells us, personally felt averse from the task. "I was not unaware," he says, "that a discussion of the leading doctrine of the book would prove unintelligible not only to 'the general reader,' but, with few exceptions, to our British metaphysicians at large. But, moreover, I was still farther disinclined to the undertaking, because it would behove me to come forward in overt opposition to a certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether unable to admit; whilst its author, M. Cousin, was a philosopher for whose genius and character I already had the warmest admiration—an admiration which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. . . . Mr Napier, however, was resolute; it was the first number of the 'Review' under his direction; and the criticism was hastily written." \* Such was the origin of the afterwards famous essay on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned,—the first of a series of contributions to the 'Edinburgh Review,' which, for force and keenness of dialectic, depth of thought, and extent of learning, have not in this century been surpassed, if equalled, by any writings on the subjects to which they refer. Mr Napier showed both enlightenment and firmness in encouraging the author of those articles to their composition; and when, some seven years afterwards, their merits began to be recognised even in this country, and testimonies

\* Discussions, p. 1.

came in from men of high name on the Continent—where from the first they were duly appreciated—the courageous editor had his reward. “I confess,” he says, writing to Sir William in 1836, “that I have a sort of selfish joy in this splendid approbation of those papers which I have been instrumental in drawing forth from you, and for the doing of which I have been blamed by those who should have known better what a journal like the ‘Edinburgh Review’ owes to science and the world.”

If we except the earnest and impassioned but fragmentary utterances of Coleridge, the review of Cousin, written thirty-nine years ago, was the first indication that any one in Britain had become aware of the true import of the highest philosophical thought of this century. The ‘Critique of the Pure Reason’ (1781) had revolutionised intellectual philosophy, and the best minds of Germany had long been at work on the great question of the analysis of human knowledge and its metaphysical bearings, ere in England men knew aught of the movement, or had risen above vague and assumptive theories about *sensation* and *association*, which leave the whole investigation of the nature of thought and knowledge at the very threshold, and serve only to delude people with the belief that the problem has been solved when it is not even reached. For some time immediately preceding the review of Cousin there had been imported into Scotland, with much rhetorical adornment but little genuine earnestness, the leading doctrines of this superficial psychology, which really avoided the deeper logical and metaphysical questions. Reid and Stewart, indeed, recognised other elements in knowledge than those allowed by the sensational school, and thus laid the foundation of a firmer metaphysical doctrine regarding the three great objects of inquiry—Man, the World, and God. But both philosophers were in the main merely observational and psychological. Their great merit lay in a resolute opposition to all attempts at constructing a theory of reality deductively out of notions or assumptions, such as had been constantly made by metaphysi-

cians from Descartes downwards. But the anti-deductive reactionary impulse which characterised them led to an excessive deference for what was called the *Inductive Method* of studying mental philosophy; but which with them really meant the reflective observation of the facts of consciousness, with little attempt at finding their genesis, even when this was possible. They were thus more ready to accept a fact of mind as a whole, and to point to it as not having been previously or adequately recognised, than to seek to analyse it into its simpler elements, or even to sum up a series of phenomena in a higher generalisation. Questions to which an observational study of the mind naturally leads were thus left unsolved; yet some theory of these was needed to give the inductive method completeness. If, as the Scottish thinkers maintained, all true philosophy is restricted to experience, or the phenomena of mind and matter, with the dim inferences or suggestions which these necessitate, and all comprehensive deductive theories of the world and Deity are impossible, we might naturally have expected some attempt on their part to ground this doctrine on a thorough-going analysis of the nature and laws of our powers of knowing. But this, in any real or systematic way, they did not essay. Their philosophy, therefore, had nothing truly valid to oppose to the pretensions of absolutist or deductive theories of being, for it had never marked out the true limits of knowledge, or determined the question of the conceivableness of infinite as opposed to finite reality. Now, what Hamilton set himself to do in his review of the philosophy of Cousin was to grapple with this point—in other words, to show, from the essential nature and conditions of human knowledge, that a science of other than finite or phenomenal reality is impossible, and, consequently, that deductive theories of the universe, founded on a conception of what is alleged to be higher than experience—call it Infinite or Absolute, or the Infinito-absolute—are *ab initio* illegitimate and delusive. The attempt was made in the spirit of Kant; the analysis of the conditions of thought on which it proceeds is in the main Kantian;

and it may be described as a carrying out, with important modifications and corrections, of principles which were for the first time announced in the Critical philosophy. This was a line of thought new to British speculation; the style and phraseology of the article were unlike anything that had before appeared in our philosophical literature; and the solution of the profound questions opened up carried with it moral and theological consequences of the most important kind. "In this country," we find the author saying, "the reasonings were, of course, not understood, and naturally, for a season, declared incomprehensible." The exceedingly condensed and abstract style of the essay, the usual absence of sympathy with such discussions, and the want of acquaintance on the part of the reading public with the writings of Kant, or with the course of Continental speculation that flowed from the 'Kritik,' were the causes that so few men in Britain at the time were able to grasp the full purport of the discussion. The same causes are still, though to a less extent, in force; and in as far as their influence is now less than it was thirty-nine years ago, this is due in great measure to the interest awakened by Hamilton's Essay, and to the growth of a speculative taste which it and his other writings have helped materially to foster.\*

On the Continent the review, immediately on its publication, was recognised and proclaimed, both by those who agreed with its conclusions and by those who differed from them, as the work of a powerful thinker—of one entitled to be regarded as occupying a foremost place among the originators of the speculative impulses of the time; and it was speedily translated into French and Italian. But by no one was the merit of the essay more fully recognised than by M. Cousin himself, whose main philosophical doctrine was passed through so scorching a fire of criticism. A literary friend of M. Cousin, Mr Austin, the distinguished jurist, had informed him that the 'Edinburgh Review,' then just published, contained "a bitter attack" on him. M. Cousin wrote in reply:—"How

\* On the Review of Cousin see Note A.

could an Englishman approve of a French work, especially a work of philosophy, and still more of speculative philosophy? I was therefore prepared for an article more than severe on the part of the 'Edinburgh Review,' and said so to one of my English friends. He has read it—this terrible article! and from what he tells me, I conclude that it is very polite towards me personally, and written in full knowledge of the cause. One extract from it, which I have received, has singularly struck me. I did not believe that there was an individual beyond the Channel capable of interesting himself so deeply in metaphysics, and I regard this article as an excellent augury for philosophy in England. I am therefore thankful to the author, and wish he knew it. You will please me by information as to his true name, for it is here doubted whether you are correct in the person you have mentioned as the writer; and I request of you on this point all the information you may be able to collect. I think he is wrong in his objections to my doctrine; but I must do him the justice to say that he has profoundly studied and perfectly understood me. I should wish him to read my Lectures of 1829, the second volume of which contains ten lectures on Locke, which might interest an Englishman." After having read the article and learned the author's name, he says:—"Sir William Hamilton's article has arrived, and I have read it. It is a masterpiece. . . . Mr Brougham has good reason to speak of it highly. For my part, I have done the same here, and I affirm that the article is so excellent that there cannot be fifty persons in England competent to understand it. It is truly to be regretted that such talents have not produced more. You seem to speak to me of other articles from the same hand. Where are these articles, and what are they? . . . I shall send M. Hamilton my 'Examen de Locke,' and wish that some partisan of Locke would be roused to answer it." Subsequently he says:—"The information you are to send me regarding Sir W. Hamilton and his writings is expected with so much the more impatience as I wish to push my chivalry towards him

to the point of having his article translated; and a few lines on the writings, age, employments, and course of life of the author would suitably accompany this translation."

M. Cousin's chivalrous interest in his critic, thus awakened, led to a warm friendship between him and Sir William. The two distinguished representatives of French and British speculation never met in person, but they kept up a pretty regular correspondence.

Mrs Austin, to whom M. Cousin had applied for information regarding the author of the article, addressed a letter to Sir William, though not personally acquainted with him. This communication elicited the following reply:—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MRS AUSTIN.

EDINBURGH, 18th March 1830.

MADAM,—In consequence of an absence of some days from town, I did not receive your letter till last night. I need not say how highly flattered I felt by the contents, as there is no one of whose good opinion I should be more ambitious than that of M. Cousin. If anything could have added to my admiration of his character, it is the generous praise with which he has been pleased to honour a criticism the views of which he must regard as so erroneous. I should certainly be proud to think that I was really entitled to a tithe of the encomium he so liberally bestows. To one merit (unfortunately too rare) I may, indeed, lay claim—that I have endeavoured to state and to canvass a philosophical doctrine *fairly*; and am gratified to find that, in M. Cousin's own opinion, I have succeeded. But I am conscious that this is almost the only merit of my paper, and am afraid he has gratuitously extended to the execution the approbation due only to the good intention. The paper has, indeed, some reason to claim indulgence. M. Cousin's Lectures were put into my hands by my friend Professor Napier, with the request (which, from the way it was made, I could not possibly refuse) that I would review them for the *first* number to be published under his editorship. Other business, however, interfered: the article, delayed to the last, was written and corrected in the greatest haste; when printed, it was found too long, and, in my absence, was summarily shortened in the proof by omissions which



left obscurity in some places, and the transition in others abrupt and awkward. In these circumstances I should have wished that my name had not transpired, even if the article, when it appeared, had not been universally voted unintelligible. I am now, however, less inclined to be ashamed of it by finding the opinion of the most competent judge so favourable, and shall certainly be the more flattered if M. Cousin may continue to think it not unworthy of his notice.

In regard to myself, I have nothing to state but that I am a graduate of Oxford, and a member of the Scottish bar; and in reply to M. Cousin's inquiries touching my works, I ought to be ashamed to acknowledge that I have as yet written almost nothing. You must have been misinformed in regard to other articles of mine. I have to answer for nothing in any English review, and of the insignificant occasional trifles of which I may have been guilty, there is nothing which would be at all interesting for M. Cousin to hear of, and not irksome for me to confess. . . .

I am very impatient to see M. Cousin's Lectures for 1829. I am sure that if any work of metaphysical discussion would succeed at present in England, a translation of M. Cousin's Lectures on Locke would. But, in fact, in this country there is no thought now bestowed on any abstract speculation; and no nation, absolutely, in Europe, thinks or cares so little about Locke as his own countrymen. If the English could be brought to read philosophy at all, M. Cousin is just the author to inspire them with a zeal for the study; but, I am sorry to say, I am afraid that, addressed to a British public, even his eloquence would be only "as the voice of one crying in the desert."

. . . Any part of this letter which you may consider interesting to M. Cousin I shall feel obliged by your communicating; and I remain, with the greatest respect, your much obliged

W. HAMILTON.

The following correspondence relates chiefly to the subject of the article now mentioned:—

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

20 Mars 1834.

. . . Je m'attendais bien que la nouvelle Préface des *Fragments* ne vous convertirait pas; mais je me permets d'appeler votre attention sur la théorie de la *Raison*, et vous prie de la bien méditer avant de

la rejeter définitivement ; car toute la question du scepticisme y est engagée, et je crois que si je vous tenais là, je vous prouverais que vous êtes sur la route du scepticisme. Il ne faut pas avoir peur du mot d'*absolu*.

Admet-on, ou n'admet-on pas, de la vérité,—c'est-à-dire, de la vérité absolue,—et sur quel fondement ? On ne le peut que sur la foi de quelque chose en nous qui soit objectif comme son objet même, et ce quelque chose c'est la Raison.

Au reste, je vous envoie aujourd'hui même le volume de M. de Biran, auquel j'ai mis une Introduction purement psychologique, et sans aucune conclusion ontologique et systématique, mais où vous apercevrez pourtant la base d'un système entier. Cette introduction se lie à celle des *Fragmens*, et toutes deux s'éclairent réciproquement. Mais voilà bien des personnalités, quand je n'aurais dû vous parler que de M. de Biran.

Le dessein que vous avez de traduire mes argumens de Platon me touche véritablement ; mais il est sage de l'ajourner tout au moins jusqu'à ce que j'ai fini ou presque fini cette traduction. La mort de Schleiermacher me prive d'un guide utile et que nul autre ne peut remplacer. C'était, avec Hegel, mon meilleur ami de Berlin ; il ne me reste plus en Allemagne que Schelling, dont la santé est loin d'être [bonne].

Je reçois en ce moment la 7<sup>ème</sup> édition de Brown. Mon Dieu ! Luttez, mon cher Monsieur, luttez sans cesse contre cette funeste popularité. En vous sont toutes mes espérances pour la philosophie en Angleterre. Dieu donc vous soit en aide, et vous donne ce que je souhaite à tous mes amis et à moi-même : courage et constance. C'est mon perpétuel refrain.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

24me Août 1834.

Avez-vous enfin reçu M. de Biran ? et que vous semble de mes éloges et de mes critiques ? Ma préface vient au secours de celle des *Fragmens*, qui ne vous a point converti, et je crains bien que celle-ci ne vous convertisse pas davantage. Cependant plus je vais, plus je réfléchis et plus je m'attache à ma théorie de la raison, et comme étant l'expression la plus vraie de ce qui se passe dans l'esprit humain dans l'acquisition de toute vérité, et comme étant le seul moyen d'échapper au scepticisme.

Prenez garde, je vous prie, de ne pas laisser dégénérer la philoso-

phie écossaise dans un scepticisme nouveau qui ne vaudrait guère mieux que l'ancien. Que la philosophie écossaise soit circonspecte dès qu'il s'agit d'ontologie, à la bonne heure ; mais en psychologie, elle ne peut pas ne pas se prononcer sur le caractère de la faculté qui nous découvre la vérité. Si cette faculté est purement subjective, alors reviennent les objections de Kant, contre lesquelles l'expédient de M. Schelling et de M. Hegel, à savoir de placer la perception ou intuition de l'être hors de la conscience, est à mon sens une hypothèse inintelligible et en opposition avec la condition de toute vraie connaissance, d'être accompagnée de la conscience. Entre Kant et la philosophie de la nature, je ne vois de salut que dans la théorie de la raison, subjective et objective tout ensemble. Quant à Fichte, je crois l'avoir assez bien réfuté dans la personne de M. de Biran, et j'appelle votre attention sur cette partie de ma préface. Mais c'est assez vous occuper de moi.

Parlez-moi de vos projets et de la philosophie en Ecosse. J'ai conçu avec M. Pillans l'espérance que vous serez bientôt Professeur de philosophie à la place du bon M. David Ritchie. O utinam ! Dites-moi de qui est l'article du dernier numéro d'Edinburgh Review sur mon compte ; je crois que l'auteur m'accuse à tort d'avoir méinterprété les opinions de Locke ; entre autres son opinion sur l'espace. Dites à l'auteur, si vous le connaissez, que ce n'est pas moi, un Français, mais Reid lui-même qui a convaincu Locke d'avoir trop assimilé l'espace et le corps. On m'apporte à l'instant une traduction anglaise, que l'infatigable Thomas Taylor a publié à Londres, de deux écrits de Proclus sur la providence et sur la nature humaine, dont le texte a péri, et dont j'ai le premier publié la traduction latine un peu barbare faite par Guillaume Moore.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 14th Nov. 1834.

. . . I have received your edition of Biran, and I know not whether to admire most the originality of the author or the more commanding universality of his editor. I was delighted to find you estimating Brown at his proper value. I have also recently received (what I had ordered from Germany) the translation of your new Preface, &c. I have not, however, yet got the treatise on Secondary Instruction. I am much disappointed at this. May I beg you to offer my best acknowledgments to M. Poret for his translation of Sir James Mackintosh's Dissertation? I received much pleasure

from the perusal of the excellent Preface. Your letter by Mr Pillans, having been mislaid by him, I did not receive till long after his return.

. . . I have spoken to Napier about an article on your Preface, and Schelling's remarks. As the editor of a popular journal, he has a perfect horror of the *Absolute*. Nor is he to be blamed, perhaps, for I do not believe there are five readers of the 'Review' who are qualified to comprehend anything above the superficial psychology dignified in this country with the name of Metaphysic, far less to understand the merits of your philosophy and that of Schelling. He has, however, agreed to an article in the number after next—next being already full. Personally, however, I am under far greater difficulties. I am loath to place myself in opposition again to the doctrine of one whom I so sincerely admire and respect, and whose authority as a philosopher is entitled to so great deference; and yet the more I meditate, the more am I compelled to believe that the human mind is unable to form even a rational conception of the Unconditioned; nor, if it could, do I see how this subjective notion of the Absolute-Infinite could afford a real knowledge of the *ὄντως ὄν*. I am, on the one hand, neither able to reject, nor to rise above, nor to overlook, nor, with Hegel, *überwinden*, the contradictions which are involved in every philosophy of the Absolute (the principles of *Contradiction* and *Exclusi Medii* I cannot get rid of); and, on the other, I find that the great law—that the conceivable is always intermediate between two extremes, each equally incomprehensible, and yet each contradictory of the other—affords a simpler solution than has yet been proposed of some of the most difficult and important problems of mental philosophy—*e.g.*, the laws of Causality and Substance. I am quite aware that this doctrine is not *μάλις κατ' εὐχὴν*, and admit that it is a virtual scepticism in regard to the possibility of an Ontology, but I cannot help it. It is only because you wish a discussion on the subject of your difference from Schelling that I would attempt an article of the kind; and if I could, I would wholly avoid interposing my own views in treating of your philosophy in contrast to that of Germany. Perhaps you will tell me what you think of the matter.

I trust that the change in your Ministry may not deprive France and Europe of your invaluable services to the great cause of civilisation. May it only enable you to promote with greater effect your benevolent and enlightened plans. I hope before long to congratulate ourselves on your nomination as Minister of Instruction.

Sir William continued to contribute philosophical and other articles to the 'Review' annually until 1836. In the October number of 1830 appeared the essay on the Philosophy of Perception, having for its text the French edition of the works of Reid by M. Jouffroy, which had recently appeared. This essay is the natural and logical sequel to that on the Unconditioned. In the former, Hamilton had sought to show the grounds on which human thought is to be held as necessarily limited to a phenomenal knowledge of reality. Its scope, in fact, was negative. In the latter, he sought to point out and vindicate a principle on which an observational or experiential knowledge of things might be based—a principle, therefore, which would yield positive results. This was the authority of consciousness, viewed as testifying to certain ultimate facts which are to be sifted by definite analytic criteria. The hint of this ground is no doubt to be found in Reid's principle of Common Sense, and in many previous writers. Hamilton, however, has carried it out to such proportions, and given it so much precision, not only in the essay on Perception, but subsequently in the Dissertations appended to Reid's Works,\* that in his hands it has assumed a new and specific character. It forms, in fact, the salient feature in the positive or constructive side of his philosophy. The main fact to which he regards consciousness as testifying—the synthesis in knowledge of self and not-self, and their antithesis in reality—has, since the time of this essay, become the great central point round which speculative discussions on the question of finite reality have turned, just as the conclusions maintained in the review of Cousin form the sphere of debate in regard to infinite or transcendent being. It might very easily be shown that the view adopted by the late accomplished author of the 'Institutes of Metaphysic' is but a modification of the doctrine of Hamilton on this point, and that it arose naturally and by historical sequence out of the essay on the Philosophy of Perception.

Without, meanwhile, entering into any discussion of the

\* See especially Note A.

conclusions of the article, we may safely affirm that, in the mode of treatment of this central psychological and metaphysical problem, it shows an immense advance on anything that had previously been done on the same question by any British thinker—all the difference, in fact, between a partial, confused, and isolated handling of this and that side of the problem, and a catholic comprehension of it in its various bearings, with a rare power of clear, refined, and un-deviating analysis. The discussion, moreover, manifests, as strikingly as any of his writings, the author's power of making his enlarged philosophical reading the pabulum of his own reflection; of raising forgotten distinctions, in which an ordinary mind would see nothing to note, to the rank of fruitful and luminous principles; and of giving to the speculations of individual thinkers their due place in the order of philosophical theory.

The following letter refers to the article on Perception:—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 23d Oct. 1830.

SIR,— . . . As there is no one whose character and genius I more ardently admire, I need not say how greatly flattered I am by the expressions of your esteem, though I could wish they had a worthier object than the crude and hasty production to which they relate. In return for your admirable work (brass for gold), I have the presumption to send you a copy of an article of mine which appears in the present number of the 'Edinburgh Review.' It was so long that I found it necessary to eject everything not absolutely essential. It thus, in many places, wants development; and the introduction, in which I had availed myself of your authority, is rendered awkward and abrupt. Of this part I send you the sheets as they ought to have appeared, and this is the curtailment that I most regret. I enclose two other copies, which, if you think the article of any interest, I would request you to present to M. Royer-Collard and M. Jouffroy; I can hardly, I think, take the liberty of presenting it to these gentlemen in my own name.

In regard to your inquiry touching the present state of metaphysical philosophy in this country, the reply is easy—we have nearly none. The works on this subject of late published in Britain (independently

of the last volumes of Mr Stewart and Sir James Mackintosh's Dissertation) are, as far as I know (but I must confess that I am very imperfectly acquainted with them), too insignificant to merit notice. If, however, you are desirous of closely "spying the nakedness of the land," I shall have great pleasure in obtaining for you any information in my power.—With sentiments of the greatest respect, I have the honour to remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

Two years after the date of the article on Perception, Sir William made his third important philosophical contribution to the 'Review.' This was the article on Logic, which appeared in 1833—being a review of the recent English treatises on that science, especially Dr Whately's 'Logic.' Like the essays on the Unconditioned and on Perception, this article inaugurated a new era in the mode of dealing with its subject, by showing, for the first time in this country, the true place of formal logic in the range of the philosophical sciences. The spirit of philosophising which had turned away from the higher metaphysical problems, had also proscribed formal logic. Although Reid wrote an able summary of the Aristotelic logic, the science itself had no proper place in his philosophy. Stewart referred to "the logic of the Schools" only with contempt, and desired to put in its stead a "rational logic," or theory of scientific method. Bacon had bequeathed this contempt of the Aristotelic logic to philosophy in Britain, and the course of thought had been sufficiently true to his spirit. The science itself was persistently contemned or ignored because of its too exclusively deductive applications during the scholastic period. Men had reasoned too much then, or rather had put reasoning in the place of observation and induction, and we were therefore called upon to omit as useless, or positively hurtful, any scientific study of the laws of reasoning itself. This has been, in the main, the spirit of the cultivators of the sciences of observation and analysis from the Baconian epoch to the present day. The theoretical result is the omission from its rightful place of one most important element of the body of human

knowledge, and the consequent marring of the symmetry of the philosophical sciences. The practical consequence is, an undue estimate of the mere possession of so-called facts, however crudely arranged or digested, and the substitution, in a liberal education, of information for culture—the evil results of which are seen in many departments of our literature, but nowhere more than in scientific writing, which is, as a rule, conspicuous for want of definition, subordination, consecution, and generally all the qualities of good method.\*

Dr Whately had done something to turn attention to the value of the Aristotelic logic, both as a test of valid reasoning and as a mental discipline. But with all his acuteness and practical ability, Whately, while clearing the science of logic from much that is extraneous to it, yet failed to ground it on any thorough-going scientific principle. In particular, his limitation of logic to the theory of reasoning or syllogism was fatal to the completeness and symmetry of the science; for a correct theory of syllogism must have its ground in a doctrine of notions and propositions, the laws of which only find a higher application in reasoning. In his review of Whately, Hamilton laid down a principle by which logic, as the science of the form of thought, may be distinguished alike from psychology and from the other sciences which assume and apply its rules. Thus also was the science of formal logic marked off from the logic of induction, with which, to the great detriment of both, the former had been confounded.

In the article on Logic we may trace very decidedly the influence of the long-continued study of the *Organon* of Aristotle both on the mental habits and the opinions of the author. With the *Organon* he was familiar as daily food; and he revelled in its curt, compact, and precise thought and style as in a congenial atmosphere—in the “*lumen siccum*,” which, in formal logic at least, is the best light. The various difficulties with

\* M. Peisse has some very valuable remarks on the neglect of logical training which prevailed till lately in the French Universities.—See his ‘*Fragmens*,’ *Préface*, p. cxix.



which commentators had wrestled afforded him a familiar and delightful arena. Here, as in everything, he might have taken as his motto, "*res severa est verum gaudium*." In this essay he vindicated his title to be regarded as an authoritative expositor of the text, on fundamental points where before its true import had been misapprehended.\* The 'Logik' of Kant had also, it is obvious, a large share in the formation of his views on the nature of the science of logic, and its place among the other branches of philosophy. But the contents of this essay even, to say nothing of his subsequent logical theories, show that with all his admiration for Aristotle, and his high estimate of Kant as a thinker, he was faithful to the spirit of the words:—"Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri, sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas, nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est."

It was from the 'Review' article that Hamilton's subsequent speculations on Logic took their direction and colouring. Nor did he ever fairly pass, in his actual treatment of the science, beyond the bounds of the formal division of it to inductive or material logic—the theory of scientific method. This he has left to others to prosecute. The portion of logic which he took up in the article, and subsequently, has a very obvious connection with the discussion on the Unconditioned; for it is in the formal department of logic that we find an analysis of the nature and laws of thought—the doctrine of the formally conceivable—points which have an immediate bearing on the question of the reach and limits of our faculties, in dealing with what is regarded as Infinite or Absolute.

Thus these three essays—on the Unconditioned, on Perception, and on Logic—though apparently isolated, and contributed at intervals of time to a periodical, in which the greater part of the writing necessarily falls out of view and memory very speedily, have yet a real philosophical unity;

\* See particularly the remarks on the Inductive Syllogism, 'Discussions,' p. 156.

and each supplied a marked want in the speculative literature of the time. They are not likely to be forgotten in British philosophical literature. Yet impressive as is the suggestion which they give of power and learning, it is melancholy to think that those accomplishments appeared so late in the lifetime of their possessor—appeared, too, almost by accident; and that even after they were revealed, they were kept by him in a reserve, which stayed his hand from completing the edifice designed—one so rare in conception, so grand in its ideal proportions, that even the tracings of its first lines stir the soul which ponders them with emotions akin to those inspired by the fragments of the stateliest architecture, or by the partly-shrouded form of a far-reaching, undefined, mountain height.\*

In the following letter to Sir William, Mr Napier refers to the article on Logic, and notices, among other things, certain of its peculiarities of style.

MR NAPIER TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

*April 1833.*

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,— . . . I hope you will contrive, on after occasions, to be ready in such time as not to be so hurried with the important business of correcting. This is more particularly necessary in regard to such subjects as those you handle. Had there been a little more time at present, I would have requested you to try to enlighten some dark spots, the sight of which may chance to turn away the impatient readers of this fastidious age from the whole; and I would also have begged you to soften various expressions, which wear a more harsh and jeering aspect than is perhaps necessary in such discussions. As it is, I have only softened one or two places. The primary responsibility falls on the editor; and Whately and Hampden may fairly think that so many hard blows were not to be expected from one who had been in intercourse with them, and been benefited by their assistance.

You have made a very remarkable article, both in respect of learning and thought. The learning, indeed, is altogether surpassing. No other man in Britain—I question if anywhere—could match it. As to the philosophy, I am not sure that I have been able to follow

\* On the influence of these essays, and generally of Hamilton's philosophical writings, in America, see Note B.

you, or that I should be able, even with the benefit of a more leisurely perusal. I think you are wrong, I confess, in imagining that such discussions do not admit of a more intelligible style. Philosophy is brought down to a mere squabble about terms when it expresses itself in terms that require a special lexicon for their interpretation. Hutcheson, Smith, Campbell, Reid, and Stewart may often be wrong, but they are always clear, and never speak in a language peculiar to themselves or to any school.

The Oxford doctors will no longer scoff at our Scotch ignorance of Greek, &c. I should suppose you have fairly beat them with their own weapons. They will, however, take the merit of having taught you, and will very probably say that if your training had been pure Scottish training you would have been nothing. We shall leave them to make a syllogism of this.—Ever most faithfully yours,

M. NAPIER.

The history and literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had been a favourite subject of study with Sir William from his Oxford days. The universality of attainment, and the cultured completeness of the men of that epoch, were features of character entirely according to his own heart. Further, their arduous struggles for the revival of learning, the noble efforts of several of them for the reform of the Church, even their personal literary controversies—which, however, generally typified vital interests and principles—roused the polemic spirit within him as keenly as the ballad of Otterbourne ever stirred the soul of chivalry that was in Sir Philip Sidney. The display of high critical acumen, and the figure of the literary athlete standing well in the fight, had a charm for him in themselves; and this was greatly enhanced if a moral interest were involved. Hence he entered thoroughly into the spirit and literature of that stirring controversial period which witnessed the production of the ‘*De Subtilitate ad Cardanum*,’ the ‘*De Causis Linguae Latinæ*,’ and the ‘*Epistolæ*’ of Julius Cæsar Scaliger, and the even fiercer polemical writings of his son. He was familiar with the ‘*Adagia*,’ the ‘*Apothegmata*,’ the ‘*Encomium Moris*’ of Erasmus; with whose subtle, refined,

and scholarly spirit he sympathised—not the less, perhaps, that it was too fastidious for much of the practical work of the time. With the lives and writings of Reuchlin and Hutten he was especially conversant. He admired the rare philological attainments of the former as the prince of Hellenists, and as almost the only Hebraist of his time ; while the accomplishments of Hutten as wit, poet, orator, and theologian, formed attractions for him, which were enhanced by the prominent part that he took in the struggles of the period for the revival of letters, and the large share that he had in the composition of the ‘*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*.’ It was from his stores of reading on this important period of the literary history of Europe that Sir William contributed to the ‘*Review*’ (1831) the article on the authorship of the famous national satire of Germany. In it he explains the circumstances of the period, entering thoroughly into the spirit of the time, and giving a graphic sketch of the character of Reuchlin, the difficulties with which he had to contend, and the aid furnished to his cause by the remarkable ‘*Epistolæ*,’ written by some of his friends in the assumed character of his opponents. For the first time the authorship of the ‘*Epistolæ*’ was definitely ascertained, and assigned to the co-operation of three distinguished literary men of the time—Hutten, Crotus, and Buschius. This article was translated into German the year after it appeared. Sir William’s decision of the question raised has been generally accepted as final by German critics.

For many years Sir William had been silently engaged in the study of the literature connected with the constitution and history of the European universities. The one great practical interest of his life lay in the higher education of the country ; and this led him, in his usual comprehensive way of dealing with a subject, to penetrate on all sides to the utmost bounds of its literature. The result was a wonderful accumulation of knowledge regarding the university systems of Europe, and the opinions of the best writers on the higher

education. His researches moreover, had ripened into definite thought, and on no subject were his convictions more fully formed, pointed, and intense, than on the proper constitution and government of universities as a means of promoting liberal education. His interest in these subjects had hitherto been that merely of a student; but public attention was now being turned to the actual condition of the British universities, and Mr Napier, being well aware of his friend's mastery of the whole subject, used his influence to get him to take it up in the 'Review.' The result was the very remarkable series of articles on the Universities and University Reform, with which commenced Sir William's practical influence on the machinery for the higher education of the country—an influence which has proved hardly less powerful and commanding than that of his speculative writings on the philosophical thought of the times. The learning with which these essays were illustrated,—the information that was conveyed regarding the history of universities, Continental and British, and regarding the perversions of constitution through which they had passed,—above all, the singularly rigorous and elevated ideal of what university instruction should aim at—the scorn, even little measured, of mere professional attainments, and the lofty view of the intellectual man as an end in himself, and not an instrument,—served to quicken and elevate the general thought and feeling of readers, and to impart new and definite conceptions of the direction which true progress in university reform ought to take.

Accordingly, in the 'Review' of June 1831, appeared the first of the articles on "The State of the English Universities, with more especial reference to Oxford." This was followed in December by a second article on the same subject, supplementary to, and in vindication of, the first. Subsequently, in 1834 and 1835, Sir William contributed to the 'Review' two articles "On the Right of Dissenters to Admission into the English Universities;" and one, in the former of those

years, on the "Patronage and Superintendence of Universities generally."

In the articles on Oxford, Sir William advocated in a very powerful way the restoration of the public or university element, which, though in the constitution of the university the main and original one, had almost entirely disappeared, through the rise and encroachments of the collegiate interest. He showed that one principal result of this usurpation by the colleges of the function of the university proper had been the abandonment of certain essential and statutory branches of academical education, and the lowering of the teaching, even in those retained, to the average level of tutorial competency—which he by no means rated high. Subsequently, on occasion of the republication of the articles contributed to the 'Review' (1852), he added an Appendix on "A Reform of the English Universities, with especial reference to Oxford, and limited to the Faculty of Arts."

The tone of the articles on Oxford has been censured as severe even to an extreme. Feeling that he was fighting single-handed, and at desperate odds, against what he conceived to be flagrant abuses, firmly intrenched in usage and self-interest, he rises to the full height of that critical and controversial vehemence which was part of his nature, and which those who knew him only in his public relations were apt very erroneously to regard as the main or salient point in the character of the man. It was his peculiarity to throw the whole force of his nature into whatever he took in hand; and, in controversy particularly, its manifestation might very aptly be described in the words of Seneca, "*Quemadmodum flamma surgit in rectum, jacere et deprimi non potest, non magis quam quiescere; ita noster animus in motu est, eo mobilior et actuosior, quo vehementior fuerit.*"

"When Sir William published his severe attack on Oxford in the 'Edinburgh Review,'" says Archdeacon Sinclair, "I expressed surprise that he did not treat his own venerable *Alma Mater* with more filial indulgence. 'Indulgence!' he

exclaimed; 'Oxford does not require indulgence, and that is the very reason why I chose it for the subject of my article. There is hardly any university against which I have not more to say. I am not so great a coward as to select the weakest antagonist.' "

In the two articles of 1834 and 1835, "On the Right of Dissenters to Admission into the English Universities," he put the question on a new and proper footing. Having shown in the previous articles that the university was in fact the original element, he maintained the general right of all to demand the restoration of this element, especially in the form of public instruction, to its legal or statutory condition. That the university existed only through the colleges—the staple argument of the opponents of the bill then before Parliament—he had shown to be untenable. The supporters of the bill of 1834 had not known or proceeded on this ground. They had sought admission into the university through the colleges, and thus rested their case on a much weaker ground than was open to them.

The interest, opposition, and discussion excited by these articles proved most salutary. They served to impart much-needed information regarding the constitution and history of the English universities, to correct prevalent misconceptions, and to direct attention to proved abuses. They attracted the notice, among others, of Lord Radnor, who took an active interest in university reform; and a correspondence ensued between him and Sir William on the subject. Lord Radnor was strongly impressed by Sir William's views. In one of his letters he says: "The perusal of your different articles in the 'Edinburgh Review' of 1831 and of last year has very much enlarged my views on the subject; and my object is now, if possible, to throw open the university altogether. With this view, at the suggestion of a friend, I am preparing a string of resolutions, to be submitted to the Lords, stating historically the fact that the benefits of the university education have been gradually confined within

narrower and narrower limits, and showing how they may be still further limited, till there shall not be a single student not belonging to some foundation; and praying that the king will take steps for causing such a visitation as shall lead to the alteration of the statutes in such a manner as will again open the university at least to all the king's subjects."\* Besides thus throwing open the university, Lord Radnor was desirous also of "restoring the old practice of public lectures and professorial education." His lordship at length determined to proceed by bill rather than by resolutions. After some further correspondence with Sir William, particularly on the question of the utility of tests, the bill was brought forward and discussed in the House of Lords on 14th July 1835. It was made a question of party and of support of the Church, and thrown out by 163 to 57.

Notwithstanding the defeat of Lord Radnor's bill, Sir William lived to see his criticism of Oxford bear fruit, and to receive an acknowledgment of his services in the cause of English university reform from several members of the Oxford Commission of 1850. Several of the leading changes introduced into that university by the bill founded on the Report of the Commissioners, were in the direction which Sir William had indicated as desirable; in particular, the revival, in part at least, of the university or professorial element, and the reconstitution of the governing body of the university. Writing to Sir William (April 1852) the Rev. G. H. Johnson (now Dean of Wells), one of the Commissioners on Oxford University Reform, says:—

. . . "Many of your essays have had a most beneficial influence (in my opinion) upon university affairs, and have been of the utmost use in preparing the world for the Report of the Commission, which I am going to deliver in to-day. I fear that no opportunity occurred to mention our obligations to you as they deserved; the articles in question have been so long before the world, and so commonly read, that they have

\* Lord Radnor to Sir W. Hamilton, March 10, 1835.



become in some sort public property ; and, without some reflection, one does not consider to whom the original account of the Oxford constitution is owing."

The Rev. A. P. Stanley, now Dean of Westminster, writes, 5th June 1852:—

"It gives me much pleasure to receive from you so flattering a tribute to our Report. I can only repeat our regret that we were unable to refer more directly to the name of one who has so powerfully contributed towards it by advocacy of reform at a time when its need was less acknowledged than at present, and by the stores of information which the articles in the 'Edinburgh Review' supplied on a subject till then almost unknown."

Similar testimony is given by the Rev. F. D. Maurice:—

"The form which this proposition has taken is certainly not that which it would have taken twenty or thirty years ago. Then it was supposed that the old universities required to be reformed according to modern maxims ; that they ought to abandon as much as possible their original character, which was presumed to be a narrow one. What has been attempted in this bill, successfully or unsuccessfully, has been to restore part of their original character which had been lost, to bring back the most ancient idea of the university, partly because this was also found to be the most comprehensive. This change in the direction of our thoughts and plans is owing, I conceive, very principally to the writings of an eminent Scotchman, Sir W. Hamilton. In his articles in the 'Edinburgh Review,' about twenty years ago, he showed very clearly that the universities, properly so called, had been merged in the colleges—that the reform which was most demanded was to restore them to life. He endeavoured to support this important doctrine by charges against the conduct of the colleges, some of which I think were not supported by evidence, and have been disproved by subsequent investigations. He appeared to regard the whole scheme of colleges with a suspicion and dislike in which I cannot participate. Respect for

the name of Balliol, and for the benefits which have proceeded out of the society bearing that name from the fourteenth century to the present day, would alone prevent me from adopting that opinion. But this difference does not make me less sensible of the obligation under which Sir W. Hamilton has laid us all, by asserting the necessity of giving prominence and efficiency to the university, and not suffering the discipline of the colleges, valuable as that may be, to overshadow it. It is this consideration which has led many, who have exceedingly disliked the thought of legislative interference with the bodies from which they have derived some of the greatest blessings of their lives, to acquiesce in the necessity of the present measure—even to desire that a more comprehensive one had been adopted.”\*

In April 1834 appeared the article on the “Patronage and Superintendence of Universities,” which had for its text the ‘Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State of the Universities of Scotland,’ printed in 1831. Here Sir William seeks, first of all, to lay down the general principles and conditions of an efficient scheme of university patronage—a matter which, in this country at least, has proved so difficult to realise. Bringing his rare acquaintance with the history of the universities of Europe to bear on the subject, he gives an account of that form of patronage and superintendence which had been found to work best in the universities of Italy, Holland, and Germany. This was an extra-academical board of curators specially constituted for the purpose—small, intelligent, responsible, and conditionally permanent. He supports this system by direct argument, by the facts of academic history, and by a trenchant and severe review of the modes of university patronage then subsisting in this country—viz., the municipal, professorial, and regal. The province of this limited body of curators would be “to discover, to compare, to choose, to recommend, and to specify the grounds of their preference to the Minister of State, with whom the definite

\* *Learning and Working*, p. 10 *et seq.*

nomination would remain—a nomination, however, which would be only formal if the curators conscientiously fulfilled the duties of their trust.”\* The subject of academical patronage, with especial reference to the University of Edinburgh, is further prosecuted in the Appendix to the ‘Discussions.’†

This article was the first attempt in this country to grapple in a competent and intelligent manner with the vexed subject of university patronage. It and the articles on the English universities must be referred to as affording the prime impulse and direction to that spirit of discussion and inquiry regarding the constitution and patronage of the universities of Scotland, which resulted in the Universities Act of 1858. The views advocated by Sir William in those contributions to the ‘Review’ influenced very considerably the Report of the Burgh Commissioners (1835), in so far as it referred to the universities. This Report recommended a small extra-academical board of curators (five in number), as a substitute for the Town Council in the case of the University of Edinburgh,—thus adopting the principle of the scheme advocated in the ‘Review.’ Sir William subsequently says of the comparatively simple method of the Burgh Commissioners, that it would be “a marvellous improvement on the present reign of ignorance, favour, passion, and caprice.”‡ “The University Court” of Lord Advocate Inglis’s bill is, in certain of its features, analogous to the schemes recommended by Sir William and the Burgh Commissioners.

It still remains for experience to show whether, by the present constitution of the university courts, we have secured the most efficient system of academical patronage possible in the circumstances of the country—whether, in fact, we have solved the difficult and delicate problem of the best mode of appointment to professorial chairs. In a body so limited, and with no check save a conflicting and often ill-informed public opinion, nearly all depends on securing men who are at once edu-

\* Discussions, p. 396.

† Appendix III. A., p. 708 *et seq.*

‡ Discussions, p. 399.

cated, courageous, and upright—the conscious holders of a high and sacred trust for the country. In this case, but in this case only, we shall find electors willing and able to look beyond the *alumni* of the local university; to put a very modified trust in mere testimonials; to discourage the insulting process of a personal canvass by interested parties; to despise sectarian clamour; and actively to seek out and sift evidence of qualification even among men who, in the absence of special interest in the town and neighbourhood of the university, are deterred from coming forward as candidates. The necessity for securing these conditions of an efficient and impartial patronage will lead to the enlargement of the present electing body; and probably the best mode of doing this, and thereby effectually annihilating powerful local influences in favour of particular candidates, would be to fuse the four bodies at present separately intrusted with the patronage into one general body for the appointment of professors in the whole of the universities.

Sir William's exposure and vehement censure of the prevailing system of examination for degrees, alike in arts and in medicine, and his suggestions as to the propriety of introducing extra-academical examiners, and generally elevating the standard for both degrees,\* served materially to pave the way for the regulations on these subjects of the recent Universities Act.

In 1832 Sir William contributed two articles to the 'Review,'—one in July, on "The Revolutions of Medicine, in reference to Cullen;" the other in October, on "Johnson's Translation of Tennemann's Manual of Philosophy."

In July 1833 appeared the review of Cousin's Report on German Schools. Reference to this article is made in the following letter:—

MY DEAR SIR,—When I received your letter, about a month ago, I had been reproaching myself for having delayed so long thanking you for the two editions of your 'Rapport,' &c. Your letter, how-

\* Discussions, Appendix III. A.

ever, caused me to defer writing you till I could collect the pieces necessary to afford you the information you wished in regard to our Scottish parochial schools. These I sent about a fortnight since to Mrs Austin, to be transmitted through your ambassador, or in any other way she might think better. . . . I regret that you will find the information so scanty, and the schools themselves so overpraised. Our Scottish system of education for the people only merits commendation by contrast to the English. I trust that the example of France, of which you have been the principal author, may shame our Government out of their negligence. I have been, indeed, deeply gratified to see you obtaining so great and merited an influence in the councils of your country; and this not so much on your own account (however interested I feel in all that concerns your honour), as for the pledge it affords for the welfare of France and Europe.

In your letter you mention a *brochure* on the state of popular education in Prussia. This I have not received, and I regret it, as it would (I imagine) have enabled me to make a more elegant epitome of your 'Rapport' than is given in the article—wholly unworthy of the subject—in the last number of the 'Edinburgh Review.' This (of which you will believe me guilty) was, from unavoidable causes, delayed till near the moment of publication, and then written against time.

I am much gratified to hear that philosophy prospers so well in France under your auspices. I look with impatience for the new edition of your 'Fragmens,' and its Preface. I shall certainly be highly flattered by any notice on your part, however unworthy I am of the honour. Nothing can be more melancholy than the state of philosophy with us. Two articles of mine in the 'Edinburgh Review' on the English translation of Tennemann's 'Grundriss,' and on the recent writers on 'Logic' in England, may afford some illustration of this. . . . —Believe me, &c. &c., W. HAMILTON.

PORTENCROSS, 1st August 1833.

The articles on University Reform and Patronage of 1834 and 1835 have already been noticed. In July 1835 appeared the essay "On the Deaf and Dumb—History of their Instruction, in reference to Dalgarno." In January 1836 appeared the famous article "On the Study of Mathematics as an Exercise of Mind." In the course of the discussion its

author lays down much that is valuable on the subject of the nature and conditions of liberal education. The limited utility which he is disposed to attribute to mathematics as a mental discipline has of course given rise to much comment and criticism. This article has been translated into French, German, and Italian.

In the following letter, which refers to the article on Mathematics, we have a glimpse of the troubles of the editor from the irregular habits of composition and procrastination of the contributor. The grounds of complaint appear to have been pretty constant. At length the wrath of the editor has reached its height.

*Saturday night (very late) [1836].*

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I will not disguise from you that I felt at first exceedingly provoked, as well as diffculted, by the exorbitant length of your article, which exceeds the utmost limit you yourself asked by nearly a sheet and a half! This mode of proceeding on your part has happened so often, and is so obviously incompatible with those fixed arrangements which every editor is entitled, and in fact is necessitated, to make, as to compel me to say, that if you are to continue to favour me with your assistance—and I need not, I presume, say how much I value it—you must comply with those necessary conditions which no man connected with the ‘Review,’ however high, but yourself, sets altogether at naught.

I have taken an hour to deliberate what course to pursue; and there is so much risk of delaying the publication, to the great detriment of the proprietor and the work, by following the only course I can take, consistently with the insertion of your article in this number, that it really has not been easy for me to make up my mind. However, as I had, perhaps incautiously, notified that an article on Mathematical Study was forthcoming, and as my own views coincide entirely with your most able and valuable article, I have resolved to print it as it stands—to postpone another article in consequence—and to set up from MS. (and hence the risk of delay) a shorter one, in order to enable me to get yours inserted without mutilation. If I fail in getting all ready in time, I shall have much cause to regret the resolution I have come to. . . .

Let me beg of you to change some of those phrases which will be

called pedantic and scholastic—recollecting that we cannot change the taste of the age, and that we ought, in addressing ourselves to it, to have some regard to its tastes.

Such phrases, too, as “the Plato of later times,” “the Dictator of Letters,” &c., belong entirely to a bygone age. Excuse me for these remarks. I have in this article and on other occasions deferred to your wishes and tastes more than to those of any other contributor; and it is not, I hope, too much in me to ask that I may not be subjected, as editor, to certain critical charges which I do not wish to incur.

I would have wished all the authorities in the type of the text, but the number and the length of the article render this impossible.

. . . —Ever most truly yours,

M. NAPIER.

CASTLE STREET, Feb. 1 [1836].

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,— . . . I do not know whether you would like to see all the criticisms I have got on this article. In one respect they would please you, namely, that all of them allow it to display great talent and learning. But the observations on style, obscurity, &c. &c., would not be so palatable. One criticism, I confess, I was not quite prepared for—viz., that the argument is injured by the “cloud of witnesses,” which, it is said, has been huddled together without discrimination, and without any rational view of the value of authorities. Lord Brougham, in a letter I received yesterday among others, makes this remark, and adds, that he is sorry the writer, whom he praises for ability and learning, should have adopted a tone in regard to mathematics so widely different from that of the cautious and philosophical D. Stewart.

If you are to write an article on classical education we must settle about it immediately. And you must allow me to say that, after reasonable limits are fixed, they must be adhered to; and further, that the article must be given me in such *time* as to admit of deliberate revision, instead of being sent at the close when all is hurry. Do, then, make up your mind deliberately, and let me know the result as soon as possible. I must arrange the articles, spaces, &c., for next number in a very few days. . . . —Ever most truly yours,

M. NAPIER.

In the October number of the ‘Review’ of this year (1836) appeared the article “On the Conditions of Classical Learning, relative to the Defence of Classical Education by Professor

Pillans." Sir William's regular contributions to the 'Review' now ceased, owing to his appointment to the Logic Chair, which, as we shall see, took place this year, and to the occupation of his time in the preparation of his Lectures. After a lapse of three years (April 1839) he contributed a short article "On Idealism with reference to the scheme of Arthur Collier." This was his last contribution to the 'Review.'

The following probably refers to Mr Carlyle's letter already given, and the proposal which it contained that Sir William should become a contributor to the new periodical\* :—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MRS AUSTIN.

EDINBURGH, *November 26, 1834.*

. . . What has become of the new Review? I am afraid there is hardly much to be expected for the success of a periodical on the same plan (however different the principles) as the old reviews. I am much flattered in being thought worth asking as a contributor, but could hardly promise to be more than an occasional ally (supposing always a harmony of views), as I am too much occupied with matters apart from all popular interest, and have in the 'Edinburgh Review' an outlet more than sufficient for any superfluous energy with which I may be distressed. I meant to have enclosed a letter for our friend Mr Carlyle along with this, as I have mislaid a letter of his with his address in London, but find that I am already late enough for the post. I shall take the liberty of doing so in a day or two, and beg you would address it. . . . How are we all thrown back by this disastrous exercise of royal will! I trust, however, it will be a useful lesson to the Whigs.†

The preparation of the contributions to the 'Review,' referred to in this chapter, necessarily formed Sir William's principal occupation during the period from 1829 to 1836; and he was now evidently looking rather to philosophy than to law as the main work of his life. In 1832, however, he had received from the Crown a minor legal appointment (the Solicitorship of Teinds), which required his attendance in the Parliament House once or twice a-week. The function of the Teind

\* *Supra*, p. 127.

† The reference is probably to the dissolution of the Melbourne Ministry.



Court is to consider and determine applications by ministers of the Church of Scotland for augmentation of stipend out of a fund set apart for this purpose at the Reformation. It is the duty of the Solicitor of Teinds, along with the Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General, to watch over the interests of the Crown in the matter of applications to the Court. Sir William was well versed in the subject of teinds, which implies considerable antiquarian and legal attainments. This office, the salary of which is inconsiderable, was the only piece of legal promotion which he ever received.

Sir William's contributions to the 'Edinburgh Review,' coupled with the remembrance of his career in the University of Glasgow, had attracted towards him the attention of the venerable Professor Mylne, his former teacher. The following letter contains a proposal of much interest, which, if it had been carried out, must have very materially affected the course of philosophical instruction and opinion in the west of Scotland :—

PROFESSOR MYLNE TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

FAIRLIE, BY LARGS, AYESHIRE,  
August 22, 1834.

MY DEAR SIR,—I beg leave to state to you a proposal to which I beg you will give your deliberate and serious consideration. I preface it only by saying that I feel a deep interest in it, and that your concurrence with it will be highly gratifying to me, and, I trust, may eventually contribute materially to your honour and advantage.

You probably know that, for reasons which I need not now detail, I have for some time past meditated my retirement from the Chair which I have held in the University of Glasgow for thirty-seven years ; and that above eighteen months ago I formed, and proposed to the Faculty, a plan by which I thought this purpose could be effected in a way easy to myself and beneficial to the University. But that plan, though it received the cordial approbation of the greater number of my colleagues, encountered an opposition which I did not anticipate, and which, as I see no means of conquering it but such as neither prudence nor my sincere concern for the advancement of sound and enlightened philosophy permit me to adopt, I shall no longer contend against.

My failure, however, in this instance has not abated the earnestness of my desire to secure, as soon as I can, the great objects for which my plan was formed. I am still anxious to obtain my immediate and speedy release from the professional duties incumbent on me, and for the due discharge of which I feel myself becoming daily more and more unfit. I long to see them transferred from me to one whose acknowledged talents and acquirements, whose known pursuits and predominating propensities towards philosophical and accurate inquiry, and whose confirmed habits of severe and persevering study, eminently qualify him for the trust. I am still eagerly desirous that, during the probably short remainder of life that may be allowed to me, I may enjoy the pleasure of witnessing the fidelity and success with which such a person, my appointed substitute and successor, shall acquit himself in my stead; and that when I am called to quit the world, I may leave it with the high satisfaction of thinking that I have contributed something to establish in our Chair of Ethical and Political Science a person worthy of its importance, and who, during a life that, it may be hoped, will be long and happy, shall nobly emulate and sustain the merited honours which some of my illustrious predecessors have brought by their genius and exertions on themselves, on the University, and particularly on that Chair.

With these objects in view, my proposal to you is that you should heartily concur with me in the attempt to bring about immediately or speedily the appointment of yourself to be my assistant, or rather my substitute during my life, and successor when I die. I am sorry that I must thus subject you as well as myself to a course of exertion which, though I cannot believe it will be fruitless, yet I cannot represent as very easy or agreeable in itself, and which might be found by some so repugnant to their tastes and feelings that they would rather reject my proposal at once and altogether than engage in it. If I could I would include in the act of resignation an express clause that you were to be appointed my successor as the condition of its fulfilment on my part; and if my resignation, so stated, were to be recognised and admitted by the patrons of the Chair, I would certainly, without hesitation or delay, put it into their hands. But I am sure that a resignation so limited would not be—indeed, for very obvious and strong reasons, I think it ought not to be—received by them. All, therefore, that I can do to promote your appointment is, to give you, as I now do, my full warrant and authority to offer yourself as a candidate for my office, and my

deliberate promise that, as soon as you shall receive the assured support of a sufficient number of the electors, I shall make way for your admission to my Chair by an explicit and full resignation of it, on the terms that shall have previously been agreed on between us and fixed by the concurrence of the Faculty. I need not add, that nothing that I can do, or that is within the reach of such influence as I can with propriety employ with the electors, shall be wanting on my part to advance your success.

The terms on which I am willing to resign may be generally and briefly stated as follows :—

First, That during my life I retain the whole salary payable to the Professor of Moral Philosophy ;

Secondly, that I relinquish to you the whole of the other emoluments arising from the discharge of the duties connected with the Chair.

I readily and cheerfully consent that from the beginning of your career you shall draw the whole of the emoluments arising from the devotion of your time, your talents, and your exertions to the duties of the Chair—that is to say, the fees or honorariums you may receive, not only from students attending the public and the private Ethic classes, but also from those who attend classes in which you give lectures, or otherwise communicate instruction on subjects that come within the line prescribed for the Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy by the statutes of the College, or that have been sanctioned by former custom and practice of the Ethical Chair, or that may be chosen by your own taste and judgment, allowed and authorised by the permission of the Faculty. Of such subjects there is a great variety, and of these several which I believe will be found to harmonise with those inquiries to which your studies have been specially directed, and on which, of course, you will find it easy to give highly useful and popular prelections—such, for instance, as jurisprudence ; the origin and progress of human society, and of the modifications of social and civil institutions ; the principles of government and its different forms ; philosophy, political and economical ; ancient philosophy, physical and ethical—a subject the adoption of which by you will, I doubt not, be greatly encouraged by our two professors of languages, and by all who are desirous of promoting in the Scottish universities a more diligent cultivation of these languages, &c. &c. &c.

I will anxiously look for your deliberate and well-considered reply to my proposal. If, after carefully pondering it yourself, and con-

sulting with your most confidential friends respecting it (to whom *only* I request your communications on the subject may for the present be made), you should determine to decline, be so good as to let me know your rejection; but I shall be much more desirous to learn from you soon your concurrence with me in it.

I would be happy to enjoy a personal communication with you on the subject, and would be glad if you could for that purpose make me a visit here. That visit it will be in all respects both convenient and gratifying to me to receive; and the sooner the more gratifying.

Believe me to be with sincere esteem and regard, my dear sir,  
yours faithfully,

J. MYLNE.

Sir William appears to have declined this proposal. The appointment lay with the Senate of the University; and he probably judged that the influence which, in accordance with the habits of the place, was certain to be put forth in favour of the local candidate, was likely to be too strong even for the reviewer of Cousin and author of the essays on Perception and Logic. Another consideration that weighed with him was the prospect of his becoming a candidate for the Chair of Logic in Edinburgh, which was likely soon to be vacant by the resignation of its holder, Dr David Ritchie.

Along with the preparation of the articles for the 'Review,' which was the most important occupation and the chief visible result of the years referred to in this chapter, Sir William was of course carrying on his usual studies in their various branches. Among these he continued to pursue those physiological researches which have been alluded to. One of the outlets which he found for his interest in this direction was in a series of experiments on his children, the results of which remain recorded in very elaborate tables. In reference to this matter Lady Hamilton says:—"The children became victims to his love of investigation and experiment, being subjected from the day of their birth to a process of weighing and measuring which does not often fall to the lot of such little creatures. The matter to be ascertained was the rate of growth of the body, especially the head, during the

first few weeks of life. For the purpose of this inquiry—which was connected with Sir William's investigations on the brain—elaborate measurements were taken (with callipers, tape, and flexible leaden bands) of the head of each of our children in succession; drawings being also made to show the varying configuration of the skull. The other part of the process was of a somewhat novel kind. The child, stretched on a wooden board, was placed on one balance of a pair of (Degraue's) scales, while on the other, in order to supply a deficiency of proper weights, were laid two volumes of the quarto edition of Montaigne's 'Essais' (the weight of which, as well as of the board and child's clothes, had been previously ascertained); and in this way, with the assistance of an old nurse, who cordially entered into his scientific ardour, Sir William proceeded to satisfy himself of the child's weight, of which on each occasion he took an accurate note. During the first few weeks, when the rate of growth was very rapid, these observations were made almost daily. Afterwards the weighing and measuring operations became less frequent, and were subsequently gone through only at intervals of a month or two. Nor were the observations on the growth of the head confined to our own children: those of our most intimate friends were made the subjects of a scarcely less minute examination.

"When his eldest boy grew too big to be weighed on scales, a handkerchief was tied round his waist, and he was suspended in mid-air from a steelyard—which was generally made fast to a step of the library ladder."

Sir William also more than once experimented on himself after a somewhat bold fashion. His purpose was to test the effect of morphia on his system, which he had found to possess the remarkable peculiarity of insensibility to the action of narcotics. "For the facts connected with this," says Dr Douglas Maclagan, his medical attendant, "I am indebted to my colleague Dr Christison, who has been in the habit of noticing them in his lectures. It seems that when at Oxford Sir William had suffered from toothache, and had sought relief

from a dose of laudanum ; but he found that it produced on him no effect whatever. He afterwards made some experiments on himself with laudanum of known excellence, and found that he could take 450 drops without the production of any effect on him except a little headache. This may be roughly stated to be equal to ten average doses of this drug for a person who, like him, was totally unaccustomed to its use." We have in the following rough jottings a record of one such experiment, made about 1836 :—

22d December.

5 o'clock.—Just before dinner, pulse 65.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 5.—After hearty dinner, and some half-dozen glasses of light wine, pulse 74.

$\frac{3}{4}$  past 5.—After dinner, 76.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 7.—(Having slept an hour) pulse 84. (N.B.—Having eaten salt herrings to dinner, drank three or four tumblers of water.)

10 o'clock.—Pulse 88 or 89.

Took 150 drops of morphia at 10 minutes past 10 o'clock.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 10 o'clock.—Pulse 80—perhaps fuller ; for last quarter of an hour feeling as it were of fulness in head. At present very slight feeling of nausea, and very slight pain in stomach ; a slight feeling of languor in muscles.

11 o'clock.—Pulse 82 ; sense of fulness rather less ; languor, or rather feeling of placidity, not increased ; slight feeling of warmth in face and over surface of body, especially in feet. No confusion or somnolency. Altogether not more effect apparent than when only 50 drops taken. Have been, since taking dose, occupied in reading.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 11.—Pulse 78 or 79—full ; feeling of fulness less ; no real languor, and feeling of less ; warmth continues ; quite alert—indeed very.

12 o'clock.—Pulse 70—not so full ; all symptoms nearly off ; very wakeful and alert ; feeling of full muscular vigour.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 12.—Pulse 75 ; still feeling of slight warmth, especially in hands and feet ; mouth not dry, but saliva not so abundant as usual, but no thirst felt. Now, as all along, a slight feeling of surd headache ; and in turning suddenly, a slight symptom of giddiness, or rather swimming, was observed, but not deserving of either name, so slight.

1 o'clock.—Pulse 69 ; headache very slight, but still a feeling in head ; and slight giddiness or swimming occasionally on turning comes on more easily than usual.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 1.—Pulse 64 ; no somnolence ; now and then a slight noise in ears ; rather mawkish feeling—this, indeed, all along ; mouth not moist, but not dry as before ; skin warm (prickly glow) ; not feverish.

2 o'clock.—Pulse 60—not full ; no somnolence ; glow still in skin, especially hands, feet, and ears ; mawkishness, but not a negation of appetite ; have eaten nothing since dinner ; slight sound in ears like distant sound of a carriage, now heard and now not heard (but this might have been, independently of morphia, from hour of night) ; surd headache not better.

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 2.—Pulse 62 ; quarter of an hour ago ate three apples—bread and cheese as usual ; [am now] reading—quite as well as usual.

$\frac{1}{4}$  from 4.—Pulse 68 ; had been asleep, or rather in a sort of dreamy slumber ; awoke naturally, indeed voluntarily.

Slept not deeply, but, on the contrary, perhaps more lightly than usual ; often awoke ; dreaming. Next morning about

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 10, fully awake, but with rather bad taste in mouth, and with feeling of giddiness, as if bile ; oddish all over, but nothing worth notice, if not looked for.

$\frac{1}{4}$  from 11.—Pulse 63 ; got up and breakfasted ; now, at

$\frac{1}{2}$ -past 11, feel nearly as usual ; pulse 65 ; perhaps not so alert as ordinary—*i.e.*, not so disposed for exertion of body.

1 o'clock P.M.—Pulse 69.

These experiments, on his children and himself, were conducted as much in the way of pastime and relaxation from severe pursuits as from a purely scientific interest,—which, however, he had pretty strongly. They serve to show the wonderful activity of his intellect at this period, which, when most hardly taxed, sought relaxation, not in repose, but in a change of work :—“*Alit lectio ingenium ; et studio fatigatum, non sine studio, tamen reficit.*”

## CHAPTER VI.

### APPOINTMENT TO LOGIC CHAIR, AND COMPOSITION OF LECTURES : 1836-1839.

RESIGNATION OF DR RITCHIE—UNIVERSITY PATRONAGE IN EDINBURGH  
—CANDIDATES FOR THE LOGIC CHAIR—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN  
PROFESSOR PILLANS AND M. COUSIN—LETTER OF SIR WILLIAM TO  
M. COUSIN—REPLY AND TESTIMONIAL—OPPOSITION TO SIR WILLIAM—  
HIS DECLINATURE TO CANVASS—ALLEGED OBSCURITY OF HIS WRITINGS  
—THEOLOGICAL OBJECTION—RESULT OF THE ELECTION—PREPARATION  
OF LECTURES—INTRODUCTORY LECTURE—LECTURES OF FIRST SESSION  
ON METAPHYSICS—HOW COMPOSED—COMMENCEMENT OF EDITION OF  
REID—LECTURES OF SECOND SESSION ON LOGIC—PLACE OF THE  
LECTURES AS AN EXPOSITION OF THE AUTHOR'S PHILOSOPHICAL DOCT-  
RINES—THEIR GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INFLUENCE—TES-  
TIMONY OF REV. DR CAIRNS—CORRESPONDENCE WITH M. COUSIN—  
CONTROVERSY WITH TOWN COUNCIL ABOUT FEES AND SENIOR CLASS.

AT the close of the College session of 1836, Dr David Ritchie, after a career by no means brilliant, resigned the Professorship of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Sir William Hamilton, as the outstanding man in the department of speculative philosophy, not only in Scotland, but in Britain, might naturally have been expected to obtain the vacant Chair without difficulty, if not even without solicitation. He had already contributed to the 'Edinburgh Review' those articles which had made him known on the Continent of Europe as the man of highest philosophical genius and greatest philosophical learning in Britain. He had also proved his remarkable, if not unique, acquaintance with the history and constitution of universities at home and abroad, and explained the



high aims of all university training. As in Germany and France the custom was for the patrons of university appointments to seek the man most fitted for the office, and not to leave it to every one who fancied himself qualified to seek the office, it was never doubted by the distinguished members of foreign universities, such as Brandis and Cousin, but that the vacant Chair would be readily offered to Sir William Hamilton. Nothing of the kind, however, took place, or was at all likely to occur. Foreigners were not aware that the patronage of the University of Edinburgh lay with the Town Council (Stadtrath), and that University appointments were decided, among other city transactions, by the burgomaster and councillors in the Rathhaus or Hôtel de Ville—a body, however useful and respectable, not to be supposed capable of judging directly of attainments in abstract philosophy, or of the qualifications necessary for teaching it from a professor's chair. Philosophical merit, like other accomplishments, had thus to be made clear by varied and laborious processes, and to approve itself to the respectable body of citizens—chiefly engaged in trade and commerce—who constituted the Town Council. These men were supposed to act as jurymen, to sift and determine on, the evidence brought before them regarding the qualifications of rival candidates. Whether evidence of the peculiar nature suitable in such a case should ever have been submitted to the judgment of a jury so constituted, how far, as a rule, they succeeded in selecting the best man, and what were the countervailing checks against abuse and preventives from mistake, are points which it is here unnecessary to discuss. The fact was so; and a candidate for the Chair of Intellectual Philosophy, be he a Plato or an Aristotle, was under the necessity, at this period, of addressing himself, with proof of his qualifications, to this body of electors, thirty-three in number. Sir William, in particular, had written, and written powerfully, against the continuance of the patronage of the University in the hands of the Council, and he did

not much relish the prospect before him of having to persuade that body of his superior qualifications.

The other principal candidates for the Chair were Mr Isaac Taylor, Mr George Combe, and Mr Patrick Campbell Macdougall. Mr Taylor was acceptable to a considerable body of electors on account of his religious views. He had recently written 'The Natural History of Enthusiasm,' the first of that series of works on questions that lie in the border-land between philosophy and theology, by which he has deservedly achieved a high reputation. He had also given to the world a small work entitled 'Elements of Thought,' in which he sought to give an explanation of various philosophical terms, with, however, but indifferent learning and success. Mr Combe was the representative of the phrenological doctrines, which, chiefly through his influence, had at this time a considerable hold of some portions of the public. Mr Macdougall, who afterwards became Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, was then a young man, of very varied and brilliant accomplishments.

It soon became obvious that the final victory must lie either with Sir William or Mr Taylor. With a body such as the Town Council, the chances might seem rather in favour of the popular author than of the abstract thinker. And there is a tolerable degree of probability that, but for the overwhelming evidence of superior attainments that came from men like Cousin and Brandis, the small majority by which Sir William carried his election would have been converted into a minority. Sir William's testimonials were by design few and select, but stronger evidence of capacity and attainments was never presented to a body of electors. I have already quoted M. Cousin's remarks on the first article in the 'Review'—that on his own writings. He had also unsolicitedly said, "Sir William Hamilton is the fittest person to be Professor of Logic in the University of Edinburgh at the first vacancy. He is pointed out for this situation by the peculiar bent of his mind, and by his pre-eminence above all his Scotch and

English contemporaries." This was part of the notes of a conversation between M. Cousin and Professor Pillans during a visit which the latter made to Paris in May 1834. On Dr Ritchie's resignation of the Chair, Mr Pillans wrote to M. Cousin, transmitting a copy of the notes, with a request that he would either formally sanction their accuracy or return a more authentic expression of his opinion. Owing to the severe indisposition of M. Cousin, two months elapsed before a reply was received. In the mean time Sir William had addressed to him the following letter:—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 23d May 1836.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have a long letter soon to write you of acknowledgments, apologies, and explanations—in particular, to justify myself for not yet having performed my promise regarding a review of the prefaces of yourself and Schelling—a non-performance for which, when you know the circumstances, I am sure you will not think me in fault. At present, however, I write only on a matter wholly personal to myself, and that briefly and hurriedly, as time is now of great importance in the affair. I therefore go at once to the business.

As the communication was thought better from another person than from myself, Professor Pillans wrote you above five weeks ago, requesting that you would have the goodness to state in writing your opinion of my qualifications for the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics, now vacant, in this University, and for which I have applied. As so long an interval has elapsed, we are apprehensive that the packet may not have reached you. In case it should be lost, I have shortly to say that a testimony from so distinguished an authority as you will have the greatest influence in my favour. It may seem, indeed, superfluous to trouble you again for such a testimony after the too flattering expression of your good opinion of me to Professor Pillans in a conversation of which he kindly secured notes. But my friends think that your opinion, given by yourself in writing, would be of greater weight and a more authentic evidence. At the same time it would be better to avoid dwelling so much on the *obscurity* of my articles (which arises, I hope, only from the abstruseness of their subjects and the limited space into which the discussions must, in a journal like

the 'Edinburgh Review,' be compressed), as this—the obscurity of my writings—is the only objection of any consequence made to my claims. This I know with you arose in reply to Mr Pillans, who was probably not prepared to understand them. I do not know whether you are aware of an article of mine on "Logic," in the 'Edinburgh Review,' No. 115. There is another on the "Study of Mathematics" in No. 126, in which, I am afraid, you will think me very heretical. There are various others to which it is needless to refer you. Among the competitors there is no one from whom I have to fear anything on the score of any knowledge of the subject of the Chair. But the electors, who are the municipality of the city (thirty-three in number), are a good deal under the influence of the clergy and the fanatical party, who, of course, always wish for some friend of their own; and I have also recently irritated the *bourgeoisie* of the municipality by an article "On the Patronage of Universities," in the 119th number of the 'Edinburgh Review,' and by my evidence before a Parliamentary Commission, in which I treated their capacity for academical patrons with the contempt it merited. In these circumstances I shall feel deeply grateful to you for anything you can candidly say in my behalf. And if you could procure any opinions to the same effect from any of your distinguished philosophers, you would add to the obligation, for our honest magistracy *count* as well as *weigh* the testimonies. Perhaps M. Royer-Collard and M. Jouffroy may have read my article "On the Philosophy of Perception" which I sent them, and perhaps may be able to say something favourable of it. But you are the best judge. I must request your kind indulgence for this egotistical epistle, as for many other *peccata*, and I must abruptly subscribe myself, with the highest regard, my dear sir, ever most faithfully yours,

W. HAMILTON.

At length the following weighty letter reached Mr Pillans, and was submitted to the electors:—

M. COUSIN TO PROFESSOR PILLANS.

(*Translation.*)

MY DEAR MR PILLANS,—A severe indisposition, which has for some time confined me to bed, has compelled me not to answer your letter so speedily as I would have desired, especially in the matter to which it relates. My first care is to do so the moment I have been able to hold a pen.

I perfectly recognise in the paper accompanying your letter the

heads of a conversation which we had together two years ago in the presence of your young friend. He has very faithfully interpreted my thought, and has even rather weakened than overstrained it in what regards the merit of Sir W. Hamilton. I will by-and-by recur to the points in which it seems to me the accuracy of your friend is somewhat at fault; but permit me previously to recall to you my own position in this affair. As some small value has been attached to my testimony, it is necessary to make known how I stand disposed, and what it is that determines my opinion.

I have no personal connection with Sir W. Hamilton. You are the only individual I have seen who knows him. It was from reading an article in No. 99, Oct. 1829, of the 'Edinburgh Review,' that I became desirous of knowing who was its author; and it was Mr Austin, the learned and profound jurist, who informed me of Sir W. Hamilton's name.

The article to which I allude, although polite in manner, was in substance very severe; and it has served for the text to all the objections which have subsequently been made to what is called my philosophy, in America, and even in France.

This article remains, of what has been written against me, that of principal account. From reading all that Sir W. Hamilton has done, I am convinced that we are not perfectly at one except in the matter of public education, and that in philosophy, under much apparent similarity, there subsist between us fundamental differences. You are therefore clearly aware, my dear sir, that my esteem for Sir W. Hamilton is very disinterested. It is not a partisan that I am desirous of supporting. No; it is an adversary of the most elevated order to whom I render an honest tribute of respect.

What, then, is the difference of opinion between Sir W. Hamilton and me? Without here treating you to metaphysics, I will only say that, professing the highest regard and the most grateful acknowledgment to the Scottish philosophy, out of which the new philosophy of France has arisen, and without deserting the principles of that excellent philosophy, I have believed it possible to bestow on these a development that somewhat surpasses the boundary which Reid and Dugald Stewart have assigned to human reason. This development, is it legitimate? or is the circumspection of your illustrious countrymen to be preferred? That is the question.

Now, on this question Sir W. Hamilton is the man who, before all Europe, has, in the 'Edinburgh Review,' defended the Scottish

philosophy, and posted himself its representative. In this relation the different articles which he has written in that journal are of infinite value ; and it is not I who ought to solicit Scotland for Sir W. Hamilton ; it is Scotland herself who ought to honour by her suffrage him who, since Dugald Stewart, is her sole representative in Europe.

In truth, what characterises Sir W. Hamilton is precisely the Scottish intellect ; and he is only attached to the philosophy of Reid and Stewart because their philosophy is the Scottish intellect itself applied to metaphysics. Sir W. Hamilton never deviates from the highway of common sense, and at the same time he possesses great ingenuity (*esprit*) and sagacity ; and I assure you (I know it from experience) that his dialectic is by no means comfortable to his adversary.

Inferior to Reid in invention and originality, and to Stewart in grace and delicacy, he is perhaps superior to both, and certainly to the latter, by the vigour of his dialectic ; I add, and by the extent of his erudition.

Sir W. Hamilton knows all systems, ancient and modern, and he examines them by the criticism of the Scottish intellect. His independence is equal to his knowledge. He is, above all, eminent in logic. I would speak to you here as a philosopher by profession.

Be assured that Sir W. Hamilton is the one of all your countrymen who knows Aristotle the best ; and were there in all the three kingdoms of his Britannic Majesty a Chair of Logic vacant, do not hesitate—make haste—give it to Sir W. Hamilton.

I say it sincerely, that my obligations to Scotland—obligations recently enhanced by the honourable title which your learned Academy has been pleased to confer upon me—have inspired me with a lively desire of seeing Scotland again represented in the congress of European philosophers. If you think it expedient, I will write to Lord Lansdowne, whom I have the honour to know a little. Were M. Jouffroy here, he would be eager to add his testimony to mine ; but M. Jouffroy is in Italy for his health, and M. Royer-Collard has just set off for the country. But have you not the suffrage of M. Royer-Collard ? My illustrious master is wholly Scotch ; he is Reid and Stewart in flesh and bone. And Reid and Stewart, if they were electors, would choose Sir W. Hamilton.

Now for the two points where the accuracy of your young friend might have been greater :—

1. That Sir W. Hamilton has, perhaps, less originality than Reid, Stewart, and Brown. Sir W. Hamilton is very superior to Brown, especially as a logician. Were the articles of Sir W. Hamilton collected, we should have a book infinitely more distinguished than the writings—very ingenious, but superficial and diffuse—of Brown.

2. Sir W. Hamilton has not even the very slightest appearance of obscurity. His style is substantial and severe, but of a perfect plainness for every one acquainted with the subject and not incapable of attention. No one is more opposed to, no one is more devoid of, the vagueness and obscurity of the German philosophy in several of its most celebrated authors. To be popularly clear, there is only wanting to Sir W. Hamilton the space requisite fairly to develop his thought; and that space is not found in a review—it is only fully obtained in a course of lectures. In short, my dear Mr Pillans, were there not too much of pretension and arrogance in the request, I would entreat of you to say in my name to the person or persons on whom depends this nomination, that they hold, perhaps, in their hands the philosophical future of Scotland, and that it is a foreigner, exempt from all spirit of party or of coterie, who conjures them to recollect that what they are now engaged in is to give a successor to Reid and to Dugald Stewart. Let them consult the opinion of Europe. Several of the articles of Sir W. Hamilton—three especially, in No. 99, No. 103, No. 115 of the ‘*Edinburgh Review*’—have made the strongest impression on all regular philosophers. I have just received from America a work of Mr Henry, entitled ‘*Elements of Psychology*.’ The following is what this praiseworthy author says of the article in No. 103: “By those who are acquainted with the article referred to—remarkable alike for philosophical learning and ability of the very first order—a higher authority cannot well be imagined.” I know not who are the competitors of Sir W. Hamilton; but I wish, for Scotland, that there may be one who has received public eulogies of equal value from disinterested and learned foreigners.

Adieu, my dear sir. When anything is decided, do not fail to let me know; and believe me always yours very devotedly,

V. COUSIN.

PARIS, 1st June 1836.

The other testimonials were from M. Angrand, the French consul at Edinburgh, a pupil of Royer-Collard, Cousin, and Jouffroy; Professor Brandis of Bonn, the editor of the *Berlin*

Academy edition of Aristotle; Mr Leonard Horner, Lord Jeffrey, Rev. Archibald Alison, Professor Macvey Napier, Professor George Moir, Archdeacon Williams, Sir David Brewster, and Professor Wilson. Certain of the testimonials that had been used for the Moral Philosophy Chair were reprinted. The evidence was strong, pertinent, and select.

The opposition, however, was formidable, and there were personal difficulties of various sorts to be overcome.

Though desirous of the office, Sir William characteristically declined entering on any personal canvass of the electors. In this he was not, he said in a letter to the Lord Provost of the 8th April, actuated by any want of respect for the electors; he declined to canvass simply because he regarded the dispensation of academical patronage as the exercise of a sacred trust, and consequently felt that such a proceeding would be at once insulting to them and degrading to himself. His declining this mode of address was in fact, he maintained, "the most unequivocal proof" he could give "of the confidence he reposed in the integrity and intelligence of the present patrons." This strong view of the matter indicated, however, a height of virtue which was not destined to be appreciated. Sir William's more worldly-wise friends shook their heads about it. This was to fly in the face of all time-honoured tradition,—to refuse the dues of the *genii loci*. That a councillor should give his vote for a man who did not solicit it privately in person, or by his friends, was a thing not to be looked for—unless in a very exceptional case of appreciation of his position. Where was the importance of having a vote, if the deference of a persistent solicitation was not accorded to its holder? Why, unless this were done, it was not in municipal human nature to give it—failure is certain if the principle of no canvass be persisted in. His opponents, again, said, and said strongly, that he could not be very anxious to obtain the Chair, seeing that he did not employ the ordinary means of success—to wit, this same private canvass. On this Sir William waxed tolerably wroth. In a second letter to the



Lord Provost of 23d April, he thus comes out:—"I alluded to this matter [the declining to canvass] in my original letter to the Lord Provost, but I must now be allowed to speak on it plainly and openly. I am assuredly most anxious to obtain this Chair; but I am ambitious of it not as a boon granted, but as a right recognised. I only ask—I would only accept—the appointment on the ground of superior qualification. To mendicate the votes of the patrons by the private solicitation of myself or friends, and to forestall an unbiassed decision of the body, on a full and final estimate of the evidence, by a private preliminary canvass of the individual electors, are proceedings which I not only scorn, but of which, as morally dishonest, I trust I am incapable. But if I will not disgrace myself, neither shall I presume to insult the Council by such a conduct. As patrons of the University, they must view that patronage in the light of a sacred trust. They will consequently administer it with the rigour and impartiality of judges; and, like judges, spurn as the worst indignity all attempts at privately influencing their decision." Whether, as the contest waxed hotter, his friends abstained from all personal canvass, I cannot say: seeing that he finally succeeded in his candidature, I should think it extremely unlikely.

Another prejudicial allegation which he had to meet was, that his philosophical writings were obscure, and his success as a lecturer, therefore, hopeless. This was, of course, the popular objection, and it was a formidable one. M. Cousin no doubt scotched it when he said: "Sir W. Hamilton has not even the very slightest appearance of obscurity. His style is substantial and severe, but of a perfect plainness for every one acquainted with the subject and not incapable of attention. No one is more opposed to, no one is more devoid of, the vagueness and obscurity of the German philosophy in several of its most celebrated authors. To be popularly clear, there is only wanting to Sir W. Hamilton the space requisite fairly to develop his thought; and that space is not found in a

review,—it is only fully obtained in a course of lectures.” But it seems difficult to lead some persons, even when they are in the official position of adjudicators, to surmise that they may not be able without previous training to judge of an abstract discussion, and that its apparent obscurity may arise mainly from their own lack of visual power. And so the objection survived to the day of election, and was duly produced by more than one of the speakers, but particularly by a seriously dull elector, who, descending to minutiae of style, declared he could not for the life of him understand the phrase “*emphatic evidence*,” and was absolutely floored—this time not without ground—by the aim of a teacher of philosophy being set down as the “*determination of students to a vigorous and independent self-activity*.” The way in which Sir William himself met the allegation of obscurity is curiously characteristic and complete. “It is,” he says, “truly humiliating to be compelled to meet such an allegation by any detailed explanation or defence. Yet, in the circumstances, it may be proper to mention that there are *two* of the philosophical essays which I have contributed to the ‘*Edinburgh Review*’ of such a description as to be incomprehensible by ordinary readers. But is the inference, therefore, just, that my writings are generally obscure? or is the fact of the obscurity of these two disquisitions any fault of mine? There are, I may be allowed to say, two kinds of obscurity; one the fault of the writer—the other, of the reader. If the reader, from want of preparation, be not competent to a subject, that subject, though treated as lucidly as is possible, will to him be dark or unintelligible. This is the case of the two articles in question. The first, that on the ‘*Philosophy of the Absolute*,’ in relation to M. Cousin’s ‘*Cours de Philosophie*,’ is on the subject of all others the most difficult and abstruse—a subject which, whilst it forms the cardinal point of the recent Continental philosophy, was one with which no British metaphysician had yet ventured to grapple; and to the discussion of which, accordingly, even the philosophical language of this country is wholly inadequate.

The article also behaved to be comprised in some twenty or twenty-five pages. Within such limits I had to give an account of M. Cousin and his philosophy—to show the relations of his system to those of the great German metaphysicians—and also to trace the latter to their sources; while, as my aim was no less than a fair and fundamental refutation of the entire ‘Philosophy of the Absolute,’ I had to explain on an opposite doctrine the whole intellectual phænomena of which that notion was supposed to afford the only solution. In such circumstances it was utterly impossible to bring up the unlearned reader to a level with the question; it was impossible even to argue it, for those already competent to its consideration, with the requisite details. It was necessary to carry the discussion of this, the most abstract problem in philosophy, to its highest possible generalisation, and where an explanation was most wanted, an indication could often hardly be afforded. The article was therefore calculated for the very smallest number of readers in this country; for those only (and those how few!) who were already versed in the higher speculations of the German schools. It was, in fact, principally intended for the philosophers abroad. It might be supposed that such an article would be allowed to pass uncensured by those confessedly unable to comprehend it; nor is it easy to see why a metaphysician, more than a mathematician or a philologer, should be required to bring down the highest problems of his science to the comprehension of the ‘general reader.’” To this he adds:—“A journal like the ‘Edinburgh Review’ is not the place for elementary expatiation. . . . Its philosophical articles are addressed not to learners but to adepts. . . . A good philosophical review is thus often the converse of a good philosophical lecture; but a capacity for the more difficult achievement does not surely infer inability for the easier.”

There was, however, still another objection to Sir William, of which he personally could not take notice; this was the usual religious or theological objection. Not one word was

whispered against the purity of his moral character, or against his scrupulous honour as a high-minded gentleman. That would have been in vain. But there was a lack of evidence, it was said, in regard to his Christian character; he had not adduced testimonials as to his being a religious man; though, in regard to this, one councillor, with a better appreciation of the evidence of a man's religion, said he would not have voted for him if he had. Nay, it was even insinuated, though not boldly asserted, that he was an infidel. For look to the positive presumption on this point: he was a contributor to the 'Edinburgh Review;' and was the tone of that journal sound or to be commended? were there not articles there which were not only not orthodox, but not Christian? Sir William was a principal contributor, and thus it was likely that he was of the mind of the 'Review,' and no better than his neighbours. And then, to make the presumption a certainty, he had not only studied, but was alleged to be profoundly versed in, the "German philosophy," that fount of all theological heresy, which left room neither for the possibility of miracles nor for the being of God. This was not a man to be put into a chair to train the youth of Scotland. All this was urged; and it is quite certain that herein lay the greatest difficulty with which he had to contend in his application for the professorship, and against which he made his way to the Chair in a spirit of dignified and contemptuous silence towards his detractors.

An insinuation or allegation of this kind, which has very commonly been urged against the advancement of originators of new views in intellectual philosophy, is with some men an honest, though an unintelligent, ground of opposition. The traditional spirit which is contented with accredited results, will always set itself against the spirit of analysis, examination, and inquiry into received opinions. It is well that these two opposing tendencies should take note of each other, so that we may not, on the one hand, lose the life of intellectual progress in the mere symbols of thoughts and things,

or, on the other hand, allow the spirit of reverence for past efforts and historical conclusions to die in the tumult of restless doubts. In the opposition, however, to Sir William at this juncture, it is to be feared that there was more of the impulse of sect and of party purpose than of higher considerations. For the special insinuations made there were no just grounds. Supposing the worst that was said against the 'Edinburgh Review' to be true, it is obvious that Sir William, as well as each individual contributor, was responsible only to the extent of his own contributions. Again, to those who really had education and intelligence enough to appreciate the character and tendencies of the philosophy which he sought to develop in the articles in the 'Review,' the general charge against him must have appeared passing strange. The doctrines which he laid down were in harmony not only with the purest ethical theories, but with the most profound and reverential theological convictions, and with the consistency of natural and revealed religion. So far from being tainted with those foreign dogmas, of which there was so much ignorant talk, he was the most skilled and powerful antagonist then living of unlicensed speculation—seeking, as he did, to oppose the Absolutism of Schelling and Hegel by the conclusions of a Philosophy of Experience. But the truth is, the men who made the objection did not know, in their narrowness of spirit and blindness of fanatical zeal, their friends from their foes, and were incapable of discriminating good and evil in the matter.\*

\* It is somewhat curious to find even now that the theological objection is still made to play its part against the same person. This time, however, it is not that Hamilton has no religion—quite the reverse; he gives undue importance and improper influence to it. For, according to a recent critic (Mr Mill, 'Examination,' p. 549), "the whole philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton seems to have had its character determined by the requirements of the doctrine of Free-Will; and to that doctrine he clung, because he had persuaded himself that it afforded the only premises from which human reason could deduce the doctrines of natural religion." Hamilton is also adduced as an example of the practice "of bribing the pupil to accept a metaphysical dogma by the promise or threat that it affords the only valid argument for a foregone conclusion,"

The religious objection was duly brought forward on the day of election. It did one good service, however; it quickened to an eloquent indignation the manly spirit of Mr Adam Black, then City Treasurer. In a few vigorous sentences, he denounced the too common crime of making religion a stalking-horse in the disputes of the day, and for party purposes; said pretty plainly that he felt disgusted with men who suddenly assumed a zeal for religion on an occasion of this sort, while nothing of the kind was manifest in their conduct at other times; challenged those who had not dared openly to allege Sir William's infidelity to the proof of the insinuation by producing passages from his articles, which from their nature must afford evidence on this point, if evidence were to be procured at all. To this there was no reply. He concluded a pointed and animated speech by adverting to the unworthy manner in which this groundless objection had been made to operate on the minds of councillors.

The election took place on Friday the 15th of July. Sir W. Hamilton was nominated by the Lord Provost (Mr, afterwards Sir James, Spittal), and seconded by Mr Hugh Bruce. As the result of the voting, Sir William was elected by a majority

and as seeking "to create a religious prejudice in favour of the theory he patronises."—(Ibid. p. 490, 491.)

This later criticism may justly be placed on the same level of fairness and intelligence with the earlier one. There is neither proof nor probability for the allegation that Sir W. Hamilton held the doctrine of Free-Will, or any of his opinions, on any other ground than that he thought it supported by the evidence proper to establish it, and therefore true in itself. If he further believed, as he did, that with the fact of Free-Will stood or fell the proof of the reality of Deity, he was not only at liberty but he was bound to state this, and to offer proof of the connection of the two points, which he has done. For a critic who differs from him in the matter, it is a perfectly fair thing to assail this proof, and show it, if he is able, to be invalid. But to accuse an author of "bribing" his pupils in the way specified, and of seeking "to create a religious prejudice in favour of the theory he patronises," merely because he held and affirmed a logical connection between two speculative doctrines, is critically as unworthy as logically it is unwarrantable. If there be here "a grave offence against the morality of philosophical inquiry," it lies not with the person upon whom it is charged, but with the person who makes the charge.

of four—eighteen members of Council voting for him, and fourteen for Mr Isaac Taylor. “I need not tell you the joy,” writes Mr Macvey Napier, “which the success of your election gave me, mixed, however, with very indignant feelings at the small majority, and the conduct of some individuals, and the uneasiness occasioned by seeing to what terrible risks the University stands exposed under the present system of patronage. I had received gloomy accounts a day or two before the news of your success arrived, and this made those news the more acceptable.”

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 19th July 1836.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have delayed writing you until the election for the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics was determined, which Mr Pillans will have informed you was in my favour; and now, when I sit down to do so, I find myself wholly unable to express to you my feelings in relation to yourself. To you, indeed, I cannot say what I would find it so easy to say of you to another. You have overwhelmed me with honour, and in so noble a spirit, that were I not humbled by the consciousness that I owe my eulogy more to a generous illusion on your part than to any merit of my own, I might be, indeed, the proudest of mortals. Such a testimony from such a witness (as yours in my favour on this occasion) could hardly fail of commanding success—even in such a country as this, and with such a body of electors as our Edinburgh municipality. But the accident of success is, in my eyes, as nothing in comparison to the honour of being so recommended by you; and I should be equally gratified by your good opinion, and equally grateful for its expression, had the result been different from what it is. I send you a copy of my testimonials. You will find yourself there associated with many distinguished individuals; but, however flattered by the commendation of others, I value no other testimony as I value yours. But I must confess that I value its paramount authority, its consummate talent, and its (too) transcendent praise, even less than the kindness that made you send it from a sickbed.

I am, indeed, most anxious to hear that you have completely recovered from your indisposition. . . . With this you will

receive two books. One is a complete edition, recently published, of the 'Dissertations' of Stewart, Mackintosh, Playfair, and Leslie; the other a translation of Kant's 'Metaphysik d. Sitten.' Mr Semple, the translator, is, as you will soon see, a mere Kantian, and wants the knowledge necessary to deal properly with his subject, and the taste requisite to obtain for his work, in this country at least, any success. He is otherwise an able and estimable man. I send you his translation as I know you are cosmopolitically interested in every indication of the progress of philosophy.

I have many acknowledgments to make for the many valuable works you have been so kind as to send me—especially for your own. I am delighted to see that Aristotle has already in part received, and is soon about to obtain in full, the benefit of your genius and erudition. I admire your 'Rapport sur le Concours' as absolutely an ideal model. With so many recent distractions I have not yet been able to study your 'Cours' by Garnier, who seems a disciple not unworthy of his master. Besides the documents you sent me, I have made a collection of all that appeared in Germany relative to your 'Préface' and that of Schelling, by Krug, Marbach, and J. H. Fichte. In obedience to my promise, I fifteen months ago attempted an article on the question at issue between you and the German philosophy. I agree wholly with you; but Mr Napier thought that, as written, the discussion would be utterly beyond the comprehension of the public in this country, and I was prevented from trying to re-elaborate it by an attack of rheumatic fever, which kept me for three months to bed. Since that, one thing or another has always intervened to prevent me from renewing the attempt. However, I am now in a situation in which it will be my duty, as it is truly my wish, to make your philosophical writings better known to the British nation; and I hope to do this in a more effectual manner than by reviews. For some considerable time, however, I must wholly devote myself to the labour of my new class: it is no very easy task to write a course of about a hundred lectures with so short a time for preparation.—Believe me, my dear sir, ever gratefully and sincerely yours,

W. HAMILTON.

*P.S.—29th July.*—On my return to town, after an absence of some days, I found lying for me your 'Introduction to the undiscovered works of Abelard.' I had heard of this some time ago, and am delighted to find that you make Abelard a Conceptualist like



Occam. I admire your industry hardly less than your genius. It would have been inappropriate had Abelard fallen into other hands than yours—the modern Abelard.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

7 Novembre 1836.

Je vous assure que j'ai été sur les épines, avant de recevoir la bonne nouvelle que contient votre dernière lettre. Je me reprochais de n'avoir point écrit à M. Brougham ou à M. Lansdowne. Mais, grâce à Dieu, vous êtes nommé ; vous voilà à votre place et dans votre élément. Une immense carrière d'utilité publique est devant vous, et je serais heureux de pouvoir penser que mon témoignage a contribué en quelque chose à vous l'ouvrir. Ayez la bonté, je vous en prie, de me mander si vous avez ouvert votre cours, quel auditoire vous avez, quelle marche vous suivez, sur quel auteur vous vous appuyez, et quels succès vous obtenez. Vos leçons doivent sans doute absorber tout votre temps. Trouvez pourtant quelques heures pour penser à moi et pour m'écrire.

Je vous ménage une ovation, et une ovation à mes dépens. Je fais traduire quatre de vos articles par un de mes amis, homme très-capable, excellent logicien, écrivain habile, auquel j'ai fait faire votre connaissance et dont vous avez fait la conquête au point qu'il ne veut plus me suivre dans l'ontologie par la psychologie. Vous avez en lui un admirateur fervent, un disciple, et je vous assure que ce disciple-là, à lui tout seul, en vaut cent autres. Bref, M. Peisse vous a traduit, il vous commente, et il va bientôt vous publier. Je ne manquerai pas d'en envoyer un exemplaire au très-honorable Lord Maire de la ville d'Edinburgh, et ces dignes marchands entre les mains desquels est placé le sort de la philosophie en Ecosse. Entre nous, si votre nouvel article inédit sur M. Schelling et moi était à peu près fini, vous seriez bien aimable de m'en envoyer une copie. M. Peisse le traduirait et ajouterait cette pièce aux quatre autres. Ce serait un grand ornement pour son recueil, et nous vous en serions tous deux très-obligés.

Je vous remercie beaucoup du volume des Introductions à l'Encyclopédie d'Edinburgh. Il m'est fort agréable de posséder cette collection. Je mets de côté la traduction de M. Semple pour m'en servir dans l'occasion.

Voulez-vous bien prendre la peine de vous informer si l'Académie d'Edinburgh a reçu mon gros in -4° sur Abélard ? Je n'ai demandé

au Gouvernement pour tout salaire de ce long travail que d'en envoyer un exemplaire aux Académies qui ont eu la bonté de m'admettre dans leur sein. J'aurais bien voulu vous en donner le volume entier ; mais j'ai craint en vérité de vous ennuyer de ma pédanterie de Bénédictin.

D'ici à quelques mois je quitte la philosophie pour l'instruction publique. Pour me délasser de mes travaux sur la scholastique, je suis allé faire un tour en Hollande, et j'en rapporte une moisson pour M. Pillans et pour vous. O les belles écoles de village ! c'est tout aussi beau qu'en Prusse. Ce voyage m'a très-fatigué, mais il m'a fait aussi grand plaisir, et j'espère que vous ne serez pas fâchés, mes très-chers amis, de voir mes descriptions, malheureusement faites à la hâte, mais fidèles et impartiales. Si Edinburgh n'était pas si loin et si j'étais plus jeune, j'irais en causer avec vous. Nous verrons. En attendant je vous fais à tous deux mes complimens.

Shortly after his appointment to the Logic Chair, Sir William, with a view to the preparation of his course of lectures for the coming winter, removed with his family to Portencross, a retired watering-place near the mouth of the Clyde. The College session would commence early in November, and now was the time for preparatory labour. It would seem, however, that Sir William, during this period, did very little to the actual composition of his lectures. As usual, he read and thought a great deal, but made little progress in writing. This arose, in part at least, from what was to him the novelty of the kind of composition which was required. In accordance with the practice of the University, he was called upon to give a course of written lectures extending over a period of five months, in which he had to combine elementary instruction in Logic and Metaphysics with at least some adequate treatment of the higher and more abstract questions of those sciences. The Logic class is usually made up of comparatively young students, in the second year of their university studies. To lead the minds of students gradually from the simpler to the higher questions of philosophy in a single session, and at the same time to treat the subject according to its proper

requirements, is, to any one with an adequate conception of speculative philosophy, an exceedingly difficult, if not an impossible, task. Sir William had hitherto dealt only with the highest and most abstract of philosophical problems; and there can be no doubt that he felt or anticipated a more than usual difficulty in suiting his style and mode of treatment to the supposed wants and capacity of his class; for, with all his authoritativeness of statement and apparently dogmatic turn of thought, he had a strong element of personal diffidence. As the result proved, this feeling was the consequence rather of a distrust in his own abilities for the particular kind of work, than of any real incapacity. To this anticipation of unusual difficulty must be added his singularly high ideal of philosophical composition, and his extreme fastidiousness both of thought and style. Composition was with him always a careful and laborious work. A rough draft was first of all thrown off, and then it was revised and corrected until the blurred page presented nothing legible of the original. His manuscripts have the appearance of palimpsests of a manifold order.

The following letter to Lady Hamilton from her brother-in-law, Captain Hamilton, refers to the small progress that had been made with the lectures, and also contains a hint about style:—

ELLERAY, 5th September 1836.

MY DEAR JANET,—I rejoice to find by your letter that you are so comfortably settled at Portencross. I wish, however, that William had made greater progress with his lectures than you seem to say he has. Sure I am that if he does not start with a very large stock at the commencement of the session, both you and he will be kept uncomfortable all the winter. But, above all, I anxiously trust that in writing them he will always keep in view the character of his audience, and study simplicity. At his age, and with his standing as a philosopher, anything like display before boys would be sadly *infra dig*. He is above this, I am sure; but of one thing I may assure him, and that is, that in writing, every *Latinism* he can displace by a *Saxonism* is a defect avoided, if not a beauty gained. I shall certainly come down to hear William's opening lecture.

The work of composition had thus made little progress before the commencement of the session. As the time of opening approached, with little work done, Sir William began to feel some degree of nervous uneasiness. The subject of the introductory lecture was changed more than once, and altogether the state of mind of the lecturer was unpromising. He thought now of putting off the opening of the class for a few weeks beyond the usual period, to afford time for more ample preparation. But his friends were strongly against this. It was, they said, certain to be instantly appealed to by the adverse parties of all descriptions as showing how much he still had to learn, and how incapable he was of meeting his practical duties, as others, if chosen, would have met them. Abandoning, then, the thought of any lengthened postponement, he returned to Edinburgh, resolved to gird up his strength for the coming campaign. He began to lecture shortly after the commencement of the session, and the work suffered no interruption until its close.

Sir William delivered the introductory lecture of the course on Monday the 21st November, before a numerous audience—one of the largest class-rooms in the University and the passages leading to it being crowded almost to suffocation. The lecture was very characteristic in tone and doctrine. After a short introductory notice of the recent history of speculative philosophy in Scotland, and its relations to the course of German and French thought—now so well known as to be matter of the merest commonplace, but then an absolute novelty—he took up the subject of the uses of intellectual philosophy. Then were revealed the peculiarities of the thinker and the man;—the play of the most orderly logical power and of the finest acumen, a style of rare lucidity, a deep, grave eloquence, abounding in wonderfully felicitous turns of expression. These qualities, along with the novelty and elevation of the thought, and the earnestness of the man—as he evidently spoke the familiar things of his mind—made a powerful impression on his audience. The reflective listener felt that a

new power had arisen in the intellectual world—that the keynote of a higher strain of abstract inquiry than had been heard before in our Scottish universities was now struck. The expectations which had been excited by the somewhat mysterious repute of his writings began to take a definite shape and clearer ground. It had often been made matter of reproach to abstract philosophy that it was a thing truly apart, not connecting itself with definite practical interests. But here, in the principal points of this first lecture of the course now inaugurated, a hand was laid at once on the abstract and on the concrete sides of truth. The “useful” was finely analysed, and the popular abusive restriction of the term to certain professional pursuits was challenged. The useful branches of knowledge, it was shown, are not those merely “which tend to qualify a human being to act the lowly part of a dexterous instrument,” but those chiefly which form the arena of liberal culture. The native dignity of man was vindicated. He is to be regarded as an end in himself—as a being with powers which must be thoroughly quickened and developed through all their breadth,—and not to be looked upon merely as a thing with consciousness that is capable of being educated to this or that professional aptitude—of becoming an intelligent machine. Abstract philosophy, without abating a jot of its integrity, came charged with a moral lesson, which the highest and most earnest poetry of the time had sought to inculcate :—

“Our life is turned  
Out of her course wherever man is made  
An offering or a sacrifice, a tool  
Or implement, a passive thing employed  
As a brute mean.”

Then it was refreshing, in an age of facts, and practical applications, and narrow utilitarian aims, to find the cultivation of the mind declared to be a higher end than the stocking of it with information, and the apparent paradox of the superiority of the quest of truth to the attainment of it unhesitatingly

proclaimed. It was shown that knowledge itself is principally valuable as a means of intellectual cultivation; and that an individual may possess an ample magazine of knowledge, and still be properly described as an "intellectual barbarian." Hamilton regarded this doctrine as countenanced by Plato, and in this Mr Grote is at one with him. "The life of the philosopher, as Plato here conceives it (in the *Theætetus*), is a perpetual search after truth."\* "At the time when most of his dialogues were composed, he considered that the search after truth was at once the noblest occupation and the highest pleasure of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a pursuit—whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in itself fatiguing rather than attractive—is likely to take little interest in the Platonic dialogues."†

Whatever may be the needed qualification of this view in the interest of moral earnestness, its proclamation at the time was an important service to the cause of the higher education, the aim of which is assuredly not the mere conveying of universal information, but the creation and keeping alive of intellectual power in the individual, through the direction of his mind for a time to a class of subjects fitted above all others to stimulate and develop it. In the inquiries of intellectual philosophy we find material eminently suitable for this end. For while our efforts after speculative truth are often, and often necessarily, unsuccessful, our feeling of despair is mitigated by finding that while we miss the treasure supposed to be hid in the ground, a full harvest of the true good, all unlooked for, has grown up in the wake of our efforts, and that we are the richer for our toil, just as faith was beginning to waver and hope to grow faint.

In the first or early scheme of the course, Sir William appears to have proposed to divide his Lectures into four series. "I shall commence," he says, in a deleted paragraph, "with Mental Philosophy, strictly so called; with the science which is conversant with the Manifestations of Mind—Phænomen-

\* Grote's *Plato*, ii. p. 391.

† *Ibid.*, p. 393.

ology or Psychology. I shall then proceed to Logic, the science which considers the Laws of Thought; and, finally, to Ontology, or Metaphysics proper, the philosophy of Results. *Æsthetic*, or the theory of the Pleasurable, I should consider subsequently to Logic, and previously to Ontology.\* This scheme was never, however, carried out with anything like completeness.

He subsequently adopted a twofold division of the course—giving one series of lectures on Psychology and Mental Philosophy in general, and another on Logic, or “the Laws of the Cognitive Faculties in particular.”† We have, in the volumes of the courses since published, occasional lectures on the branches indicated in the first scheme—some of them glimpses into the subject of great value—but we fail to find any regular systematic discussion of all the four heads. At first he designed to lecture, during the same session, at different hours, on both of those departments. This intention he carried out for a short time; but, owing to circumstances, to which we shall refer in the sequel, he finally delivered the courses in alternate years. The course given during the first session after his appointment (1836-37) was that on Psychology, or Metaphysics.

This first course of lectures was composed during the currency of the session of five months. He gave three lectures a-week, and each lecture was, as a rule, written on the night preceding its delivery. The lecture-hour was one o'clock in the afternoon, and the lecturer seldom went to bed before five or six in the morning. He was generally roused about ten or eleven, and then hurried off to the College, portfolio under arm, at a swinging pace. Frequently, notwithstanding the late hour of going to bed, he had to be up before nine o'clock, in time to attend the Teind Court. All through the session Lady Hamilton sat up with her husband each night until near the grey dawn of the winter morning. Sir William wrote the pages of the lecture on rough sheets, and his wife,

\* Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 128.

† Ibid.

sitting in an adjoining room, copied them as he got them ready. On some occasions the subject of the lecture would prove less easily managed than on others, and then Sir William would be found writing as late as nine o'clock of a morning, while his faithful but wearied amanuensis had fallen asleep on a sofa. Sometimes the finishing touch to the lecture was left to be given just before the class-hour.

In the midst of the strain of this winter's hard work on them both, Sir William and Lady Hamilton suffered their first domestic bereavement in the death of an infant son, which took place after a short illness at the close of the year 1836.

It was while engaged in the composition of his first course of lectures that he commenced, and to some extent carried on, the edition of Reid's works, which was destined to occupy so much of his time and thought, and to be the receptacle of his elaborate erudition. The taking up of Reid was a matter almost entirely of accident, and had its origin in an occasion as slight as the conversation among some private friends to which, as Locke informs us, his essay may be traced. One afternoon in October of the year in which Sir William was appointed to the Chair, he, along with Lady Hamilton, turned into the shop of Mr Tait, bookseller, then in Hanover Street. Sir William made some inquiry about the number of copies of Reid's works on hand, with a view to adapting portions as a text-book for his students in the forthcoming session. Mr Tait suggested that Sir William should write a preface for a new issue. To this he agreed. Setting himself to write the preface, and to revise the sheets of the issue as they passed through the press, he grew interested in the work, added footnotes, and, his conception of the whole matter widening, promised appendices in the form of supplementary dissertations. Any time that he could spare from his lectures during the winter was given to this task, and he continued his editorial labours during the following years until the winter of 1839,—the work gradually expanding under his hands, until it promised to assume its present



form and dimensions. In 1839, however, it came to a stop, owing to a difficulty in the arrangements for publication. Sir William had originally made no bargain with Mr Tait; and as the terms which the latter subsequently proposed were rejected by him as entirely inadequate remuneration for his labours, he took the work out of the publisher's hands. This course involved him in expenses for printing, stereotype plates, &c., to the amount of nearly £500. As he did not succeed in making immediate arrangements with any other publisher, the edition of Reid was abandoned for seven years, then resumed, and finally published for the first time in 1846.

The second course of lectures—those on Logic—was composed under circumstances similar to the first—that is, during the currency of the session. Very little, if any, progress was made in their composition during the summer of 1837. The time he devoted to study was occupied with the edition of Reid's works. "He has got," writes Lady Hamilton (4th September), "for his edition of Reid a great deal of unpublished matter and letters from the Alisons and Gregorys, which he seems to think valuable; and he is himself making numerous notes. . . . I look forward to another winter of hard work both to him and me, although he declares I am to have nothing to do."

After the commencement of the session, 7th December, Lady Hamilton writes to Captain Hamilton as follows:—"The lectures have been going on prosperously. The numbers at the College have very much decreased this winter, and all the other Professors are grumbling exceedingly; but William has no reason to complain. His class is the best attended of any of the literary classes, and he has above forty more students than last winter. . . . For the first three weeks he gave some of his old introductory lectures; but he has now commenced on Logic, which he did not enter upon last winter. The lectures will now be all new, and not one of them is written, so that there will be as hard work this year as last. If William keeps well, I have no fear of his

breaking down. He is much interested in his class, and likes the subject; so, now that he is obliged, he works cheerfully. The sitting up all night is, however, very trying to us both; but I have not had any writing except the first lecture to do till now."

Farther on in the session (22d February) we find Lady Hamilton saying:—"We are going on in our usual quiet way, generally dining out every Friday or Saturday by way of refreshment to William's mind, after the exertion of writing his three weekly lectures. He finds that he will require the whole of the session to finish the course of Logic, so none of last year's lectures will be of any avail for this year; however, six or seven weeks will soon pass away, and now that he has got into the habit of regular daily, or rather nightly, work, he does not seem to feel it any very great drudgery. His students are taking great interest in the business of the class, and, since Christmas, William meets them two hours daily."

It is perhaps necessary here to say a word regarding the place of the Lectures as an exposition of their author's philosophical doctrines, and in relation to his other writings. What has been already said of the circumstances under which they were composed, and the purpose which they were designed to subserve, is sufficient to show their special and exceptional character as expositions of their author's opinions. This was pretty fully explained in the Preface to the first edition of the Lectures (p. ix. *et seq.*) But as a recent critic, who professes "to anticipate the judgment of posterity on Sir W. Hamilton's labours," has yet represented the Lectures as "the fullest and only consecutive exposition of his philosophy,"\* and has very elaborately criticised the author's opinions on this assumption, it may be proper again to state the matter at greater length. Though written subsequently, in point of time, to the articles in the 'Edinburgh Review' on Cousin (the Unconditioned), on Perception, and on Logic, the Lectures were yet prior to nearly all the footnotes on

\* Mill's Examination, p. 3.

Reid, to all the Dissertations supplementary to the same author, and to the development of Sir William's special logical doctrine of a Quantified Predicate with its consequences—prior, in fact, to all that can fairly be regarded as the published authoritative expositions of his philosophical doctrines, excepting only the articles in the 'Review.' In the Lectures, indeed, we find the subject of Perception treated with somewhat greater detail, and certainly with more diffuseness, than in the article on the same subject in the 'Review;' but we must have recourse to the Dissertations supplementary to Reid (Notes B, C, D, and D\*) for the full and final development of Sir William's own doctrine of Perception. To these, as he himself tells us in a footnote to the article on Perception, republished in the 'Discussions,' he gives references "when the points under discussion are more fully or more accurately treated." \* These Dissertations were published for the first time in 1846, ten years after the 'Lectures on Metaphysics' were written. Again, the doctrine of the limitation of human knowledge—of the Conditioned and Unconditioned—is formally expounded only in the article on M. Cousin's writings, republished in the 'Discussions' (1852), and in the new matter contained in Appendix I. A and B. In the 'Lectures on Metaphysics' (L. xxxviii., xxxix., xl.) he states the doctrine with some illustrations, and seeks to show its application to the principle of causality. But this exposition is slighter and looser in manner than that in the article on Cousin, and earlier in time than the consideration of the same point in the Appendix to the 'Discussions,' where, as he says, a "more matured view of the conditions of thought" is to be found than that given in the review of Cousin.† The Lectures on Consciousness contain, among other matters, the distinctive doctrine which he developed under the designation of the Argument from Common Sense; but here, too, we must refer for the latest and most precise exposition of the doctrine to Note A of the supplementary Dissertations to Reid's works. The 'Lectures on Logic' contain,

\* Discussions, p. 39.

† Ibid., p. 18.

of course, the fullest exposition of his views of the details of that science from the Aristotelic and Kantian stand-points. But his new and special logical doctrines (with the exception of that of Comprehension in Concepts, Judgments, and Reasonings) are only cursorily and incidentally treated in two lectures, which he occasionally interposed in the middle of the course on Logic, and which are to be found in the Appendix to the second volume of the Logic Lectures (p. 255 (c), first edition). The latest and fullest development of his special logical theory is to be found in the 'Discussions,' second edition, Appendix II. A and B. On many topics—especially the distinctive doctrines in the philosophy of their author—the Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic can in fairness be taken merely as the point from which he started in his course of philosophical investigation; and where there may appear, as there must do in the career of every man of vitality of thought and activity of research, any difference or discrepancy between the earlier and the later form of opinion—as, for example, in his theory of association—the later view, especially if it be also that published by himself, is that which ought, in common fairness, to be attributed to the author, and dealt with as his. What renders this the more imperative in the present case is, that Sir William did not find it necessary or expedient to embody the fuller or more advanced statement in his series of Lectures, which were already sufficient to occupy the whole time of each session, and most adequately to fulfil the wants of university instruction. For the more elaborate and more advanced discussions of certain questions he was content to refer his students to his published writings. After their first composition, indeed, the Lectures were never substantially changed; they received only occasional verbal alterations. Though amply sufficient for the purposes of class instruction, they were always spoken of by their author as falling far short of complete or adequate courses, whether of Metaphysics or of Logic—as forming, in fact, only introductions to a full and thorough-going discussion of the

principal topics of those sciences. In the Lectures he certainly introduces and briefly discusses a number of subjects upon which he has not otherwise given anything to the world. But these are taken up always and only with a view to class instruction, and do not receive at his hands (as, in the time allotted to each course, they could not) that prolonged or deliberate treatment which is accorded to the subjects of the 'Discussions' or of the 'Dissertations on Reid,' published in his lifetime. On the more elementary and trite parts of philosophy and logic, Sir William, moreover, was content to piece together expositions from authors who had clearly stated current or received opinions. This practice he carried to a greater extent than was desirable or commendable; the only consideration that could even temporarily excuse it being the pressure under which the Lectures were originally written—for which, however, he had ample time subsequently to apply a remedy. Whatever degree of censure may be awarded on this ground, it is a matter of positive unfairness in any critic who professes to discuss Sir W. Hamilton's opinions, to deal with these Lectures—written early, hastily, for a special and temporary purpose, never revised for publication by their author, not containing either the most authentic or the most complete statements of his peculiar doctrines—as of co-ordinate authority with his other published writings; and, keeping all this out of view, actually to represent them as "the fullest exposition of his philosophy." This they are not, in any true or pertinent sense of those words; they are simply offhand expositions of a series of philosophical questions, and are in many respects of style and treatment in absolute contrast to the author's published writings. What a knight in undress was to himself armed *cap-à-pic*, this Sir William is in the loose robes of the Lectures compared with himself in his usual formal and guarded manner. The spirit of ancient chivalry would have disdained to draw the sword at a vantage, and would have sought a foe when his armour was on; but the modern philosophical knight-

errant is of a different type ; he strikes his home-thrusts through the loose robe, and withal loudly proclaims that his opponent was armed to the teeth.

As to the other statement, that they are "the only consecutive exposition of his philosophy," it is hardly better founded than the preceding. Though the Lectures, especially those on Logic, show great clearness and power of arrangement of a certain number of philosophical topics for purposes of academical instruction, and are thus "consecutive," they are far from being a "consecutive exposition of his philosophy;" for a consecutive development of his distinctive theories in Metaphysics and Logic he has not anywhere given, unfortunately enough for the interests of those sciences, but especially for a competent comprehension of his views by his critics.\*

Sir W. Hamilton's appointment to the Logic Chair in Edinburgh was the inauguration of a new era in the philosophical thought and education of the country. Through his writings, few and limited in quantity as they were, his general influence on the course of reflection was already beginning to make itself felt. But his academical position gave him the means of a more intimate, intense, and systematic influence

\* To show the occasional carelessness with which Mr Mill has dealt with his materials, I may refer to the extraordinary blunder on a matter of the order of Sir W. Hamilton's writings which he commits at p. 172 of his 'Examination' (first edition). We are there informed that "much" of the paper on Brown—the second in the 'Discussions'—was "transcribed from our author's Lectures"—that is, an article which appeared in the 'Edinburgh Review' in 1830, and which is reprinted (with the restoration of a few introductory paragraphs deleted for want of space) almost verbatim as it appeared originally, was transcribed from Lectures which were written six years afterwards ! But Mr Mill, as usual, had found an "inconsistency," and Sir W. Hamilton himself, Mr Mill goes so far as to allow, had, in an exceptional moment, become aware of it, and had therefore substituted another "argument" in room of the one that conflicted with his own principles. Unfortunately for the explanation, there is nothing needing to be explained, the facts of the case being precisely the reverse of what is supposed. If there was any transcribing in the matter, the Lectures on Perception must have been taken from the paper since published in the 'Discussions,' and not contrariwise. It is right to add that, in the third edition of the 'Examination,' Mr Mill silently reverses his first statement on the point referred to in this note.

than he could otherwise exercise. He was now to speak his doctrines to other minds; and what was personal in the man was to have its full weight on young and ingenuous minds. The subjects and style of the lectures, not less than the tone of the lecturer, were new to the time. Fresh active thought on philosophical themes had ceased as a power in Scotland—philosophy lived only in books. The impetus which Hume and Reid had given to speculation, and which Stewart and Brown had propagated, was apparently spent. The tide had at any rate ebbed below the level of the universities of the country. Logic, beyond the ordinary elements, had ceased to be taught in the Chairs assigned to it. As for the high problems of metaphysics, these were entirely strange. No teacher of philosophy knew or felt anything of their meaning or reality. The youth of one university had been treated to a dull retail of the nomenclature and more superficial doctrines of Reid. In another, some elementary account of logic was usually given, to the complete exclusion of all vital metaphysical inquiry; and the highest aim of philosophical teaching was traditionally regarded as a discipline of the faculties by means of composition on general themes that lay on the outskirts of the proper work of the Chair. In this way students acquired some culture and accomplishment; but they were never brought even within view of the true problems of philosophy—never confronted with their own necessary ignorance.

The questions of philosophy had thus, so far as academical teaching was concerned, ceased to penetrate to the moral and spiritual life of the country. Without further help, philosophy must have died of inanition. Even at the best, Scottish speculation had been too ignorant both of ancient and modern philosophy to know its relations either to the past or the present. It had been carried on rather in the way of an arbitrary selection of topics, in accordance with the tastes of the individual thinker—often able and ingenious—than from any knowledge and previous determination of the great

catholic questions of philosophy. Many questions were thus altogether omitted ; and no attempt was made to determine the order or mutual relation of the various branches of philosophical investigation. The discussions even of the topics thus singled out by individual preference, or forced upon the thinker by circumstances, though frequently able contributions to speculative inquiry, had seldom been carried to the highest point of which they were capable, or indeed pushed farther than served to satisfy the objections of an antagonist. Speculation in Scotland, though powerful and intense, had not been full, systematic, learned, or exhaustive.

With the already published writings of Hamilton the spring-time of a new life in Scottish speculation had begun. A more profound analysis, a more comprehensive spirit, a learning that had surveyed the philosophical literature of Greece and Germany, and marked the relative place in the intellectual world of the sturdy growths of home thought, were the characteristics of the man who had now espoused the cause of Scottish speculative philosophy. The speculation of the country had been raised above its comparatively low level, and brought face to face with the highest metaphysical problems. The modified doctrine of Experience of the Scottish school had been marshalled with the skill of a great general against the positions of the highest representatives of modern Absolutism. Hamilton had shown that he knew the strength and the deficiency of the line of speculation which had been pursued in Scotland. Now that he was called upon to devote his energies in an academical position to the study and the teaching of philosophy, a keen sifting, purification, and amplification of preceding doctrines were to be looked for at his hands. In his Lectures, accordingly, we find, for the first time in the history of British speculation, an appreciation of the nature and number of the departments of intellectual philosophy, of their mutual relations, and of the questions appropriate to each, a restoration to their proper place of neglected branches of the study, and a thorough and service-



able acquaintance with the literature of the subject. These points are now familiar among us; but they were unknown thirty years ago: and adherents and opponents of the views then inculcated are alike indebted for their knowledge of the departments of philosophy, and of the attempted solutions of many of its higher problems, to the writings of Hamilton.

In the Lectures the spheres of Psychology, Logic, and Metaphysics were for the first time in this country clearly defined, and their mutual relations established. The much-despised and much-misunderstood Logic of the schools, after centuries of neglect, was revived and reinstated in its proper place as a true and vital science, and valuable academical discipline. Adventitious matter that had been suffered to deform its symmetry and impede its progress was detected and thrown aside. Its value as an analysis and development of the ultimate laws and processes of human thought was vindicated; and the bearing of the fact—that human thought is subject to formal necessary law—on systems which allege the virtual omniscience of man, was luminously declared. In Psychology a new, simple, and beautiful general analysis of the intellectual powers was propounded; original views were afforded of special departments of psychological inquiry, especially the laws of association, imagination, and feeling. In Metaphysics there was a reassertion, coupled with a new and profound analysis, of the principles which Reid and Stewart had maintained as ultimate laws of belief, and which they had advanced as a valid defence against the Nihilism of Hume. The theory of Perception, involving the questions of Realism and Idealism, was investigated with a rare skill, learning, and subtlety. The problem of the nature and extent of human knowledge, and its relation to the infinite and absolute in existence, which had been discussed in the article on Cousin with matchless power, and in a way entirely new to British speculation, was not omitted in the course of instruction.

The Lectures, while thus containing the more important

problems of philosophy, yet by no means embraced all the topics, metaphysical and logical, which a thoroughly complete course in both departments should comprise. Only small space was given to the questions of applied or inductive logic; and several of the discussions, both on logical and metaphysical points, were slight and hasty. To this no one was more fully alive than their author. In realising the purposes of philosophical instruction, for which alone they were intended, they were, however, eminently successful. In several points they have been superseded by subsequent writings of their author; but they adequately enough represented the state of his views at the time they were written; and amid much elementary and general matter that was pieced together from books whose very titles were then unknown in Britain, they contained the results of his own fresh and vigorous thought on the topics of philosophy to which he had given special attention. A lecturer of less power might have given more complete courses, but we should then probably have had a more elaborate formality of system, instead of the visible workings of a great mind, and the charm of original thought and unparalleled learning.

From the commencement of his career as a lecturer, and during the twenty years that he occupied the Chair, Sir W. Hamilton was the means of inspiring and impressing young minds—opening up to them new fields of thought and vision—giving principles and convictions which passed into their intellectual, moral, and religious life—to a degree and an extent which has very rarely been equalled by any academic teacher. And this he did not accomplish through any elaborate system of class drilling and general mental discipline. He was not ready as an examiner on lectures or text-books, did little by interrogation, and had not at any time much power of oral explanation or illustration. The advantage derived from the mere exercises of the class was comparatively subordinate. In all this he has been excelled by men otherwise vastly his inferiors. The power which passed as the shock of a

new life into many minds lay primarily in the man, the matter of his teaching, and his felt personal relation to his subject. The feeling he inspired was that of one who did not teach from the low level of a professional accomplishment, but who had naturally, spontaneously, and with full simplicity of heart, found in his high theme the nourishment of his thought and life. He had been

“ By love of truth  
 Urged on ; or haply by intense delight  
 In feeding thought wherever thought could feed.”

Philosophy was not a thing appended to him, which he could take up and lay down—use for pleasure or profit—an elegant accomplishment—far less a thing which he could bend according to changing circumstances, or the shifts of an immoral expediency—or mould after the unhealthy dimensions of popular beliefs and prejudices; but it was a body of convictions, definite, thorough, real—a living growth from the depths of his nature—part and parcel of the man himself. To reflect and to inquire on the great questions regarding matter, mind, freedom, God—the finite and the infinite—had obviously been not the business of his life, but his very life.

And now this man, subtle in thought, vehement in argumentation, precise in speech, ardent in nature, disdainful of all practical narrowness, came to tell what meaning he found in the words which indicated those great ideas—what of reality he had been able to rescue from it all. No wonder that to young minds it appeared as the revelation of a new world. So firm and close was his hold of the world of consciousness, so distinct the utterance of what he himself saw therein, that its invisible and impalpable phenomena came, for the time that the student was under the influence of this teacher, actually to supersede the interests and impressions of the world of sense, and appeared indeed the only abiding and real present. It was thus that by words

“ Which spoke of nothing more than what we are,”  
 he won his hearers to “ noble raptures,” and

“Bred such fear and awe  
As fall upon us often when we look  
Into our minds—into the mind of man.”

The qualities of the lectures which enabled their author, in the same course, to combine elementary instruction with an adequate discussion of the higher philosophical questions, were mainly the extreme exactness of the definitions, the clearness of the divisions, the remarkable orderliness of the development of the thoughts, and the extraordinary precision and perspicuity of the language. His method was a purely synthetic one—he was careful to mark out in the most general form the limits and the various departments of the science he was treating, and to develop his doctrines under each head in complete obedience to the natural laws and instincts of the understanding. He thus made a strong demand on the attention of every student; but, when once this was given and an interest awakened, the listener was readily and naturally carried on from the more elementary to the more advanced parts of the science. It was thus that, while any ordinary student who was able and willing to give the requisite attention could follow the lecture, those who had an aptitude for the subject were quickened and captivated, and even roused to enthusiasm. The stately ratiocination of the more polemical parts was impressive and overawing, as the tread of an armed host marching to the onset. The symmetry of the argumentative array—the ease, variety, and compass of the movement—filled the mind as the harmony of a grand music fills the sense. The style, at least of the metaphysical lectures, was not so condensed as that of the author's published writings. It was novel and peculiar in many of its turns of expression—often resolutely and most exactly technical—always clear, precise, nervous, pregnant. It was such a style as one felt the thought had shaped for itself. Amid all this array of exact but never overpowering distinctions and orderly argumentation, there came ever and anon passages of a grave and impressive eloquence—original, or it might be quotations from Plato, Pascal, or Malebranche—

from Boethius or Sir John Davies—apt and beautiful: when the eye and countenance that had before been keen as the keen logic of the thought would

“ Even like an altar lit by fire from heaven,  
Kindle before us ; ”

and the voice, always clear, deep-toned, and full, would swell and fall in a pathetic cadence—the outflow of profound emotion.

Curiously blended with all this power of the teacher there was a wonderful fascination about the man. His personal appearance in the Chair was to the end exceedingly impressive; at first, when he lectured standing, it must have been singularly striking. “ It was impossible,” says a distinguished pupil,\* “ not to be impressed with the commanding expression of that fine countenance and noble bust; the massive well-proportioned head, square and perfectly developed towards the front; the brows arched, full, and firmly bound together, with short dints of concentrated energy between; the nose pure aquiline, but for its Roman strength; and a mouth beautifully cut, of great firmness and precision, with latent sarcastic power in its decisive curve. But the most striking feature of all to a stranger was Sir William’s eye; though not even dark hazel, it appeared from its rare brilliancy absolutely black, and expressed beyond any feature I have ever seen, calm, piercing, sleepless intelligence. . . . Though naturally most struck with this at first, one soon found that it but harmonised with the perfect strength and finish of every feature—nothing being weak, nothing undeveloped in any.”

The dignity, earnestness, and simplicity of his character showed themselves in his manner as a lecturer. Though felt to be so high above the student in intellect and learning, he was withal so unaffected, so courteous, so kind in his dealings with the members of his class—so ready to explain difficulties and answer inquiries—that love and reverence for the man were blended with enthusiastic admiration for the

\* Prof. Baynes of St Andrews, ‘ *Edinburgh Essays* ’ (1856)—“ Sir W. Hamilton.”

teacher. Hamilton was, as I know, deeply and warmly loved by students who never saw him, except in the Chair, and never perhaps exchanged with him more than a few unimportant words.

The mode in which Sir William conducted the business of the class had its peculiar features, and was closely connected with the kind of influence which he exercised as a lecturer. He did not observe the usual practice of ascertaining by interrogation, whether oral or written, how far the student had mastered the lecture. The student who submitted to examination had to prepare the lecture or lectures that had been previously delivered by Sir William in such a way as to be able without interrogation to give an unbroken account of any part which might be selected. The salient feature of the examination thus consisted in the student making to the Professor and the class a statement of the contents of the written lectures without the prompting of consecutive questions. This method had its advantages: it was an admirable dialectical discipline, accustoming the reciter to the orderly connection and arrangement of his thoughts; it was a training in public speaking; and, above all, in the course of the five months during which it was continued, the mind of the zealous student was thoroughly imbued with the mode of thought of his teacher, and acquired certain valuable intellectual habits which remained with him as permanent possessions. It implied, however, nearly entire devotion to the work of the one class, and while it succeeded admirably with the few who submitted to the process, it cannot be said to have been useful to the many who did not undergo it—as the method of oral questioning may readily be made—or to be the most effectual means of reaching and quickening the minds of the majority of a class. The following highly graphic account of the system is given by one who himself passed through the training:—

“The active discipline of the class,” says Professor Baynes,\* “consisted of exercises and examinations, the latter of two

\* “Sir W. Hamilton” in ‘*Edinburgh Essays*.’

kinds—compulsory and voluntary. The compulsory, which generally occurred four or five times during the session, was an examination (in the lectures) of the whole class, when any member was liable to be called up, and generally before the end of the session all were actually questioned once or twice at least. Latterly, however, this fell rather into disuse, so that often the voluntary, which had always been the principal, remained the exclusive form of examination during the session. This examination was of two kinds, or rather in two subjects,—the lectures, and what was called “additional information”—i. e., subjects connected with the lectures. The examination derived its name from the fact that it was quite optional whether the students took it or not; the order in which those who offered themselves were examined being determined in the most impartial manner—in fact, by lot—as follows: On the examination days, which were Tuesday and Thursday—Monday, Wednesday, and Friday being lecture days—the members of the class were requested to sit in alphabetical order according to their names, the benches being lettered for this purpose. On the table before the Professor, at the commencement of the hour, was placed a jar (by courtesy a vase or urn) containing the letters of the alphabet printed in large type on rounds of millboard; in fact, a child’s alphabet, with highly-coloured pictures at the back of the letters, from ‘A was an apple’ to ‘Z was a zebra.’ These Sir William mixed thoroughly together in the jar, and then taking the uppermost one, say W, held it before the class, inquiring whether any gentleman in W was prepared to undertake the examination; whereupon Mr Walker, or Watson, or whatever the name might be, rose, bowed to the Chair, and commenced at the point where the last examination left off. The work of preparing for these examinations was by no means slight to those who did it regularly and well. For the lectures being so full of condensed matter, a mere outline would not do—some important points being necessarily left out in any abstract the student might attempt. There were always three

or four, and generally five or six, lectures in arrear, any part of which he must be prepared to take up at a moment's notice, as it was of course impossible to know when or where he should be called, or whether he should be called at all. Finally, the lectures he was thus required to have at his finger-ends often contained long series of minute and extremely subtle discriminations, such as the thirty-three distinctions between mediate and immediate knowledge in Note B, and the thirty-one between the primary and secondary qualities of body in Note D, of Sir William's edition of Reid, both of which, I remember, were included in the lectures the year I attended the metaphysical course,—to say nothing of exercises in syllogistic, such as concrete examples of every valid mood under the old and new systems, and the like, which naturally occurred in the logical course. It was useless for any one to attempt the examination trusting to memory alone, as some men are said to do with Euclid; for in the first place it was almost impossible to remember the lectures without understanding them; and in the second, one's knowledge was continually tested by cross-examination on the more difficult points, in which the mere *memoriter* men were sure to break down altogether. The effort of thorough preparation was, however, a most invigorating one to those who made it, not only from the mastery of the subject induced, but from the habits of clear mental discrimination and exact verbal precision it necessarily helped to form. The second voluntary examination in subjects connected with the lectures, though not so arduous as the first, was a very useful, pleasant, and at times even entertaining one. The subjects brought before the class in the space of an hour were often miscellaneous enough, as the only restriction imposed—that the 'additional information' should refer to points touched upon in the previous lectures—still left a large margin for the diversities of individual choice. The pupil might, for example, give the views of any philosophic writer on questions directly or indirectly discussed in the lectures, such as the division of the mental



powers, the distinction between art and science, the theories of perception, &c.; the history of a philosophic word, such as category, predicament, concept, consciousness, &c.; the distinction between related terms, as hypothesis and theory, discovery and invention, observation and experiment; a short biography of any philosopher, poet, critic, historian, or celebrated man mentioned in the lectures; or, finally, state difficulties and speculations of his own on points arising out of the previous exposition. Sir William strongly encouraged all such manifestations of interest in the subject of the prelections, especially, perhaps, the last; and from the greater freedom thus allowed, this examination brought the students more directly into contact with the Professor than any other class exercise. After the student had finished his account, whatever it might be, Sir William would inquire what books he was reading, give valuable hints as to the best course of study, and often supply the information brought by particulars derived from the vast storehouse of his own learning. The examination thus acted as a powerful stimulus and guide during the whole course of philosophic study. The exercises of the class were short essays, restricted, like the foregoing examination, to subjects connected with the lectures, and generally prescribed every fortnight or three weeks. Extracts from these essays were regularly read to the class by the writers, each student being allowed five minutes (measured by a sand-glass) for this purpose—the time being extended at the option of the Professor, who generally criticised the more important exercises. While only a fourth, or at most a third, of the class attempted the voluntary examinations, a large majority of the members wrote essays of some sort or other. In addition, however, to the regular class exercises, essays on special subjects were now and then prescribed to the competitors for prizes, which were also, of course, read to the class. Indeed it was part of Sir William's system that all the class work should be done in public; and as the essays were read in public, so the examinations were all *viva voce*, and before

the whole class. Each member had thus an opportunity of deciding the relative position of the prize competitors; and at the end of the session the honours of the class were awarded to the successful candidates by the votes of their fellow-students."

Of the nature and intensity of the influence of Hamilton as an instructor in philosophy, no more pertinent evidence could be adduced than that contained in the following passage, written by one who attended his early courses of lectures, and who powerfully describes what he and others of that time experienced:—"So rich a treasure of thought and learning," says Dr John Cairns,\* "brought to light in a succession of lectures at once profound and luminous, adventurous and sober-minded, full of exact distinctions and criticisms, yet pervaded by a grave academic earnestness and eloquence, could not but be hailed by all students of speculative tendencies with sympathy and admiration, while, in the more congenial spirits, these feelings were kindled into passion and enthusiasm. Many are now living who have experienced this shock in a high degree of intensity, and who connect it with a wide and definite enlargement of their intellectual horizon, which has remained, and cannot disappear, though the excitement has long passed away. . . .

"Willingly do I recall and linger upon these days and months, extending even to years, in which common studies of this abstract nature bound us together. It was the romance—the poetry—of speculation and friendship. All the vexed questions of the schools were attempted by our united strength, after our higher guide had set the example. The thorny wilds of logic were pleasant as an enchanted ground; its driest technicalities treasured up as unspeakably rare and precious. We stumbled on, making discoveries at every step, and had all things common. Each lesson in mental philosophy opened up some mystery of our immortal nature, and seemed to bring us nearer the horizon of absolute truth, which again

\* Memoir of the Rev. John Clark, by the Rev. Dr Cairns of Berwick, p. 21.

receded as we advanced, and left us, like children pursuing the rainbow, to resume the chase. In truth, we had much of the character of childhood in these pursuits—light-heartedness, wonder, boundless hope, engrossment with the present, carelessness of the future. Our old world daily became new; and the real world of the multitude to us was but a shadow. It was but the outer world, the *non-ego*, standing at the mercy of speculation, waiting to be confirmed or abolished in the next debate; while the inner world, in which truth, beauty, and goodness had their eternal seat, should still survive and be all in all. The play of the intellect with these subtle and unworldly questions was to our minds as inevitable as the stages of our bodily growth. Happy was it for us that the play of affection was also active—nay, by sympathy excited to still greater liveliness—and that a higher wisdom suffered us not, in all these flowery mazes, to go astray. The fascination of these hours of wandering in the morning twilight few can sympathise with. To those who have loved them most they cannot return; and they awaken only tears of regret that those who shared them, and could best understand them, are gone with them. But it is wrong to complain of the laws of mental and moral progress. These days, too, had their cares, their sorrows, and their sins; and the true golden age lies not behind, but before us.”

In the following notes, which Dr Cairns has kindly furnished for this Memoir, he refers more particularly to the subject which he has noticed generally in the foregoing extract. The statement will be read with interest by every one who has any concern in the higher education of the country.

“I was in the second year of my studies when I entered the Logic class in November 1837; but I had been absent from College for two years, and I knew little or nothing of the impression which Sir William had made by his first course on Metaphysics in 1836. I was but indifferently prepared for such a style of instruction as he brought with him to the Chair. I had given a good deal of attention to classics, and read

widely enough in miscellaneous literature, but I had never gone to any extent into mental philosophy or logic. Such questions I had perplexed myself with as the freedom of the will, the reality of moral distinctions, and the ultimate grounds of certainty. I had struggled through Butler's Analogy and other less difficult books on the evidences of Christianity, and had read some systems of divinity; but I had not taken up the study of mind with any warmth or deep interest, the only works that I had gone through having any express connection with it being Watts on the Improvement of the Mind, and, if I remember rightly, Reid's Inquiry. As for logic, all that I knew was gathered from Duncan's, and a hasty perusal of an early edition of Whately's, sufficient only to make me see that they contradicted each other, and that the latter gave a place to the Aristotelian scheme, which the former denied. Scanty as this furnishing was, it is not likely that many of the class—most of the members of which were still, like myself, in their teens—had much more; and one can thus understand the difficulties under which Sir William submitted to us his profound and elaborate investigations into the most abstruse questions of mental and logical science.

"I need not speak of the substance of his lectures; for these were materially the same as in the published volumes on logic. As published, however, they hardly give an idea of the manner of his delivery; for the paragraphs or principal statements, which, as numbered, amount to one hundred and thirteen, were slowly dictated in the German fashion, while the succeeding illustrations were simply read over. The moment that he entered he began, without sitting down, to read, often waving his hand to stay the applause with which he was greeted, and thus continued throughout the hour during which the lecture lasted, his standing attitude giving him the appearance of being taller than he really was—an impression which was confirmed by the flowing gown which he always wore and the high desk behind which he stood, and above which, as if belonging to a more gigantic frame, rose his truly Olympic

head, massive but finely chiselled in forehead, nose, mouth, and chin, and with a dark eye looking out from beneath the shaggy eyebrows with a concentrated depth and penetration that could not be surpassed. His gesture had little variety, his appearance presenting from first to last a look of solid and impregnable conviction; and this was also reflected in the clear and emphatic tones of his deep-set voice, which, however, could be quickened into true rhetorical grandeur, and deliver poetical quotations or highly-wrought passages with a peculiar roll such as I have not heard in any other speaker.

“The fascination of so commanding a personality for young and susceptible minds can easily be understood. It was assisted by the novelty of the lectures, and by the sense of novelty even on the part of the lecturer, which had its stimulating effect on the audience as they strove to march with him through the unexplored regions of a first course. If I may judge from myself, it must have cost even those who at all succeeded a great effort. The style was wholly new in our philosophical literature. It was replete with technical terms, and bristled with Latin and even Greek words and quotations. It carried with it a constant load of definitions and distinctions, and involved, even in its elementary statements, difficult processes of analysis and criticism which could only be fully mastered at an advanced stage. It was liker stretches of Aristotle and steppes of Kant than the flowery field opened out in Stewart and Brown. After the border of the wilderness was passed in the introductory lectures, I well remember the sense of difficulty and even desperation that seemed to fall upon the class as the definition of logic was unrolled in all its formidable proportions—‘the science of the laws of thought as thought, or of the forms of thought, or of the formal laws of thought.’ Another slough of despond was the enunciation of the fundamental laws of thought; and many a shuffle of the feet entreated the lecturer to pause upon and repeat, for the enlightenment of a wholly bewildered audience, such dark formulas as that of the law of contradiction, ‘ $A - A = 0$ .’ I do not

think, indeed, that I ever saw more blank dismay upon any countenances than that which sat upon the majority of the class during this lecture. Some, perhaps many, abandoned the effort henceforth ; but to a select minority, and that by no means inconsiderable, the sense of difficulty acted with the force of inspiration. In the throes and struggles of the unwonted exercise an altogether new power of thought was created, and the frowning and rugged cliffs, at the base of which some sank to rise no more, became to others the means of ascent to the command of a wide and unsuspected horizon of land and sea. Gradually, to those who waited for it, day broke upon the extensive prospect, and the toil of climbing, with the horror of darkness, gave place to exhilaration.

“ It soon appeared, by a decisive test, that a fair contingent were able to follow the lecturer. Sir William adopted a system of examination on alternate days which revealed the exact impression which his lectures had made. After the example of his own teacher, Professor Jardine of Glasgow, he resolved to put the decision of the prizes at the end of the session into the hands of the class ; and in order to give them opportunities of judging, he encouraged, in addition to the regular oral examination to which the whole class was successively liable, a more lengthened voluntary recapitulation of the substance of his lectures on the part of the more enterprising or ambitious. Sitting quietly in his chair on examination days, he would, after sticking for a time to the questioning of selected names, the questions being rather elementary, open a wider field by looking over upon the benches before him, each of which had its set of occupants arranged according to the alphabet, and offering the challenge, ‘ Will any gentleman in A give an account of my last lecture ? ’ If A was unfruitful, the challenge went through B, or C, or D, till some one was adventurous enough, amidst general cheering, to rise and make the effort. Ere long all the competitors came to the front, and their rising, sometimes to the number of two or three under one letter, could be anticipated as certainly as the utterance of the summons,

'Any gentleman in X?' The extent to which these rehearsals were carried was really surprising. Sometimes a student would recapitulate for fifteen or twenty minutes; and though some deviated into new tracts, the general strain was that of minute reproduction of all the technicalities and peculiar phrases that had been employed, including, of course, the substance of the lecture. A more invigorating exercise could hardly be imagined, and the class in general had the advantage, if not of much variety, at least of some light and shade, from the different parts remembered and restored by different minds, and these of their own order. Besides, independent thinking and style were helped by written exercises, and these were read, at least in selected instances, in the class. Altogether, the amount of mental impulse given has probably never been exceeded in the history of any Scottish university, and the youthful enthusiasm excited took a somewhat irregular form, for it was proposed and carried at large meetings of the class to present Sir William with a testimonial, which, however, he immediately and firmly declined.

"During the session it was the custom of Sir William to invite his students in parties to his house, which was then in Manor Place, as afterwards in Great King Street. I recollect nothing of the conversation on the first occasion when I thus met him, except the general impression of unaffected kindness and simplicity, which was increased by every subsequent interview. The immense library also, as venerable in its look as striking in its size, could not be forgotten. I believe I was not the only one who, during the summer recess, returned once and again to Manor Place, simply to take a look at the outside of the house which recalled the excitement of the past session, and held out the promise of the future.

"The second course of lectures—that on Metaphysics (since published)—delivered in 1838-39, at a separate hour from his Logic course, was to me still more interesting than the first; and those who attended it were attracted only by the love of the study, as it was not required for graduation. In connec-

tion with it there arose an unwelcome controversy with the Town Council, who had then the superintendence of the University. Into the merits of this I cannot enter, as I only remember the circumstances imperfectly. There was some demur to Sir William's disjoining Metaphysics (or Psychology) from Logic, and charging for the two simultaneous courses separate fees; and he, on his part, resented the interference all the more, that in regard to the ordinary fees, some preference, which he considered unjust, had been given to the Medical and Legal Chairs over those in the Faculty of Arts. In a pamphlet written by him on the subject, and containing his correspondence with the Town Council, I remember his indignant quotation of the lines—

‘Dat Galenus opes, dat Justinianus honores,  
At nos philosophi turba misella sumus.’

“Besides the qualities of vehemence and energy which Sir William carried with him into all his literary controversies, this correspondence was conducted with all the formal divisions and elaborate definitions with which he would have reviewed and exploded an erroneous opinion in philosophy, so that, as Professor Macdougall once wittily remarked to me, ‘He answered the Edinburgh Town Council as if he had been refuting Porphyry.’ This misunderstanding, which had the unfortunate effect of leading Sir William to retrench afterwards his separate course, and to give his different lectures only in alternate years, had no disturbing influence on our class. We were quietly engaged in our discussions as to the existence of the external world while the storm was raging without, and only felt it to be another form of the non-ego; while the contrast between the singular gentleness and simplicity of our teacher in his dealings with his pupils, and his more impassioned qualities in controversy, became more remarkable. In addition to his other labours, Sir William, throughout this winter, held meetings with a voluntary class for reading in Aristotle's Rhetoric; and this hour was entirely free. I well remember



that during the private gatherings of this season, discussions between Sir William and his more advanced students took a larger compass; that some difficulties in regard to his philosophy of perception, and other points, which have since been abundantly urged, were proposed, and that he endeavoured to meet them with the greatest candour and fairness. I can distinctly recall one evening in Great King Street, when successive groups of querists assailed him, not with objections so much as with difficulties calling for explanation; and when, I believe for hours, with his back leaning against the shelves of his library, he met all comers with the most perfect good-nature, and with that unconsciousness of his own greatness, which was the charm of his friendly intercourse.

"Another fruit of his influence was the formation by his advanced students in 1838-39 of a Metaphysical Society, which, for a considerable series of years, held its place in the list of College societies, for which Edinburgh is so honourably distinguished. Few agencies contributed more to give currency to his views and speculations ere they were fully laid before the world; and the delightful meetings prolonged to midnight, of which not a few still survive to retain the recollection, were almost as much marked by freedom of discussion as by natural deference to his authority.\*

"I may state, before leaving my account of Sir W. Hamilton as a professor, that having occasion to study for a winter in Berlin—the year being 1843—I had the opportunity of comparing him with some of the most eminent professors of philosophy there, including his great contemporary, who was also the subject of his criticism, Schelling. But in this last case there was no comparison possible. Schelling was striving in his last period to recover himself from his pantheistic aberrations, but without abandoning his *a priori* or speculative

\* Besides Dr Cairns himself, the following were among the members of this Society:—A. C. Fraser, now Professor of Logic in the University of Edinburgh; John A. Wood, advocate; David Masson, now Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Edinburgh; Andrew Wilson, afterwards minister of the Abbey Church, Paisley; John Clark, afterwards minister in Glasgow.

method; and though there were gleams of unextinguished genius, with the revelation of power, there was neither the clear vigour nor the progressive march of Sir William's style of lecturing; and the impression on the class was mixed and doubtful. Michelet and Beneke—the one a high Hegelian, the other a disciple of experience—had their merits and their interest. But the most Hamiltonian in his professorial manner, in which grave authority mingled with vast philosophical learning, was Trendelenburg, though the kindling and quickening element was less conspicuous. The only man, however, of the same moulding power was Neander, who, in another department, and with many other differences, breathed the like breath of vital enthusiasm into the immense body of his materials, and united the solidity of research and the originality of thinking with the glow of passionate and even dogmatic conviction."

In the following letters of this period between Sir William and M. Cousin, we have references to the lectures and other subjects of interest common to the two philosophers.



## SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, *21st May 1837.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I am deeply ashamed that I allowed your kind letter which I received at the commencement of winter to remain so long unacknowledged; but for five months I was so occupied with writing lectures from day to day—for I had not been able from indisposition to do anything in that way last summer—that I was too easily induced to procrastinate this among other duties. . . . I have read M. St Hilaire's preface to his translation of the Politics of Aristotle, and some of the translation itself and notes. It appears to me a work of great accuracy and ability, and puts to shame any attempts of the kind that have been made in this country. I trust, however, that M. St Hilaire's translation will not prevent you from proceeding with your half-promised work on the Organon and Metaphysics of Aristotle: that would be a disappointment indeed. Among my collections relative to Aristotle I have a copy of the Organon, with MS. notes and collations by Isaac Casaubon, not contained in his edition of the 'Opera Aristotelis;' and also

notes and a collation of the 'Codex Argentoratensis' of the Rhetoric of Aristotle by Franciscus and Aemilius Portus, not contained in their edition of that book. If these could be of any possible interest to you or to M. St Hilaire, it will give me great pleasure to send them to you. By the by, I may notice what has escaped all the editors, that on the margin of the first edition of the *Organon* by Pacius (Lugd. 1584) there is the collation of a MS. In the subsequent editions, though the result of a collation of five MSS., there are no various readings given. The first edition is very rare; you must have it in the Parisian libraries, otherwise my copy is at your service. Buhle could not obtain it, and the Berlin academicians have made no use of its *variæ lectiones*.

Can you answer the following questions without any trouble, when you again favour me with a letter? 1°, I am desirous to know whether the Greek verses corresponding to '*Barbara, Celarent*,' i.e. Γράμματα, "Εγγαψι, κ. τ. λ., are to be found in any Greek logician prior to M. Psellus, in whose '*Synopsis Organi*' (published by Ehinger 1597), I presume (for I have not been able to obtain the work), they appear; and whether from them Petrus Hispanus (whose '*Summulæ*' are chiefly taken from the Synopsis of Psellus) took the hint which he improved in the '*Barbara, Celarent*,' &c. The verses in question are not, I know, to be found in Alexander Aphrodisiensis (to whom they are erroneously attributed by Nunnescius), nor in any of the subsequent Greek commentators on the *Organon* (Ammonius, Philoponus, Magentinus, &c.) prior to Psellus. 2°, These diagrams illustrative of the syllogism—



are they to be found prior to Faber Stapulensis? Is there any trace of them in the MSS. of the Greek commentators on the *Organon* before the end of the fifteenth century? Now I should not have mentioned these doubts if they were to give you the slightest trouble; but it is probable you may be able to satisfy me, from what you know of the subject, without the cost of any inquiry; and it is only in the hope you can do so that I take the liberty to request your solution.\*

\* On the points here referred to, see Discussions, p. 669, note.

I am superintending a collected edition of Reid's Works, more complete than has yet been made, and shall add a few notes. Were the work not beneath your consideration—I mean as far as my share extends—I should have been anxious to have requested that you would allow me to inscribe it to you. I have got through my first course, upon the whole, with tolerable satisfaction. I am happy that, though I did not give a very elementary view of the philosophy of mind, my auditors did not find it unintelligible. . . . I am much gratified by hearing that you are engaged in profound study of the scholastic philosophy. What you have already done in that department only excites the desire that you should do more. The separation of the gold from the dross requires a workman like yourself. I am afraid you will find the deciphering of my execrable handwriting more than your patience can submit to, and I shall therefore desist for the present. You kindly ask about the plan of my lectures. I have been hitherto solely occupied with psychology,—next session I shall commence with logic proper. The course will contain psychology, logic, metaphysic, and æsthetic. I mean to have a text-book made out soon for certain parts, and I shall, of course, send you a copy when printed.\*—Believe me, with the highest respect, ever most truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

1 Sept. 1837.

Il y a long temps que j'aurais dû répondre à votre lettre du 21 Mai dernier. Mais j'en ai été empêché par mille occupations, dont la plus pressante était la publication de mon livre sur la Hollande. L'avez vous reçu, ainsi que mon *Ecole Normale*? Je vous ai fait passer ces deux ouvrages par des voies si peu sûres que je ne sais s'ils vous sont parvenus : et je le désire beaucoup, car vous êtes du petit nombre de ceux auxquels je pense en écrivant, et il m'importe que vous preniez la peine de me lire. Mandez-moi donc si vous avez reçu ces deux écrits. . . .

Parlons maintenant de la philosophie. Combien je suis ravi du succès de votre cours ! et combien j'en approuve la division ! Vous commencez donc aussi par la psychologie. Dans ce cas, je suis impatient de voir quelle valeur vous attribuez aux lois de la logique. Si elles sont purement relatives, vous aurez affaire à Aristote ; si vous les croyez et les établissez comme vraies *en elles-mêmes*, et non pas

\* This design of a Text-Book was never realised.



seulement par rapport à nous, il vous faudra bien revenir à une philosophie quelconque de *l'absolu*, sauf le mot que je vous abandonne. Enfin vous préparez un Manuel. Je le lirai avec la plus grande attention.

Vous êtes fort aimable de m'offrir votre nouvelle édition de Reid. Je l'accepte volontiers, car je respecte infiniment Reid auquel je dois beaucoup ; et je compte bien l'appeler à mon secours contre le scepticisme qui commence à sortir de tous côtés de notre chère philosophie Ecossaise. Est-ce là ce qu'avait voulu Reid et la philosophie du sens commun ? Ou il n'a pas compris la portée de ses principes, ou vous leur donnez, mon très-cher ami, une signification qu'ils n'ont point. Vous voyez que je suis fort entêté de ma philosophie. Mais je vous l'avoue, autant le doute en beaucoup de points me paraît sage et forcé autant le scepticisme général sur la raison et les *réalités* qu'elle nous découvre, me semble, plus j'y réfléchis, arbitraire, artificiel, et dangereux.

Je suis bien aise que vous estimez le travail de M. St Hilaire. Il vient de remporter le prix de notre Académie sur l'*Organon*. Il n'a rien à voir avec la famille de notre célèbre zoologiste. Il vous écrira lui-même pour vous remercier de vos aimables propositions. Nous avons causé ensemble de vos questions, et voici notre commune réponse.

1. Les mots techniques, Γράμματα, Ἐγγραψι, κ. τ. λ., ne sont ni dans aucun logicien grec avant Psellus, ni dans Psellus lui-même. Avant Pierre d'Espagne, on ne les trouve que dans Nicéphore Blemmidas, abrégé de l'*Organon*. S'ils remontent plus haut, toute trace est perdue, et, jusqu'à nouvelle découverte, on peut très-bien les considérer comme un fruit de la scholastique constantinopolitaine.

2. Les figures explicatives—



n'appartiennent point à la scholastique latine ; et sont de petites inventions grecques du bas Empire. Ils sont d'un usage général dans les MSS. du 13<sup>ème</sup> siècle, et ils doivent remonter plus haut, peut-être même à l'ancienne école péripatéticienne, dont le chef a joint plus d'une fois des dessins explicatifs à son texte. Ce n'est là qu'une conjecture probable ; le certain est qu'on rencontre ces figures

à chaque pas dans les MSS. grecs antérieurs à la grande scholas-  
tique latine.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

10 Février 1838.

Et bien, mon cher Monsieur, que faites-vous, et où en êtes-vous ? Je n'ai plus de nouvelles d'Ecosse, et l'Edinburgh Review ne m'apporte aucun article de philosophie qui trahisse la main de M. Hamilton. Songez donc que pour moi la philosophie de la Grande Bretagne, c'est vous, et que je ne sais plus rien dès—que vous vous taisiez.

Sans cesse je vous demanderai des nouvelles de votre cours, de votre futur *Manuel*, et de votre édition de Reid.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

30 Juillet 1838.

Voici, mon cher Monsieur, une troisième édition de mes *Fragmens*. Le libraire m'a fait violence pour donner cette édition ; j'ai cédé à regret, n'y pouvant mettre qu'un mot d'*Avertissement*, où vous jouez un rôle que j'aurais fort agrandi, si l'espace ne m'eût manqué. Je n'espère pas vous convertir, mais je désire ardemment et j'espère bien n'avoir pas dit un seul mot qui vous puisse choquer. Soyez assez bon pour me répondre à cet égard.

. . . . Mais votre cours ? Grâce à Dieu, j'en ai des nouvelles et d'excellentes par M. Horner, qui est ici, et avec lequel je cause beaucoup de notre cher professeur de logique de l'Université d'Edinburgh. Il est certain que vos leçons sont saisies et goûtées, et je m'en réjouis comme d'un événement très-heureux pour la philosophie. Toutefois comme je suis très exigeant, je me permets de désirer aussi que les succès du professeur ne nous privent pas des articles de l'écrivain.

A propos d'articles, je vous avais annoncé qu'un de mes amis, M. Peisse, dont vous verrez le nom dans mon *Avertissement*, avait traduit plusieurs articles sortis de votre plume. Il se décide enfin à les publier, à mon instantane prière. Je ne crois pas qu'à aucune époque, depuis la vogue de la philosophie de Condillac, il y ait eu en France autant de zèle sincère et sérieux pour nos chères études. Le cours de M. St Hilaire est suivi de peu d'auditeurs, mais par des auditeurs choisis et laborieux. Celui de M. Damiron sur la philosophie moderne a un succès plus brillant; et si la santé de M. Jouffroi lui interdit à peu près l'enseignement, ses écrits lui font partout un nombreux auditoire. Son Introduction à Reid serait très-bonne sans

cette fâcheuse tendance au scepticisme que Reid n'approuveroit guère, et que je vous reproche à vous aussi, mon très-cher monsieur. Dans ce siècle de faible croyance, est-il digne de vous d'avoir l'air de favoriser le moins du monde un scepticisme que ses conséquences me feraient redouter, quand ses principes me tenteraient? Vous voyez avec quelle franchise je vous parle; c'est la mesure de la haute estime que je professe pour vous et de l'affection que je vous porte, à travers les deux cents lieues et plus qui nous séparent. . . .

Ne manquez pas de me tenir au courant de tout ce qui se fait d'un peu important en Ecosse, en philosophie et en pédagogie.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 18th Sept. 1839.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . I have read with the greatest interest (and, I need not add, admiration) the papers with which I was previously unacquainted, and which appear for the first time in the new edition of the *Fragments*. Will you allow me to answer a question you put in note (1), at p. 297 of the second volume? It was the 'Opera Varia' of Joannes Michael Brutus to which Leibnitz refers, and the editor of the Berlin edition of 1698 (which I have), though his name is not given, was Johann Friedrich Cramer, as appears from the article "Brutus" in the 'Zedlerisches Lexicon.' I trust you will not desist from your labours on Aristotle, though Plato may claim your attention for a time, and though a Peripatetic School has sprung up under your auspices. I have the intention—which I hope I may before long be able to realise—of attempting an article on the recent works on the philosophers of antiquity in France, Germany, and Holland. Of course you and your *élèves* will constitute the central group. I rejoice also to hear of the flourishing state of philosophy in your country. M. Peisse's intention of translating some of my papers is extremely flattering, but if he execute his purpose I could have wished that some errors in the original were corrected. With M. Peisse's reputation I was acquainted from M. Damiron's *History*, before I had heard of him from your letters and preface. I see he was engaged in opposition to Gall's doctrine in an able polemic. I have had a long series of experiments in relation to that doctrine, which completely disprove its most fundamental positions, lying by me for above ten years, half forgotten. The account you give of M. St Hilaire's success as a professor gives me much pleasure.

I trust your health is now completely restored, which I was grieved to learn had not been such as to allow you to engage in the more arduous functions of the Ministry of Instruction. You have been employing your summers in journeys into Switzerland and Holland. Would you not be induced to visit us in this remote region? I can promise you that no one would be more honourably received by all; and nothing could, to me personally, afford a higher satisfaction than such an event. Do think of it, and magnify any objects of interest we may possess that may concur in affording you a temptation.

Of Reid I am ashamed to speak. The work has been nearly ready for a year and a half, but having been obliged to change my publisher, I have allowed the publication to be delayed without any good reason for it longer than it ought. I mean to set about finishing it in the course of a few days, and hope to have it out in about six weeks, when I shall send it for your indulgent criticism—your approbation of such a production I cannot hope for. I shall at the same time thank M. St Hilaire for the present of his valuable work on the *Organon*. I had a letter from Mrs Austin lately, and a well-deserved reproach for my epistolary delinquencies.—Believe me, my dear sir, with the highest regard, most truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

Sir William, as we have seen, speedily excited an ardent enthusiasm in the youth by whom he was surrounded in his class-room. The daily hour of formal prelection—*i. e.*, reading a prepared discourse on the different topics of the course—was soon found not to be sufficient. Closer contact and keener questioning between student and professor became necessary. The study in which they were engaged had passed from its previous state of dull stagnation and formality, and become a living and quickening mental discipline. Sir William, therefore, instituted hours of oral examination, discussion, and exercise, over and above the prescribed five hours a-week. Before the third session of the new order of things, a strong desire was felt on the part of many of the students for a higher and more advanced course than the ordinary one, which should deal chiefly with metaphysical problems. These could be discussed more adequately after



the preliminary training of the ordinary class, and with more ease before an unmixed audience of senior students. Sir William, accordingly, in 1838-39, instituted, or rather revived, a senior class of speculative philosophy; and during the session added considerably to his stock of lectures. It was attended by a number of highly-interested students. Any one at all acquainted with the subject of speculative philosophy must be aware of the difficulty of combining its two great branches—Logic and Metaphysics—in one course of instruction, and must be aware also of the quickened but unsatisfied craving for further progress and instruction with which the better students necessarily terminate the first year's attendance. These wants Sir William, in his love for his science and interest in his students, sought to meet; and he would have succeeded, but for the prompt interference and determined opposition of the patrons of the University. This involved him in a controversial correspondence of six months' duration.

The controversy regarding the institution of a second and advanced class was connected, and to some extent mixed up, with another regarding the amount of fee exigible in the philosophical classes (Logic, Moral Philosophy, and Natural Philosophy), in which Sir William took a prominent part. The Town Council, by a resolution of 11th September 1838, had declared that the fee which the literary and philosophical professors were authorised to exact from all students without distinction was three guineas. They still, however, allowed the fee of four guineas to subsist in the classes of Law and Medicine. Sir William very strongly opposed this resolution, pointing out the invidiousness of the distinction which it made in the different Faculties. In an elaborate circular letter\* addressed to the Town Council, he maintained the right of the philosophical professors to receive

\* Afterwards printed, along with the correspondence relative to the second class of Logic and Metaphysics, under the title, 'Correspondence relative to certain proceedings of the Town Council of Edinburgh, affecting the philosophical Professors of the University, and in particular the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics.' Edinburgh: pp. 41: 1839.

two different rates of fee—a minimum of three, and an (optional) maximum of four guineas, from different classes of students. Previously to 1812 the fees were simply *honoraria* given by the students, and not payments strictly exigible; hence they varied in different classes. By a resolution of the Town Council of that year, proceeding upon a memorial from the Senatus, the fee of two guineas (received as a *minimum* in the philosophical classes) was raised to three, and that of three guineas (established in certain other classes) to four; but as in the memorial of the Senatus the term *minimum* had been omitted in referring to the fee of two guineas, the Council now maintained that by the resolution of 1812 the maximum fee was abolished, and that thenceforward only one fee of three guineas was exigible from all students of literature and philosophy without distinction. This interpretation was put on the resolution of 1812 by the Council only in September 1838, and in face of the fact that the professors of Mathematics, Rhetoric, Moral Philosophy, and Natural Philosophy, had all along, from 1812, been accustomed, without interference, to accept a higher optional fee or honorarium of four guineas. It was done, moreover, with a special and avowed reference to the case of the new Professor of Logic, who in the session 1837-38 had, in the exercise of what he maintained to be his right, accepted the higher fee. The Council by their resolution of September 1838 not only maintained this maximum fee to be abolished in the philosophical classes, but, in the classes of law and medicine, confirmed the fee of four guineas made exigible by the resolution of 1812, or authorised this amount to be exacted where hitherto it had been drawn only by custom. “While all the other classes are thus,” says Sir William, “continued on the same or placed on a better footing, the philosophical classes alone are degraded to a worse.” Against all this Sir William, in the circular, reclaimed in a very emphatic manner. He maintained the right of the philosophical professors to the higher fee as an honorarium; and

alleged that the resolution of the Council involved an indignity and an injustice: an indignity, inasmuch as it placed them on a lower level than their colleagues in respect of emoluments, and implied that they had been drawing fees to which they had not as good a title as the other professors who were authorised to continue to exact the same; an injustice, because the fees of the philosophical professors, which even before were not equal to those of their colleagues, were now still further reduced. He argued further, very pertinently, that if a difference of fee were to be made, the literary and philosophical chairs are those to which the higher fee should be allowed, on the ground that chairs of law and medicine further the professional success of the holders, while the occupants of the other chairs depend exclusively on these for their subsistence; "or if they do pursue an extra-academical profession, the mere fact of holding an academical position is an impediment to professional success, an impediment which augments precisely as the professor distinguishes himself for assiduity in the performance of his university duties." The Council adhered to their resolution of September; which, while it abolished the somewhat invidious distinction among students caused by the payment of a lower and higher fee, constituted and perpetuated the inequality complained of between the classes of arts on the one hand, and those of law and medicine on the other.

This controversy did not leave the Town Council very amicably disposed towards the new Professor of Logic, who, besides, had long been known to be the most powerful antagonist to their position as administrators of the affairs of the University. Unluckily the institution of the second or advanced class of Logic and Metaphysics took place while the controversy about the fees was pending, and while both parties were considerably exasperated. Sir William, in this second dispute, avowed his decided impression that the prompt and unexampled interference of the Council with his new class was due to the fact that he had advocated against them

the claims of the philosophical professors. This impression, and what appeared to him to be the unintelligent character of the opposition to his plans for furthering his favourite science, may account for the tone of his communications to the Council, which certainly was far from conciliatory. He was throughout caustic, elaborate, even scornful; stimulated, but not overmastered, by a certain white heat of passion, which shone through a dialectic far too keen and fine for the occasion.

The Council alleged that the institution of the new class, without their sanction having been previously asked or obtained, was an interference with their rights as patrons of the University, which they held to extend to the control and regulation of the courses of study therein. Sir William, while admitting a general right of administration on the part of the Council, punctiliously refused to acknowledge their authority to determine the manner in which a professor should carry on the teaching of his class, or subdivide his subject. He pointed out, moreover, that in delivering two courses of lectures,—a higher and a lower,—he introduced no novel practice into the conduct of the chair, for which it was necessary he should show cause; for “down to the demise of Professor Finlayson two separate courses, at two different hours, viz., a First and Second Logic, were regularly advertised.” Then, in reply to the charge that he had “divided his lectures into two courses—one on Logic and the other on Metaphysics,”—his answer was that he had not divided into two courses lectures which he had delivered as one, or which ought to be delivered as one, but that he taught in separate courses the two departments of science which he was specially commissioned to teach, and that this was a necessity arising from the extent, and from differences in the matter and order, of those departments themselves. His more recent predecessors had met this difficulty by cutting it; they in fact omitted,—and that without observation, at least without censure, from the now zealous patrons,—one of the departments of the chair; “and as Logic was of the two the easier, and

only lucrative, department, being the one of the more popular attractions and the one alone protected, as alone compulsory on students of theology, Metaphysics was allowed to drop from the lectures of the professor, and, as a natural consequence, from the title of the chair. . . . Had I chosen the same alternative," he continues, "the practice of my predecessors might have well excused me in its adoption; but the other was the one which better accorded both with my inclinations and my notions of duty. I determined, therefore, at least to make the experiment whether a more advanced course of mental philosophy, principally though not exclusively conversant with Metaphysics, could not maintain itself in efficiency, along with another of a more elementary character, chiefly, but not solely, occupied with Logic."

These sentences should have been sufficient to obviate the only reasonable objection to Sir William's proposal of a second class,—that he apparently departed from the terms of his commission, in not giving in one course lectures on both departments of the chair. From first to last, however, this objection was maintained by the patrons in the most dogged and unintelligent manner, and in the face of all explanations. In vain Sir William showed that his ordinary course was actually fuller and at least as long as that of his predecessors'—that, in fact, he gave more hours' instruction than had been customary; and that, so far from the one series of lectures being insufficient, as was insinuated, to satisfy the Faculty of Arts and the Church, the science of Logic—that specially prescribed to intending students of Divinity—was more fully taught by him than by "any at least of his latter predecessors, or by any contemporary professor whatever in any Scottish University." All that Sir William's very elaborate argumentation elicited from the patrons was a series of curt replies, in which they simply reiterated their unchanged opinion on the points in dispute. The subtle pleadings of the advocate of the higher Metaphysics were thrown away on a body which, after listening to all that could be said in their behalf, still looked on the

science as relating to "an abstruse subject, not generally considered as of any great or paramount utility." \* To this they graciously added :—" It will be specially observed that they did not refuse their sanction to the course *altogether*; but only provided that a second fee should not be charged in the mean time for a course which could only be looked upon in the light of an experiment." \* It would probably have been more technically regular had Sir William asked the sanction of the Council to the charge of a separate fee for the second class; but this he maintained he had a complete right to make, in accordance with the practice in other chairs, where junior and senior classes existed; and it may be added that, as the class was optional, the fee was after all a voluntary and conditional payment. It is proper to mention that throughout this controversy Sir William had the support of the Senatus, who, when the Council proceeded to the extremity of deleting the announcement of the second class of Logic and Metaphysics from the programme of classes for session 1839-40, protested against the step, "because it superseded an act of Senatus, hitherto unchallenged, and because it expunged the announcement of an important course of lectures proposed to be delivered." Professor Macvey Napier's opinion of the controversy is given in the following letter :—

*Thursday night* [1839].

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I am much obliged by your sending the enclosed† for my perusal. It is a profound and satisfactory view of your plan, and must give satisfaction to all who, like myself, anticipated everything good from your appointment, and who looked to it as one of the best hopes of a philosophy honourable to Scotland, though shamefully neglected in the present age. I am not sure that I have a precise idea of some of your distinctions, or that I would agree in them all; but that is nothing to the purpose. The plan shows profound acquaintance with the subject, and honourable zeal to promote it. This makes me deeply regret that you did not follow a different course. Had you presented your plan to the

\* Report of the College Committee of the Town Council, September 1839.

† Probably a detailed outline of the courses of Lectures.

Council, and solicited their sanction, they would not have dared to gainsay it ; but your taking the matter of *fees* into your own hands is a great mistake and misfortune. Your argument fails there ; for wherever a plan calls for a double fee, clear it is that, in order to prevent abuse, it should have the sanction of a competent tribunal. However, I hope the storm will blow over. Keep yourself calm, and don't allow yourself to be disgusted by this opposition.—Ever yours truly,

M. NAPIER.

Although at the conclusion of the correspondence Sir William intimated his intention of still, as circumstances required, giving two courses, the second class was not again resumed ; the lectures remained during his further occupation of the chair as they were now written ; and, the stimulus of the advanced class being withdrawn, the University and the world were deprived of a regular and systematised series of lectures on the higher questions of Metaphysics.\* During the remainder of his career, he delivered a course of Logic and one of Metaphysics in alternate years.

\* Thirty years have surely made great changes in the views of men, or the new authority in the University of Edinburgh is of a different spirit from the old, for in 1865 the present distinguished Professor of Logic in that University instituted or rather revived an advanced class of philosophy, of precisely the same character as Sir William proposed, without interference from the governing body.

## CHAPTER VII.

IN THE LOGIC CHAIR: 1839-1844.

WORK OF THE CLASS—RECORD OF HONOURS—MECHANICAL CONTRIVANCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CLASS—RELATIONS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES—GRADUATION IN ARTS—EXAMINATION FOR HONOURS—REID FUND—ELECTED MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE—LETTERS TO LORD MELBOURNE AND LORD ADVOCATE RUTHERFURD—HIS BROTHER'S DEATH—PAMPHLET ON THE DISRUPTION CONTROVERSY—THEOLOGICAL INTEREST—DR CAIRNS'S REMINISCENCES OF INTERCOURSE WITH SIR WILLIAM—CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUSIN.

BESIDES carrying on the ordinary work of the class in the manner already described, Sir William gave special opportunities of prosecuting philosophical studies, which were entirely novel in the conduct of the Logic Class in Edinburgh. He instituted courses of Reading and prescribed subjects of Essay for the summer vacation. To eminence in these departments, the taking up of which was of course optional, he attributed great importance, as indicating a special and continued interest in the work on the part of the competitors. Prizes in the form of books were given in the three departments of ordinary class-work, summer reading, and essays. In a lecture on Academical Honours which Sir William delivered at the commencement of his first course, he thus explains the practice which he adopted in reference to the awarding of prizes in his own class:—"In the first place, I am convinced that excitement and rewards are principally required to promote a general and continued diligence in the ordinary business of the class. I mean, therefore, that the prizes should with us be awarded for general eminence, as shown in the examinations and exercises; and I am averse on principle from proposing any premium during the course of



the sessional labours for single and detached efforts. The effect of this would naturally be to distract attention from what ought to be the principal and constant object of occupation ; and if honour is to be gained by an irregular and transient spirit of activity, less encouragement will necessarily be afforded to regular and sedulous application. Prizes for individual essays, for written analyses of important books, and for oral examination on their contents, may, however, with great advantage, be proposed as occupation during the summer vacation ; and this I shall do. But the honours of the winter session must belong to those who have regularly gone through its toils.

“ In the second place, the value of the prizes may be greatly enhanced by giving them greater and more permanent publicity. A very simple mode, and one which I mean to adopt, is to record upon a tablet each year the names of the successful competitors ; this tablet to be permanently affixed to the walls of the class-room.

“ In the third place, the importance of the prizes for general eminence in the business of the class may be considerably raised by making the competitors the judges of merit among themselves. This, I am persuaded, is a measure of the very highest efficacy.”\*

Sir William carried out the plan of memorial tablets here referred to. At the close of each session there was placed on the wall of the class-room, immediately behind the chair, a board painted green, on which were inscribed in golden letters the names of those students who, by the votes of their fellows, had been adjudged worthy of a place on the prize-list. These boards in course of time covered the entire line of wall behind the chair, and caught the eye of all in the class-room. The wall facing the chair displayed in a similar manner the names of those who had carried off the prizes for summer reading and essays, and also of those graduates who in mental philosophy had gained first or second class honours. Above the tablets behind the chair were inscribed the following mottoes, also on a green board, in golden letters :—

\* Lecture I., Appendix I. A.

"ON EARTH, THERE IS NOTHING GREAT BUT MAN ;  
IN MAN, THERE IS NOTHING GREAT BUT MIND."

Πόνον ἥδ' οὐν κάματον τε εὐκαμάτων ἔχει δσα δὴ πρὸς ἀμιλλαν καὶ τιμὴν ἐπιχειρεῖται·  
'Ερεθίζεται γὰρ, καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλονίκου εἰς τὸ φιλόπονον ἢ ψυχὴ  
Κύριον δρ' ἔστω τὸ 'Ησιόδου, περὶ μὲν ἀρετῆς ἀπλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ παιδείας,  
'Αγαθὴ ἔρις ἦδε βροτοῖσι.


Altogether, as the tablets increased with the years of Sir William's occupancy of the chair, the class-room presented a unique and picturesque appearance, and afforded a complete retrospect of those students who during the period had achieved distinction in the study of Intellectual Philosophy. It is to be presumed that the heart of young ambition was frequently fired by the sight of the names thus conspicuously emblazoned; and that the tyro in Logic was incited to hope that his name too might be elevated to a place in this sphere of the *Dii dialectici*!

These devices for recording the names were entirely Sir William's own. His power of mechanical contrivance was also shown by certain black boards that stood on either side of the chair, and were occasionally used for exhibiting propositional and syllogistic formulæ and diagrams. They have been thus described:—"One of these moves up and down in the ordinary way; another opens up, and is like a door on its hinges; and a third does neither, but stands out four-sided like a truncated pyramid on a tall pedestal of its own. This mysterious instrument, which is not unlike the trees seen in old sampler work, or the cropped yew and box of country gardens, is looked upon with a certain feeling of awe by casual lady visitors in the vacation, and timid students on first entering the class, as probably a *novum organum* of philosophy, a syllogistic machine, or perhaps a dwarfed and hoddled specimen of Porphyry's tree."\*

Some years later than the period now referred to, a veritable logical machine, that would have delighted the heart even of the figurative Raymond Lully, occasionally appeared in the class-room before the wondering eyes of the students. This

\* 'Edinburgh Essays': "Sir William Hamilton."

was an ingenious apparatus, contrived by Sir William himself, for illustrating the doctrine of the comprehension and extension of notions or concepts—a favourite point with him in the Logic course. It consisted of a series of hollow wooden cylinders sliding into each other, and diminishing in depth as they increased in circumference. These cylinders were arranged round an upright rod, so that their upper faces formed a horizontal plane, and the whole presented the appearance of an inverted cone. The illustration was made by first of all exhibiting the upright rod, which represented the individual, standing naked on its pedestal, and then proceeding to clothe it with the cylinders, denoting such notions as say *Greek, Man, Animal, Living Body, Body, Being*, when the mere supraposition showed the increasing extension with the decreasing comprehension, and *vice versa*.



“The vowels,” says Sir William, “have been taken as affording a compendious order of subordination according to their priority and posteriority in the alphabet: A, of course, representing the *summum genus*; and  $z^1$ ,  $z^2$ ,  $z^3$ , &c., denoting this or these individuals. The letters in general, or the consonants, would better approximate to the possible infinity of subordinate classes; but the vowels are more convenient, and quite sufficient in number to show the variety and relations of logical classes, concrete examples of which may in any variety be applied to the abstract symbols.”

The central rod was seven inches in height; the first or lowest inch was painted white, and bore the letters Z, and  $z^1, z^2, z^3, z^4, z^5, z^6$ . Above the portion of the upright rod allotted to Z was a series of six similar divisions reaching to the top, and painted successively green, purple, yellow, blue, red, black, and lettered Y, U, O, I, E, A. These represented the attributes contained in the individual Z—that is, its comprehension; and as the colours reached to the top of the rod, comprehension was thus seen to be at its maximum in Z. Extension again was shown to be at its minimum there, seeing that Z stood at the inverted apex of the cone.

Now let the first cylinder, the lowest inch of which was painted green and lettered Y, be slipped over the top of the stick, it would slide down so far as to take its place immediately above the white or Z division. It thus represented a notion (say *Greek*) wider or more extensive than the individual Z (say *Socrates*), for it included under it also the little zs— $z^1, z^2, z^3, z^4, z^5, z^6$  (say *Alexander, Plato, &c.*) As, however, it only reached from Z to the top of the stick, and bore the letters U, O, I, E, A, its comprehension was seen to be less than that of Z by one division; viz., Z itself.

The second cylinder, the lowest inch of which was painted purple and lettered U (say *Man*), was now slid down over the first cylinder, the whole of which it covered, except the part allotted to the letter Y, thus showing that its extension was greater than Y, but its comprehension less, for it had under it Y and Z, but on it upwards to the top only O, I, E, A.

The third cylinder, the lowest inch of which was painted yellow, and lettered O (say *Animal*), was in a similar way let down on U, and it was at once seen that its extension was greater than U, for it embraced under it U, Y, Z, while its comprehension was less, for upwards to its top there were only I, E, A.

The fourth cylinder, the lowest inch of which was painted blue and lettered I (say *Living Body*), was now let down on O, and it was seen that while its extension was increased, taking

under it O, U, Y, its comprehension was decreased, for it showed upwards only E and A.

The fifth cylinder, the lowest inch of which was painted red and lettered E (say *Body*), was now let down upon I, and it was seen that the extension had further increased, for it embraced under it I, O, U, Y, Z, and upwards there was only A.

Finally the cylinder painted black, and lettered A (say *Being*), was put on to crown the whole and complete the inverted cone, and it was seen that here the extension was greatest, embracing as it did E, I, O, U, Y, Z, and, there being nothing above it to represent an attribute, the comprehension least.

Now the complete inverted cone stood before the student, who gathered up the whole lesson by noticing that the cylinders gradually lessened in breadth as they neared the base, and that the lowest of them was the least in breadth, while it supported all the increasing circles above it; wherein was symbolised the depth or comprehension of the notion, which, while it took in the least number of objects, contained at the same time the greatest number of attributes. Again, looking to the uppermost circle, he saw how it in its wide circuit embraced all the gradually lessening cylinders down to the lowest, thus symbolising the fact that the sphere of the most extensive notion, while it contains under it all the lesser or subordinate notions—*i. e.*, the greatest number of objects or classes in the same line—contains in it at the same time the least number of attributes—*i. e.*, the smallest comprehension or depth. And thus the young logician obtained in a concrete symbol a summary glimpse of the very abstract doctrine of the nature and relations of concepts.

Sir William was far from being an idle or uninterested member of the Senatus. He even made himself conspicuous by his zeal in matters of university administration, which seemed to him to involve educational interests. His appointment as secretary to the Senatus, an office which he held from 1833 to 1846, involved him still more in its discussions.

His views on university matters brought him pretty frequently into sharp collision with some of his colleagues. For with all his loveliness, even tenderness of nature, Hamilton was yet a man of resolute will, and high and somewhat uncompromising temper. Left fairly to himself, he was gentle, calm, serene—a patient student and thinker; but there was another side of his character which the circumstance of opposition—especially in practical arrangements—would wake into the most resolute energy. As in intellect he was critical, so in temperament he was strongly polemical, even finding a certain enjoyment in conflict for its own sake. He had very definite convictions, especially in philosophy, education, and university management; and he was always ready to stand by them and to fight for them strongly. He was, moreover, sternly opposed to all appearance of interested management or self-seeking in a public body. The very semblance of unfaithfulness to a trust would rouse him to the most vehement and passionate opposition. Hence to the public view he appeared chiefly as a controversialist—vehement, keen, pertinacious, unsparing—a very Anak in battle. His antagonism, however, was against opinions, not against men; when he fought, it was for a principle that was clear, pertinent, distinct. In some of the controversies in which he engaged there is apparent, I think, an exclusiveness of regard to the abstract truth and value of a principle, or to the symmetry of a plan. His tendency rather was to overlook the mixed state of the facts and the specialty of the new or modern circumstances in which the principle he advocated fell to be applied, or under which his theory was to be worked. This made him in a large degree uncompromising, and impracticable in action and co-operation. But for one who engaged so much and so vehemently in controversy, he was singularly free from any feeling of personal hostility, as he was absolutely above all interested motives. Referring to his contests in the *Senatus*, Professor Kelland, one of his colleagues, thus writes:—"I can say, who was witness and part actor in all

these contests, that never did Sir William exhibit a shadow of self-seeking; for his science, not for his comfort or his gain, he contended: and although my own department was the object of some of his best known attacks, I can say that never for one moment did I feel towards him other than the warmest personal regard—nay more, attachment. He was indeed one of my kindest and steadiest friends."

Finding that graduation, especially in arts, had fallen greatly into abeyance about the time of his appointment to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics, Sir William was led to take up the subject of a reform with much ardour. As the regulations which he was anxious to see introduced were supposed to clash with the interests of certain individual professors, the discussions on the subject assumed a keen and somewhat personal character. The tradition even is that on these occasions he sometimes used language more emphatic than choice.

One point in regard to graduation in arts on which he strongly insisted, was the necessity of a change in the order of study, so as to allow the philosophical classes, at least that of Logic, to come later in the curriculum than the second year, on the ground mainly that the abstract sciences should be preceded by the more concrete. This, however, is an arrangement which many, taking into consideration the actual constitution and working of the Scottish university system, would regard as very far from being advantageous.

Another point was that the amount prescribed for examination in the classical department was excessive, and out of all proportion to what was actually accepted.

A third point was the absence of any proper mode of ascertaining and recording extraordinary attainments in special departments of examination. This was a matter in which he was greatly interested, and there can be no doubt of the immense importance of a well-constituted Honours examination in enhancing the value of the degree. Failing to get the Senatus to concur in his proposals, he instituted an Honours examination in his own department. This was the first scheme proposed in Scotland that even professed to ascertain and re-

gister special attainments in any department of University study. The following is the advertisement of the new plan, with the result of the first examination :—

EXTRA GRADUATION HONOURS IN SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 1841.

As the scheme of Examination for the DEGREE IN ARTS, recently adopted by the Faculty, takes no account of any proficiency beyond that displayed in written answers to common questions on the tasks proposed to Candidates in general,—and as, in the department of Speculative Philosophy, Candidates are invited to give up any number of approved works, ancient and modern, over and above the minimum necessary for a degree,—the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, in justice to those who have come forward to his higher Examination, has instituted a scale of Honours, according to which philosophical learning and ability, of a superior order, may be graduated ; and this not merely with relation to Competitors of the same year, but also by a general and permanent standard. Excellence will be estimated, 1°, By the extent and difficulty of the works given up ; 2°, And more especially, by the accuracy and relative comprehension with which these have been studied.

The Examination will be partly oral, partly by writing. The oral Examination by the Professor, or the Professor and his coadjutors, will take place in the presence of all the Candidates, and, if not public, before a competent number of witnesses.

As this Examination is wholly independent of that by the Faculty of Arts, it will not be limited to those proceeding to a Degree. No one, however, not thus proceeding, will be admitted as a competitor, who has not, at least, completed his third academical session in the study of Philosophy proper, Speculative or Practical ; and the Graduates and Non-Graduates will be distinguished.

In the Fourth Class, for which (though with a minuter Examination) the minimum required for a Degree may qualify, the names will not be published, though a testimonial of extra proficiency will be given.

Candidates to give in their List of Books on or before the 1st of April.

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*First Class.*—JOHN CAIRNS, M.A., Berwickshire.

*Second Class.*—(Vacant.)

*Third Class.*—(Vacant.)

*Fourth Class.*—(Unnamed.)



Sir William's arrangement, in allowing more than two classes of honours, is decidedly superior to that instituted by the Commission of 1863, and at present in force. A third, if not a fourth class, is absolutely necessary to allow any scheme of this kind to work efficiently. Sir William's scheme did not call forth so many candidates as it might have done had it been formally and regularly connected with the University arrangements, or had such a thing as an honours examination ever before been recognised in Scotland; yet it did good service on a limited scale. With no prospect of reward beyond the mere fruits of the study, and the comparatively local honour attending success in the examination, a young student gave up the following list of philosophical books:—

“WORKS ON SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY FOR GRADUATION  
IN APRIL 1843.

- |                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| 1. ARISTOTLE.   | —De Animâ.                                       |
| 2. —————        | —Categoriæ.                                      |
| 3. PORPHYRY.    | —Isagoge.  |
| 4. DESCARTES.   | —Méthode.  |
| 5. —————        | —Méditations.                                    |
| 6. —————        | —Principes de la Philosophie, P. I.              |
| 7. LOCKE.       | —Essay on Human Understanding.                   |
| 8. MALEBRANCHE. | —Recherche de la Vérité.                         |
| 9. BERKELEY.    | —Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.          |
| 10. COLLIER.    | —Clavis Universalis.                             |
| 11. REID.       | —Inquiry.  |
| 12. ———         | —Essays on Intellectual Powers.                  |
| 13. STEWART.    | —Philosophy of Human Mind, Vol. I.               |
| 14. —————       | —History of Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy. |
| 15. COUSIN.     | —Examination of Locke.                           |
| 16.             | —L'Art de Penser.                                |

Besides the Lectures on Logic and Psychology.

31st March 1843.

WILLIAM SHAW.\*

Sir William had further conflicts in the *Senatus* on the

\* Now minister of Alloa.

subject of medical graduation. His views on this point may be found in the 'Discussions,' Appendix III., A.

At length, in 1846, he finally withdrew from taking any part with the Senatus in the matter of graduation. From that time he published the list of candidates in Logic separately, with the nominal values of their answers; thus indicating that he had ceased to take any share in determining on whom the degree should be conferred. This unfortunate state of matters arose partly out of the rejection, by a majority, of his proposals for a reform in the arrangements for graduation, but more immediately from the circumstance that two candidates who, though passing the examinations in the other departments competently, had failed to answer the simplest questions in Logic (one of the subjects for the degree), were nevertheless admitted by the Senatus to the Mastership of Arts. Sir William protested against this proceeding, and along with him Professor Wilson; but in vain. He considered it to be a violation of all sound principles of graduation, and held that, after such candidates had been allowed to pass, the Senatus could not consistently reject any one, however deficient in a particular department, and that the value of the degree had thus been permanently lowered.\*

Sir William had strong views on other points of academical polity and arrangements, which brought him into frequent collision with his colleagues in the Senatus. One topic of chronic dispute and conflict was what is known as the *Reid Fund*. Without entering into the complicated history of this fund, and the disputes connected with it, it may be sufficient to say that a sum of money was left by General Reid in 1803, which after being allowed to accumulate for a number of years, was destined, by the terms of his will, to be devoted, in the first place, to "establishing and endowing a Professorship of Music in the College and University of Edinburgh;" and, in the next place, to "making additions to the Library of the University, or otherwise promoting the general interest and

\* See *Discussions*, p. 355, 2d ed.

advantage of the University, in such a way and manner as the Principal and Professors thereof for the time being shall in their discretion think most fit and proper." The *Senatus*, it would appear, made certain applications of this fund, which Sir William and others, standing on the strict legal construction of the terms of the bequest, from the first opposed. Among those applications, was the setting aside of a certain sum to constitute a fund for retiring allowances to the professors. Of this use of the money, however much it might have been in favour of his personal interest, Sir William decidedly disapproved. He was always anxious to obtain a larger share of the bequest for the Library,—the claims and requirements of which seemed to him too little regarded. The controversies about the Reid fund were settled by the provisions of the Scotch Universities Act of 1858, and thus a bone of chronic contention was taken away from the Edinburgh *Senatus*.

The inadequate income from the Logic chair, which was burdened by an annuity to Dr Ritchie, so as to leave the free emoluments under £300 a-year, constrained Sir William to make application for any legal appointment that was compatible with his office as professor, and the work of which he judged himself competent to perform. In 1840, on the occasion of a vacancy in the Keepership of the Great Seal of Scotland, it was generally supposed that the office of Deputy-keeper, which had hitherto been in the gift of the principal, would be made a direct Government appointment. On this assumption, Sir William applied for the office, and sent a statement of his claims to Lord Melbourne, then at the head of the Ministry. But the disjunction of principal and deputy keeperships was not made, and the application fell to the ground. The new principal, the Duke of Argyll, appointed as deputy Mr John Christison, advocate.

Later in the same year, when it appeared likely that there would be a vacancy at the clerk's table of the Court of Session, Sir William applied again to Lord Melbourne for the office,

referring to the statement of his claims already submitted to his lordship. But this too, the last application of the kind made by Sir William to Government, was without effect.

Sir William's manner of applying for an appointment was thoroughly characteristic. As he never sought one for which he did not deem himself qualified, so he did not hesitate to state, in an honest and manly way, his especial claims and qualifications. In illustration of this, his letters to Lord Melbourne and the Lord Advocate (Rutherford) about the clerkship are here subjoined.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO LORD MELBOURNE.

MY LORD,—On the 30th of December last I had the honour of addressing a letter to your Lordship, in which, on the supposition that the Deputy-Keepership of the Great Seal of Scotland was to be made a Government appointment, I humbly submitted to your Lordship and the other members of Her Majesty's Treasury a brief statement of the claims on which I rested an application for that office. This letter I communicated to the Lord Advocate, who had agreed to transmit it to your Lordship, that he might, if so disposed, be enabled to support my application. I offered him any details he might be pleased to require in regard to the general statements of that letter. This he did not do; and as I have now become aware that his Lordship is interested in another, I trust that your Lordship will in the circumstances pardon me in thus presuming again to solicit attention to a more explicit exposition of the grounds on which I confidently found the justice of my suit.

In my former letter I stated in general my claims for the appointment in question, as grounded on my open and unswerving adherence, from my first entrance into public life, to Whig principles, and the personal sacrifices I had in consequence been called upon to make; my long standing at the Scottish bar; the small and insignificant preferment I had, as yet, received from my party; the inadequate remuneration I receive for my services as a professor; and withal the circumstances of a large family, and no private fortune competent to its provision. To these I ventured to add my claim as the head of an old historical family, long distinguished and finally ruined by its efforts in the cause of civil and religious liberty.

I may, indeed, safely say that no individual at the Scottish bar, with equal claims and wants, has asked or received so little; and

nothing but the duty I owe my children could induce me on the present occasion to sue even for what I am confident, it will be generally acknowledged no one is better entitled to obtain.

In the first place, I have to state, in supplement of my former letter, that should her Majesty's Government graciously favour my present application, the appointment will not even make up to me sacrifices I cheerfully have made to my political convictions. When the vacancy in the chair of Moral Philosophy (one of the most honourable and lucrative in this university) took place, by the death of Dr Brown, I became a candidate. My claims were warmly supported by the emeritus professor, Mr Dugald Stewart, and other distinguished philosophers; and I had the best prospects of success (however worthy my opponent), provided the contest were not made a political one. In these circumstances, it was intimated to me from a most influential quarter that, if I would allow it simply to be said that I was not a Whig—not a political opponent of the then dominant party—the election would be allowed to take its natural course. I refused; and in refusing I knew not only that the chair was lost (for the Tory electors were to the Whigs as three to one, and every individual voted according to his party), but that my non-exclusive devotion to professional pursuits having been thus proclaimed, my legal practice, which had hitherto, for my standing, been highly prosperous, might be expected to decline.

In the second place, may I presume to allege on my behalf my exertions in the cause of public education and the reformation of the great national seminaries? In the 'Edinburgh Review,' I was the first to call attention to what had been done in Germany, and was doing in France, for the instruction of the people. In a series of articles, the present corruption and illegality of the English universities was laid open to the light, and the question touching the admission of Dissenters to these seminaries first placed and argued, as is now admitted, upon its proper ground; to say nothing (in more immediate relation to our Scottish universities) of an historical and philosophical development of the general principles on which every rational system of academical patronage must be established. These services to the cause of educational reform I regard as trifling compared to what I hope yet to perform in the promotion not only of these interests, but of interests of far higher political urgency and moment; but I humbly venture to hope that they may be allowed their weight, if public patronage is to be dispensed for public services, and not by private favour.

But in the last place, my Lord, I humbly but confidently prefer a claim to the present appointment in my character of professor. My chair (that of Logic and Metaphysics) is one of the greatest importance; and it requires for the proper discharge of its duties, besides learning and philosophical talent, strenuous and unremitted exertion. To zeal as an instructor I may lay claim without any imputation of vanity, and I am happy to think that my efforts are not unappreciated by the public. In regard to any erudition and talent I may possess, it is exceedingly unpleasant for me to speak. I have as yet published on philosophical subjects only a few hasty occasional articles, and then anonymously; but the reception these have met with from the profoundest philosophers throughout Europe far exceeds what I could have hoped for from the success of any regular and extended work. In Germany, my literary and philosophical papers have been for the greater part translated, and the latter have been ranked, though without any personal knowledge of their author, so high by the best authorities, that, knowing what they are and what they ought to be, I feel only humiliation from the pre-eminence accorded. I may refer, for example, to 'Krug's Phil. Lex.,' in the article under my name, vol. v. p. 220, 500, 647. In Paris, the greater part of my philosophical writings have been very recently collected and translated, and this publication was followed by my election, in a late meeting of the Academy of Sciences, to the distinguished honour of a place among the members of the Institute. As this publication contains evidence of what is thought of me and my philosophical acquirements by some of the most illustrious thinkers of France, I take the liberty of transmitting a copy of it to your Lordship.

But if I am capable of reflecting credit on the university with which I am connected, and if my instruction be of benefit to the interests of philosophy and of the public, the chair I hold affords no equitable remuneration in return. As originally stated to your Lordship, in consequence of the burdens imposed upon this chair, the free emolument to the professor is under £300 a-year; and even of this paltry sum I have always found that I must expend nearly a third in the books requisite for my relative studies. But were there no deductions from the emoluments of the chair, and were the salary of the office in question added to these, they would not amount to more than a very moderate endowment—not more than the endowment of a similar chair in another university, which I would have thought it my duty to my family not to

have neglected, had I not trusted that my preferable claims to professional promotion would not have been long postponed. At the same time, I am anxious not to abandon my function of academical instructor, which is at once suitable to my tastes and a vocation in which I feel that I am usefully employed; and I am more peculiarly anxious for the success of my present application, because this appointment will not, like most legal offices, interfere with my functions as professor. Independently, therefore, of all other grounds, I would urge my suit upon her Majesty's Government as affording me only a fair remuneration for my professional services, and the means to devote myself without distraction or anxiety to the prosecution of those plans which I trust will prove of some advantage to science, and reflect no discredit on the patrons by whom their author was enabled to carry them into effect. It is, my Lord, on public grounds alone that I rest my claims; and though few have sacrificed so much to their political party and creed, if another can be found whose public services entitle him to rank above me or on a level with mine, I shall be the first to applaud his nomination to the office for which I now apply. I therefore humbly entreat that your Lordship would be pleased to take my case into your impartial consideration; and should my suit be granted, I shall ever gratefully acknowledge the generosity and love of justice by which her Majesty's Government were actuated.—I have the honour to remain, your Lordship's, &c.,

W. HAMILTON.

EDINBURGH, 11th February 1840.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO THE LORD ADVOCATE.

EDINBURGH, 27th April 1840.

MY DEAR RUTHERFURD,—As I understand that it is probable that some new appointment must be immediately made among the Principal Clerks of Session, I earnestly entreat that you would take my claims to such appointment into account.

I do not request you to second any application on my behalf on the ground of personal favour. I should, indeed, feel most grateful for any act of friendship from you; but I would be the last to request of you, in your public character, to do anything not justifiable on public grounds. I may be mistaken, but I do not think that any one has now a higher claim on the present Government to such an office than I have; and I am so situated that, however disagreeable to my

own feelings, it is my duty—my *urgent* duty—to do what an honourable man can, to make that claim effectual. I am induced to hope that Lord Melbourne is not indisposed to me ; and, were you free to support my suit, I would be desirous to lay a statement of my claims before Lord Normanby. Seconded by you, I should indeed have little doubt of success ; and there is assuredly no one whose recommendation and good opinion would be more flattering to me on their own account.

I have been no importunate and habitual suitor ; and no one with equal claims has asked or received from his party less. I have never, indeed, been the candidate for any office to which I was not fairly entitled ; and I can confidently affirm that I have undertaken no public duty which I have not discharged with more than satisfaction. For a sheriffship I have not pressed, as I was conscious that it required a knowledge of forms and details with which I had not made myself familiar. But as to the office of Clerk of Session, in which, with a general knowledge of law, precision of language and of thought is the principal requisite, I may without presumption say, that no one is better qualified to discharge its duties ; while I would endeavour to devote myself, without distraction or anxiety, to pursuits which I trust will not be found to be without result.

In January 1840, Sir William was elected Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, in the department of Philosophy. His immediate predecessor, in whose room he was appointed, was Van Heusde.

The following is M. Cousin's letter announcing the conferring of this highly honourable distinction :—

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

25 Janvier 1840.

Je m'empresse de vous annoncer que, sur ma proposition, la section de Philosophie de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques vous a présenté, et l'Académie vous a nommé aujourd'hui même, correspondant de l'Académie pour la section de Philosophie.

Je vous annonce en même temps que la traduction de vos beaux articles de l'*Edinburgh Review*, par M. Peisse, avec une très-excellente Préface, a paru depuis quelques jours. Je vous l'enverrai par la première occasion.



SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 7th April 1840.

MY DEAR SIR,—I am sure you will pardon my delay in offering you my acknowledgments for this new testimony of your kindness—when you know its cause. A few days after the receipt of your note, a dear son was attacked with fever, and, after a tedious and painful struggle, has been taken from us, and I have hardly recovered spirits to perform even the most urgent—and otherwise the most agreeable—duties. This is the first letter I have written since the affliction. I am gratified more than I can express by the great honour of which your letter was the informant; and not the less so, that I am indebted for it to your friendly influence far more than to my own deserts. Of this I am well aware. But to pass from petty concerns to great :—I can hardly congratulate you on your accession to the ministry, as on the acquisition of any honour or advantage to yourself personally; but this is an event which, I am sure, all the friends of education—all the votaries of philosophy—will hail as propitious to the highest interests not only of France but of Europe. May your health and strength not suffer from your new labours! It is too much to expect that your philosophical avocations should not be interrupted; but—*patientur aquilæ dum pascentur columbæ*. . . . —Believe me, my dear sir, with sincere regard, ever faithfully yours,

W. HAMILTON.

To the load of literary and academic distinctions conferred on Sir William must be added the somewhat singular one of Doctor of Divinity. “Sir William one day mentioned to me,” says Archdeacon Sinclair, “a singular academic honour conferred upon him. He received a letter from a friend at Leyden, offering to obtain for him the degree of Doctor of Laws from that ancient university. In reply, he said that he had no ambition to obtain so ordinary a degree as that of Doctor of Laws, but that as a layman he would be gratified to be made a Doctor of Divinity. His friend succeeded in convincing the authorities of Leyden that Sir William was not unworthy of the peculiar compliment in question. Accordingly, the diploma was duly transmitted, and the Professor ever after

jocularly maintained that he was perhaps the only layman in Europe that could pretend to the title of Reverend."\*

Sir William was for a considerable period a member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. The Society's hall was a place of almost daily resort with him for many years; and he enjoyed the social gatherings which once a-month took place in connection with it. Some years before this time, however, (in 1835), he had resigned his membership of this body, on failing to carry out certain proposals to revive the original constitution of the Society. The point of difference between him and the majority of the existing members seems to have related to the balance between the literary and physical elements in the constitution. In a paper, which was read at a meeting, he maintained that originally the literary and physical classes possessed a complete equality of rights, the government of the Society being by law divided between them. This constitution of the Society, which had been established on the distinction of these two co-ordinate classes, had subsisted until the close of the year 1828, when it was apparently superseded by certain bye-laws then promulgated. He contended that these bye-laws were illegal, having been passed in violation of the charter of the Society, and in fact without the sanction of the members. His appeal on this point was not successful, and, finding that his views were not accepted, he very characteristically resigned his position as a member of the Society. The whole proceedings show the intensity with which he threw his strong will and character into anything which he took up, and at the same time a certain impatience of opposition, an assertion of his own individuality, and a readiness to sacrifice his likings to his conception of what was strictly legal, and probably theoretically the best. These were features of his character which appeared in many of his controversies. He must have his views completely accepted, else he is not to be represented in any form. It was a case of "aut

\* In a note in *Discussions*, p. 349, he refers to the fact that in the German universities laymen may be Doctors and Professors of Divinity.

Cæsar aut nullus;" the "Cæsar" being not certainly in any degree a personation of self-seeking, but an intense individuality that would be satisfied with nothing short of the complete ideal of what appeared to him to be right and best.

In the spring of 1842, Sir William and his brother met for the last time. Captain Hamilton, who some years before had married the widow of Sir Robert Townsend Farquhar, Bart., Governor of the Mauritius, had continued to reside in the Lake district, chiefly at Elleray, employing his leisure in literary pursuits. As a neighbour of Wordsworth he had much intercourse with him, and was his frequent companion on long mountain-walks. The poet had a great liking for the literary soldier—in whom there was a fine vein of feeling and poetry, mingled with a keen perception of the ludicrous, and a power of quiet sarcasm; and this liking was reciprocated by the object of it, though not without a certain enjoying appreciation of the contrast between the higher qualities and the somewhat stolid and prosaic background of Wordsworth's character.

Captain Hamilton and his wife were now about to start for a lengthened sojourn on the Continent, but came first of all to Edinburgh to bid farewell to Sir William and Lady Hamilton. A last farewell it proved. Besides the wish to see his brother, another motive which brought him to Edinburgh was the desire, which he and Sir William regretted not to have sooner realised, of placing a slab over their mother's grave.

Captain Hamilton spent the summer in France and Switzerland, and had reached Florence at the beginning of winter. Here he was seized with paralysis. He recovered so far as to be able to proceed to Pisa; but he there had a second attack, and, after a short illness, died on the 7th December 1842. The news of this sad event came as a sudden and painful shock to Sir William; and he long and deeply felt the loss of his only brother, to whom, amid strong differences of character, tastes, and sympathies, he was ardently attached.

Captain Hamilton was buried at Florence, where years before he had laid his first wife in the tomb. On the marble which the brothers had raised in memory of their mother, Sir William had the pain of adding within the year a record of his brother's death. There it is shortly and beautifully written that

THOMAS HAMILTON

DIED AT PISA, VII. DECEMBER MDCCCXLII, AGED LII YEARS,  
AND, LAID, AS HE DESIRED, BY THE DEAREST OF THE LIVING  
BESIDE THE DEAREST OF THE DEAD,  
IS INTERRED AT FLORENCE.

In the winter and spring of 1843, Sir William seems to have given his attention to the controversy in the Church of Scotland, which had been going on for some years, and was then evidently nearing its crisis. His ordinary interest in ecclesiastical matters was quickened by what was passing around him. His constant intercourse in private with his colleague, Dr Welsh, and in the *Senatus* meetings with Dr Chalmers, served to add intensity to his feeling about the Church question. The legal bearings of the question, moreover, were naturally a frequent subject of discussion in the Parliament House. He was thus led to turn aside for a time from his more appropriate studies, and give his attention to the questions involved in this controversy, especially in its historical retrospect. It happened but rarely that he was thus deflected from his ordinary work, and the unusualness of the circumstance may in part account for the intensity with which for the time he took up the new line of investigation. He set about examining historically one of the main points of dispute, known as "the principle of non-intrusion." The result of his researches was given in a pamphlet addressed to the ministers about to leave the Church, and entitled, 'Be not Schismatics, be not Martyrs by Mistake, —a demonstration that the principle of non-intrusion, so far from being fundamental to the Church of Scotland, is sub-

versive of the fundamental principles of that and every other Presbyterian Church Establishment.'

The "principle of non-intrusion" referred to consisted in asserting as final the refusal by a congregation,—as represented by the male heads of families in full communion,—to accept a presentee apart from the decision of any court, ecclesiastical or civil, on the merits of the objections or grounds of refusal. This—the rights of the people—was one of the points upon which the disruption of the Church of Scotland turned ; the other, which came to be involved in it, being that of the nature and limits of the powers of Church courts, or the principle known as "the independence of the Church in matters spiritual." The purport of the tract is sufficiently set forth in the title. Its composition and publication were resolved on only about a week before the meeting of the General Assembly, at which the disruption in the Church took place. Sir William knew generally where to find the evidence required to support his position, but he had too little time to do more than gather together what lay nearest to his hand—the whole pamphlet having been written and printed in little more than a week. It did not pass through the press until the secession from the Church had actually taken place, but there is little probability that, if it had appeared sooner, it would have had any effect in staying the progress of events. With his usual comprehensiveness of design, Sir William first of all entered on an extended examination of the historical grounds of the non-intrusion principle, as respected all the chief Presbyterian Church establishments on the Continent. He intended that this should be followed by a review of the evidence for the principle in the history of the Church of Scotland itself. But the first part, relating to foreign churches, was all that ever appeared. A good deal of space is devoted to the mode of electing pastors in the Genevan Church, as that form on which the Scotch procedure was supposed to be modelled, and particularly to the opinions of Calvin and Beza. Here the question between Sir William

and those on the other side was entirely a matter of interpretation of the passages quoted, for the same statements were regarded by each of the opposing parties as establishing their own views. There is very emphatic reference, in the quotations from Calvin and Beza, to the necessity of having the *approbation, consent, &c.*, of the particular congregation in order to the settlement of a pastor; but it is equally clear that the grounds of objection were required to be stated for judgment. The action of the consistory, syndics, and council in the Genevan Church, after dealing with the objections, is not precisely stated, and its probable character can only be presumed. The case, in fact, does not seem so clear on either side as to warrant very confident assertion. Objections to the nominee selected by "the ministers," and approved by the petty council, were probably as rare as they were unnecessary; for the process of selecting the presentee, before he was offered to the congregation, was most careful and thorough, and very much in contrast with what usually took place under the system of unchecked and irresponsible lay-patronage in the Scottish Church. Whatever be the merits of the case, the pamphlet in question (which reached a third edition) is sufficiently characteristic of the author's mental habits. It contains the fruits of much curious reading; and it was acknowledged to show the greatest historical acquaintance with the subject on the side of the discussion which it espoused.\*

"When the controversy was raging in Scotland," says Archdeacon Sinclair, "as to the right of the people to choose their own ministers, and a disruption appeared imminent, I remarked to Sir William 'that the conservative party in the Kirk seemed most unadvisedly to abandon as untenable the ground of Scripture and antiquity, and were fighting to needless disadvantage about the Books of Discipline and the opinions of the Scottish reformers.' 'You do not pretend to

\* For some strictures on this pamphlet see 'Three Letters on Sir W. Hamilton's Pamphlet.' By William Cunningham, D.D. 1843.

say,' replied Sir William, 'that Scripture and antiquity are against the people's claim to choose their own ministers? If you do, you have Bingham, Father Paul, and Gibbon point-blank against you; Bingham representing your own Church, Father Paul the Church of Rome, and Gibbon the whole body of unbelievers.' I was surprised that even Sir William should at once remember what these singularly combined authorities had written on the subject; but made him promise that he would let me read to him, as soon as it was completed, a pamphlet I was preparing on the question. I took it to him accordingly soon afterwards, and we discussed it paragraph by paragraph. He showed himself as well acquainted with the subject as if meanwhile he had been making it his especial study. At last he said: 'You have made out a much stronger case than I expected. By all means publish your essay. You will have this advantage, that no one in the Kirk, or out of it, is sufficiently acquainted with the Fathers to refute you.'"

Sir William's theological interest was occasionally manifested very keenly when he had an opportunity of bringing together at his house men of different creeds. It gave him great pleasure to hear opposite views on theological subjects put well and pointedly by men of definite convictions and power of giving expression to them. One party in particular of this sort is still remembered by some who were present as having taken place in King Street, some years later than the date of this chapter, but yet illustrating sympathies in Sir William's character which ever and anon found an outlet. The gathering on the occasion referred to was a casual one, but it included representatives of the varied prominent theological opinions of the time—of the English Church, of the Church of Rome, and of Scottish Presbyterianism. Sir William's wide catholicity, sense of fairness, and readiness to acknowledge what was good and true in the most opposite theological views, found great gratification in the conversation. He seemed to throw off all signs of his illness (for

the party took place after his first seizure), and entered with the greatest animation into the good-humoured debate of the evening, especially on the question at issue between Roman Catholics and Protestants in regard to faith and works.

The following reminiscences of private intercourse with Sir William, from about 1839 onwards, are written by one\* who, at first his pupil, was afterwards admitted to intimacy with him, and occupied a high place in his regard. They refer to several of the points touched on in this and the succeeding chapter, especially Sir William's views on theological subjects. They also well illustrate his habits of intercourse with his more intimate friends, and the general tone and topics of his conversation. Their force will be best preserved by giving them unbroken as communicated by their author.

"My intercourse with Sir William, after I ceased to be one of his regular students, did not supply very much that could be suitably communicated to the public. Besides the necessary relation of much of his conversation to passing topics, the opinions on men and things uttered in perfect freedom have a sanctity which must be respected; and I can therefore only make a limited collection of his judgments and sayings.

"On questions of philosophy his opinions uttered in conversation so nearly resembled those delivered in his lectures and other works, that I can add but little. An expression I have heard him use repeatedly was this,—in speaking of the philosophers who assert the knowledge of the Absolute,—'Hegel and his followers have to take the bull by the horns, and deny the law of contradiction.' And again, 'Cousin thinks my system one of scepticism; but it is only sceptical as disclaiming omniscience.' With Cousin's somewhat depreciatory estimate of Locke he did not agree, and spoke of him more affectionately than in his published writings. He was constant also in his praises of Malebranche and Pascal; and used to say in regard to Spinoza, that 'we must deny his premises, if we would escape his conclusions.'

\* Rev. Dr John Cairns, of Berwick.



"I repeatedly urged him, if I remember rightly, to finish his scheme of Psychology, by fully discussing what he called our conative or exertive faculties, as well as our faculties of knowledge and feeling; and I am certain that I especially solicited him to give us his Metaphysics proper, in the shape of necessary inferences from the facts and laws of mind, and thus crown his system. He admitted it to be very desirable, but did not hold out much hope that it would ever be accomplished.

"Naturally enough, during my course as a student of Divinity, and afterwards, our conversation not unfrequently turned to questions of theology. This also had been included in the circle of his studies, though he certainly had not gone so deeply and minutely into it as into systems of philosophy. One great source of his interest in theology was to see in it the reappearance of philosophical problems and difficulties under other names. His application of the Law of the Conditioned to the question of Free-will is sufficiently known; and on this he dwelt in his conversation as much as in his writings. He thought that he harmonised the difference between the Calvinist and the Arminian, by taking away the bone of their contention: and while he regarded Calvinism as the more philosophical system, and spoke with the highest respect of its author, he protested against its alliance with philosophical necessity—a protest in some measure shared by his strenuous antagonist in some theological controversies, the late Principal Cunningham. Of his Scottish theological contemporaries, he spoke in the warmest terms of Dr M'Crie, who he held had kept Calvinism free from the necessitarianism of Dr Chalmers, though he admired Chalmers also, and stood with him as a colleague in kindly relations. Dr John Brown he praised for his learning and devotion to biblical study, and took some interest in the controversy in which he was engaged in regard to the extent of the Atonement; but he seemed to doubt whether the question was solvable, or whether anything had been added to the earliest Calvinism by the de-

bates of centuries on this point. He spoke highly of some American divines, such as Stuart and Robinson, as, to use his own phrase, 'more solidly built' than the great body of English theologians; but I do not remember any special allusions to the more recent theologians of France or Germany, though he was familiar with the current of religious thought in both countries.

"One subject which has some place in his writings had a considerable part in his conversation—the questions at issue between Romanism and Protestantism. Some of his published utterances regarding the Reformers have led Archdeacon Hare and others, in their defence of them, to underrate, if not to deny, his genuine sympathy with the Reformation, and his admiration of Luther and the other leaders of that great movement. But if anything that he wrote on this head was liable to misapprehension (and perhaps here and there it was so), it was otherwise in his spoken discourse, which freely expressed even a passionate regard for the great Reformer, and thankfulness for his work. At the same time, even in conversation, there was a frequent expression of the opinion that some parts of the Protestant argument, as commonly conducted, were not sufficiently conclusive. For example, in regard to the claim to continuous revelation, he held that Protestant advocates had too lightly rested their denial of it on *a priori* grounds, and not treated it as a question of fact; and under some other heads he conceived that the stress of the argument had not been directed to the point where it was needed. One who did not know Sir William well, nor enter into his dialectical tendencies, might have supposed that there was something of a half apology for Romanism in what was merely, in his eye, an exposure of the weakness of illogical Protestantism, made in its own interest. When met, as I sometimes took the liberty of meeting him, either by defending the inculcated logical procedure, or by attempting to supply the missing argument, he would show sufficiently that he had in him no real affinity to the Romish conclusion—at the most, a reluctance to drive the argument to extremities, or a kind of

tenderness to the great thinkers who had not abandoned the communion of Rome. With its dogmas, its hierarchical claims, and its special modes of worship, in themselves considered, he had no coalescence; and I have heard him denounce some of the kindred features of Ritualism, when they were as yet novelties, in language almost too strong to be quoted.

"Of conversations on differences of government among Protestants, and on the connection between Church and State, I remember nothing. All through, in his class and in friendly intercourse, the differences of religious parties were to him nothing, though he was personally attached to the Established Church of Scotland. I recollect that about the year 1842, when the controversy that ended in the Disruption was nearing its crisis, I happened to call on him and found him reading a pamphlet, containing a 'Friendly Reply' by Dissenters to a 'Friendly Address' issued to them by the Non-Intrusion party in the Church of Scotland. He took the deepest interest in the question, showed me passages in one, if not both, of these pamphlets carefully marked, and was as much absorbed as in any philosophical discussion. How much he could be carried away by a great public agitation his own elaborate pamphlet, designed to arrest the Disruption, but only published after it, sufficiently shows. It will certainly now be regretted by all, that he should have been diverted from his unfinished philosophical labours into a region more contentious, and where no such appeal of a solitary thinker, on either side, could affect the movements of great ecclesiastical parties.

"As an example of his interest in ecclesiastical matters of a quite different order, I may mention that, some years afterwards, when the United Presbyterian Church had for some time established a mission in Old Calabar, near the mouth of the Niger, a statement was published, descriptive of the nature and success of the mission, which had in it something unusual as dealing with novel and dark superstitions, and as occupying an abandoned seat of the slave-trade. I sent a copy to Sir William, thinking that he might like to see it. After

an interval he returned it, thanking me for the great pleasure it had given him, and declaring it a perfect model of that species of literature.

“Looking back on these and such indications of interest in matters higher even than philosophy, and remembering the respectful and even reverential strain of every allusion in speech or writing to Christianity and the Christian Scriptures, it is with peculiar pleasure that I think of so great a mind as having, in days of doubt and restless speculation, satisfied itself with that common Christian belief with which so many of the loftiest human intellects have been contented, and as having proved, with a yet deepened sense, its value, as I humbly believe, amid the discipline of affliction and the shadows of death.”

Now and again letters passed between Sir William and M. Cousin, on subjects of common interest.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, 1st July 1843.

MY DEAR SIR,—I am so ashamed of not having hitherto performed what I promised to do, that I should have been tempted to procrastinate writing to you till I had been able to fulfil my wishes, had not my friend Count Davidoff, a distinguished Russian nobleman—the heir of the house of Orloff—solicited me to make him acquainted with you, of whom with the rest of the world he has the highest admiration. This I was the less averse from doing, because I am confident you will find him highly worthy of being known to you. He was for several years a resident here during the course of his education; and he left behind him the warmest recollections of his excellent qualities, which he has lately renewed by a visit to his old friends.\*

As I said, I have been long under the burden of an unfulfilled obligation,—I mean, to bring your more recent works before the British public in the ‘*Edinburgh Review*.’ When I spoke to Mr Napier, the editor, about an article on your ministerial acts, he thought, and I cordially agreed with him, that it would be better to

\* See above, p. 86.

have a more comprehensive review ; and I have recently arranged with him, that the *first* article I write for the 'Edinburgh Review' (in which I have had nothing for four or five years), shall be a survey of your influence through your writings, &c., on the present state of philosophy in France. This, however, will require some reading ; and I shall not be able to undertake it for several months to come. Before that I hope to send you Reid's Works, which has fallen asleep on my hands once and again. I shall take care to send you the volume of the 'Transactions of the Royal Society.' You will, however, I am sure, find them utterly worthless to a philosopher.

I received the first volume of your *Leçons* on Kant, which I think the best exposition of his philosophy I have seen. I have given it out as the prize subject for study during the present summer vacation for my pupils (as I often do with your books), but I am not sure if the second volume is yet published. I have not yet seen your Pascal, though I have read the notices of it in the 'Journal des Savans.' But I must close.—Believe me, my dear sir, with high respect, ever truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

20 Septembre 1843.

J'ai reçu par Monsieur Davidoff un billet de vous, auquel je réponds avec empressement, pour vous prouver le prix que j'attache à une correspondance beaucoup trop interrompue.

M. Davidoff m'a dit que vous aviez publié récemment sur vos affaires religieuses, une brochure qui avait eu un immense succès. Vous êtes un méchant homme de ne pas me l'avoir envoyée. Je lis avec le plus grand intérêt tout ce qui sort de votre plume, et je ne vous tiens pas quitte de cette brochure. . . .

. . . On songe à Paris à fonder une *Revue* philosophique, mais le libraire résiste beaucoup. Pourrait-on avoir quelques souscripteurs en Ecosse ? Il faut que d'un bout de l'Europe à l'autre tous les amis de la bonne philosophie, indépendante à la fois et vraiment morale et religieuse, se soutiennent et forment un certain ensemble, devant des attaques aussi concertées que celles des plusieurs clergés. Pensez à cela, mon très-cher confrère. Notre Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques résistera, et moi je ne me rendrai pas. La bonne philosophie du 19<sup>me</sup> siècle ne peut-elle donc pas s'entendre

pour se défendre légitimement, comme la mauvaise philosophie du 18<sup>m</sup>e siècle s'est entendue pour attaquer ? Le temps est venu de chercher nos ressemblances plus que nos différences. Vous verrez comme dans mon *Rapport* je parle de la philosophie Ecossaise. Peu-à-peu je me dégage davantage de la philosophie Allemande, et je m'enfonce de plus en plus dans la psychologie. Vous, recommandez-vous un peu avec l'eclecticisme, comme méthode historique. Enfin, aimons et servons la philosophie selon nos convictions, qui sans se confondre peuvent se rapprocher. Surtout, écrivez-moi par la poste, et donnez-moi de longs détails sur l'état de la philosophie dans cette Ecosse que j'aime infiniment et que je voudrais bien voir.

## CHAPTER VIII.

ILLNESS, AND LAST YEARS OF LIFE: 1844-1856.

ILLNESS—DR MACLAGAN'S NOTES—EFFECT ON HIS HEALTH—MIND UNIMPAIRED—SOLICITUDE OF HIS FRIENDS—CONDUCT UNDER HIS ILLNESS—APPLICATION FOR A PENSION—AND RESULT—COMPLETION OF REID'S WORKS—CONTEMPLATED WORKS ON LOGIC AND LUTHER—CORRESPONDENCE WITH DR CAIRNS—DOMESTIC LIFE AND HABITS—MR BAYNES'S REMINISCENCES OF CONVERSATIONS—LETTERS TO LIEUTENANT HAMILTON IN INDIA—RESEARCHES IN CONNECTION WITH LUTHER—THE DISCUSSIONS—LETTERS RELATIVE TO THEM—TESTS IN THE SCOTTISH UNIVERSITIES—VISITS OF STRANGERS—EDITING OF STEWART'S WORKS—LETTERS FROM HOME—LAST ILLNESS—GENERAL REMARKS.

IN July 1844, without any premonitory symptoms, Sir William was struck down by paralysis. During the immediately preceding year he had been working very hard,—first on his edition of Reid's Works, and then on the course of inquiry, opened up by his interest in the Disruption, into the original constitution of the Scottish Church. This latter subject had led him into an investigation about the Books of Discipline, the results of which are recorded in a large body of manuscripts. Through his absorption in these occupations his usual late hours of study were at this period protracted, so that it was not uncommon for him to be going to bed when other people were about to rise. There can be little doubt that this imprudent disregard of the laws of health had much to do in bringing on the paralytic attack.

The following account of the illness is furnished by Dr Douglas MacLagan, Sir William's medical attendant :—

“I wish that I could comply in a more satisfactory manner with the request made to me that I would give some account of Sir William Hamilton's illness in 1844, but the unfortunate loss of a note-book compels me to write from memory, and prevents me from furnishing some particulars which I would like to give. It is, however, not requisite to give a clinical history of the case, which would have no interest for any but medical readers, and my recollection of the salient points is sufficiently vivid to enable me to state them accurately.

“Sir William's illness, as is well known, was an attack of paralysis (in technical language, hemiplegia) of the right side. The seizure was sudden and severe. Not merely were the arm and leg paralysed, and the muscles of the tongue so much affected that speech was rendered extremely difficult, but the power of swallowing was so completely lost that I had for three or four days to feed him with the stomach-pump. This piece of practice was suggested by himself, specially with a view to relieving the thirst from which he suffered. He was well aware of the fact that thirst can be relieved by fluids being introduced into the stomach though they do not touch the mouth and throat to which the sensation is referred.

“The marked feature in the case was the retention by him of his mental faculties. Such paralytic attacks are sometimes by non-professional people erroneously called apoplectic, but the true characteristic of apoplexy—the loss of consciousness—was entirely wanting here. The gigantic intellect of the man was at work throughout the whole illness, and made itself manifest in a striking manner on the day after his seizure. He had been thinking over the phenomena of his own case, and making a physiological study of himself. The difficulty of articulation, of which he was painfully conscious, had evidently been uppermost in his mind, and



upon this subject he began to question me, or rather to discourse to me, on the occasion referred to. He spoke of the views of Sir Charles Bell and other modern physiologists, and referred to a paper in the transactions of one of the older scientific academies—Belgian, according to my recollection—in which was enunciated the connection of the ninth pair of nerves with the movements of the tongue,—a subject on which he had himself written. Of this old memoir, whatever it was, I never had heard, nor can I now guess what it was. The fact in question was known to men of science long before the time of those modern inquiries which have given so much precision to our knowledge of the nervous system, and may readily have been noticed in some early scientific writing, which none but a person of Sir William's extensive reading was likely to know or remember. The interest which attaches to his quoting it lies in the evidence which was thus afforded of the integrity of his intellectual powers under this severe illness. I need not say that all exertion on his part, either of mind or muscle, was discouraged in the strongest possible manner, both by myself and by Dr Davidson, who saw him in consultation with me. But though Sir William was an excellent patient, so far as submission to medical treatment was concerned, it was not easy to obtain compliance with our injunction regarding mental exertion. I was particularly struck with the eagerness with which he entered upon this physiological topic, and questioned me with regard to theoretical points involved in his own case—an eagerness intensified no doubt in appearance by the efforts which he required to make to overcome the difficulty of articulation. His recovery from the primary dangers of the attack was steady and satisfactory, but the injury done to the brain was so considerable that he never completely regained the power of the paralysed limbs."

The stroke was sudden, and heavy to bear. He was yet in his prime, and up to the day of his seizure had been active and athletic beyond most men. The illness which followed was

tedious ; and it left him broken in health and vigour. His intellect, however, was entire, active, and acute as before ; and his wonderful memory remained unimpaired. He himself, indeed, considered that his memory was even better and more reliable after his illness than before,—that he could now more securely trust to it in making quotations ; an improvement for which he accounted by his being liable to fewer outward distractions than formerly. But the body had suffered severely. The right hand was powerless, the right leg impaired, and the articulation was often indistinct,—in a word, there was much physical weakness, which made all bodily exertion laborious and painful. His vision also was affected. Though there was, strictly speaking, no failure of eyesight, there was an appearance of motion in small objects before the eye, which was very unpleasant, and compelled him when reading to use an obscured right eye in his spectacles. Still he carried on his congenial work ; brought out his edition of Reid's Works, and republished with additions his articles in the 'Edinburgh Review.' He also during the College session, with the exception of that of 1844-45, appeared regularly in his class-room, read a portion of the hour's lecture, having an assistant who read the remainder.

As might have been looked for from the nature of the illness, there was a good deal of nervous feeling, especially in walking ; and his early friends noted that he had now a tendency to irritability and occasional warmth and vehemence of temper in a degree which they had not before observed.

His illness served to show the intensity of affection with which he was regarded. During the night that followed the seizure, and before it was known whether the sufferer would rally, the greatest solicitude was felt by his friends on the spot. One of them, with a loyalty of affection which is honourable to both, might have been seen pacing to and fro on the street opposite the bedroom window of the invalid, during the whole of the long anxious night, watching for indications of his condition, yet unwilling to intrude on the attendants,

and unable to tear himself from the spot where his friend was possibly passing through the last agony. This was his old friend, amid much speculative difference and debate, James Ferrier.

On hearing of Sir William's illness, Mr John Cay had sent a brief note to Lockhart, whose heart, despite the unfortunate misunderstanding of recent years, still beat warmly towards his early friend. Lockhart writes in reply :—

*Aug. 8, 1844.*

MY DEAR CAY,—Your short and not very clear account of poor Hamilton's seizure afflicts me to the inmost heart. You don't say whether he was struck with paralysis or apoplexy or what, but I fear it was something very terrible, and beg you will let me hear what you know. . . . James Traill was the last person who had seen Sir W. H., and it was, I believe, a year ago. He told me he had been grieved with the change in his appearance—the body heavy, and complexion not healthy, and the temper seemingly much affected. He came away with the impression that there must be something far wrong in his worldly affairs pressing him down and irritating him. I have nobody now in Edinburgh that I could write to. How changed are all things since the days you allude to !

I need hardly say that there was not the slightest ground for the surmise regarding Sir William's worldly circumstances expressed by Mr Traill.

The manly, heroic, and unselfish spirit which Sir William manifested under his grievous affliction was truly touching and admirable. Naturally at first he found the condition of restraint and dependence to which he was reduced hard to bear. It was especially a calamity to a man of his time of life, who had always delighted and excelled in bodily exercises, and who, painfully conscious of his own helplessness, was sensitive of its being noticed by others — yet he was never heard to murmur or complain, and in general was very cheerful. "In those first days of his recovery," says Miss Craig, who from a child had known and loved him, "how unchanged he was in mind, though so sadly stricken in body! How in-

stantly he made you feel at home in his sick-room—made you join in all that was doing, whether in mechanical contrivances to assist him in his helplessness, or in writing for him when he was able to resume his work; and how completely he engaged you in what he was doing himself, taking it quite for granted that you were to be so, and by his own intense interest creating yours, till you felt, even in the plenitude of your ignorance, as much interest as he did in the subject he was discussing, whether it were the exegetical works of Luther or the syllogisms of Aristotle!”

From the commencement of his illness, as we have seen from Dr Maclagan’s account, he was in the habit of making its symptoms a subject of careful observation. He could not help smiling at the first awkward attempts he made at using his legs, and resolutely set about practising the way of walking straight in spite of missing nerves. He also at once began to acquire the habit of writing with his left hand. Sir William was confined to his room for some months, and during the whole of the winter of 1844-45 continued to be more or less of an invalid. The winter, too, was saddened by the loss of a little girl, whose beauty and sweetness of disposition had greatly endeared her to her parents.

It was not long, however, before he resumed study, devoting himself particularly to logic, and filling with his researches a Common-Place Book, which remains as the record of this winter’s employment. Some of the results of this winter’s work are to be found in the Appendix to the second volume of the ‘Lectures on Logic.’

Sir William was unable to undertake the work of his class, and there was some talk of his spending the winter at St Andrews—a plan which was not carried out. Mr Ferrier acted as his substitute in the class-room—reading Sir William’s lectures and conducting the business of the class.

From the time of his illness, Sir William’s physical vigour was, as we have seen, greatly impaired. It was painful to see how terribly broken-down was the powerful man—the com-

manding form and great athlete of former years. While still below sixty, his physical vigour had given way under the strain of so many years of intellectual labour; and when he resumed his College work, he was assisted daily in ascending the stairs which led to the class-room, where he still continued to prelect to a class that increased in numbers yearly to the close of his career. Especially during the last years of his life, it was evident that the unfailing mind and resolution alone sustained the bodily effort. Still the business of the class was to the end efficiently conducted. Had the circumstances of his position allowed it, there can be no doubt that he would have withdrawn from the active duties of the Chair, and confined himself to philosophical writing. He was in every point of view well entitled to retire from his public office, especially after a professional term of service which commenced in 1820, and the latter part of which had been so distinguished and laborious. But his personal means were very limited. The income from the Chair did not average £500 a-year, and out of this, for the first seven years of his professorship, he had paid to his predecessor, Dr Ritchie, an annuity of £100. Then there was no retiring allowance—not even the meagre proportion of income which has been recently provided in the case of professorships in the Scottish universities, and arranged on a principle so evidently unjust and inconsiderate as to defeat the end for which it was originally proposed. In these circumstances, it was felt by many men of influence in Edinburgh that, considering Sir William's philosophical eminence and learning, the great services he had rendered to the higher education of the country by his writings and instruction, and the state of his bodily health, his was a case in which it would be proper and becoming in the Government to proffer some pecuniary recognition. It had been the custom lately for the Government to recognise and reward eminence in physical science, in literature, and in other departments of intellectual effort, merely as such — where there existed no

bodily affliction—and even where the person thus singled out occupied a position of emolument, or still continued to discharge the duties of a university chair. Sir William's was thought to be a strong case compared with these, even on the ground of intellectual eminence and services: the state of his health added to this seemed to render it irresistible. What had been given to Mr Dugald Stewart, to say nothing of lesser men, could not surely be withheld from Sir W. Hamilton. He had spent a lifetime in the quest of philosophical erudition, and in the exercise of abstract thought, impelled by as strong an enthusiasm, and in a spirit as little worldly, as any man who ever devoted himself to intellectual pursuits. His learning was unparalleled in his time. He had grappled with the profoundest philosophical questions; he had set them in new lights; he had originated views that would confessedly affect the course of abstract thought for generations to come. His writings had carried the name of the university with which he was connected and of his country over the continents of Europe and America. He had discussed, moreover, with a learning which only he could display, and a force of thought in which he was not surpassed by any writer of his time, the questions of the Higher Education and University Reform. Finally, he had taught with singular success and power for a considerable period, and made luminous to his students the abstrusest philosophical problems. True, he had not appealed directly to the popular intelligence. He had not been a scientific discoverer or a popular author. He had worked in a quarter where he did not expect, and did not receive, general sympathy. His philosophy, though profoundly religious, was the natural growth of a free and simple mind—not squared to the dimensions of any prevailing form of unthinking dogmatism, and therefore commanding no wide interest. Still his work was a good in the commonwealth—a rare good, even a blessing, which men worthy of occupying the position of heads of the state might have been expected to appreciate. Now that he was paralysed in limb and

broken in health, it would be but becoming to afford him at least what had been given to others who were still unimpaired in powers, and had been rewarded for their services alone. To give to them and refuse to him were an act simply of the grossest injustice. Means were accordingly taken, at first entirely unknown to Sir William himself, by his friends in Edinburgh, who were of all political parties, to bring his case before the Ministry of the day, at the head of which was Sir Robert Peel. As the Peel Ministry, however, was evidently about to fall, it was not thought desirable to press the matter, and it was not brought before the Government until Lord John Russell succeeded to power. How the application was dealt with by the head of the Whig Ministry, the following brief narrative will show.

In 1846, Lord Advocate Rutherford having brought Sir William's services and claims before Lord John Russell, his lordship's reply, as communicated by the Lord Advocate, was as follows:—"I found that of £1200 pension, £900 had been distributed by Sir Robert Peel. I have advised pensions of £200; there remains only £100. But I will recommend £100 a-year to Sir William Hamilton, if he thinks proper to take that sum. I can only say that it is all that is left." The Lord Advocate, in his letter to Sir William (22d August 1846), adds:—"I trust you will accept it—though I wish it had been more adequate to your merits and position. His means for this year are exhausted, and I did not expect him to give any engagement for the future. But I shall bring the matter again before him in due time, and I hope the same considerations which have led him to give you all he now has to bestow will enable him to enlarge the grant from the fund of next year." Sir William, in a letter to the Lord Advocate, declined Lord John Russell's offer, on the ground mainly of its obvious inadequacy as a recognition of his claims. Some of his friends, among whom was Lord Jeffrey, at first thought that in this he was wrong, as the Government had offered him all that was then at their disposal—the terms of

the offer even implying a sense of the inadequacy of the sum. On this Sir William wrote a second letter to the Lord Advocate as follows :—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO THE LORD ADVOCATE.

EDINBURGH, 3d September 1846.

MY DEAR RUTHERFURD,—I have for the last three days been suffering from a smart feverish attack ; and as Mr Gibson-Craig, whom I saw on Monday, bid me write you at my leisure, I have allowed the irritation to subside before doing so. Since Mr [now Sir William] Gibson-Craig spoke to me, I have been favoured with a second note from Lord Jeffrey, in which he says :—"The element of publicity, or rather defective publicity, had not occurred to me, and that certainly is a consideration not to be overlooked." I am thus confirmed in my conviction that, if the present grant is to be published, and that without explanation, I have no alternative but the painful one of respectfully declining that for which I feel most grateful to all concerned ; for it would appear to the world as if this were an estimate of my claims, and that by a Government of my own party—an estimate, independently of the consideration of my illness, I should be mortified to think correct. But if Mr Gibson-Craig is right in his belief that there is no necessity for the matter to be published *hoc statu*, unless a return be called for in Parliament, I should most gladly avail myself of your kindness, and beg you to hold my former letter *pro non scripto*. For I have full reliance, independently of the terms of his lordship's letter to you, that neither Lord John Russell nor any other Minister would allow me to remain on the pension-list in an inferiority to others of inferior claims, so soon as he had the usual means at his disposal ; whilst it would greatly pain me to do aught that might possibly be construed into any want of gratitude for what was so kindly intended.

I hope you will indulgently excuse the writing of this note, which I trust you will be able to read. Believe me, my dear Rutherford, most gratefully yours,

W. HAMILTON.

P.S.—I see that I have not begged you, as I ought, to offer on my behalf my most grateful acknowledgments to Lord John Russell. This I earnestly request that you would do.



The Lord Advocate appears to have thought it for Sir William's interest not to bring before Lord John Russell this conditional acceptance of the pension; and though zealous in Sir William's behalf, he omitted to send a reply to this letter. In the end of September it turned out that the pension-fund was entirely exhausted. Sir William's friends still hoped that, in the following year, a sum not unbecoming his services and position might be offered. But on July 2, 1847, the Lord Advocate wrote:—"I am under the necessity of announcing that Lord John Russell has found it impossible to include your name among those who are to share in the distribution of the pension-list of this year. He is very sensible of your great merits, and of the high position you hold in literature and learning, and deeply laments the circumstances which render important the assistance he is unable to afford. But the funds he has to dispose of fall very much short of answering what he would otherwise consider just objects of the country's grateful acknowledgment, and other claims have been pressed upon him to which he feels himself compelled to postpone yours, more especially as he could not have proposed now a larger sum than was last year rejected as inadequate and unbecoming, though it was all he then had to bestow."

This conduct of the First Lord of the Treasury caused very great dissatisfaction in Edinburgh, among both his political supporters and others. Lord Cuninghame writes to Lady Hamilton (July 14, 1847):—"I return you the Lord Advocate's letter, which Lord Jeffrey had for some days, and tells me he perused with great pain. That Lord John has taken some offence at the refusal last year is plain; and I own I am shocked at the unreasonableness and littleness of the feeling. It has produced the deepest condemnation among all classes of Liberals, and justice must and will be done to Sir William next year, without any effort. That I and all our friends are confident of."

In the following year Sir William addressed a letter to Lord

John Russell, of part of which a copy has been preserved. It ran as follows :—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO LORD J. RUSSELL.

[ 1848. ]

MY LORD,—It is with extreme reluctance that I venture to obtrude my claims upon your lordship's consideration ; and nothing has overcome my repugnance to the step but a conviction that this is a duty which I owe to the public, to my family, and to myself—I mean my own usefulness and reputation—and that your lordship's is the judgment by which they ought to be considered.

But, first of all, I must speak on what is to me a very painful matter. I am informed that I have given offence by declining the pension which your lordship two years ago was pleased through the Lord Advocate to offer me. On this I am only anxious that your lordship should be fully aware of the facts, for I have no apology to allege, but am humbly confident that your lordship in the circumstances will not think that any is required. On partially recovering from a severe attack — an attack of paralysis — some distinguished members of the Conservative party did me the honour of thinking that, though a Whig, I was, independently of party considerations, worthy of a public pension. When informed of the proposed application, I expressed, as I felt, and feel, my grateful sense of the sympathy, compliment, and intended benefit, and only required that no secret might be made of my political opinions. Of this precaution, however, there was no need ; for though ignorant of what the memorial contained, I know that it was signed as intended by a few high names of either party, and that it was only drawn up by the Lord Justice-Clerk [Hope] on Lord Jeffrey being, from an attack of illness, obliged to delegate the task. This was soon before your lordship's administration commenced. The Lord Justice-Clerk deemed it proper not to transmit the application during the final struggle of the parties ; but he has written me that he made no doubt that Sir Robert Peel, had he remained in office, would at once have granted what was asked. On your lordship's becoming Prime Minister, my case was brought under your consideration by the Lord Advocate [Rutherford], and when your lordship was pleased to say (I quote from the Advocate's letter to me) that "I will recommend £100 a-year to Sir William Hamilton, if he thinks proper to take that sum," I received this intimation with

every feeling of gratitude to your lordship, for having done and said all that in the circumstances was possible or proper on my behalf. Still, as is more fully stated in my letters to the Advocate (a copy of the second is subjoined), I felt that, if the grant to me of a pension of that amount were published without explanation, I should appear to the world on a lower level than was my due. And, from the terms of your lordship's letter, I even thought that it was not expected of me to accept. With these sentiments, I at first wrote to the Advocate, begging him, for the reasons given, to express to your lordship my sincere gratitude, and the regret I had in declining the offered pension. But after a conversation with Mr Gibson-Craig, and two notes from Lord Jeffrey, I wrote to the Lord Advocate, requesting to withdraw my previous letter; and—if Mr Gibson-Craig were correct in his supposition, that publication in ordinary circumstances was unnecessary—accepting of the proposed grant, and begging through him to express my most grateful acknowledgments to your lordship.

The pension-list of 1848, however, appeared without Sir William's name; on which Professor George Moir writes to him as follows:—

MY DEAR HAMILTON,—Your note of to-day grieves and annoys me very much. Not that I was not in some degree prepared for it, from seeing several pensions awarded—some of them I believe worthily—though none, as far as I can see, on grounds of literary or scientific eminence, which could be mentioned beside yours without exciting ridicule; and the last which I have seen mentioned,—to some entomological personage, a dissector of fleas and embalmer of beetles,—is really beyond measure indefensible. . . .

You know very well, my dear Sir William, that though a strong Tory, I have a perfect contempt for the introduction of political opinions into any questions connected with literature and science; and though I regret, more than I can express, the present state of things (as you explain it) as to the result of the application, which your friends felt themselves honoured in making, it is a great satisfaction to me to think that the first move in the matter was made by those who, differing from you, *toto cælo*, in mere political opinion, admired and respected your great abilities at least as much as those who had entertained congenial political opinions. Nor can I really believe that the matter is to rest here. . . .

Ever very affectionately yours,

Geo. Moir.

In 1849, Lord John Russell, who had again been induced to consider Sir William's claims, renewed the offer of £100. This was communicated by the Lord Advocate Rutherford to Mr James Gibson-Craig (July 28th, 1849) in the following terms:—

MY DEAR CRAIG,—I have a letter from Lord John Russell, in which he says, "The Queen has sanctioned a pension of one hundred pounds a-year to Sir W. Hamilton. This is all that can be spared, but it may be increased next year, if there are the means of doing it."

Will you have the goodness to ascertain whether Sir William Hamilton will accept the pension? I wish Lord John had been enabled to propose a larger sum. I trust he may be able, as I believe he will be inclined, to increase it next year. But I shall be very sorry if anything again occurs to prevent Sir William accepting it, as it is again offered, even though his friends should think it inadequate to his claims.

Sir William still declined to accept the sum of £100 as for himself; but he concurred in an arrangement, brought about through the friend to whom the above letter was addressed, in virtue of which, with Lord John Russell's consent, the pension was bestowed on Lady Hamilton. The expectation of an increase to this pension during Sir William's lifetime proved delusive; and it may be added that an application for an addition to it, made shortly after his death, to Lord Palmerston, though largely and influentially supported,\* met with no success. Philosophical genius and rare learning, such as appear once

\* The names attached to the representation to Lord Palmerston were as follow:—Principals Lee and Macfarlane, the Lord Justice-General (M'Neill), Lord Dunfermline, Sir David Brewster, the Lord Justice-Clerk (Hope), Lords Murray, Wood, and Cowan, Sir W. Gibson-Craig, Bart., the Dean of Faculty (Inglis), Bonamy Price, Esq., the Dean of Carlisle (A. C. Tait), the Dean of St Paul's (H. H. Milman), Professor Jowett Rev. Dr Thompson, Provost of Queen's, Oxford, the Dean of Wells (G. H. S. Johnson, M.A.), Rev. Dr Hawkins, Provost of Oriel, Rev. H. L. Mansel, Right Hon. T. B. Macaulay, Rev. A. P. Stanley, Rev. Dr Scott, Master of Balliol, Adam Black, Esq., M.P., the Duke of Argyll, the Lord Advocate (Moncreiff), Sir Charles Lyell, Henry Hallam, Esq., Lord Panmure.

in two hundred years, were apparently viewed in high places as but of second-rate importance. Abstract thought was not to be weighed in the same balance with physical discoveries or imaginative talent. These latter were appreciable by the men in power; the other was to be looked on merely as a curious eccentricity; for in this nineteenth century are we not bent mainly on the useful, the pleasurable, and the spasmodic? So long as the profoundest speculative power had not become palpable to that enlightened, deep-seeing, and infallible judge of all true good,—popular opinion; so long as there were none to applaud it on hustings or throw up their hats in the air for it, it was not worth the recognition of the great political leaders. So John Locke worked out the idea of toleration not only without any official recognition, but with a good deal of obloquy and persecution. Adam Smith, too, quietly elaborated his doctrine of free-trade; and though it was a great deal above the popular and statesman intelligence of the time, its author did not fare so badly in respect of social recognition and reward as might have been expected. But probably his better fortune was due more to the accident of his connection with the Buccleuch family than to any appreciation of his merits. Francis Hutcheson developed his elevating theory of morals, and Thomas Reid made his grand protest in behalf of the noble and inspiring in human hopes and destiny. All this work was done apart from general sympathy and appreciation; and thus it is that while scientific discoverers—men who can make their work palpable to eye, ear, and touch—and even intriguing local politicians who can manage a borough or county, are rewarded, we do not find even the most ordinary provision made for men of abstract thought or learning. They may live for ever,—where to the popular mind they find their life's pleasure,—in their abstract sphere, the "*domos Ditis vacuas et inania regna*." Yet these men of abstract studies, while working far away in their time from public sympathy and immediate understanding, and therefore to purblind politicians as nothing, have proved the really

influential forces at work in society,—in that very sphere over which statesmen are called upon to preside. Their thoughts fall unheeded at the time, so far as general effect is concerned, as the rains on the high mountains, which, however, quite certainly in the end come down in streams to the plains.

A distinguished colleague of Hamilton's in the University, John Wilson, became ill, and was understood to be desirous of retiring from active work. The same Minister who offered Hamilton £100, bestowed on Wilson a pension of £300 a-year, a gift in itself well merited, and begrudged by no one. This act of Lord Russell's was regarded as exceedingly magnanimous; and probably it was, for politically Wilson had been the violent foe of all Whigs and all Whig Ministers for nearly half a century, and would, if he could, have put them in a position in which they should have had no State patronage to dispense. It would, however, have been pleasing to be able also to record that the same Minister showed not only magnanimity to a political foe, but justice, and intelligence somewhat proportioned to this magnanimity, in regard to one who happened to be a political adherent, and whose claims to advancement had been sacrificed, when they were undoubtedly the first, by his declared attachment in evil times to a party whose leaders never showed him either gratitude or appreciation.

Sir William, as we have seen, had so far recovered from his illness in the winter of 1844-45 as to be able to resume his studies, and he continued the work of reading and thinking with but slight interruptions till a few days before his death in May 1856. The editing of Reid, which had suffered so much from interruptions, was resumed. The work was finally published—though without being completed—in November 1846. The supplementary dissertations D\*\* and D\*\*\* had been written before his illness. The latter was given in an unfinished state—breaking off, in fact, in the middle of a sentence. The edition of Reid's works has recently been

completed, as far as it was possible to do so, from the papers and fragments of dissertations which were left by Sir William at the time of his death, under the able and learned superintendence of the Rev. H. L. Mansel, D.D., late Canon of Christ Church, and Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, and now Dean of St Paul's.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

1 Décembre 1846.

. . . Vous faites mieux que me répondre : vous m'envoyez un cadeau inappréciable dans votre édition de Reid. Je l'ai reçue le jour même où je corrigeais mes dernières épreuves. C'est un grand travail, et j'ai bien regretté de ne l'avoir pas eu sous les yeux, en corrigeant la première et défectueuse édition de mes leçons sur la philosophie écossaise. Les voici moins indignes de vous être offertes. . . . Puisse votre santé être enfin rétablie entièrement et vous permettre de me donner de vos chères nouvelles !

SIR W. HAMILTON TO M. COUSIN.

EDINBURGH, December 16, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR, . . . I have forgotten, I find, to speak of the additions you wished to Jouffroy's list.\* This, with the inquiries about Stewart and Ferguson, was a part of your letter which I could not read. As to my making any additions to that list, from that list I learned the existence of many professors of philosophy of whose being I, and the Scottish public in general, were not aware—names unknown to fame,—men who wrote nothing, or authors unworthy to be read. By the by, you complain of having found me backward in sending you notices of works on philosophy appearing in this country ; but in truth this is no fault of mine, for either there are no books to write about, or they are so poor that I should be sorry to attract your attention to them. As an exception, being a work of merit, I may mention Burton's 'Life of Hume,' lately published. If you have not got it, I shall have much pleasure in sending it to you.

I beg leave to offer my best thanks for the volumes of the new

\* List of Scottish philosophical authors in Jouffroy's 'Traduction des Œuvres de Thomas Reid,' t. i. p. cxxv. *et seq.*

edition of your works. I have read with much interest and admiration your speech in the Chamber of Peers upon the new law in regard to the Council of Instruction. I have as yet been disappointed in getting the numbers of the 'Journal des Savans' containing your articles on what the French are pleased to call the Scottish school of philosophy. I have, however, read again with much gratification what you say of us Scotch in the sheets you kindly sent from the fourth volume of your works. These I have sent as you had addressed them. How much you know of this obscure corner of Europe! The only inaccuracy I noticed was in your spelling of the name *Shaftesbury*, which you write as a German word *Schafesbury*. Such a spelling occurs in no English word.

It would afford me the most sincere pleasure should you realise your intention of visiting Scotland; though I am now, unfortunately, debarred from offering you the services which I should otherwise have been so happy in performing as cicerone, &c., by my great lameness. No public man in France, I am sure, would be more hailed than yourself in this country, for there is no one more generally and more highly admired.

As I have not yet had the gratification of seeing you personally, I have endeavoured to supply that want by a portrait. The one I have is a lithograph of Delpechi after a picture of Maurer. This is a very pleasing print; but if there is any better likeness, you would oblige me greatly by telling me of it. . . . I remain, my dear sir, with the greatest regard, most truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

. . . I should like very much to know what you think of the emendations which I have proposed on Aristotle's text of the *De Memoria*, &c., in Dissertation D\*\*.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

14 *Février* 1847.

. . . De mon côté j'ai reçu votre excellente lettre du 16 Décembre 1846 et un peu auparavant les épreuves de votre édition de Reid, où il ne manque qu'une préface et une fin. Je me suis plongé dans vos notes et vos dissertations, et j'y ai trouvé mille choses dont j'aurais fait mon profit, si je les eusse connues plus tôt. Il est impossible d'accumuler sur un moindre espace plus de connais-



sances exactes et profondes. Je vous relirai quand j'aurai reçu votre ouvrage des mains de Monsieur Mitchell. . . . Soyez persuadé que je désire que vous teniez de moi tous mes écrits, comme un gage de ma profonde estime. . . . Adieu : soignez bien votre santé, écrivez-moi le plus souvent possible, et aimez-moi un peu pour toute l'affection que je vous ai vouée.

M. COUSIN TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

7 Décembre, 1847.

. . . Nous sommes ici dans la plus vive admiration de votre édition de Reid. Exactitude, sagacité, profondeur, tout y est. Aussi nous soupignons après la fin de ce grand travail qui mériterait vos préférences. Le monument que vous élevez à Reid portera à jamais votre nom. Je connais votre prédilection pour la logique. Mais passez-moi la mienne pour la psychologie.

MR NAPIER TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

CASTLE STREET, December 28, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I was truly happy to see the great and important volume of Reid's 'Works,' with your additions, completed, and before the public. The appearance of such a volume, amidst that flood of flimsy literature which seems to threaten the destruction of all grave and manly exercises of the mind, is, indeed, a spectacle most worthy to behold; and I wish, with all my heart, that I could see it hailed as such in the countries which produced Locke and Reid, and some deserved reward bestowed upon so worthy a successor. I wish I had health and strength, and leisure and mind enough, to renew my acquaintance with these idols of my early devotion, and to let the world know how precious is the volume which you have laid before it; but these are vain thoughts, and I hope that some one may be found in all respects qualified for the task, which I can only wish that I were able adequately to perform.—Most sincerely yours,

MACVEY NAPIER.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR G. L. CRAIK.\*

June 1, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have to apologise for my procrastination in answering your letter, for which I will not trouble you with stating

\* Afterwards Professor of the English Language and Literature in Queen's College, Belfast.

any of the excuses I might allege. In reply to your question about the *acute dictum* of Bacon, "*Antiquitas seculi juvenus mundi*," I have never met with the two placed in contrast in any previous author; and of this I am sure, for my attention would have been arrested by it in relation to Bacon. There are numerous sayings in which the present is talked of as the only age of the world.

I am glad to hear that you are about a work on Bacon;—a selection and arrangement of whose happiest thoughts I have long considered a desideratum. I had myself got a couple of waste copies of his works for the purpose of clipping out and placing under common heads his *sententiæ illustriores*, but never carried this purpose into effect. Most of the translations I have seen of the Latin writings are worthy of all abomination—none worse than those in Basil Montagu's edition. I am also delighted to hear what you tell me of Mr Spedding's labours.—Ever most truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

In 1846, appended to the edition of Reid's 'Works,' appeared the prospectus of 'Essay towards a new Analytic of Logical Forms.'\* This Essay was designed to contain the author's new logical doctrines,—especially the theory of the Quantification of the Predicate, with its developments and results. The prospectus contains the principal heads of the essay. It is to be regretted that Sir William did not carry out his promise, and give a complete and systematic view of his proper logical theory. As it is, we have only fragmentary discussions of certain of the heads indicated in the prospectus, and these scattered through his various writings,—the Appendices to the 'Lectures on Logic,' his 'Letter' to Professor De Morgan, and the Appendices to the 'Discussions.'

In September 1846 commenced the correspondence between Professor De Morgan and Sir William on certain points in the theory of the Syllogism, which ultimately led to a serious controversy. The correspondence was interrupted by a tedious inflammatory attack under which Sir William suffered for fully two months in the winter of 1846-47. As soon as his health permitted, he resumed communication with Mr De

\* See Lectures on Logic, vol. ii., Appendix V., p. 249 (1st edition).

Morgan, and the result was that he published 'A Letter to Augustus De Morgan, Esq., on his claim to an independent Rediscovery of a new Principle in the Theory of Syllogism,' in April 1847.

The same prospectus which promised the logical essay also contained the intimation of a work on Luther, entitled 'Contributions towards a true History of Luther and the Lutherans. Part First: Containing Notice of Archdeacon Hare and his Polemic.' In the article on the Right of Dissenters to admission into the English Universities ('Edinburgh Review,' October 1834), Sir William, in discussing the question, —Do religious tests insure religious teachers?—had referred to certain opinions of Luther on points in Speculative and Practical Theology and Biblical Criticism. The reference was relevant enough. Mr Pearson, whose arguments in favour of religious tests he was combating, had regarded the theological novelties and heresies taught in the German Universities as the result of the removal of academic religious tests. Sir William maintained the "alleged licentious speculation to be the natural result of a vigorous and unimpeded Protestantism;" and cited the example of Luther as, "though personally no rationalist, yet affording a warrant to the most audacious of rationalistic assaults." Sir William's reference to Luther and statement of his opinions drew forth from Archdeacon Hare a very elaborate criticism, in his work entitled 'The Mission of the Comforter,' vol. ii., note iv., published in 1846. The note, from the nature of its animadversion and its tone, was not likely to pass without a tolerably sharp retaliatory notice by Sir William. And this it certainly received. At first Sir William appears to have designed, as is manifest from the prospectus already noticed, to go fully into the whole subject of Luther and his opinions; and from 1847, for some years, he resumed his Lutheran studies, which had long had an interest for him, and devoted a great deal of his time to the subject. As usual, however, with him, in formally attempting a systematic work, the subject widened out before him so greatly, and his re-

search became so extended, that it was not brought to an end. He has left a large mass of papers on the subject of Luther and his opinions, carefully arranged under different heads,—the fruit of long and elaborate research. These we shall notice in the sequel.

His reply to Archdeacon Hare's attack was given in notes to the first and second editions of the 'Discussions' (1852-53).<sup>\*</sup> The second edition of the 'Discussions' also contains a notice of an article in the 'British and Foreign Evangelical Review,' June 1853, with the *ad captandum* title of 'Sir W. Hamilton's *Attack* on the Apocalypse;' the fact being that the question related not to Sir William's opinion of the book, but to the correctness of his representation of the opinions regarding it of others, such as Calvin.

Now and then a letter from a former student reached Sir William, showing an affectionate interest in him. The following is from his pupil and friend, Mr (now Dr) Cairns of Berwick:—

BERWICK, Nov. 16, 1848.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I herewith enclose the statement respecting the Calabar Mission of our Church, which I take blame to myself for having so long delayed to send. My avocations are very numerous, and a habit of procrastination, where anything is to be written, has sadly grown on me with time.

I cannot even send you this brief note without testifying, what I could not so well utter in your presence, my unabated admiration of your philosophical genius and learning, and my profoundly grateful sense of the important benefits received by me both from your instructions and private friendship. I am more indebted to you for the foundation of my intellectual habits and tastes than to any other person, and shall bear, by the will of the Almighty, the impress of your hand through any future stage of existence. It is a relief to my own feelings to speak in this manner, and you will forgive one of the most favoured of your pupils if he seeks another kind of relief—a relief which he has long sought an opportunity to obtain—the expression of a wish that his honoured master were one with himself in the exercise of the convictions, and the enjoyment of the

<sup>\*</sup> P. 524.

comforts, of living Christianity, or as far before himself as he is in all other particulars. This is a wish, a prayer, a fervent desire often expressed to the Almighty Former and Guide of the spirits of men, mingled with the hope that, if not already, at least some time, this accordance of faith will be attained, this living union realised with the great Teacher, Sacrifice, and Restorer of our fallen race. You will pardon this manifestation of the gratitude and affection of your pupil and friend, who, if he knew a higher, would gladly give it as the payment of a debt too great to be expressed. I have long ago been taught to feel the vanity of the world in all its forms—to renounce the hope of intellectual distinction, and to exalt love above knowledge. Philosophy has been to me much ; but it can never be all, never the most ; and I have found, and know that I have found, the true good in another quarter. This is mysticism—the mysticism of the Bible—the mysticism of conscious reconciliation and intimacy with the living persons of the Godhead—a mysticism which is not like that of philosophy, an irregular and incommunicable intuition, but open to all, wise and unwise, who take the highway of humility and prayer. If I were not truly and profoundly happy in my faith—the faith of the universal Church—I would not speak of it. The greatest increase which it admits of is its sympathetic kindling in the breasts of others, not least of those who know by experience the pain of speculation, the truth that he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. I know you will indulge these expressions to one more in earnest than in former years, more philanthropic, more confident that he knows in whom he has believed, more impressed with the duty of bearing everywhere a testimony to the convictions which have given him a positive hold at once of truth and happiness.

But I check myself in this unwonted strain, which only your long-continued and singular kindness could have emboldened me to attempt : and with the utterance of the most fervent wishes for your health, academical success, and inward light and peace, I remain your obliged friend and grateful pupil,

JOHN CAIRNS.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR CAIRNS.

*Dec. 4, 1848.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I reproach myself for not having sooner thanked you for the very interesting account of the mission in Calabar, and

for your accompanying letter. Mr Waddell's statement was read here by old and young, and by all with almost equal interest. It seems to me a good model for such accounts, and Mr Waddell himself to be admirably fitted for the great service to which he has so zealously devoted himself. Africa is surely the field in which missionary enterprise has been as yet most successful; and no people stand more in need of the change which Christianity and gospel truth so blessedly determine.

I feel deeply obliged to you for the kindness of your letter, and trust that I shall not prove wholly unworthy of the interest you take in me. There is indeed no one with whom I am acquainted whose sentiments on such matters I esteem more highly, for there is no one who I am sure is more earnest for the truth, and no one who pursues it with more independence, and at the same time with greater confidence in the promised aid of God. May this promised aid be vouchsafed to me!

Your brother stood up on last examination-day for the first time. If I had looked a moment, far less heard him speak, I would at once have recognised him. There is a strong family likeness; and I could not wish him better than to resemble you in the zeal and ability with which he pursues his studies. I hope in a day or two to become personally acquainted with him. I hope soon to see you in town, and remember that you promised to take a quiet dinner with us when you came in.—Believe me, my dear sir, ever truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

The following are letters to Mr Cairns of a somewhat later date, which explain themselves.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR CAIRNS.

*Feb. 2, 1850.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I return you my best thanks for your article on Julius Müller's philosophical theology, who is for me quite a new hero, for I have read little or nothing in German divinity for some years. Your essay, which I perused with great interest, both on your personal account and for the importance of the subject, struck me not only for the ability and learning which it exhibits, but for the wisdom and charity and unsectarian spirit which pervade it. I trust that this is only the commencement of your contributions on such subjects, for I am sorry that in the criticisms on German the-

ology that have fallen in my way in the journals of this country the writers have usually shown rather their own ignorance and bigotry than the one-sided views of those whom they set themselves to combat. *Macte animi*. Believe me that as much is expected from you by all your friends, no one will be more rejoiced as you gradually fulfil these expectations than myself.—I remain, my dear sir, ever truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR CAIRNS.

April 15, 1851.

MY DEAR SIR,—I must needs beg for your kind indulgence in having been so long in returning you my thanks for the Memoir of Mr Clark. I read it, you may be sure, with the greatest interest, and I need hardly say that it is equally honourable to your heart and head. I was certainly not prepared for the opposition he encountered from a part of his congregation; for there are few of whom I would so confidently have anticipated more than harmony between flock and pastor. Indeed, I would have expected that Mr Clark, from his talents, his zeal, and his amiable dispositions, would have been an especial favourite with all his congregation; and his example is indeed to me a confirmation of Seneca's doctrine—*argumentum pessimi turba*.

I have read likewise your very able article in the 'North British Review' on Ethics and Christianity. I feel much gratified by your expressions in regard to myself both in that article and in the Memoir, and not the less that I must attribute them far more to the personal partiality of an old pupil and friend than to any desert of my own. Your review of ethical systems interested me very much, more especially the accounts you give of the more recent theories, of which I was wholly ignorant. The foundation of ethics, connected as it is with moral freedom, has always appeared to me the most difficult, as the most important, problem in philosophy; and I confess that I see not how the discrepancies of opinion on this point could be avoided by merging philosophical ethics in Christian theology. The problems, I still conceive, ought to be treated separately; the first asking, What do we know of the moral nature of man apart from all positive revelation? the second asking, What do we learn of the moral nature of man from the Christian dispensation? But waiving this, would there not

be as much controversy in regard to morality and accountability if ethics were taught only as a Christian doctrine, as there is when they are taught apart from revelation? For some theologians would hold that man can do something for himself, whilst others would maintain that he can do nothing,—in the words of Dr Chalmers, that God worketh all in all (the words of St Paul touching *supernatural* gifts), and that man has no more freedom of operation than the particle of flying dust or the drop of running water.—Believe me, my dear sir, ever truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

Sir William's curious out-of-the-way reading comes out in the following:—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO PROFESSOR CRAIK.

EDINBURGH, Dec. 22, 1851.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have been time out of mind reproaching myself for not having thanked you in my own and Lady Hamilton's name for all the volumes of your 'Romance of the Peerage,' which were read as they arrived with the greatest interest. And now I have also to acknowledge the receipt of your admirable little book on the English language. By the by, if you are at all curious about the matter, there is a very characteristic account of the duel between Stuart and Wharton by a foreign contemporary, the famous Jesuit Latin poet Baldi. It is principally in the form of an inscription, and is of course full of points and antitheses. One of these I recollect is very good, it being said that, in this case,

"The point of honour drew the line of death."

. . .—Ever truly yours,

W. HAMILTON.

The patience and cheerfulness which Sir William exhibited during these last twelve years of his life struck every one who came into contact with him. "Latterly," says his daughter, "he was much more subject to depression of spirit; he dreaded the failure of his mental powers, and this thought of course was inconceivably bitter to him. The reality, thank God, was spared him. With all the infirmity of his body



never was there any cloud over his great mind. It seemed indeed to be in its very height of vigour and acuteness during the nine years that followed his paralytic seizure. . . . Perhaps during the last two or three years of his life there was less power of working his brain, mental exertion was more of a toil, but that, with sometimes a suspicion of a little failure of memory, was all; and I suppose it was inevitable along with the decline of physical tone which we observed in him from the end of 1853. During the years that he suffered from the effects of paralysis, the excellence of his general health was remarkable, and testified to the original strength and soundness of his constitution. He hardly ever had a headache or a trifling ailment."

His comparative helplessness was to draw forth and be alleviated by the most devoted love and care which it was in the nature of a woman and wife to bestow. Lady Hamilton had all along been peculiarly helpful to her husband in his work and life. Of this we have had glimpses in the course of the Memoir. She had been much to him before; now that he was so struck down by illness, she became well-nigh all to him. "She made it the business of her life to wait upon and tend him, and by every means in her power to promote his comfort and ease. He now more than ever required the assistance of her pen, and for some years she almost alone wrote to his dictation. Except to consult and acquaint him with everything that went on, she never let him be troubled with matters that her sound sense and general faculty for business enabled her to manage instead of him. In all things he had in her a wise and reliable counsellor, and he knew it. Nor was it only what she did for him. She was so cheerful and buoyant of spirit that her presence was a brightening, quickening influence. When he was depressed or put out and annoyed, she often did him good with a little playfulness. She understood his nervous irritability, and never minded it. More and more as years went on, and his strength declined, and illness again

attacked him, did he lean upon her and seek to have her constantly beside him, and with ever-increasing care and assiduity did she to the last moment fulfil her life's labour of love,—to smooth and cheer and remove all outward hindrances from the path of her husband ; feeling, when she could no longer do this, that her occupation was gone. She had the only reward for which she cared, in the one life which she and her husband in their several spheres lived, in the perfect confidence which he reposed in her, in the depth of his affection and appreciation. Those who knew them both will not be slow to believe that without her he would never have done what he did."

From the date of his illness Sir William's life was necessarily one of retirement, spent entirely at home. There is thus in this latter period nothing beyond two or three simple facts that are patent to an outside observer. Yet these were among the most fruitful and laborious years of his life, and witnessed the publication of all the independent works which bear his name. The materials, accordingly, of most use for their history, are those which can lift the curtain from his home-life, and show how under bodily infirmity he still carried on unceasingly the pursuits to which his life was devoted, and what he was when withdrawn from personal intercourse with the world. For the following interesting picture of Sir William's ordinary life at this period, and notice of his reading for relaxation, and his relation to his children, we are indebted to his daughter. The description of the day's routine here given may be regarded as applicable to the entire period after his illness. It should be kept in mind that the college session extended over the winter half-year, and that he was free from college duties during the six months of summer.

"When my father went to the college, he came down just in time to let him be up there by one o'clock, latterly a little before it, so as to be in the retiring-room before the students assembled. In vacation-time he was often later of rising.

He had always been in the habit of rising late, as might have been expected from his hour of going to bed.

"In summer, from the time when he came down-stairs till near dinner-time, the day was in general devoted to study and writing, subject to the interruption of a short walk, or a drive, or of visitors. He sat in a parlour on the ground-floor, in which, though it did not contain the bulk of his library, he had about him the books which he habitually used. A number of these he kept quite at hand in a large desk of his own contrivance which stood by his sofa. Although in this apartment all his study was carried on, it was also the one most used by the family—his power of concentration on his work being so great, that he ordinarily felt no distraction from what went on around him. Here also he received such visitors as came specially to see him. Having established himself on the sofa, a desk was placed before him, and with pencil and paper, and books laid all around within easy distance on desk and chairs and floor, he began his work. Of course he had constant need of assistance, and every now and then some one would be summoned to hand him something, or to go for a book, or to write to his dictation. He pretty often had letters to write. He dictated rather slowly, often repeating the clause, but fluently—sometimes, however, altering expressions on the way, and having read over to him what he had written. He had a way which amused us of very often spelling words, without trusting to the knowledge of his amanuensis. My father's manner of composition was, I think, to make with his own hand a rough pencil jotting of his ideas, and then to dictate an amplified and accurate expression of them, in which again he would frequently make alterations. His power of abstraction was very great; sometimes he would become so absorbed in the subject he was thinking of that we had to speak to him over and over again before we could make him hear.

"Often, on his way down-stairs for the day, he would go into one of the upper rooms and see some books taken out which he wished to use that day, a glance at the book-

shelves perhaps suggesting others which he had not previously thought of. Sometimes also, in the course of the afternoon, he would make a journey up-stairs for a similar purpose. But most frequently when a book was wanted he would call one of us into the parlour, and there give us directions where to find it. He never had a catalogue; yet from his excellent memory, and the order in which his library was kept, there was hardly a volume about which he could not tell the shelf where it lay, and the other books near it, or give such directions that, unless from stupidity, we could soon find it.

"After dinner he returned to his sofa. Sometimes he did a little work then, at other times he at once composed himself to sleep, with some one reading aloud to him. I don't think he almost ever passed an evening without a nap, though it varied in length; indeed, his late hour of going to bed made this refreshment necessary. After tea he was quite brisk, and when we were alone resumed serious occupations, with which he generally went on till far on in the morning. Even in bed I fancy he sometimes read.

"My father had others to read to him solely for relaxation; he always read himself books which he used in the way of study or reference. This was indeed almost a necessity, as the latter were mostly in dead or foreign languages. Latterly when newspapers came to be daily, and when, during the Crimean campaign, they were of an absorbing interest, they supplied the staple of his reading for relaxation; and he would generally have them read pretty much straight through. I don't think he was much in the way of speaking on political questions, at least in the family. He was always more or less in the habit of indulging in light literature as a recreation, and many is the novel, story, and book of travel which we have read to him. The *Waverley* Novels, Dickens's and Thackeray's serials in their monthly parts, Charlotte Brontë's '*Jane Eyre*' and '*Shirley*,' '*Sintram*,'

‘Caleb Williams’ (which I think was a favourite with him), ‘Mary Barton,’ ‘Cranford,’ ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin,’ ‘The House of the Seven Gables,’ ‘Hypatia,’ Curzon’s ‘Monasteries of the Levant,’ Laing’s ‘Norway,’ and very many other books of fiction and description, are recalled to my mind in thinking of those days. Review articles, too, were frequently read. The kind of books which my father enjoyed for relaxation brings out a feature of his mind in which his simplicity and freshness of nature strikingly showed itself. This was his love for works of the imaginative type in fiction—the more strongly tinged with the fantastic, or weird, or horrible, the better he liked them. Mrs Radcliffe’s stories, for instance, he used laughingly to confess, he had enjoyed. ‘Frankenstein’ he had liked. ‘The Ancient Mariner’ was a favourite with him. On the other hand, he had not patience for the ordinary society or domestic novel, unless there was in it much of intellect, or pathos, or wit. ‘Causes Célèbres,’ I believe, were favourite reading with him. None of us children were fonder of fairy tales than he was. He would now and then order them for us, and then he took a reading of them himself. I remember a parcel arriving, among which was a translation of Tieck’s ‘Phantasmus’ (which was read to him), and also of the ‘Shadowless Man,’ of which he had a lively recollection, and which he now listened to again with pleasure. Then I remember a volume of German legends and fairy tales which we had in the country the last summer of his life. We thought it a very indifferent collection, yet my father had a number of the stories read aloud—chiefly I think because, not being well then, he was glad to be soothed to sleep by the sound of something which made no demand on his attention; still the choice was characteristic. He was easily moved by anything pathetic, and latterly could not help showing it outwardly. And how he did enjoy humour! He would be quite overcome with laughter; nor was it difficult to make him laugh. He readily saw the comic side of things, while not himself possessing

much power of making humour, though here and there in his writings I think there are real gleams of it brightening the general gravity of the style.

"When any one was reading to him, he would, in general, every now and then, make some remark to give a piece of information which the book suggested, or to explain a word or passage. Often, too, he would make corrections in pronunciation, which, as some of his readers were juvenile, was very often necessary. It was marvellous how he had something to tell about every sort of subject—his stores of knowledge being not only vast, but so well ordered as to be always available. And he gave forth from them so kindly, so ungrudgingly, perhaps with even more liberality when it was spontaneous, though he was always ready to answer kindly his children's questions. And I am sure no one ever made his children feel more that they could go to him freely, or let them be on a simpler, more familiar footing with him. He might be to others a great and learned man—to us he was but our dear affectionate father, whose position and fame in the world we only understood so far as to make us proud of him, and value the more his kindness to us. There was in him a tenderness which enhanced his even slight words and acts of affection; they went from the heart to the heart, and drew those around wonderfully to him. People who stayed in the house were always fond of my father, and felt him to be very kind. Even those who had begun by being shy and afraid of him soon became quite at their ease. For almost all young people he had an attraction—he himself was fond of children. His consideration for animals was remarkable; and nothing made him more angry than ill-treatment of them: in driving, for instance, he was always very careful of horses. He had always been fond of dogs."

His sense of humour and perception of the grotesque—appropriately referred to in a notice of his domestic life—was certainly a very remarkable feature in his character. The contrast which this trait offered to the general solidity, almost sol-

emnity of his character, probably heightened the effect. But there it was, strongly marked and continually cropping out. Strange to say, in the manuscripts of some of his most abstract writings, such as the articles on Cousin, Brown, and Whately, we find that every now and then the writer had apparently relieved the pressure of his thoughts, and indulged an unsuspected side of his nature, by rapidly dashing off on the manifold corrected page a grotesque face, which had suddenly risen on his fancy,—much as the architects of our great cathedrals have flanked the grand creation by the grinning ape and the distorted countenances of the animal and human grotesque. His reading, too, had supplied him with some rich bits of bathos, which he was fond of repeating with intense enjoyment of their absurdity.

In the class-room his sense of the ludicrous not unfrequently threatened to compromise professorial dignity. The fine face would occasionally be observed striving hard to restrain the internal emotion from overcoming the expected decorum of the chair,—not always with success. And if the sense of the ludicrous proved too powerful, the fit of laughter was for a time absolutely uncontrollable.

Among those friends who, at this period, were on intimate terms with the family in Great King Street, was Mr Thomas Spencer Baynes, the present Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of St Andrews. Mr Baynes, who was then attending College at Edinburgh, and had attracted Sir William's notice by his abilities and zeal in logical research, would frequently drop in of an evening at Sir William's house, where he ever was a welcome visitor. He has fortunately kept notes of some of his interviews with Sir William, when the latter would pour out the stores of his reading in kindly and easy talk. The beginning of Mr Baynes's intimacy with Sir William, to which reference is made in the notes, is very characteristic, and is an example of the kindness and courtesy which he displayed to his students. These notes may be taken as faithful indications of Sir William's manner of inter-

course and conversation at this period with his more familiar friends, who at the same time had an interest in the studies he pursued.

"One of the first evenings I ever spent with Sir William Hamilton was in the early weeks of Session 1846-7. Sir William was accustomed to prescribe annually some standard work in philosophy to be read by candidates for honours in connection with the work of the class, and that year the 'De Anima' of Aristotle had been selected for this purpose. Soon after the commencement of the session, Sir William having intimated to the class that he would be glad to see any students who were reading the book, and answer any question they might wish to ask, I went to his room at the close of the lecture hour, mainly to inquire what edition he recommended for critical study. He mentioned Trendelenburg's as the best, adding, that of the older commentaries on the 'De Anima,' that of Philoponus was of the greatest interest and value. It would be of great service in helping to clear up the obscurities of the text; and he promised, if I would call in the evening, to lend me an excellent Latin version of the Commentary to keep at hand for reference while reading the book. On calling according to my appointment, Sir William entered almost at once into an interesting conversation about the 'De Anima' and its author, giving a number of particulars which so impressed themselves on my memory that I can even now distinctly recall them. He spoke of the 'De Anima' as the earliest purely psychological work we possess, the first systematic attempt at the inductive study of the mind, and one which, curiously enough, had only in recent times been followed up with anything like success: that a number of treatises formed on the same model had been produced by the Arabians, the Schoolmen, and their successors, which, though in many instances marked by acute and original observation, did not carry the investigation of mental phenomena much beyond the point that Aristotle had reached. He then referred to the influence of Aristotle generally, as being of a wider and more



permanent kind than that of any single thinker. While his direct and acknowledged influence was apparent enough in the earlier periods of revived philosophical activity, the indirect but powerful effect of his writings might be discovered even in modern times, and that too in quarters where it would be least expected. Hobbes, for example, is justly regarded as the type of a shrewd, original, and intrepid thinker, acknowledging no authority in philosophy, and hardly referring to any of his predecessors except in the way of disparagement. But it is clear from his writings that he not only diligently studied Aristotle, but was largely indebted to the Stagirite for hints and illustrations, which he turned to good account in his philosophical writings, especially in his *Psychology*, which is usually regarded as peculiarly his own. How carefully he had studied Aristotle, his 'Brief of the Art of Rhetoric,' containing in substance all that Aristotle had written in his three books on that subject, sufficiently attests. The early thinkers of the Scottish School, again, were more remarkable for their homely sagacity and independence of thought than for scholarship or learning of any kind. Several of them were, however, well acquainted with Aristotle's writings. This was true of Alexander Gerard, Professor of Logic in Aberdeen, and author of two Essays, one on 'Taste,' the other on 'Genius,' published about the middle of the last century; not to mention Ferguson the historian, and Gillies, whose acquaintance with Aristotle was of a loose and uncritical kind. It was true also of Hutcheson. And that the practice of reading Aristotle was partially kept up among Hutcheson's successors was seen in Adam Smith's Essays, and even in Reid's very imperfect 'Account of Aristotle's Logic.' But the Scottish writer of the last century most profoundly versed in the Peripatetic philosophy was the curious and eccentric author of 'Ancient Metaphysics,' Lord Monboddo, who, in his devotion to the ancient 'science of universals,' and admiration of the Peripatetic principles of nature, stoutly opposed the results of modern research, and in particular Sir Isaac Newton and his discoveries.

In relation to Lord Monboddo, Sir William went on to add, that the first volume of his 'Ancient Metaphysics' abounded in references to the 'De Anima,' and might usefully be referred to in reading the book; that his discussion of difficult points was always acute, and his exposition of Aristotle's meaning generally accurate, though he had fallen into some mistakes, especially in illustrating the four kinds or categories of motion. With regard, for instance, to the mental change involved in the acquisition of knowledge, and the growth of habits, good or bad, he not only mistakes Aristotle's text, but contradicts the explicit statements of his chief commentator, Philoponus. Lord Monboddo was one of the few moderns, however, who had carefully studied not only Aristotle but his Greek commentators, whose writings, though abounding in interesting matter, in original discussions, and acute criticism, had in recent times fallen into unmerited neglect,—Harris, the author of 'Hermes,' being perhaps the only other modern writer who showed any minute or critical acquaintance with the Greek commentators of the Peripatetic school. Recurring to Philoponus, Sir William highly praised his interpretation of the 'De Anima' as luminous and acute, referring especially to the introduction as discussing and deciding some curious points left obscure or doubtful in the text; in particular, the question as to the threefold division of the vital principle not simply into distinct functions, but into separate entities or souls. While Aristotle constantly speaks of the vegetable, animal, and rational soul, he leaves it doubtful whether he regarded them as substantially distinct or as various energies of the same simple principle. Philoponus, however, decides in favour of three separate souls, adducing in support of this view cases in which the hair and nails have continued to grow after death,—the vegetable soul thus remaining present and operative after the animal and rational souls had fled.

"After a conversation of more than an hour I bore away the coveted version of Philoponus, a thin folio in limp vellum,

which I found copiously underlined with blue and red inks. On a subsequent evening, when I called by invitation to consult some other volumes, the conversation turned on the practice of underscoring books of study. Sir William spoke highly of the practice, as attended with many advantages, especially in the saving of time and labour. Intelligent underlining gave a kind of abstract of an important work, and by the use of different coloured inks to mark a difference of contents, and discriminate the doctrinal from the historical or illustrative elements of an argument or exposition, the abstract became an analysis very serviceable for ready reference. He mentioned that this principle had been carried to a ludicrous extreme in the publication of a coloured New Testament by an Anglicised German, Wirgmann by name, the author of some articles on philosophy in the 'Encyclopædia Londinensis.' In this book, entitled 'Divarication of the New Testament into Doctrine and History,' the pages were all coloured, most of them parti-coloured, the doctrine being throughout visually separated from the history by this device; the doctrine being, if I remember rightly, blue, and the history red. The author expressed his belief that all the sects of Christendom had arisen from a confusion of these elements, and that his grand discovery in the 'Divarication' would annihilate sects, establish pure Christianity as a sacred science, and become hereafter a Euclid in Theology. Wirgmann, Sir William added, had also published a 'Grammar of Mental Philosophy,' illustrated with coloured diagrams, designed to represent to the eye the categories and distinctions of the Kantian philosophy. The author was evidently a simple-minded enthusiast, with a touch of fanaticism in his nature; but if I remember rightly, Sir William spoke of some of his papers on the Kantian philosophy with praise, as giving in some respects a better outline of Kant's system than had appeared in English at the time of their publication.

"The memoranda of conversations now referred to I extract from my note-book, with only such slight alterations of

expression as may be necessary to render the more condensed jottings intelligible.

"*Friday evening, June 1848* (early in June, probably the first week).—Went to Sir William Hamilton's about eight o'clock, and found him busy re-covering with blue leather an old quarto copy of Buchanan's Poems, Lady Hamilton helping, evidently in a most efficient manner. Sir William, referring to Buchanan's Poems, said they were perhaps the very best to be found in the whole circle of modern Latin poetry. They had been widely and systematically plagiarised by later writers, especially the Epigrams, in which he was often peculiarly happy. One of the most celebrated poems, that on the Calends of May, rose quite out of the region of poetical commonplace, and had passages of the rarest beauty and sublimity. A part of the poem was, however, borrowed, at least in idea, from Joannes Secundus. Referring to the different editions, he said that Ruddiman's was the most complete, though still defective in not having some of the best readings; that the Basel was also good, but that in all the editions there were numerous mistakes of words and letters, especially in the interchange of *u* and *n*, as *levis* for *lenis*, and the like. Sir William then spoke of Buchanan's intimate friend, the poet Ronsard, who had imitated in French verse some of Buchanan's best poems; and also of his friend and colleague Muretus, who, from the same college in which they had taught together at Paris, went to Italy to become the defender of the Massacre of St Bartholomew, while Buchanan came to Scotland to take a leading part in the northern Reformation, and become ultimately a violent Presbyterian.

"From Buchanan the conversation turned to Scottish scholars and men of genius who had gained a reputation abroad, and amongst others the 'Admirable Crichton' was mentioned. Sir William said that although he had been a good deal depreciated by some writers in modern times, he was in fact a most accomplished gentleman and scholar, and in the rare union at an early age of physical and intellectual dexter-

ties of almost every kind and in the highest degree of perfection, with wide and solid attainments in literature and philosophy, might fairly be regarded as a great wonder—as ‘admirable’ in the old and etymological sense. That ample testimony to his varied powers had been given by an eyewitness of his performances (I think an Italian poet-laureate), and also by a Scottish contemporary [Johnston ?].

“In connection with Latin poetry, elegiac and epigrammatic, Sir William spoke in very high terms of the epigrams of the Welsh scholar Owen, who lived in the reign of James I., and whose works seem to have been published in all the countries of Europe. He remarked that the Latin poems of Englishmen were for the most part far from good; that Addison’s were decent, those of Crashaw, the Catholic poet, and of Vincent Bourne, decidedly good, but that perhaps Milton’s were the best of all.

“A lady came to tea [Miss Mitchell], whose father was for many years consul at Hamburg, and who had a brother in the army, author of some works, amongst others, a ‘Life of Wallenstein,’ ‘The Fall of Napoleon,’ etc. The eldest sister, Sir William said, was remarkably accomplished, and talked French and Italian with the accent and fluency of a native, while all the family talked German and Danish, the latter at home amongst themselves.

“Some discussion arose as to hydropathy and the general value of the water-cure. Sir William thinks highly of its usefulness in cases of chronic rheumatism, gout, and kindred affections, and generally that in moderation it is good as a tonic to the system. From hydropathy and other medical heresies he referred to the Medical Faculty in general as strongly marked by the spirit of caste, the majority of the adult members being almost inaccessible to new ideas. He said that on the whole we perhaps derive more harm than good from the Faculty, fewer people dying of sickness probably where there are no doctors than where they abound. He quoted on this head the maxim or rule laid down by Hoffman,

'Fuge medicos et eorum medicamenta, si vis esse salvus,' adding, that medicine had made no advance in modern times, its most recent theories being simply a return to the doctrines of Hippocrates. Surgery, on the other hand, was a most important branch of the curative art, and had rapidly advanced in our own day. Sir William mentioned a curious fact in regard to himself, that he can take laudanum in almost any amount without being sensibly affected at all. He had on one occasion taken 500 drops, but this enormous dose had produced no effect in any way; other narcotics, again, such as snuff and tobacco, have a powerful effect.

"The other evening's conversation, of which I find some record in the same note-book, occurred nearly a year later, and is fully dated.

"*Thursday evening, April 12, 1849.*—Went to Sir William Hamilton's and found him asleep on the sofa, Lady Hamilton working, and their little girl reading by the fire. He was soon awake, however, and began talking of Trendelenburg, one of whose works I had recently been reading. Sir William spoke of him as an acute man, well versed in the history of philosophy, and comparatively orthodox in his philosophical views. He writes a good deal against Hegel, especially in his work on Logic, but amidst the widespread influence of Hegelianism is little listened to—is in fact almost like St John, 'the voice of one crying in the wilderness.' He is in the same university with Beneke, who, unlike the Germans in general, is a thorough sensualist in philosophy, and stands almost alone. Beneke writes to Sir William, however, to the effect that he has no misgivings, and is a thorough-going believer in his own system.

"Showed Sir William, Franck's '*Esquisse d'une Histoire de la Logique*,' recently published, which he had not yet seen. Observing in the work a notice of Carpentarius (Carpentier), Sir William said that he wrote fiercely and at great length against Ramus, rarely, however, mentioning his name, but designating him by some assumed or descriptive name or

epithet. In his persistent polemic against his opponent and rival, Carpentarius went into such a number of biographical details that a good account of Ramus might be obtained from Carpentarius's controversial writings. He was, however, so bitterly opposed to Ramus, that he is said to have hired assassins to murder him on the night of St Bartholomew. Ramus was a good subject for a biography, still open, as his life, though often attempted, had never been well written. There was a good deal of incident, and something of adventure, in his history. He boldly opposes Aristotle, and rouses the Aristotelians to a pitch of the highest excitement; travels in Germany, Italy, and other countries; and tries to effect reforms in the current systems of education. He is a theologian, moreover, and church reformer, holding, with Morelli [Jean Morel], that the people ought to possess the power of the keys, and is blamed by the Calvinists for supporting such a doctrine. Ramus, Valla, and Vives were free-thinkers in logic and philosophy, who did good service in stimulating a spirit of enquiry, and provoking a reaction against the dominant influence of traditionary systems. Vives was perhaps on the whole the best, but he would be considered now a very good Aristotelian. Beza was strongly prejudiced against Ramus, and there seems to be even a touch of personal spite in his references to him. He speaks somewhere of 'that beast Ramus.' Beza also writes in offensive terms against Buchanan and Goveanus.\* Referring to Govea, Sir William said that he had translated Porphyry's Introduction into beautiful Latin, but that the translation was extremely scarce, not being included in the collected edition of Govea's works.

\* \* Govea, Anthony, must be the brother here referred to, not Andrew, who was Buchanan's intimate friend and colleague in the College of Guienne at Bourdeaux, and who induced him to accompany him to Coimbra as Professor in the College which John III. had just established there. Andrew died the year after his settlement at Coimbra; but his younger brother Anthony also taught at Bourdeaux, and was no doubt well acquainted with Buchanan. He was a distinguished scholar and man of letters, and had probably excited Beza's wrath by replying with spirit to the charges of heterodoxy which Calvin had urged against him.

"Buchanan suggested some reference to Scottish professors abroad, and, amongst others, Mark Duncan was mentioned, and one professor, if not more, at Geneva, whose name or names escaped. From these references Sir William went on to speak of the great intercourse formerly kept up between France and the Continent generally and Scotland; that for a long time it was the custom for students intended for the Scottish Church to finish their education at some foreign university. Latterly they had gone very much to Holland, until studying abroad was forbidden by the General Assembly, and, in consequence of this prohibition, learning had very much declined in the Church. He then asked how the English Congregationalists do with regard to the education of their ministers; in what way, since they are unjustly excluded from the national universities, the standard of clerical attainment is kept up amongst them. The best means, he said, of keeping up a good standard was to have accredited examiners, who should test the attainments and qualifications of candidates for the ministry by a fair and impartial examination. The existing machinery for this purpose in the national churches north and south of the Tweed was practically almost worthless,—the Presbytery examinations being inept, and the Bishops' examinations in the Church of England no better. Returning to the English dissenters, Sir William said that in modern times the Baptists had been the first to send out missionaries, and that many of them, such as Carey and Ward in India, were able men, who, apart from their directly religious labours, had done good service in preparing the way for a better understanding between the English governing class and the natives. He went on to add that missionary societies should be more united, that the various Churches and denominations should, in their missionary efforts, combine to teach the rudiments of Christianity, which do not involve doctrinal differences,—inculcating common truths without insisting on their distinctive symbols. In recent times Dr Winslow had remarked that the main thing for missionary



societies to do was to translate and circulate the Scriptures and religious tracts; but this was a mistake, for though the people would take them readily enough, they often regarded them as mere waste paper, without attempting to read or understand them. Missionaries were necessary, and in modern times perhaps some of the German missionaries were amongst the best. Swartz, for example, was a man of singularly high character and devoted life, and Sir William said he had heard him spoken of in terms of the highest praise by persons from India who had known him intimately. The early Jesuit missionaries, again, went to the other extreme, and became too much all things to all men, adopting the habits, manners, and to a certain extent even the religious usages of the natives amongst whom they laboured. It was a poor religion they taught, but they excused or justified themselves by saying that it was necessary first to teach a rude form of Christianity and then the more perfect.

"Henry Martyn the missionary was then referred to. Sir William said he was a fine noble character, but that in his 'Persian Controversies' he had fallen into strange mistakes. His Persian opponents argue well, and are in relation to Mahomedanism very much what the Hegelians are to Christianity. They ingeniously divide miracles into three kinds—magical, medical, and rhetorical; the magical, those of Moses at Pharaoh's court, the medical, those of Christ, and the rhetorical, those of Mahomet in the production of the Koran, which is itself a standing miracle, so beautifully eloquent and perfect in style throughout, that it must be divine. Martyn in his reply says that magic was unknown in the time of Moses, while in fact the Pentateuch abounds in references to it, which show that it must have been quite common. He says further, that medicine was not practised in Judæa in the time of Christ, and was indeed virtually unknown. This was a most incredibly ignorant statement, as the Gospels abound with references to medicine and physicians. The woman with the issue of blood, for example, who had spent her substance on

the doctors without any good result, 'had suffered many things of many physicians, and was nothing bettered, but rather grew worse'—a satire on the Faculty of medicine as true now as it was then. The whole controversy between Henry Martyn and his Persian opponents was very interesting, and had been well translated by Professor Lee. The Asiatics are peculiar in their philosophy, and their religion is directly connected with their philosophy. They are Absolutists, Hegelians; the main sources of information respecting their speculations are Colebrooke, Saisset, Tholuck, and the rising French school of Oriental scholars who are studying in the original the great movements of Eastern thought. Curiously enough there is a complete Oriental system of logic, and the Indian syllogism has the peculiarity of beginning with the *quæsitum* or question, after which come the conclusion and then the premises in order.

"The conversation then turned on forgotten scholars, and books of life and interest no longer read or even remembered. Sir William mentioned as an example the *Epistles of Clenardus* [Nicholas Clenard or Cleynærts]. They are full of lively description and incident, and many of the stories and adventures he relates are quite as good as things in *Gil Blas*. He was for some years in Spain as Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Salamanca; and in his letters, which were not written for publication, referring to the poverty and wretchedness of the country, he says, 'Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed.' In another letter he gives an account of a grand Spanish barber, whose man lathered the customers, while he himself, as a superior artist, condescended to shave them. Clenardus went from Spain to the coast of Africa as a teacher and missionary, and died there.\* It would be well worth while to translate the *Epistles*,

\* He went mainly for the purpose of acquiring a mastery of Arabic, in which language he intended to write a refutation of the Koran, to be circulated amongst the Mohammedans with a view to their conversion. He died on his way back to Spain.

and give some account of the author. This led to a general reference to men of thought and action, whose lives afford interesting materials for a biography. Sir William mentioned Lord Herbert of Cherbury and Ulrich von Hutten as examples. They were men of keen intellect, high courage, and chivalrous character—cavaliers and philosophers—whose lives combine literary and philosophical interest with a good deal of action and adventure. Hutten, though a little man, fought like a game-cock,—on one occasion defending his life against three [five?] Frenchmen well armed, and defeating them. Other good subjects for biographies were Erasmus, the Scaligers, Barclay the author of ‘Argenis,’ Mark Duncan and his son, and Sir K. Digby.”

Sir William's eldest son, having obtained an appointment in the Indian army, sailed for India in February 1849. From that period the letters to him from home form a domestic chronicle, from which interesting glimpses of Sir William in his daily life and habits may be obtained. From these, and letters to other members of the family, selections will now and again be made, with a view to illustrate his character as it appeared in his family, the tenor of his life during his latter years, and his idiosyncrasies in reading and working.

During 1848, 1849, and 1850 he was busy with Logic, Luther, and the points of controversy between himself and Archdeacon Hare. The following extracts give us a glimpse of his manner of working:—

LADY HAMILTON TO WILLIAM HAMILTON.

*22d August 1848.*

. . . Your papa has been rather idle this last week ; he has, I think, finished what he was writing about the Book of Discipline, so he has taken a few days at his logical problems and been washing and mending his books. To-day we had a visit from the American Ambassador to this country, Mr Bancroft, who is making a tour in Scotland at present. He is the author of the best History

of America. He remembers meeting your papa at Berlin seven-and-twenty years ago.

*5th October 1848.*

I do not wonder that you have been daily expecting to hear from me. I think I was never so long of writing to you—not, you will easily believe, from forgetfulness, but your papa has kept me constantly writing for him, and I have not had a minute I could call my own for these three weeks past. As soon as he was able, after his attack of erysipelas, he took to answering a letter from Mr Thomson of Oxford, on some of his logical theories, and last night we despatched a second letter of twenty-two folio pages of close writing, all of which I had to write twice over. Within this last fortnight I have written seventy folio pages, besides letters and notes and other things, so you may understand that I have had little leisure.

These ample letters to Mr Thomson contained an account of the principal novelties in Sir William's logical system, particularly the doctrine of Comprehension and Extension, and that of Quantification of the Predicate. His method of Notation was also explained.

*14th March 1849.*

We have all been going on very much as usual since you left us, your papa working for a while at his Latin poetry, of which I think he is now tired, and amusing himself in sizing your present [Waitz's edition of Aristotle's *Organon*], and getting it interleaved and arranged according to his own notions. It has been bound, and you would be quite amused if you saw it with all its various coloured marks to distinguish the different divisions and subjects. Certainly you could not have given him a book which he would have liked better, or one which he is more likely to use frequently. He is quite taken up with it, and every day, almost every hour, something is to be done or written in this wonderful book !

*17th May 1849.*

We are all well—your papa particularly so, and working away at Luther, which he says he must finish this summer. Most truly do I hope so. Mr Maclachlan [the publisher of Reid's Works] came down the other evening to speak to him about finishing Reid, and above all bringing out a Logic ; but your papa would promise nothing, and

said he must do Luther first. Mr Maclachlan was also speaking of making a collection of your papa's contributions to the 'Edinburgh Review,' and publishing them in one volume with a few additions and notes. Your papa seems to like the idea of this, and it will probably be done this summer.

16th June 1849.

Your papa is still working away at the old subject [Luther]. If he ever publishes, the materials he has collected and prepared will, I am sure, be sufficient for many thick volumes, instead of one small one, as originally intended.

17th July 1849.

Your papa still works indefatigably at the old subject, but I don't see much progress made towards the completion of the work. If I could only see any prospect of his ever finishing his intended book, I would work night and day to get it off hands. He says it is to be completed this summer; but, as long as he has the volumes of Luther's works beside him, he will go on translating and adding to his materials till he will disgust himself with the whole subject, and be driven distracted by such an overwhelming quantity of matter as he will not know how to get arranged. You will be glad to hear he is very well and strong.

7th January 1850.

As Hubert, I believe, told you, your father has been making a fine Tower of Babel to represent some of his logical notions;\* we have done little else but dress it for the last fortnight with various coloured ribbons and fine cut-out letters that have been the plague of Hubert's life and mine, for you know your papa is not easily pleased. I think it will afford some amusement to the students.

13th February [1850].

Your father is very busy at present with Logic,—some new views or discoveries which have troubled him a good deal to arrange; but he seems to think he has now hit upon it. . . . He is reading at present the 'Life and Correspondence of Southey,' written by his son. If you can meet with it, you will find it pleasant reading.

The logical points here referred to are probably those embodied in the note appended (p. 153) to Mr Baynes's 'Essay on

\* The nature and relations of Extension and Comprehension in Concepts—noticed above at p. 153.

the New Analytic of Logical Forms,' published in May 1850. They are the reduction of hypothetical reasoning to immediate inference; the division of the syllogism into figured and unfigured; new canons of inference; and emendations on the propositional and syllogistic tables.

## HUBERT HAMILTON TO HIS BROTHER.

16th March 1850.

Poor Luther has for a long time been laid aside—indeed he appears to have enjoyed a sort of serpentine torpidity all winter; and papa is now bent upon—what do you think?—skulls! All our heads have been callipered, taped, and all the rest of it: in fact, he is speaking of sending out to you directions so as to enable you to measure your own skull and send the dimensions home. He has purchased a lot of millet-seed, and has had out all the array of scales, shot, blacking-bottles full of sand, and other articles, and is evidently meditating some grand operations, which I am rather afraid of. As I have said, we are to have the full benefit of book-sizing to-day, and Mr Baynes is coming down to act as a kind of lieutenant under papa, while I will be the middy who runs about carrying messages and bringing all that is required. . . . Mr Colquhoun still comes on Sundays and talks to papa, the subject on his side being mesmerism; while papa generally entertains him with Luther.

## LADY HAMILTON TO W. HAMILTON.

18th March.

. . . We are all going on much as usual, except that your father has taken to a new hobby. He desires me to ask you if you think there are any *callipers* to be found in Lucknow, and if you could manage to send him the measurements of your head! He has been induced to look into his papers on this subject by Professor Jameson asking him for some remarks upon a paper he is publishing in his journal; and your papa has taken the opportunity of correcting some animadversions and attacks which had been made on some discoveries of his, published long ago by Dr Monro.\* This has set him to measuring of heads and weighing of brains for the last week. . . . Your father sends you his kindest love, and says he will dictate a letter to you next time. His class will now soon be over, and then he talks

\* See above, p. 113 *et seq.*

of being very busy. He is using galvanism at present daily, and thinks himself more supple in consequence.

This interruption had been of short duration, as very soon after we find Sir William again engrossed with Logic.

*18th April 1850.*

Your father is working hard at Logic at present, making out some new syllogistic tables; but he talks of resuming Luther soon, and also of reprinting his articles from the 'Edinburgh Review,' and publishing them in a single volume.

*18th June 1850.*

This is the anniversary of Waterloo, and you will be surprised when I tell you where we have been—at a review in the Queen's Park. I have not been at anything of the kind for thirty-six or thirty-seven years; and, except one that he saw at Berlin some thirty years ago, when there were about 40,000 reviewed, your papa says it is even longer since he has been—so it was as novel a sight to us as to the children. You will wonder how we came to go. Last night I incidentally mentioned that the children had been speaking of it and wishing to go. "You had better take them." "No," I answered, "unless you will go." Papa, of course, said he could not; but I saw that he rather liked the notion, and would have no great objection to being pressed. Well, this morning was beautiful, and papa wakened much earlier than usual, and in great good-humour, so I asked him if he would take a drive and let them see the review; and seeing, although at first he said "No," that he wished to go, I sent Hubert, who had got a holiday, to see if we could have an open carriage, which we got, and off we all set by eleven o'clock. And greatly delighted we were, for the day was lovely, and the views, you know, from the Queen's Drive are exquisite. Your father had not been there before, so he was much pleased. Indeed I cannot conceive anything finer than the whole scene was.

*5th July.*

Your papa is quite well, and still enamoured with Logic, and neglecting Luther.

*18th July 1850.*

. . . Your father desires me to give you his kindest love, and says you must not think him less interested in you that he does not

write ; but you know how lazy he is about writing a letter, and at present he is spell-bound by Logic, and everything is allowed to lie over. It is really quite vexing, as he himself says, for he ought to be doing other things.

7th August 1850.

Your papa is busy cutting up De Morgan, and has had a great many people calling for him. [A meeting of the British Association was then being held in Edinburgh.] I think, however, he has rather enjoyed it, and you will be surprised to hear he dined out on Monday to meet some of the *savans*, and went all alone.

NORTH BERWICK, 17th September 1850.

Your papa has recommenced working at Luther, but I think he has rather begun to tire of the subject, and is actuated more by a sense of duty than inclination in resuming the work. To-day he is answering a letter from a gentleman in China, who wrote to him to ask his opinion upon the rendering of the words which express *Supreme Being*—the missionaries who are translating the New Testament into Chinese having got into a controversy on the subject.

4th October.

Your father has been reading Macaulay's History, and was so pleased with it that he read incessantly till he finished the two volumes. He even lay awake all night perusing the fascinating pages. Luther gets on very slowly. I think your papa is tired of it, and it is not unlikely that all his work for years will be thrown away. It is very provoking. The chief employment he has had of late is answering letters from Mr Ferrier, who has taken to study Logic in the most energetic way, and is continually writing to your papa to ask explanations or to controvert some opinion which offends him. I am sure there have been more than a dozen letters from him this last month.

The following are interesting as evincing Sir William's intense solicitude and affection for his son :—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO LIEUTENANT W. HAMILTON.

GREAT KING STREET, 5th June 1849.

MY DEAREST BOY,—Your letters, which we have duly received, have afforded us the greatest pleasure, not only for the interesting



accounts they give of what you saw, but for the evidence they contain (and this is even far more agreeable) that you are thinking of home at every step of your removal from those to whom you are so dear. Your last letter—that to me—was particularly delightful for the minute details it gave concerning yourself and what you had seen in Egypt and Ceylon. It is not so much the things themselves as that they have been noticed by you which makes them welcome here. Follow the plan of jotting down whatever occurs to you from time to time; and any journal of your proceedings you send us will be the more pleasing the minuter it is. You are naturally of a reserved and diffident disposition. You must be on your guard against this, especially to us, for you may rely upon it that though you may tire yourself you can never tire us. This I have said once and again. Your mother will tell you any news to be told, though in fact there has occurred nothing to inform you of since she last wrote. We are all looking forward to your next letter, which we trust will contain an account of your safe and happy arrival at Calcutta. God bless you, my dear Billy! and believe that there is no object on earth dearer to me than you are. I trust He will take you into His holy keeping, and that you may always fulfil all the duties which are now incumbent on you to perform. His blessing you may be sure will accompany you in this, and I need not remind you that the chief duty which a man has upon earth is his duty to God.—Your ever affectionate father,

W. HAMILTON.

*18th January 1850.*

MY DEAREST BILL,—Your mother will have told you all that I can say in the shape of news and information; I only add a word to assure you of my kindest love and blessing, wishing you all health and happiness now and hereafter. It most sincerely rejoices me to hear nothing but good in regard to you; and your letters, which are excellent in themselves, delight me principally by the evidence they bear that the love which we all feel towards you is fully reciprocated on your part. I am sure that no distance and no length of absence will ever weaken the affection which we bear towards each other. At home here, Billy, Billy is more spoken of from Tommy upwards than any other name, and I am sure that no name is connected with warmer feelings than your own. My dearest boy, continue to write us all that interests you. You may rely upon it that it will interest us as much. Of course we cannot suppose

that you will always be equally able to write at every return of the mail, but I am sure that nothing but necessity will prevent us hearing from you, be the letter shorter or longer. We are all happy in thinking that you have been sent to so pleasant a station, and one that in every respect seems so favourable. But in whatever place, in whatever relation, you may be, I trust confidently that you will do your duty; and be certain that an anxiety on your part to perform all the duties which Providence may make incumbent on you, is the way to gain the favour of God and man. God bless you, my dear boy! and though I may not always express to you what I feel, devolving as I must the details of correspondence on those around me, it surely requires no declaration on my part to make you believe that no one is nearer or dearer to me than yourself.—Ever your affectionate father,

W. HAMILTON.

NORTH BERWICK, *September 5, 1850.*

MY DEAREST BILLY,—I leave your mother to tell you all our news. I have only to express to you, what I am sure you do not require to be told, the deep affection and anxious interest with which you are regarded by me and all others here. My dear boy, your letter to me afforded the greatest gratification; and indeed all your letters to us display both your excellent feelings and your good sense and observation. I trust that next arrival will bring us good accounts of your examination. I trust that you may obtain every honour competent; but at any rate it is most gratifying to be assured that you are doing everything in your power to deserve them. That is the principal matter. There is in these things always a good deal of accident, favourable and unfavourable; and if at one time you may obtain more, at another you may obtain less, than you merit. The great thing is to do always as well as you can; and you may be sure that if you do not succeed so well as you are entitled to expect at present, another time will set it all right. I am delighted to see that you are anxious about, and that you are taking an interest in, matters which, while they afford you a relief against *ennui*, will greatly add to your happiness, and in the long run certainly to your external prosperity. . . . No sugar was ever so sweet as yours, at least so it seems to all here, and your rice, &c., tastes better from the recollection of him from whom it comes. I must not, however, occupy more of the paper, as your mother has a great deal, as usual,

to tell you of. I shall merely add that I should like this place far better if you were here along with the rest of us, and you may be assured that you are never absent from the kindest thoughts of your mother and myself. May God bless you, my dearest Billy, and keep you in His care and fatherly protection!—Believe me ever your very affectionate father,

W. HAMILTON.

ELIE, FIFESHIRE, 17th September 1851.

MY DEAREST BILL,—Though I depend upon your mother to express to you from post to post my unceasing affection for you, I cannot allow the return of your birthday to pass by without in my own person saying a few words of love and endearment. I need not say how much gratification your letters afford to all of us: they are equally creditable to your head and heart. You may be sure that every the smallest particular of what you see, and feel, and think, is of interest at home, and I rejoice that you also are confident of this. I have nothing, my dear boy, to say to you in the way of remonstrance; you seem to be acting as those most interested in you would have you to act. Go on improving yourself to the utmost of your power, and with the blessing of God you will not be without reward in the end, and all the while you will have the approval of your own conscience. I am glad to see that you are applying yourself with assiduity to the languages. This is an indispensable qualification for ever rising above the routine promotion of your particular department; and I trust you will steadily persevere in the study. I suppose that you have all kind of books more peculiarly adapted for Indian pursuits provided and accessible; otherwise you have only to mention the work and it would be sent to you. I thank God that you have not only given us no anxiety about your conduct, but that your health has been so uniformly good. I trust that this blessing may be continued to you; and though I am unable to write to you frequently myself, there is no one who is more constantly in my dearest thoughts. God bless you, my dearest Billy!—Your ever affectionate,

W. HAMILTON.

From notices in some of the foregoing letters it is evident that the subject of Luther occupied Sir William's time very much during the years referred to. In fact he would ever and

anon, down to the close of his life, go off into investigations on points connected with the life and doctrines of Luther. He had a strong impression that the character of Luther had been unfairly represented—that its excellences had been exclusively emphasised and idealised by his admirers, while its defects had been kept in the background. In dealing with the subject, Sir William's honest and ardent desire was to present a picture of Luther that should be historically accurate. And as the balance of exaggeration seemed to him to lie with the admirers of the Reformer, he thought himself called upon in the interests of historical truth to present chiefly the other side of the picture. There can be no doubt that any representation of an historical character, such as Luther, that Sir William might present, would be distinguished by completeness and great literal accuracy. It is doubtful, however, whether he would make due allowance for exaggeration of statement arising from intensity of conviction; and be able quite to put himself in the position of one whose nature was so little, as Luther's, that of the mere scholar and man of thought, and so much that of the ardent worker and practical innovator. The passionate nature of Luther was not one to tarry to weigh statements or balance periods or reconcile contradictory opinions; it overleapt the barriers of theory, scorned speculative limitations, and found satisfaction only in the substitution of what appeared to be the true and real, for the false and insincere. His work was a moral, not a speculative one, and it was probably wider and better than any theory he himself ever gave of it. Luther's positions, if occasionally extreme, were adopted not under the calm inspiration of mere reflective thought, but under the pressure of an antagonistic power, the struggle with which was an issue of life or death. But we shall allow Sir William to speak for himself. The following is an extract from what appears to have been designed as a preface to the work on Luther. The purpose which Sir William had in view, and his general feeling towards Luther, are at least indicated.

“ Under every changeful phasis of opinion, in every country of Germany, Catholic and Protestant, Luther is still the man of the nation. His general intellectual ascendancy is decided. All endeavour, if not to enlist, at least to disarm, his authority. In theology, Rationalist and Supernaturalist both adduce his declarations. In philosophy he is regarded as the emblem of regulated, as of independent, thought. In politics, the conservative and revolutionary appeal, the one to his precept, the other to his example. Nor is his surpassing greatness unacknowledged even in those countries of the empire which have remained constant to the faith which he assailed; and in the Valhalla of Munich, Luther and Arminius stand as the two liberators of Germany from the two dominations of Rome. The painter, in fine, and sculptor venerate in the friend of Cranach the protector of art against the iconoclasm of his followers; whilst the Reformer has bequeathed to the most musical of all nations, not only its most celebrated religious hymn, but its most popular convivial catch. Luther, in short, is to his countrymen what no countryman has been to any other people of Europe. He alone is a one concrete reality, living in the heart of every German; whilst other nations have only at best the precarious memories of dead and jostling abstractions. Luther, in fact, supplies to the people of other countries what they want among themselves; his coarse but characteristic features are familiar to every European; and there is no observer of the Reformation, Catholic or Protestant, from Erasmus to Carlyle, who has not recognised in Luther the veritable hero. Of Luther, indeed, pre-eminently may it be said with St Paul—that ‘he being dead yet speaketh;’ or, in the language of Homer,—

Τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνηα,  
Οἷον πεπνύσθαι; τοὶ δὲ, σκιά ἀίσσουσι.

‘He, he alone from Pluto’s silent glades,  
Warns wisely back, the others flit as shades.’

Yet it is not so much the doctrine as the doctor that survives and teaches. For of Luther’s letter and Luther’s spirit we

may too truly say that 'the letter killeth, but the spirit maketh alive.'

"With all his faults and frailties, Luther stands alone in this—he exercised a greater influence over a greater number of his fellow-men than any human agent in the history of the world. Herein Mohammed is his only rival; but the influence of the Arabian was far more limited during life than the influence of the German. No one, indeed, in modern times has ever established so extensive and permanent a glory. Other of the reformers have perhaps exerted a higher scientific authority over the learned, but no other name is so popular as Luther's, not in Germany only, but in Europe. In Germany, even where the doctrine of the theologian has faded or never flourished, the fame of the man is perennial. But whilst the Lutheran doctrine stood entire, who was ever glorified like Luther the theologian? Countless dissertations have been devoted to evince the reality of all (and more than all) of Luther's dreams. Books upon books have been written to show that his advent was miraculously foretold. The Apocalypse alone (the canonicity of which, by the way, he himself denied) afforded four such prophecies to his followers. To them he was there prefigured either by 'the two witnesses' (xi.); or by 'the man child who was to rule all nations with a rod of iron' (xii.); or by 'the angel with the everlasting gospel' (xiv.); or by 'the angel calling mightily, "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen"' (xviii). To them also he was foretold in the pretended vaticinations of Huss, of Hilten, of the Elector Frederic the Sage, &c. Many and elaborate are the treatises in exposition of Luther's own prophecies, and to prove him a veritable prophet; to prove his title to the style of evangelist and apostle, of saint and worker of miracles, of confessor and martyr, of hero and conqueror, of the Megalander or Great Man, by pre-eminence, &c. Much likewise has been written touching his similitude with the sun and with the morning-star; with Abel, with Noah, with Abraham, with Moses, with Samuel, with Elias

with Jeremiah, with St John the Baptist, with St John the Evangelist, with Ananias, with St Paul; to say nothing of St Christopher the Great, St Martin of Tours, St Benno, Wicliffe, Huss, &c. But if the real Luther be lost in a flood of panegyric, he is equally lost in a counter-flood of invective. I know a hundred portraitures of Luther the Angel, and a hundred pendants of Luther the Devil; but I know not a single true likeness of Luther the Man. One party seem to have ignored his real features, another to have been ignorant of them; and yet there they stand, painted in all the vivacity of truth by his own powerful pencil—a pencil more graphic for the inner man than that of his friend Cracnach for the outer. No one can know Luther who does not know him in his writings,—writings, however, hardly more deserving of study as reflecting their illustrious author, than as interesting and instructive in themselves. All in all, they are among the most engaging of works; and whilst the rapidity with which they were thrown off by Luther, in writing or in speech, is adverse to condensation, a full and fair selection would prove an invaluable contribution to the history of human strength and weakness, that is, to the true history of man. I regret that the extracts here made are principally limited to the latter phasis; for I am at present called on to antagonise and correct the one-sided and erroneous representations, exclusively given of Luther under the former. I therefore earnestly caution my reader that he do not mistake the proof which I now adduce, that Luther is not impeccable, for a demonstration that Luther does nothing but err. Such a conclusion would, indeed, be greatly farther from the truth than the prevalent delusion against which I here contend. In these I make no pretension to a full portraiture of Luther. I merely call into relief certain neglected features, which ought to be taken into account in any veritable picture of the Reformer. Luther I not merely admire but love. My love is, however, limited to the real Luther, and him I love with all his faults and weaknesses—nay more, perhaps, that he is no

‘monster of perfection.’\* As to the ideal Luther, angel or devil, for such I care no more than for any other fancy which folly, ignorance, prejudice, or perfidy may engender. I look to truth alone.”

A great deal of time and research was spent by Sir William on Luther. There was much reading, and not a little thinking. The results are given in some thirty separate parcels of papers, which, if published, would occupy a large volume. These are carefully arranged under various heads, seemingly exhaustive of the subject.

A 1. Biography and personal anecdotes—alphabetical.

2. Luther, various references to, from Walch’s Index and various works.

(a.) Notes from Luther’s letters.

(b.) *Varia Ecclesiastica*.

(c.) *Varia Ecclesiastica Anglicana*.

3. Various extracts from various books, chiefly in reference to Luther and the Reformation.

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4. Luther in general—being extracts from his own works.

i. Manner of Life ; and of, in general, . . . . . 1-4

\* “*Monstrum perfectionis*” is the expression of Julius Cæsar Scaliger. Pope, who was a curious reader, copies but spoils the saying in his famous line,—

“A faultless monster that the world ne’er saw.”



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Diabolic Agency.

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|                 |   | B. Lutheran Church Constitutions as established :—                                  |
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| Gerhard.        |   |   |
| Balduinus.      |   |   |

In January 1851, Sir William commenced to look over his contributions to the 'Edinburgh Review,' with a view to their collection and publication in a separate form. The thing was to be done speedily; only a few notes were to be added, and the book was to be out, Sir William thought, in a few months. But, like the edition of Reid, which he hoped would be published in a few weeks as far back as 1837, the new volume did not appear at the time contemplated. He felt the need of making additions to the articles as originally published; and accordingly, the design of writing appendices on points in philosophy, as well as on education and university reform, gradually grew and strengthened. From his extraordinarily careful, thorough-going, and elaborate manner of working at a subject, these appendices took up his time and strength in such a way that all calculation as to when the volume would appear was completely baffled. The more he laboured, the more did there appear to be done. Those around him began to think, as date after date fixed for the publication of the volume passed without its appearing, that it might possibly never be finished. However, after more than a year's almost constant labour—the greater part of the work being done after midnight—the 'Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform,' appeared in March 1852. The lengthened notes and appendices that were added to the original articles, and their quality, showed how the time had been employed, and made it appear wonderful that such a body of thought, at once compact and profound, had been produced in the limited period of fifteen months.

The 'Discussions' reached a second edition in 1853. And now since his death there has appeared a third edition in 1867.

The following letter acknowledging a presentation copy of the 'Discussions' is from one with whom Sir William had most elaborate controversy:—

REV. DR WHEWELL TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

TRINITY LODGE, CAMBRIDGE, *April 23, 1852.*

DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure of receiving your ‘Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,’ and as a present from yourself. This I accept as a mark of your goodwill, and value it much on that account; and also on account of the matter of the book, with much of which I am already familiar, and know its interest and value. I had the fortune to differ with you on various points which are discussed in these pages, and may possibly still have something to say on such points; but if so, I hope that it will only produce some farther “shaking of the torch of truth,” which, as your motto says, makes it shine the brighter. And all we who venture to write on philosophical subjects must feel fresh obligations to you, who have done so much to keep alive and to extend the interest felt in this country respecting such speculations. I hope you will long find pleasure in the prosecution of such studies; the subject of philosophy is sure to gain as long as you do so.

The notice which you have taken of a short paper of mine (though you think me in error), induces me to send you a few other papers which I have published in the like manner. They will at least show you that I continue to speculate about such matters; and I hope you will accept them as a token that I am, with great esteem, your faithful and obedient servant,

W. WHEWELL.

The following contains a reference to Sir William’s views on Oxford:—

REV. C. P. CHRETIEN \* TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

ORIEL, 28th April 1852.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON,—Will you allow me to thank you very much for your kindness in sending me your philosophical and educational ‘Discussions’? Independently of their separate value, they claim, and must receive, renewed attention in their collected form and with your second imprimatur. I have read the last Discussion with much interest, and find in it much to which I assent willingly; some things too, to which I must give a more reluctant adhesion. I fear that we have departed too far from our

\* Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, and author of ‘Essay on Logical Method.’

original model to think of really returning to it as a whole ; and its dead forms are often painful mockeries. What parts will bear reviving, what will not, is a question of detail, on which there will be differences of opinion. Excuse me if I say that, on some points which you mention, the divergence of the college practice from the university theory does not seem so wide to me as it appears to you. And perhaps I may add that the statistical estimate of the colleges, though true in fact, and useful in your hands, might be made the ground of very false inferences. . . . —Believe me, very faithfully yours,

CHARLES P. CHRETIEN.

MR JAMES BROWN \* TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

HARCOURT BUILDINGS, 19th May 1852.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—I have to thank you for the present of your ‘Discussions.’

I trust that you will not wholly abandon your design of giving a sketch of the Scaligers. I should not willingly see your thoughts withdrawn from the completion of the Notes to Reid, but you might surely give a sketch, and indicate the sources of information. The most interesting parts of the history of philosophy at that time would lie in your way. Muretus must have owed much to the earlier Scaliger, and in a finer spirit than he afterwards showed, for now the earlier “Julius Cæsar” is contrasted with the later sycophant orations before the Papal chair, and his impudence in offering the whole soil of Scotland to the Pope.

I am not quite clear that mathematics are so easy to study ; in reading thoroughly good mathematicians—as James Bernoulli, or Maclaurin, or Lagrange—there is quite enough for energy of the intellect. Bad mathematicians obscure their no-meaning with complicated signs ; but to the better class of them the signs are an incumbrance in some respects, though an aid in others.

Nor is it quite so straight a road to walk in. Poor Joseph Scaliger got off the narrow path right into the ditch, and over the boots in mud. Of course a pedant in geometry will be stupid in business, but other exclusive pursuits lead the same way—Dominie Sampson was no geometer.

There is a saying of Pascal, about eight years before his death, of

\* Barrister of the Inner Temple.

M. Mère : "Il a très bon esprit, mais il n'est pas géomètre—c'est, comme vous savez, un grand défaut.

I am pretty well convinced in my own mind that logical quantity is not a whit different from algebraic. I can't see any difference between  $\frac{4}{4}$  and "all"—for four-fourths of a number of things is clearly all of them. I have half a mind to write a note to the 'Athenæum' to draw more attention to this, and let it be refuted if that can be done. With kind remembrances to Lady Hamilton, I remain, my dear sir, yours most truly,

JAMES BROWN.

REV. DR W. LINDSAY ALEXANDER \* TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

PINKIE BURN, BY MUSSELBURGH, 10th October 1853.

DEAR SIR WILLIAM,—On my return home from London a few days ago, I found waiting me a copy of the second edition of your 'Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,' "From the author." For so valuable a gift, and so flattering a token of regard, I beg to convey to you my sincerest acknowledgments.

I have not now for the first time to make myself acquainted with the rich stores of thought and learning which that volume contains. More than twenty years ago, the perusal, in the 'Edinburgh Review,' of the first two of these Discussions produced on me effects which have influenced my habits of thought ever since, and given a prevailing tendency to my studies and opinions in philosophy. If I may without presumption appropriate language which Kant uses of himself, I would say that your article on the Philosophy of Perception "meinen dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach, und meinen Untersuchungen im Felde der speculativen philosophie eine andere Richtung gab." I had, up to that period, been a kind of somnolently acquiescent follower of Brown, and had very nearly relinquished philosophical studies under an idea that his four volumes contained the *ne plus ultra* of speculative science. After repeated perusals of your Discussions, I found out my mistake pretty distinctly, and awoke to the conviction that I had yet to begin philosophical pursuits in the right direction. I cannot pretend that I have made much progress in these ; still I feel that I have gained something, and I cannot but seize this opportunity of expressing to you my grateful sense of the advantages I have reaped from the study of your philosophical writings.

\* Minister of Augustine Church, Edinburgh.

Of the additions to the present edition of the 'Discussions' I have as yet only had time to read your reply to the writer in the 'Evangelical Review.' I felt exceedingly offended at the tone and style of the article to which you have replied, and therefore enjoyed not a little your castigation of the author. As to the point at issue, I think there can be no reasonable doubt that your statement as to the judgment of Calvin and Beza concerning the Apocalypse is strictly correct. Beza's own language in the Prolegomena to the Apocalypse, in his edition of the New Testament, is sufficient to show how hesitatingly he came to admit its canonicity, how uncertain he remained as to its author, and how deeply he felt its obscurity. His advice also to all "to venerate the mysteries of God contained in this book, rather than pollute them with their fanatical comments," shows pretty clearly that he was no friend to the free exposition of it. But I must not further intrude with such remarks.—I remain, dear Sir William, yours most respectfully and faithfully,

W. LINDSAY ALEXANDER.

PROFESSOR BOOLE TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

CORK, 27th May 1852.

MY DEAR SIR,—I beg you to accept my cordial thanks for your kind and valuable present of your new volume of collected essays.

Though I have long been familiar with several of the essays and reviews, it has afforded me sincere pleasure to read them again, and there are portions of them to which I yet purpose to recur. For whether I agree with you in opinion or not (and there are far more points upon which I do agree with you than upon which I differ), it is impossible not to be instructed by the very learning and ability with which you support and adorn your cause. . . . Will you forgive me for adding that I do not think that upon all points you have manifested that freedom from prejudice which is essential to the formation of a right judgment? Much of what you say upon the study of mathematics appears to me to be only applicable to an exclusive study of the science. The evils of which you speak are due, I conceive, not to the direct and positive influence of the study of the relations of quantity and of the methods proper to that study upon the mind, but to the absence of those influences of general literature and human intercourse which the very preoccupation of the mind in extreme instances occasions. Would not, then, the very same, or a strictly parallel observation, apply to the exclusive

study of any other department of knowledge, psychology for example? Are not all one-sided men (intellectually speaking) deficient in general strength and aptitude of mind? I think so. The sole question which remains is, whether there is anything in the nature of mathematical science which specially tends to make the study of it exclusive. Is there anything in the interest attaching to mathematical pursuits and objects which is specially unfriendly to other interests—which demands to rule alone?

Now, while I admit it to be true that many minds have been absorbed to a very injurious extent in mathematical pursuits, I cannot, judging from the nature of the case and from individual experience, believe that such is a necessary or a proper result. I do not see why a man, because he feels an interest in mathematical speculations, should therefore *not* feel an interest in moral, or philosophical, or social inquiries. I should rather suppose that the effect of the former study would be, not to destroy the intellect in question, but to add to it a disposition to pursue the particular studies with a reference to general laws, as the end of investigation. And such a disposition is not in itself to be reprehended. Undoubtedly it may, however, be carried too far—the immediate value of facts may be too little regarded; but all this only brings us to the same position as before—viz., that any mental disposition suffered to gain an undue predominance becomes injurious.

I have in my own case (which I mention only by the way) observed that every period of sustained mathematical effort has been followed by, and has been, I believe, productive of, an opposite state of mind—a state in which the mind appeared to assert its unwillingness to be too long subject to one set of ideas, and to demand for itself “fresh fields and pastures new.” I cannot doubt that whenever this indication is neglected, this call refused, great mental injury must result. And in this way it seems to me probable that the rewards which universities hold out to ambitious minds for special attainments may often be productive of irreparable and most melancholy evils. But the result is not properly chargeable upon mathematics as a study, nor is it solely chargeable upon the abuse of mathematical studies. Some men have been warped by philology, some crazed by metaphysics; and the whole history of the pursuit of learning stimulated by other incentives than the love of learning, would, I suppose, if truly written, tell of the ruin of many noble minds, and make large deductions from the general benefits which the world owes to academical institutions.



Now this leads me to say that I do not think that you have sufficiently discriminated between the *use* and the *abuse* of mathematical studies.

May I add too, and in the same spirit of candour and of respect, that I think you are unjustifiably severe upon my friend Mr De Morgan. He is, I believe, a man as much imbued with the love of truth as can anywhere be found. When such men err, a calm and simple statement of the ground of their error answers every purpose which the interests either of learning or of justice can require. The peculiarities of Mr De Morgan's system of logic I have not made an object of study, and I do not feel competent therefore to pass any opinion upon the correctness or mutual consistency of his views.

I hope that it is not needful to offer any apology for the freedom of some of my observations. Merely to have thanked you for your very valuable work would not have conveyed my real feelings or convictions as to its great merits, and to have confined my remarks to points of entire agreement would not have been strictly candid.

In the following correspondence, Mr Collyns Simon \* raises a point of considerable speculative importance in reference to Perception :—

MR T. COLLYNS SIMON TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

LONDON.

MY DEAR SIR,—Nothing could be more agreeable to my feelings than your very kind recollection of me. The gift of your most valuable work is an honour of which I cannot but feel myself quite unworthy, and which I shall never cease to esteem. I trust that a few months of repose and recreation will restore your strength, which must have been heavily taxed in the production of such a volume.

On looking into it I am surprised that you should think that there is anything respecting Berkeley to be discussed between you and me, even if you had leisure for it. I see, with a great deal of gratification, that, until now, I had sadly misunderstood you, having considered you one of what you very appropriately call the Hypothetical Realists. We differ, I see, more than I can well understand respecting Reid, but that is at present of less consequence. The only thing that I would beg of you is to mention to me the point in

\* Author of 'The Nature and Elements of the External World,' 'Hamilton *versus* Mill,' &c. &c.

which you consider that your views differ from Berkeley's. I am thinking of publishing a second edition of my work with additions, and propose to decorate it with a few quotations from both your works, though neither of them allow me to speak of you as a Berkeleian; and it could not fail to be matter of great interest to the public to know what point of difference there is between you; for that you consider there is some I infer, though I look for it in vain in what you have written.

What you describe at p. 54 as your own views, under the name of Natural Realism, represents exactly those of Berkeley. The matter of which we have intuitive knowledge—the reality of the reciprocal independence or antithesis between this matter and the percipient—the unconditional admission of everything of which we are conscious—he agrees in all this. Even when you assert (in the same page) a “co-originality” between this matter and the percipient, I do not think you mean by this term anything denied by Berkeley. Do you mean by it that the cause of this matter is also the cause of the mind? He did not deny this. Or do you mean it as a mere synonyme of “reciprocal independence?” Then in this also he agrees with you. Or do you mean (as the word “genetic” there used seems to indicate) that neither the mind educes the phenomenal world of which it is conscious, nor the phenomenal world the mind which is conscious of it? I need not say that there is no difference between you upon this point. Or, lastly, do you mean that we have it among the facts of consciousness that the mind does not begin to exist until—or does not exist afterwards except when—it is conscious of its material world? If so, there would be a difference between you and Berkeley, inasmuch as he clearly considered (which appears to me to be the fact given in consciousness upon this point) that every individual mind must have existed prior to its own individual world of phenomena. But after all, this is at best but a mere corollary of Berkeley's doctrine, and not a portion of it; for those who hold his doctrine may (as far as it is concerned) look upon each mind as beginning to exist either prior to, or simultaneously with, its own world of phenomena—which two are, I think, the only possible alternatives; for would it not be absurd to suppose that the existence of the mind supervenes upon its own phenomena? You speak in the page I refer to of materialism as being distinguishable by this last-mentioned supposition. But I think, on reflection, you will see that though materialism teaches that the “otiose” substratum (as you justly term it) exists prior to the mind, it does not

assign this priority to the world of phenomena,—at least I have not fallen in anywhere with that statement. The first tenet of materialism assumes a substratum world of which we are not conscious, besides the phenomenal world of which we are ; and thence derives, I think very naturally, all its other tenets. But without this matter of which we are not conscious, and the substitution of this in their doctrine for the matter of which we are, they could not argue the priority of matter, and still less (if less in such a case were possible) the “*eduction*,” as you there call it, of the percipient from the thing perceived. I have prolonged this remark because I sometimes fancy that it is a fear lest Berkeley’s doctrine should lead to confusion in this respect that makes some writers unwilling to identify their views with his ; and from p. 54 I could almost imagine that this might be your case. Even the idea there expressed in the term “*co-originality*” exhibits no difference between your views and Berkeley’s. Pardon me, therefore, I beg of you, the trouble that I give, when I ask you to tell me the particular term which you consider to express the difference between you to which you occasionally allude. I perfectly agree with you that the Berkeleian question is one of common-sense alone.

With the sincerest wish that you may long enjoy the fame which you have so gallantly earned, I remain, my dear sir, most faithfully yours,

T. C. SIMON.

#### MEMORANDA OF SIR W. HAMILTON’S REPLY.

If Berkeley held that the Deity caused one permanent material universe (be it supposed apart or not apart from His own essence), which universe, on coming into relation with our minds through the medium of our bodily organism, is, in certain of its correlative sides or phases, so to speak, external to our organism, objectively or really perceived (the primary qualities), or determines in us certain subjective affections of which we are conscious (the secondary qualities) ; in that case I must acknowledge Berkeley’s theory to be virtually one of natural realism, the differences being only verbal. But again, if Berkeley held that the Deity caused no permanent material universe to exist and to act uniformly as one, but does Himself either infuse into our several minds the phenomena (ideas) perceived and affective, or determines our several minds to elicit within consciousness such apprehended qualities or felt affections ; in that case I can recognise in Berkeley’s theory only a scheme of theistic ideal-

ism—in fact, only a scheme of perpetual and universal miracle, against which the law of parcimony is conclusive, if the Divine interposition be not proved necessary to render possible the facts. For “non Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus” holds good in philosophy as in poetic. Noticed that egoistic idealism, therefore, more philosophical than theistic; because the former postulates only a great miracle once for all, whereas the latter supposes the Deity to perform a petty miracle on each representation of each several mind. Noticed also that in the place referred to (Disc. p. 54) I only had in view the proximate sources of idealism and materialism, and did not allude to the first cause of both sources in the word *Genetic*; nor is idealism there distinguished into its two species as at pp. 193, 194, &c. &c. I also noticed the ambiguity of the terms object and objective, subject and subjective, in relation to and as discriminating the material and mental worlds.

MR COLLYNS SIMON TO SIR W. HAMILTON.

ROSTREVOE, IRELAND, Jan. 22, 1853.

MY DEAR SIR,—Your kind offer induces me to trouble you with one or two remarks.

It is to me a great satisfaction to hear that you have seen nothing in Berkeley that appears to you irreconcilable with your own views. Of this I became convinced upon reading your ‘Discussions,’ and the first page of your letter is to the same effect. But when you defend, as you do in your letter (or rather seem to do), a correlative and hypothetical universe over and above that universe of qualified sensations of which we are conscious, I begin again to fear that your views and Berkeley’s are irreconcilable. What I would ask you is, when you have leisure, to have the kindness to explain to me what use you see in supposing a universe of which we are not conscious, correlative to that of which we are. The phenomena called “sensations” (in your letter “subjective affections”) exhibit in themselves all the primary qualities. When we see a square green object, its form is evidently in its colour and delineated by it; what more need, then, is there of a prototype for the one set of qualities than for the other—for the primary than for the secondary? or am I mistaken in thinking that you mean “a universe” when you speak of something unsensational and correlative connected with our universe of qualified sensations?

Another question suggested by your letter is this: In what re-

spect do you fear that Berkeley's views infringe that principle of parcimony on which you cite "*non Deus intersit nisi dignus vindice nodus*," and in which I fully acquiesce? How can it be said that his views involve more miracle than the ordinary theory? You suppose his doctrine to imply an intermittent universe, and that such a universe calls for more of the "*Deus vindex*" than a permanent universe would do; but on both these points allow me to offer a few suggestions, for I neither look upon the universe as intermittent, nor can I see that an intermittent miracle would involve more of the *Deus vindex* than a permanent one.

1. Even if we are not to consider each so-called "act" of the material world as an act of the present power and direct present attention of the Deity, how can it be said that a mass of continuous petty miracles is a greater display of miraculous power, or a more complex display of it—a less parsimonious display of it—than one great isolated miracle comprehending all these petty ones? To create and to set going in a moment a huge institution of future miracles which shall hereafter take effect of themselves and without the present agency of the Deity, involves quite as stupendous a display of the Divine power as to suppose all this done in successive acts instead of in one act, and in a million of years instead of in a single minute. How can length of time be supposed to *augment* the miraculous display? Surely if there is any difference it is in favour of Berkeley; for is not Babbage's calculating machine a larger display of mental power—a less parsimonious display of it—than all the results it ever gave or ever could give? and the same principle holds in all such cases. But after all, no one with whom we now have to do considers the so-called "acts" of the material world as anything else but acts of the present power and direct present attention of the Deity; so that in this respect Berkeley's views involve nothing new. The apple falls by laws of gravitation established 6000 years ago; but no modern writer seems to think (not even the author of the '*Vestiges*') that it would do so if that which originally founded the law was not there to enforce the law, or that Divine interposition is unnecessary to preserve Divine law. All admit that a law cannot enforce itself.

2. As to the "permanence" of the universe, in the ordinary sense of this permanence, Berkeley has nothing new. When educated people say or think that the light, or sound, or colour, or any other such element of nature of which we are conscious, is permanent, they do not mean that such things are not intermittent sensations.

They only mean the same thing as when we say that knowledge is permanent or an idea permanent, although we know that, in one sense, it can only exist when we are conscious of it. The intermission of the things of the mind does not break their "permanence;" and in all this Berkeley thought but as other educated men. The attempt made by some to explain this permanence in colours, sounds, and other such things of which we are conscious, by supposing other correlative colours, sounds, &c., of which we are not conscious, is of no use. The supposition does not answer the intended purpose. On this the learned are now agreed. The colours in the furniture of a room to-day and these colours yesterday are the same. We are conscious that they are so, and yet education teaches us that they are not numerically the same. Berkeley has added nothing to and taken nothing from this fact; for, as I have said, the hypothesis of a correlative universe does not explain the permanence in question. But besides, what permanence is, after all, assigned by Berkeley's opponents even to their supposed correlative universe? None whatever. They admit that its particles are constantly shifting their position—that no part of it remains one hour the same—that all the "primary qualities" in it, as well as those which create the "subjective affections" are for ever changing, and might be *wholly* changed without affecting its permanence and identity—and that the only really permanent creation originally effected was a creation of laws—of those laws which we can perceive only in the sensational universe, but which these parties attribute also to their supposed correlative and unsensational one. Thus, neither in respect of permanence nor of miraculous display is the Berkeleian system inferior to that of our opponents.

You speak of Berkeley's doctrine as a theistic one, as if the opposite one were not also theistic. But all the theistic portion of his doctrine he has merely adopted from the ordinary belief of men. In reality his doctrine has nothing theistic in it, for it does not relate to the *cause* of the universe but to the *contents* of the universe—his problem being not, what is the origin of the universe? but, what does the universe elementally consist of?

I shall greatly value any remarks with which you will have the goodness to favour me upon these points.—Believe me, my dear sir, with the greatest esteem, ever most truly yours,

T. C. SIMON.\*

\* It is much to be regretted that Sir William's letters to Mr Simon on this and other speculative points were lost.

SIR W. HAMILTON TO PROFESSOR CRAIK.

HUNTFIELD HOUSE, BIGGAR, 26th Aug. 1852.

MY DEAR SIR,—Before leaving town I received your last kind note, and am much obliged to you for stating the opinion of your ingenious friend touching the vexed question of causality. This is a point on which I am very anxious to receive objections—the weightier the better; for I have endeavoured in vain to find difficulties to the theory which do not admit of an easy solution, whilst at the same time the theory itself seems to me more favourable to our moral interests than any other that has been proposed. If, therefore, you or your friend would state what appear its weak points I should be indebted; not, however, that I would ask you to take any trouble in the matter, for I myself have too strong a tendency to inertia to think of requesting others to do what I should be too willing to avoid myself.—Believe me, my dear sir, yours very truly,

W. HAMILTON.

The tests that were exigible from persons appointed to professorships in the Scottish universities, consisting of a declaration of adherence to the Westminster Confession of Faith and other standards of the Church of Scotland, besides having proved useless for the end which they were designed to secure, had been found, especially of late years, to operate very injuriously on the interests of the universities, as well as unjustly on many candidates for the chairs. Certain lay members of the Church of Scotland, persuaded of the impolicy of a continuance of these tests with respect to non-theological chairs, subscribed a Declaration affirming this, and recording their desire that an appeal should be made to the Legislature for their removal. Among the names appended to the document were those of Lords Belhaven, Lauderdale, and Ruthven; Professors Christison, Campbell Swinton, More; Dean of Faculty Inglis (now Lord Justice-General), David Mure (now Lord Mure), E. S. Gordon (late Lord Advocate), &c. The paper was sent to Sir William for his signature. In reply he sent the following letter:—

SIR W. HAMILTON TO PROFESSOR CAMPBELL SWINTON.

EDINBURGH, 25th January 1853.

I feel quite at one with you and those who sign the Declaration, in so far as it goes. The exclusion of men of merit from the lay chairs of our universities, in consequence of any sectarian differences of opinion, appears to me an evil which ought to be removed. But, in the circumstances of our Edinburgh University, I am firmly convinced, by reasoning corroborated by recent experience, that an abolition of the religious test, without depositing the academical patronage in more worthy hands, would only tend greatly to aggravate the evil. Professors would then be here selected merely because they belong to this or that sect; in fact, there would be a division of the chairs among the preponderant religious bodies; and merit would then have far less chance of success even than it has at present. With this conviction, I am sorry that I cannot append my name to your Declaration, though I am happy to think that there is no essential difference between my opinion and that of yourself and the other eminent individuals by whom it is signed.

These tests were finally abolished in 1853.

Sir William's illness very much cut him off from society, and thenceforth his intercourse was almost entirely confined to those whom he saw in his own house. He had, especially latterly, rather a dread of having to appear and speak in company. But his native kindliness and genuine hospitality (along with Lady Hamilton's influence) led him to overcome this nervous feeling, to the extent at least of having quiet gatherings of friends occasionally of an evening. And to the last he kept up the kindly practice of having students' parties. It was very pleasant and touching to see him on such occasions, established in an arm-chair by the fireplace of the drawing-room, which also contained his library, listening to the conversation around him, and joining in it on any topic that interested him,—the old "lion-like look" about the face, now softened and made more attractive by illness,



and ever and anon beautified by a kindly smile or sudden flash of animated interest. He was pleased with ladies' talk, and he would take fancies to people, or sometimes the reverse. Except that he did not move from his chair, and that with a slight hesitation in speech there was apparent a certain feebleness of voice which, to those who had known him formerly, contrasted with his old tones, there was little visible trace of the illness through which he had passed.

Among Sir William's intimate friends at this period was Mr John Shank More, Professor of Scots Law in the University. Mr More occupied a house nearly opposite Sir William's, and between the families there was very frequent intercourse. We are indebted to one of Mr More's daughters for the following most graphic and truthful picture of Sir William and his surroundings in this latter period of his life:—

If the houses in our street [Great King Street] were outwardly uniform, the interiors were abundantly varied, and always characteristic of the inhabitants; and, as might be expected, Sir William Hamilton's was pre-eminently distinguished for individuality. The rooms in which he and his family usually sat were surrounded by books; and how clearly does one in which we passed many a pleasant hour rise to mind! In it, from floor to roof, the bookshelves mounted one above the other, almost entirely covering the walls. The books were of all sorts and sizes, but the brown folios and great volumes clothed in vellum, which were level with the eye, inspired us at an early period with profound respect, from seeing them so near, and yet feeling they contained treasures of wisdom and knowledge which we would never reach. Above the black marble mantelpiece the picture of a strikingly handsome man (Sir William's brother) looked grandly down, and at his side the wall was occupied by fine engravings of the Italian poets—Dante's earnest face always seeming to catch the eye, and to be reminding one that the way to paradise is steep and long. Beneath these, on a table inlaid with brass, stood two handsome malachite vases, some pieces of old china, and usually a glass with flowers—all looking like homage offered to the immortals above. The room was lighted by one large window, and in its embrasure stood a great Indian jar covered with strange devices, which must

have had a charmed life, since it had survived many generations of children unscathed. Outside the window, the top of a tall poplar (planted in the court below) swayed to and fro with every breath of air.

At the farther end of the room, two pillars supported a beam which crossed the roof. By some inexplicable combination of ideas, these always reminded us of the two middle pillars in the temple of Dagon. Without doubt, the impression which the pillars in themselves first conveyed was afterwards confirmed, by Sir William in his latter years being almost invariably seated near them at the side of the fire; the sight of the strong man, shorn of his strength by the mysterious malady which had laid hold of him, almost naturally suggesting thoughts of Samson. What a brave spirit his was, which, in a form of such massive mould that physical strength seemed its right, endured with patience being held captive and bound with fetters which no effort of his will could break! His grand appearance was adorned with that essential and most ethereal attribute of beauty—colour; and the gleam of the silvered hair, with the deep, dark fire in the eyes, and the delicate carmine which often mounted to the cheek, produced a combination which pleased indescribably. Time and increasing feebleness only made the spirit shine out more visibly from its house of clay, and the sharp distinction between the mortal and immortal part always grew more vivid and interesting.

If the spirit of Queen Constance seemed held against her will in a bodily prison, with him it rather seemed as if the shattered tabernacle was held together by force of will and mental strength until his work was done. Dr Samuel Johnson has said that “he hoped he never passed unmoved over any spot dignified by suffering bravery or virtue;” and to those who, sympathising with the moralist’s feeling of “*religio locorum*,” saw or can imagine the painful faltering steps necessarily made when the limbs had become no longer willing servants but lifeless drags, the heroism of Sir William Hamilton’s daily exits to the College must ever make his threshold dignified.

At this period strangers frequently came to see Sir William, attracted by the fame of his genius and learning. The visits were sometimes of an odd character. One evening there arrived at Cordale, in Dumbartonshire, where Sir William was

spending the summer, a gentleman, who described himself as engaged in trade in South Shields. Disappointed of finding Sir William in Edinburgh, he had ascertained where he was living, and taken the long journey for the sole purpose of seeing him, and getting him to write his name in a copy of the 'Discussions.' This object attained, he took his departure next day, without caring to visit Loch Lomond, or any of the scenes of interest into the midst of which his zeal had brought him.

The spread of Sir William's philosophical opinions in America brought a number of visitors from that quarter.

Professor Porter, of Yale College, who has furnished an interesting account of the influence of Sir William's writings in America (printed in the Appendix), visited him in Edinburgh in 1853. He thus records his impressions:—

"The writer of these lines had a slight personal acquaintance with Sir William Hamilton, the remembrance of which he will ever cherish with unalloyed satisfaction. In June 1853 he spent a few days in Edinburgh, when on his way to Germany to prosecute his studies. Though at that time he had for a few years taught in philosophy, he felt all the timidity of a novice in the presence of the very eminent scholar and critic, whose writings he had read with so much interest and respect. I was of course impressed by his commanding presence and his wonderful eye, but even more by the simplicity of his manners, and the cordiality of his personal feelings. The combination of commanding dignity and winning sweetness was remarkable—more remarkable, with one or two exceptions, than in any man whom I have known. His look and manner, his thought and speech, gave the impression of an intellect and character of singular and irrepressible fire and energy, which would always command respect and enforce compliance. But to a stranger, his unaffected simplicity and sympathetic kindness were quite as noticeable, especially when set off against such gigantic power and volcanic energy. He entered at once into all my plans with the interest and

warmth of an old friend, answered all my questions with the greatest readiness, talked to me about books and men with unwearied patience, and treated my comparative illiteracy with the utmost consideration. His infirmity evidently sat heavily upon him, most sadly and painfully impeding his powers of speech and locomotion. He did not seem, however, annoyed by his slow and imperfect utterance, but quietly and gracefully sought to remove from my own mind all the sense of disquiet or discomfort which I might feel from sympathy with himself. In order, as it seemed to me, to remove any such feeling, he spoke to me freely of this infirmity, and of his varying condition on different days, depending on the changing condition of his nervous system. He expressed a warm interest in the scholarship of my own country, repeated his surprise at having read in the 'Methodist Quarterly Review' a series of very able papers upon the philosophy of Comte, and spoke in flattering terms of the high position which the country would soon occupy in his own favourite sciences. He talked freely and emphatically, in what, I presume, was his usual vein, of the Scottish University system, and of its effects upon the scholarship of the country. He spoke very familiarly and freely, in answer to my questions, of his courses of instruction; and when I expressed a very strong desire to attend the course in Psychology, he replied that I should find it comparatively worth but little, and very incomplete, intimating most distinctly that the course upon Logic was far more finished and satisfactory to himself. I sent him a few trifling pamphlets on my return from Germany, and afterwards from America, and received a very courteous letter in reply—an attention which, considering his infirmity, and the very slight claim I had upon him, I regarded as illustrating the kindness and simplicity of his nature."

The following fragments of letters refer to elementary inquiries about the doctrine of Association. They were written by Lady Hamilton to dictation :—

Nov. or Dec. 1852.

The Lectures on Association were written previously to a more accurate consideration, especially of Aristotle's doctrine on the subject, which you will find in the two last printed Dissertations upon Reid. Professor \* \* \* \* seems to think that what Sir William calls the Law of Redintegration may be reduced to the principle of custom or habit. But this, Sir William says, is not correct, because custom is more than one action, being a repetition of the same. Custom, therefore, supposes the principle of redintegration, but the principle of redintegration does not suppose custom. There is an old English proverb, "*Once is no custom*," but the German adage is better, being rhyme—"*Einmal ist Keinmal*." Sir William says that his emendation of Aristotle's text, § 8—"from the absurd and impertinent"—is well illustrated by the French proverb, "Apropos des bottes."

15th Dec. 1852.

The question is, whether what Sir William calls the Law of Redintegration be the primary or most generic law of Association. On this see Dissertations on Reid, p. 897 *et seq.* The tendency to redintegrate cannot be called *custom*, though it be the basis of custom; for custom, the result of which is habit, supposes a plurality of redintegrations, that is a repetition of it. This the proverbs which I wrote you in last letter recognise; the English adage, "*Once is no custom*," the German, "*Einmal ist Keinmal*." We ought, therefore, Sir William says, to keep redintegration distinct from habit or custom. Custom is, in fact, the association itself—that is, the consecution of thought on thought, through a psychological tendency in opposition to logical necessity. This you will see frequently stated on p. 894 and 895, especially, of the Dissertations. In Garnier's new work, at p. 251 *et seq.* is a doctrine of association. You will see (p. 270-278 more particularly) that Garnier makes, without reference to any previous writer, the Law of Redintegration the principal condition of Association.\* "Previous coexistence" may be called the law (that is, the subjective rule or reason) or the cause (that is, the objective principle or determination) or the condition (that is, the limitation under which alone the phenomenon emerges); but Sir William does not think that it can be called the occasion: for why? the occasion is that which is now present; but, *ex hypothesi*, "previous coexistence" is not now present—it is a past cause of a present effect.

\* Facultés de l'Ame, t. II. § 2, c. 1.

In 1853, Sir William was requested by the trustees of Miss Stewart to undertake the superintendence of a collected edition of Mr Dugald Stewart's Works, for the publication of which, in fulfilment of her instructions, they were making arrangements. Miss Stewart had herself named Sir William as the editor whom she would prefer above all others. He agreed to the proposal, and this task mainly occupied his time from this date onwards. The purely editorial part of the task did not imply much labour, as Sir William was not expected to do more than revise the text, and arrange generally the order of the Works. The Lectures on Political Economy, however, which had not been printed before, gave him a good deal of thought and trouble. To this portion of the work, which consisted of two volumes, Sir William wrote a short but very excellent preface. This was the last composition which he gave to the world. The issue of the Works was intended to comprise a Memoir of Mr Stewart by the Editor; but this Sir William did not live to accomplish.

The Messrs Black of Edinburgh, while bringing out the last edition of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' were desirous that Sir William should contribute to the work a Dissertation on the History of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy, carrying on the subject from the points at which the Dissertations of Stewart and Mackintosh had left off, and thus supplying an account of the more modern systems of speculation, especially in Germany and France, during the first half of this century. This task, as also a subsequent proposal that he should contribute the article "Logic" to the same work, Sir William, with much regret, was constrained to decline, on account of the prospect of the full occupation of his time and strength by the editing of Stewart's Works.

The letters from home to Lieutenant Hamilton give us further continuous glimpses of Sir William, and form the chief materials for illustrating his life from this period onwards to the close:—

LADY HAMILTON TO W. HAMILTON.

*7th June 1852.*

. . . Your papa is quite well, and speaks of setting to work to finish his notes to Reid; but as yet he has done nothing. A great accumulation of letters have required answering, and as that is an employment he does not like, he does not make much progress.

*17th August 1852.*

We have been trying to persuade him to finish the notes to Reid, but he seems to be frightened to begin.

TO H. HAMILTON.

*Jan. 1853.*

There is a long and complimentary article on your papa's Reid and 'Discussions,' in the 'North American Review.' I send it, and you will return it on Monday. As usual, your papa says in some points he has been altogether misunderstood.

*5th February 1853.*

. . . The greatest piece of news that I have to tell you this letter is what I consider something of a misfortune!—that your papa has found out that he can attend an auction, which he has not done since his illness, more than eight years ago! The inducement to this unusual proceeding has been the sale of the valuable library of the late Lord Glenlee. The books were in beautiful order, and of the best editions. However, the greater part were mathematical, and, of course, they did not tempt your papa; nevertheless he has bought a good many volumes. He seems well pleased with his purchases.

TO W. HAMILTON.

*2d July 1853.*

There will be one advantage in going out of town so early—we shall escape the strangers who are continually invading us. Already we have had several Americans, and the other night we had quite a brilliant little party—a Sicilian *prince* and his friend, a Polish nobleman, whom Count Krasinski asked leave to introduce to your papa. Fortunately, several people who speak French and Italian well were here, so we got on very well, and the prince was most agreeable and affable.

The somewhat unvarying tenor of Sir William's life was a little broken in upon in the summer months by an annual migration to the country. The place of temporary sojourn was generally on the sea-coast. Occasionally we find the family located in an inland residence. Sir William liked bracing air, especially of the sea ; and as latterly he never otherwise left home, he found himself benefited by the yearly change, though the actual moving from his usual haunts was a troublesome exertion, which he would not of himself have undertaken.

When in the country, he generally accompanied his family in expeditions and picnics, which he enjoyed as much as the youngest. A characteristic feature of him came out very markedly in those summer sojourns,—the readiness and zest with which he entered into his children's pursuits and amusements—rejoicing, and, as far as he was able, taking part, in every youthful pastime. A round game with his family delighted him at any time. But the country afforded scope for another form of pastime. His mechanical turn had, from his own early boyhood, found an outlet in the construction of kites, for which among juveniles he was famous. Two of his productions in this line had a traditional fame, and were always reported as marvels of art ! The one was an immense fellow, and the other a very small one, but of elaborate construction. One of intermediate size was regularly carried to the country. When it rose in successful flight from the sands of Leven, or the uplands of Lanarkshire, amid the plaudits of the youngsters, it was difficult to say whether they or the constructor himself had the greater enjoyment. This was but the outcome of a part of his character, which was not so generally known or understood as the sterner side. There was, indeed, a loveliness and a depth of tenderness in Sir William's strong, hard-knit nature which those who knew him only as the abstract thinker, or as the fierce polemic—keen, unsparing, and impatient of contradiction—did not dream of. So may we find in the massive mountain, which towers high, immovable,



and grim against the sky, that all is not as in the distance appears; for, in the shadowy recesses of its bosom there are pure founts and streams, deep as it is high, which are ever flowing, beautiful, bountiful, and blessed.

TO W. HAMILTON.

LARGO, 17th September 1853.

. . . At length I am happy to announce to you that the new edition of the 'Discussions' is finished and sent off to London. . . . I wish I could also tell you that the preparations for the edition of Stewart's collected writings were commenced; for I fear it will require all (and more than) the time allowed for the completion of the publication; but you know it is always a difficult matter to get your papa to bring his mind to the work he ought to do; and as yet we have not been successful in persuading him to begin to look over the MSS. and other materials whilst he has Hubert at home to assist him, and whilst he is free from the interruptions to which he is exposed in town. Our time here is now drawing to an end, which we are all sorry for, as we have enjoyed our summer very much, notwithstanding our poor accommodation.

At Largo (Fifeshire), in the autumn of 1853, he met with a very alarming and serious accident. In walking up-stairs alone, as he was at this time accustomed to do, he fell and broke his right arm. The doctor of the place was very skilful, and, under his care, Sir William recovered wonderfully quickly from the accident; but it was afterwards surmised that in the shock to the brain by this fall on his head lay the first cause of an illness which he had in the following winter, and after which he never recovered his former vigour.

Just before the commencement of the session, Lady Hamilton writes:—

TO W. HAMILTON.

25th October 1853.

Your papa is very well. He has not yet commenced with Stewart, but will I suppose be obliged to do so next week; in the mean time he is absorbed in some logical speculations.

Only some weeks later, however, Sir William was taken ill. During his recovery Lady Hamilton thus writes to her son :—

*6th January 1854.*

I did not write by Southampton, thinking it better to give you the latest accounts of your papa. I am glad to tell you he is considerably better since my last, and for the past week he has been in the drawing-room for several hours every day. He sleeps well, eats well, and looks well, and I think has been more cheerful since he has been down-stairs; but he is so extremely nervous about falling, it is very difficult to persuade him to take any exercise, so his walking does not improve so much as we could wish. However, the weather has been so extremely cold, I daresay his difficulty in walking has been very much the result of the cold, and we hope when the hard frost takes its departure he will feel less stiff. Yesterday the thermometer was ten degrees higher, and he seemed much more comfortable in respect to heat. What vexes us most is that he does not attempt to resume work; indeed the very thought of applying himself to anything like work makes him quite nervous; and, except occasionally looking over a proof, he has not had a book in his own hand since he was laid up. We read to him constantly. He is much interested in the newspapers, of which we have always a plentiful supply. I think it is fortunate that your papa has got the editorship of Mr Stewart's Works to do, as I trust it will not give him a great deal of trouble, and yet it will be an inducement to exertion. But I have little hope of his being able to write the Memoir, for it would require more mental exertion than he seems now equal to. However, I trust he will be quite able to superintend the printing of the Works, as Miss Petre and I can do a good deal of the drudgery of looking over the various editions, &c.

*2d Feb. 1854.*

. . . You will be glad to learn that for the last three days your papa has been going up to his class. He has certainly been much better this last fortnight, but he feels the fatigue of going to the College very much. Robertson, the porter (whom you will remember), goes with another man to carry your papa up the stairs in a chair, as he finds it too fatiguing to walk up the long stair when none of his own family are there to afford him the accustomed assistance. By another session we must try and have matters better arranged, and, if possible, get a class-room on the ground-floor.

18th March 1854.

. . . My report of your papa must be very much the same as it has been for some letters back. He continues to go to the College and to take a short walk after his return; but he is still timid about walking a step alone, and he never attempts to rise off his chair or sofa without assistance. He complains of being weak, yet I don't think he is really so, unless it is in his limbs; and this is induced, I have no doubt, by want of exercise. The printing of Stewart's Works goes on, and affords him occupation and interest exactly suited to his present state of health; for this we cannot be sufficiently thankful—for he could not be contented without some mental employment, and yet I do not think he is able at present for original thought, so this is just the thing for him.

To H. HAMILTON.

27th April 1854.

I daresay you will be looking to receive another letter from home; so, as Miss Petre and papa are busy reading over a "proof," I may as well take a little chat with you. The sheet they are reading is the last of the second volume; to-morrow the third volume will be commenced; so you see the work is getting on. . . . In regard to Mr Thomson's [Archbishop of York] question as to which is the best 'Manual of Psychology,' your papa says he is totally unable to answer it; for he considers one such book good in this respect, another in that, but he cannot name any one which he would recommend as absolutely and pre-eminently the best. He has seen, he cannot say read, the principal modern manuals of the kind written in Germany, France, Italy, Holland, and Denmark, besides those of British authors, but he finds it difficult to make a selection—indeed, does not feel able for it at present, when his mind is occupied with other matters, and he has little strength to spare. . . . Your papa desires me to return upon Mr Thomson's inquiry to supply what I had omitted to state, that he might mention Garnier's book, 'Traité des Facultés de l'Ame,' as affording one of the most recent digests of the kind from France, though he does not think it very profound.

A portion of the summer of 1854 was spent at Cordale, in Dumbartonshire, on the banks of the Leven. Sir William's health was not so good as in the preceding summer,—the ill-

ness of the previous winter having told on him,—and he was busy with his edition of Stewart's Works. But both he and Lady Hamilton had spent many pleasant days of their youth in this spot, and there was a quiet happiness in again sojourning for a little amid the former scenes of life. Since the time of his boyhood, the past had been nobly used, and the near close of the future was unseen. "He would often stop in his wheel-chair," says his daughter, "to gaze on the beauty of the views from the walks near the house. The pretty old-fashioned garden he enjoyed, and was often in it, sitting on a shady seat near the river, or walking on the grassy paths. He and Miss Petre \* used to sit out of doors making the index to one of the volumes of Stewart's Works, and looking quite picturesque, as well as happy, in their combination of labour with enjoyment. He had a swing put up, which he would come and watch us using. During this summer we were seldom without visitors, whom he was always glad to see, particularly as they were often old friends with whom of late he had not had the opportunity of holding much intercourse."

TO W. HAMILTON.

CORDALE, 17th June 1854.

I am sure you will be pleased to receive a letter dated from Cordale, and to know that we are so comfortably settled for the summer, as we find ourselves in this sweet place, which has to me at least the pleasing associations of the home of my early days. The house is much improved, but, I am glad to say, little changed in external appearance; and the garden and grounds remain the same I have ever known them, except that the trees are nearly fifty years older!

CORDALE, 2d August 1854.

. . . We are all well, and now all gathered together, except your dear self; and that you were with us is, I think, all that is wanted to make us perfectly happy in this sweet quiet place, which seems

\* Miss Petre had resided for several years in Sir William's family as governess to his daughter, and now assisted him in his labours on Stewart's Works with a zeal and intelligence of which he always expressed a grateful sense.

so much of a home to me. For some time past we have had very fine weather, and have enjoyed our drives very much ; and on Saturday last we accomplished a great thing in taking your papa round the Loch [Lomond] in the steamer ; and having made out this expedition to his satisfaction, I hope we shall be able to get him to undertake some others. I think he has been very much better and happier since we have been having more people with us, especially friends with whom he is on no ceremony.

CORDALE, 17th Sept. 1854.

. . . It is a year to-day since your papa broke his arm ; and although I think it has told upon him in many respects, and he is much more infirm and helpless than he was some two or three years ago, we have reason to be thankful he is upon the whole so well. He is looking very well at present, and is walking better, and more than when we came here ; but as the time draws on for our return to Edinburgh, he is beginning to be troubled about the class, and how he is to get on in the winter. I have long been anxious on this point, but as he never mentioned the subject, I refrained from speaking to him. My own opinion is that he ought to have resigned last spring, and applied to Government to grant him a retiring allowance. We shall leave this the end of the month, and I am sure we shall all leave it with great regret and with much gratitude to our kind cousins, who have enabled us to spend such a comfortable and pleasant summer. All the party have had great enjoyment. . . . Your papa and I have been all the better of the variety of seeing a number of old friends, who have seemed to find pleasure in coming here to visit us.

The following were written after the family returned to town :—

18th October 1854.

. . . The house is now at last in tolerable order, and we are settled down into our old ways. Your papa is kept busy by the printer sending him "proofs" every evening. . . . Yesterday Mr Ferrier and two or three other gentlemen dined here, which was something of an event, as your papa, for a long period before we left town, thought himself quite unable to have company. He enjoyed himself, however, last night very much, although he did not speak much, except when enticed into a discussion on the "Absolute" by Mr Ferrier, whose book is at length on the eve of publication.\*

\* Institutes of Metaphysic.

2d Nov. 1854.

. . . You will be glad to hear we are all well here, and that your papa was able to commence his lectures yesterday, and to get through the fatigue and worry more comfortably than we expected.

. . . Your papa has just got Mr Ferrier's book, which he has been so long engaged in writing. It is a very nice-looking volume outwardly, but your papa does not appear to think so much of its contents; but he and Mr Ferrier have differed on "the Absolute," the subject of the book, for the last twenty years, so it is not to be expected that they will agree now.

23d Nov. 1854.

. . . You will be glad to hear we are all well, and particularly that your papa continues to get on comfortably with his College duties. He is decidedly much better than he was last year; he walks up and down stairs, and reads at least half an hour; nor does he feel tired with his exertions, but is generally ready to take his walk when he comes home. Still the nervous dread of falling remains, and he never attempts to walk a step alone, or to use his stick.

TO H. HAMILTON.

15th Feb. 1855.

Bill's kind and generous offer has quite overcome his father and me; of course we could never think of accepting it; but that does not diminish the gratification which we feel, that he should have wished to make so great a sacrifice of his own income to increase ours. I do not remember having expressed any anxiety that your papa should give up his professorship; but since I did, it must have been previous to the commencement of the session, when, of course, it was a matter of doubt and anxiety how he was to get on. To his own feelings, and to ours, it is certainly very painful, that when so unable for his work, he should be compelled to go on with it for the sake of income; but at the same time in many respects it is good for him, particularly in causing him to make the bodily exertion, and in giving him the variety of occupation, which is needful, and which it is always difficult to persuade him to take; and, for these reasons, it is well that he should retain his professorship as long as he can at all fulfil its duties.

4th April 1855.

Your papa is pretty well, though he complains much of feeling weak, and I think is walking ill. The class will not finish till next

week. The index to the Active Powers is well advanced ; indeed, Miss Petre expects it will be finished in a few days, so the seventh volume of the Works will soon be out.

TO W. HAMILTON.

*2d April 1855.*

. . . Your papa is well ; he intended to have dictated a few lines to you, but he was tired, and having been much agitated with the news of your letter, I persuaded him to go to bed, promising I would give you his kindest love and blessing, and tell you how thankful and proud he is of his son.

The incident here referred to was a nocturnal attack by a party of hill-men on the tent of Lieutenant Hamilton. They were in considerable number, and well provided with arms, while he, suddenly aroused, had nothing but a partially-loaded revolver with which to protect himself. After a struggle, in which he showed great presence of mind and courage, he drove off his assailants. Another similar attack, which had proved fatal to the person assailed, and the news of which reached Edinburgh at the same period, increased the emotion with which Sir William regarded the fortunate issue of the assault on his son. An accidental reference in the class, shortly after he had learned Lieutenant Hamilton's escape, to a case in which danger was similarly ward off by personal bravery, caused Sir William to give way to strong emotion.

TO W. HAMILTON.

*24th May 1855.*

. . . Your papa is now busy printing the eighth volume of Stewart's Works, which is to contain the Lectures on Political Economy ; and as they are in MS., and require a great deal of arrangement, he has been a good deal bothered ; but he finds a most efficient assistant in Miss Petre.

*13th June 1855.*

. . . Your papa is in his usual health, only very nervous at the thought of writing the Memoir of Stewart. I don't know what to do, whether to urge him to give it up altogether or not.

He thinks he is unable to do it, yet I think he would be sorry to give it up, and I always hope, if it were once begun, he would find he was getting on better than he anticipated.

The autumn of 1855,—when he left home for the last time,—was spent at Auchtertool, an inland and retired spot in Fifeshire. At this time Sir William frequently felt both ill in health and depressed in spirits, and there was about him an unusual want of tone and vigour. This was apparently the beginning of that decline of strength which ended fatally the following year. The thought of the Memoir of Mr Stewart weighed heavily on his mind. The kind of composition was comparatively new to him, and in his present health and spirits he had no courage to look forward to the task. He seemed, however, to derive benefit from his stay at Auchtertool, which suited him extremely well. He was much in the open air, the neighbourhood being so quiet that, in a little wheel-chair drawn by his sons, he was able to share in the walks of the rest of the party, which he thoroughly enjoyed, and from which he would come home braced and cheered.

Some fragments on the Scottish Philosophy (printed in the Appendix to his metaphysical lectures), which were written in connection with the Memoir of Mr Stewart, and were his last philosophical compositions, date from this time.

LADY HAMILTON TO W. HAMILTON.

AUCHTERTOOL, 1st Sept. 1855.

. . . It is well I had written so much of my letter before going out, for we have had such a long expedition I am quite worn out and can scarcely keep myself awake. Your papa's chair-carriage is really invaluable to him. I wish you saw the road we took him to-day, and the two hills he mounted. You would be astonished both at what he can accomplish in the way of walking, and what Hubert, Bessy, and Tommy can do in the way of drawing him. I think papa is certainly better since my last; but still his work is not



begun. He has been doing a little at other things, though the Memoir has received no attention; but every day I hope he will commence. It is vexing that already so much time has been lost.

We have had one or two visitors of late. The first was an American gentleman, who has been studying in Germany for two years, and can talk of nothing but German philosophy. He is translating a History of Philosophy from German into English, and wished papa's opinion upon it. He came quite unexpectedly one day, and stayed till next morning.

AUCHTERTOOL, 17th Sept. 1855.

. . . Your papa sends you his blessing, and fondest and best good wishes [on his birthday]. Letter-writing is such a burden to him, he hopes you will excuse him, and believe that it is from no want of affectionate interest that he does not express his feelings except through me. This place has agreed with him remarkably well, and in every way suits him, and his general health has much improved; but his spirits are still much depressed, and his work does not get on. How it is to be got through I don't know, but we hope he is getting a little more interested in it, and that, when the pressure of necessity comes, he will set to work in earnest.

After the family had returned to town for the winter, Lady Hamilton writes:—

To W. HAMILTON.

2d Nov. 1855.

. . . Your father was very nervous and feeling very weak last week, but I think he is better again. The anticipation of the class beginning upsets him, but I hope he will not find it so unpleasant after the first few days are over.

To H. HAMILTON.

16th Nov. 1855.

I am sure you are wearying to hear again how your papa gets on at the College; and for these some nights past I have fully intended to write, but there has been so much to do, and I have been so tired, I have been quite unable to fulfil my intention. I am happy to tell you your father keeps well, and, from all I can hear, gets on as well at the College as last year. At home we think he is speaking

better. One evening we had Mr \* \* \* at tea, and we were all struck with your papa speaking so well and distinctly ; indeed, we all think him better since the class commenced. The printing of the second volume of the 'Political Economy' goes on rapidly—a proof almost every night, which is hard work for him and Miss Petre.

TO W. HAMILTON.

7th Dec. 1855.

. . . Since my last, both your papa and I have had a good deal of worry and annoyance—he, from having to write a Preface to the first volume of Stewart's 'Political Economy' hurriedly and unexpectedly, as the publisher had not intended to bring out that volume until the second was ready, but found occasion to change his mind, somewhat inconveniently for papa, who has little leisure or strength for extra work during the College session. Fortunately, some of it had been written whilst we were in the country, but it is curious how the strength comes when exertion is requisite, and we have all been surprised to see how well he has got through the hurry, and written really a very good advertisement—perhaps the best he has composed for Stewart's Works. He gets on also in the class much better than we anticipated, reading generally about half an hour ; and, altogether, we think him happier and more cheerful since the class commenced.

19th Dec. 1855.

. . . Within these few days your papa has got one load off his mind by the publication of the first volume of Stewart's 'Political Economy,' and the satisfaction which his Preface has given to the Trustees, and to those more immediately concerned in the publication. As the contents of this volume have not been printed before, and as it has cost an immense amount of trouble to arrange the MSS., it will be a pleasant thing if the volume is well received by the public ; we shall therefore be looking out anxiously for notices of it in the reviews and newspapers.

13th Feb. 1856.

. . . When I said to your papa on the 12th, "This is the seventh anniversary of Billy's leaving us," he burst into tears at the thought that he might never be allowed to see you again in this world. . . . He is pretty well, and has not missed a day in going to his class, but he reads very little of the lecture himself. The second volume

of Stewart's 'Political Economy' is now completed, as far as your father is concerned, so now the only portion of the undertaking which is to do is the Memoir, to which I suppose he will not do anything till the College session is over. Indeed he has neither leisure nor strength for it at present.

19th March 1856.

. . . I am glad to say we are all very well—your papa holding out wonderfully, though now looking forward to the termination of the College session with some impatience, and counting the days, like a schoolboy those to the commencement of his holidays. We are to have the first students' party to-morrow evening. The Bannatynes have given us a very kind and pressing invitation to pay them a visit as soon as the class is over. . . . I should like it very much, and so I think would your papa, but I fear he will not be able to make up his mind to the exertion, he is so very nervous and unwilling for any change. It would, however, I am sure, be a refreshment to us all, and with the Bannatynes he might do as he likes and feel under no restraint. I think one thing that might tempt him is the wish to see the Glasgow Cathedral, which has been undergoing a complete repair and restoration.

3d April 1856.

. . . Your papa is just off to the College; next week his class will close, which will be a relief to him.\*

18th April 1856.

We have been reading a deeply interesting memoir of an officer who was killed last spring in the Crimea, as truly pious as he was brave, and the latter years of whose life were spent in the most zealous efforts to do good to all who came within his influence [Captain Hedley Vicars]. . . . Your papa has been much interested in it, and as we read it to him many times the tears were running down his cheeks.

The College session came to an end about the 10th or 12th of April. Sir William was daily in his class-room to the

\* The following is a list of the number of students who attended the class during Sir William's occupancy of the Chair :—In 1836-7, 117; 1837-8, 172; 1838-9, 155; 1839-40, 128; 1840-1, 117; 1841-2, 108; 1842-3, 105; 1843-4, 129; 1844-5, 110; 1845-6, 174; 1846-7, 104; 1847-8, 122; 1848-9, 111; 1849-50, 159; 1850-1, 146; 1851-2, 166; 1852-3, 150; 1853-4, 157; 1854-5, 132; 1855-6, 143; making an average each year of 135. There was thus, on the whole, an increase of the attendance during the latter years of Sir William's professorship.

last ; and after the work of the session was over, he took leave, as usual, of the class with the simple but heartfelt and impressive words—"God bless you all." It was noticed that on no former occasion had he spoken the words with more emphasis.

There was, as we have seen, a little plan, in which he himself was interested, of going to Glasgow to visit his cousins, Mrs Stark and the Misses Bannatyne ; and it was proposed to proceed thence to Fairlie in Ayrshire, to spend a short time with his friend and relation Miss Home, who was ill. Evidently he was far from well, and it was thought that a change might do him good. Shortly after the close of the session he had attacks of giddiness and headache. With care and quiet these passed away for a time ; then they recurred so as to cause considerable anxiety. The proposed journey was accordingly given up.

The end was now very soon to come.

On Monday, the 28th April, Sir William was down-stairs for the last time. He employed himself in looking over and correcting the proof of a short account of Heyne, written by him for a former edition of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' with the view of making a few alterations rendered necessary by lapse of time. He seemed so much better that there was again some talk of leaving home. But during the night a temporary confusion of mind seemed to come over him, which alarmed his family. He lay in bed for the next few days, not suffering, and able to listen to reading. A friend had lent him the Life of Dr Kitto, in which he was much interested.

On 2d May Lady Hamilton wrote to her eldest son :—

Your papa sends you his blessing. He seldom speaks of you that the tears do not come into his eyes. I hope I shall be able to give you a better account of him when I next write.

The same day he attempted to rise but found himself unable. From that time he gradually became worse. The illness was pronounced congestion of the brain, and the physician's aid

was in vain. On Monday, the 5th, he fell into a state of unconsciousness, yet with lucid intervals, in which he was able to recognise and faintly speak to those about him. As night drew on the unconsciousness became more profound, and early next morning life ceased.

"A simpler and a grander nature never arose out of darkness into human life: a truer and a manlier character God never made. How plain and yet how polished was his life in all its ways; how refined, yet how robust and broad his intelligence in all its workings! . . . His contributions to philosophy have been great; but the man himself was greater far." So wrote one who, knowing him long, and loving him well, and, unbiassed by assent to the conclusions of his philosophy, was well fitted to appreciate him.\* No one could come into contact with Hamilton without feeling that in him simplicity was blended with the truest manliness. The ground of his nature was simplicity;—its strength was sustained and nourished from this root. All through life there was a singleness of aim, a purity, devotion, and unworldliness of purpose, and a childlike freshness of feeling, which accompanied, guided, and in a great measure constituted his intellectual greatness. To the vulgar ambitions of the world he was indifferent as a child; in his soul he scorned the common artifices and measures of compromise by which they are frequently sought and secured. To be a master of thought and learning, he had an ambition; in this sphere he naturally and spontaneously found the outlet for his powers. But this craving, passionate as it was, never did harm to the moral nature of the man. The increase of years, the growth of learning and fame, took nothing away from the simplicity of his aim, his devotion to its pursuit, or his freshness of heart. No sordid covering ever gathered over his soul to restrain the warmth, the quickness, the chivalrousness, the generosity of his early emotions; no hardened satisfaction with the routine of the world settled down on a

\* Professor Ferrier.

nature which had looked so long and so steadily at the point where definite human knowledge merges in faith:—

“Time, which matures the intellectual part,  
Had tinged the hairs with grey, but left untouched the heart.”

The elevated intellectual sphere in which he lived carried with it a corresponding elevation and purity of moral atmosphere; the ideals of philosophy had been to him far more than the world of the real.

We might reasonably expect that a prolonged meditation of the great metaphysical questions about this universe of which we are a part, would have a tendency, as a sense of their vastness and ultimate insolubility grew in the mind, to touch the moral and spiritual soul within, to quicken awe, and thus to take from the keenness of the intellectual questioning, by teaching the hopelessness of an adequate speculative comprehension of them. The imperfection of theory would thus remain as the last result, as at once the sign of personal reverence, and the moral tribute of a great intellect to the ultimate reach of a theme which is felt to surpass the bounds alike of individual intelligence and of the experience of the race, as far as that has yet been unfolded. Those who were familiar with the daily life of Hamilton through the greater part of its course, observed towards the close, and while his intellect was vigorous as ever, that there appeared in him an increasing feeling of that mysterious side of things, the recognition of which it was the purport of his philosophy to show to be rationally unavoidable on any view of human experience that may be taken. In the questionings of his prime, he reached what seemed to him the insuperable limitations of thought regarding transcendent being; gathering withal gleams of faith and hope from the very barrier that arrested speculative advance. If at that time he seemed to dwell mainly on the limitation of knowledge, and merely to indicate the suggestions of our natural faith regarding what is beyond all that we definitely know, in the subsequent period of his life he felt more strongly the force of the latter, and

what had appeared the lesser light at noon grew gradually greater and brighter as the shadows fell. In the one hour of consciousness that preceded the close, he found expression for his feelings in these words: "Thy rod and thy staff, they comfort me."

On the tombstone in one of the vaults of St John's Chapel, Edinburgh, where Sir William was laid, the following words are inscribed:—

**In Memory of**  
**SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BARONET,**

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,

WHO DIED 6TH MAY 1856, AGED 68 YEARS.

HIS AIM

WAS, BY A PURE PHILOSOPHY, TO TEACH

THAT

NOW WE SEE THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY,

NOW WE KNOW IN PART:

HIS HOPE

THAT, IN THE LIFE TO COME,

HE SHOULD SEE FACE TO FACE,

AND KNOW EVEN AS ALSO HE IS KNOWN.

## CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

### READING, COMMONPLACE-BOOK, AND LIBRARY.

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO READING BY HAMILTON—READING AND NON-READING PHILOSOPHERS—LEIBNITZ AND HAMILTON—RELATION BETWEEN HIS READING AND THINKING—VALUE OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE IN HIS TIME—CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS READING—THE LARGE COMMONPLACE-BOOK—WORKS OF REFERENCE—BIBLIOGRAPHIES—FORMATION OF LIBRARY—MECHANICAL SKILL—SIZING—CONTENTS OF LIBRARY—ACUTE DICTA—GENERAL REMARKS—FELLOWSHIP—BUST.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S writings are obviously distinguished by an extraordinary acquaintance with the literature of their subjects, and a ready command of his stores of learning. It may therefore be interesting to give some account, in a concluding chapter, of his general habits of reading and study, of his library, and of the modes by which he succeeded in amassing, and making readily available, his minute, ample, and varied learning. His habits of study, and the helps which he used in reading, and conserving what he read, form matter of general description rather than of narrative, characteristic as they were of the man all through his life, from his college days onwards. Nor can these points be properly described without a reference to certain of the more prominent characteristics of his mind.

To the mastery and treatment of a subject, the essential preliminary with Sir W. Hamilton was reading. He must know, in the first place, what had been thought and written by others



on the point which he proposed to consider. In this respect he may be taken as the extreme contrast of many men who have given their attention to speculative questions. Hobbes, Locke, Brown—to say nothing of writers nearer the present time—were content with a very limited knowledge of the conclusions of others on the subjects which they discussed. Hamilton's writings show how little he sympathised with men of the non-reading type—how he was even blinded, to some extent, to their proper merits—as in his references to Brown and Whately. In the universality of his reading, and knowledge of philosophical opinions, he is to be ranked above all those in Britain who have given their attention to speculative questions since the time of Bacon, with the exception, perhaps, of Cudworth. Dugald Stewart was probably his superior in acquaintance with general literature, but certainly far from his equal in philosophical learning. On the Continent, the name which in this respect can be placed most fittingly alongside of Hamilton during the same period is Leibnitz.

Between Leibnitz and Hamilton, indeed, amid essential differences in their views of what is within the compass of legitimate speculation, there are several points of resemblance. The predominating interest of each lay in the pursuit of purely intellectual ideals and wide-reaching general laws, especially in the highest departments of metaphysics. Both were distinguished by rare acuteness, logical consecution, deductive habit of mind, and love of system. They were greater thinkers than observers; more at home among abstract conceptions than concrete realities. Both had a deep interest in the important intellectual and moral questions that open on the vision of thoughtful men in the highest practical sphere of all—the border-land of metaphysics and theology; both had the truest sympathy with the moral side of speculation. In each there was a firm conviction that our thoughts and feelings about the reality and nature of Deity, His relation to the world, human personality, freedom, responsibility, man's rela-

tion to the Divine, were to be vitalised, to receive a meaning and impulse, only from reflection on the ultimate nature and reach of human thought.

To grasp, as far as possible, the entire domain of knowledge—at least, to be found absolutely ignorant in nothing—was their common intellectual ambition; and yet, with all their love of completeness and of system, the way in which each gave to the world the results of his thought and erudition was exceedingly desultory and fragmentary, and far short of the extremely fastidious ideal mode which he had proposed to himself. Both were learned classical scholars; both were well read in Greek philosophy; and if Leibnitz was more Platonic, Hamilton was by far the greater Aristotelian. Both were deeply versed in scholastic philosophy; zealous in historical antiquities; and a similar curiosity impelled them to fields of out-of-the-way research—fields untrodden in their generation save by themselves. They had a like interest in ecclesiastical history and theological controversies; and both viewed with a catholic and tolerant feeling the differences of the sects. If Leibnitz was interested in physical research, and helped to advance mathematics, Hamilton had the specialty of a thoroughly scientific acquaintance with medicine, and was a discoverer in physiology. In the matter of philosophical reading, they were exceedingly alike. Their learning sustained and coloured their thought. In philosophical composition that is at the same time distinctively original, the nearest parallel to the prodigality of the learned references in Hamilton's 'Reid,' is to be found in the 'Théodicée' of Leibnitz: and the miscellaneous papers of the latter show how, like Hamilton, he could extract unappreciated germinative principles from the 'De Anima' or the 'Metaphysics' of Aristotle, and give life, colour, and fruitfulness to scholastic distinctions which to other minds appeared only as barren subtleties. Each, in a word, had the power of detecting the catholic forms of human thought in the varied clothing and terminology which they assume in different reflective epochs, and of making ap-

plications of them to the discussion of the problems of their own time. And, to add to the parallel, both aimed at more than they accomplished; both had to regret unrealised ideals. "Leibnitz," says Gibbon, "may be compared to those heroes whose empire has been lost in the ambition of universal conquest." This is not with any completeness applicable to Hamilton; but it is at least true that he too would have done vastly more had he aimed at less. He would have left results of at least greater bulk, had he been satisfied to work more within the sphere of what he really knew, and yielded less to that noble but somewhat fruitless restlessness which carries the high minds of the race to the outmost circumference of human knowledge.

Sir W. Hamilton's ideal appears, indeed, to have been the impossible one of mastering *all*—all at least of any importance—that had been written on a given subject. To exhaust the literature of a subject on which a man proposed to write, appeared to him so completely a natural prerequisite that he regarded any shortcoming on this score as quite a disgraceful deficiency—one not to be tolerated.\* The terms in which he denounced it were among the strongest in his vocabulary:—"I have heard him," says Archdeacon Sinclair, "charge an eminent scholar with 'brutal ignorance' for not being acquainted with some apposite passage in an obscure author of the middle ages." Underrating, moreover, as a rule, his own extraordinary attainments, he considered other men shamefully deficient in knowledge if they betrayed inferiority to himself in acquaintance with a subject. An amusing example of this is given by Archdeacon Sinclair. Speaking of Archbishop Whately's 'Rhetoric,' Sir William said: "The Archbishop is a clear, bold, powerful thinker; but he is a plagiarist. He fancies himself original, when he is anything but original; and delivers as his own remarks and opinions which he should have known belonged to other men." The Archdeacon inquired of Sir William the names of the authors

\* See above, p. 95—Letter to Faculty of Advocates.

from whom Dr Whately had borrowed without due acknowledgment. He mentioned several books and treatises, most of them long ago forgotten. His friend replied that in all probability the Archbishop had never seen nor heard of the obsolete authorities in question. "So much the worse," replied Sir William. "Why did he undertake to write a treatise on rhetoric without knowing all that had been written before upon the subject?"

Sir William's critical habit of mind, and wonderful power of systematising opinions, found in this wellnigh universal reading their natural nourishment. That this insatiable appetite for books—this *totalising*, as it might be called, of the literature of a subject—absorbed intellectual power somewhat unduly, and frequently led him to postpone, and even finally to abandon, a special definite handling by himself of the subject of his reading, may frankly be admitted. He, probably as much as any man devoted to this mode of working out intellectual questions, was led into a hurtful extreme. But it would be a very great misconception to suppose that he looked upon reading as anything but a means to the end of thinking, or that he really substituted the opinions with which he thus became acquainted for his own final and definite conclusions on the great questions of philosophy. In his Lectures, as already noticed,\* he certainly made a liberal use of his reading for purposes of elementary instruction, and too frequently allowed others to speak for him, especially on the more trite parts of rudimentary logic and psychology. But this temporary application of the results of his reading finds no parallel in any of his deliberate writings.†

All of these show how thoroughly he made the results of his reading subordinate to the efforts of his thought;

\* See above, p. 212.

† In a footnote to Reid's Works, p. 632, on the *Scientia Media*, he has, I notice, unwittingly given the substance, and to a great extent the words, of a passage from the '*Théodicée*' of Leibnitz (Partie I. §§ 39, 40). Anything of this sort, however, in the writings published by himself, is, I am convinced, extremely rare.

and how it was his habit powerfully to vitalise the passive process of reception by the ardent activity of intelligence. "My own direct acquaintance with Sir William Hamilton," says Mr De Quincey, "soon apprised me that, of all great readers, he was the one to whom it was most indispensable that he should react by his own mind on what he read." What he read he mastered, appreciated, subordinated, by his great powers of comprehension and judgment. His progress through the literature of philosophy is at one time as the advance of a great light which brightens the obscure; at another, it is the presence of a quickening power which fructifies the unproductive; and, again, the touch of a master's hand which gives completeness and symmetry to the fragmentary. Then he has none of that littleness of assumption which, disregarding of anything but a superficial knowledge of the past, rests in the narrow world of its own individual impressions—dignifying it with the name of experience. Men of this habit of mind are great in elaborate rediscoveries of elementary psychological facts, which they fondle as novel and important. The discoveries of some of those writers remind one of what Johnson said of Goldsmith's project of going abroad in order to acquire a knowledge of arts peculiar to the East, and introduce them into Britain—that the trophy of novelty he would in all probability carry home with him would be a "grinding-barrow," which was to be seen in every street in London. Parallels to Goldsmith's grinding-barrow in the logical and psychological line are not far to seek. As a rule, such investigators know nothing of the breadth and bearings of the really vital speculative questions. We may rest assured of this, however, that philosophical speculation will be nothing but a series of novel beginnings and fruitless endings—of petty nibblings at this or that side of a wide problem—so long as it does not recognise the worth of past speculative efforts, and fails to seek and to see, in the course of reflective thought, a true progress towards unity amid apparent variety. Of the

two extremes now noted—the limited superficial acquaintance with the forms of past thought, and the vain desire to know and conquer even all that vast region—the former is eminently the more hurtful to the cause of philosophical truth, and morally it is much the less respectable. This spirit, in conceitedly neglecting the historical aspects of philosophical questions, simply throws away data essential for a solution of the questions themselves, and misses the only means of ascertaining the true origin and import of present abstract thought and expression. The horizon—the experience—of any one individual must indeed be a wide one, if it can be substituted for the whole sphere of the past thought of our race.

And we may further note on this point that, in the circumstances of the place and time in which Hamilton worked and wrote—in an island whose speculative writers, however distinguished for force and originality of conception, have never been pre-eminent either for catholicity of view or for learning—he accomplished the one thing that was needed for speculative philosophy, by connecting the best reflective thought of the country with that of the past and the surrounding present; thus freeing it from its insularity, and, in the words of one than whom there was no more competent judge in our day, “forming a bond between the Scotch, Greek, and German philosophy.” \*

Of the literal accuracy, of the reach and variety, of Sir W. Hamilton’s philosophical reading there can be no question. He stands out as the learned philosophical thinker of Britain. This is admitted even by the one or two men who are most forward to disparage his philosophical merits. But, as a foil to this acknowledgment, it is alleged, that while “he knew with extraordinary accuracy the *ἔνσι* of every philosopher’s doctrine, he gave himself little trouble about the *δύσι*.” The same author adds:—“I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind

\* Professor Brandis.

of any great thinker. . . . He is weak as to the mutual relations of philosophical doctrines."\*

There are two points in this criticism. The one refers to what may be called the historical imagination as exercised in philosophy. This is the power of entering into the mind of a thinker, and seeing his system from his own point of view, exhibiting its mutual bearings and relations, and making allowance for the aspect or colouring under which the circumstances of the times in which he lived led him to regard the problems of philosophy. For this power Sir W. Hamilton does not appear, from his writings, to have been especially remarkable; he has not left very much, indeed, from which we can form a favourable judgment of his capacity, and he has left just as little to lead us to form a conclusion of his incompetency. In his notice of the '*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*' there is evidence of considerable historical imagination; and this power is not without its manifestation in his more abstract discussions, in which, however, as the relevant point was the consideration of doctrines rather than of men or entire systems, little pertinent evidence can be looked for.

With regard, however, to the totally different point of the mutual relations of philosophical doctrines, in the apprehension of which he is said to be weak, there can be nothing more thoroughly the reverse of the fact. If strong in anything, he was strong in this—strong in the power of logical consecution, ready to apprehend the mutual connections of doctrines—ready to deduce their consequences, and able to grasp a system in its logical coherence and entirety. No one who reads with any intelligence either the article on Cousin, or that on Perception, especially the latter part, can doubt this. In regard to Hume, Reid, and Brown, he has certainly apprehended, and for the first time in this country, their mutual relations, from the historical point of view. The connection of their doctrines he has seized and emphasised with clear, thoroughgoing, and resistless power. To show

\* Mill, *Examination*, p. 554.

on historical grounds that he has failed in this, would be to adduce relevant evidence of his incapacity. Until this is done, we must hold the charge unsupported by proof.\*

Sir William Hamilton's method of reading and study was exceedingly persistent, concentrative, and minute. The moment a book or subject was taken up, his whole mind was given to it, whatever it might be. No amount of labour or trouble was spared, so long as any point did not appear thoroughly determined, or seemed capable of improvement or emendation. No note was taken by him of the lapse of time; the hours of sleep were systematically disregarded, and a task commenced in the evening would very frequently hold him long past midnight to early morning.

He was careful and fastidious about literal accuracy in everything to an extraordinary degree. Great as were his intellectual powers, and wide and high as was their range, he felt no constraint, apparently, in descending to the minutest details of matters of fact. He seems, indeed, even to have delighted in the minutiae of style and editorship. This was especially shown in his labours on the Works of Reid and Stewart. Proof-sheets were read and re-read, quotations searched out and verified, punctuation corrected. The placing of a comma or the division of a sentence occupied him as thoroughly as if he had never risen to any higher mental exercise—discussed either absolute or infinite. With regard to punctuation he was exceedingly careful, and used to say, "One must either punctuate very much or very little." That he himself greatly favoured the former mode, is obvious. In these lighter labours his ardour diffused itself over his household, and enlisted in the work all the available hands of the family.

Even in his later days, when illness had shattered his bodily strength and frame, this peculiarity continued. "He seemed always to enjoy," says one† who knew him well, and cheerfully aided him in his researches, "the lighter task of

\* For a criticism of the grounds of the opinions contained in the quotations in the text, see Note C, on Hume, Leibnitz, and Aristotle.

† Miss Petre.



revising and correcting, and seldom required much persuasion to engage in it. Even when sitting out of doors in the country, though by no means insensible to the *dolce far niente* apt to be induced by this practice, he was always ready to read a proof or prepare a portion of an index; and once at work, gave his attention as undividedly as if sitting in his parlour at home. Indeed I do not think he could do anything by halves, except, as Lady Hamilton used to say, listen to the reading of the newspapers."

Besides the exhaustiveness already noticed, a peculiarity of Sir William's mode of reading and study was, as might have been expected from his extremely logical cast of intellect, his thorough love of order and system. This was manifested in dealing with particular subjects, the various points of which he carefully divided and arranged in his mind, generally before commencing his researches. The orderliness of his reading reflected the character of his memory, which was singularly retentive, precise, and accurate, as well as ready in reproducing what had been stored up in it. In some memories that are even powerfully retentive, impressions are yet so dim, and so overlies each other—the more remote buried under the more recent—that what is sought is not easily and promptly recalled. Then they arise vague and inaccurate, the general outlines only being preserved, the details faded. With Hamilton it was not so. Intense attention and thought, the power of referring each thing to its class and place, had been at work in the first process of storing: it was not a mere passive reciprocity, but an active effort, an appreciation and digestion; and hence the facts or points noted remained clear and distinct, the more recent not obscuring the more remote, but all lying, as it were, side by side, capable of ready recall and immediate application. This faculty was little, if at all, impaired, even to the end of life; and many of his students, even during the latter years of his teaching, will remember the vast range, the accuracy, the promptitude, of memory which he displayed on

those occasions when, as was the practice in the class, students rose to give historical accounts of men or doctrines, of the subjects of which he was beforehand totally unaware.

But this feature of his method of working was especially shown in the large Commonplace-Book which he constructed, and which contained in orderly arrangement the results of his varied reading. From a very early period of his studies he appears deliberately to have adopted the principle of a commonplace-book, and formed one after the model of Locke. The volume known as the "Large Commonplace-Book" is as old as 1813; it was probably preceded by others of a less elaborate arrangement. "I think," he says, writing in 1853, with his unfailing courtesy, in reply to the inquiry of a stranger—Mr H. W. Chandler, of Pembroke College, Oxford—"that Locke's plan of a commonplace-book is the most convenient; but on this matter I may perhaps be prejudiced, for having first become familiar with his method, to me it may appear the best. His distribution of the index is very good, but I would allow double space for his subdivisions by the vowels. Another recommendation is to have the volume (which I suppose you to get made up) bound with catches, so as to admit of insertions; and especial care should be taken never to place different matter on the opposite sides of a leaf. This allows you, when necessary, to transfer pages from one place to another. I have likewise found it useful to state a problem, leaving room for the insertion of the authorities who maintain the *pro* and the *contra*."

Locke's plan of a commonplace-book, which he himself practised for twenty-five years, is fully stated by him. He thus explains the principle of the index:—"I divide the two first pages that face one another by parallel lines into five-and-twenty equal parts, every fifth line black, the others red. I then cut them perpendicularly by other lines that I draw from the top to the bottom of the page. I put about the middle of each five spaces one of the twenty letters I design to make use of, and a little forward in each space the five

vowels one below another in their natural order. This is the index to the whole volume, how big soever it may be.

"The index being made after this manner, I leave a margin in all the other pages of the book, of about the largeness of an inch in a volume in folio, or a little larger, and in a less volume smaller in proportion.

"If I would put anything in my Commonplace-Book, I find out a head to which I may refer it. Each head ought to be some important and essential word to the matter in hand, and in that word regard is to be had to the first letter, and the vowel that follows it, for upon these two letters depends all the use of the index."\*

Sir William's Large Commonplace-Book—the treasure-house of his stores of learning—is a folio of some twelve hundred pages, of which about eight hundred are devoted to psychological and metaphysical topics, and four hundred to logical—to say nothing of numerous slips inserted between the paged leaves. He had also several smaller commonplace-books, arranged on less rigid principles. The entries in the large volume are brief statements of general and special heads, with the names of authorities who had maintained the various opinions, and references to their works. There are also, pretty frequently, statements more or less extended of personal opinions. The divisions and subdivisions are planned on principles of exact logical order—so much so, that in the portion devoted to logic itself, we have the skeleton outline of a thoroughgoing and exhaustive logical treatise, with most of the points illustrated by an ample array of opinions and authorities. The book was made up and bound in black leather with his own hands; the arrangement, divisions, and subdivisions of the topics were entirely the contrivance of his active and methodical intellect.

The heads of "Attention" and "Expectation of Constancy of Nature" have been selected as affording specimens of the con-

\* For fuller details of the plan and its working, reference may be made to Locke's Works, vol. iii. p. 481 *et seq.* (ed. 1714).

tents of the folio. The part on Attention fills one folio (f. 359) of the Commonplace-Book; that on the Expectation of the Constancy of Nature is distributed over two folios (ff. 284-5).

### Attention.

#### (*Reflection—Observation.*)

##### On, in general.

Vives, *De Anima*, p. 54.

Steeb, II. 675.

Tiedemann, *Unters.* I. 98. *Psych.*

Irwing, II. p. 209.

##### That Attention constitutes—

##### 1°. Analysis.

Condillac, *Log.* c. 2 (*implicite*).

Fracastor., *De Intell.*, Opera, f.

##### 2°. Abstraction.

Bilfinger, *Dil.* § 262, p. 258 (*explicite*).

S' Gravesande, *Introd.* pp. 3, 111 (*implicite*).

Daube, *Idéol.* p. 19.

Bonnet, *Essai Anal.* I. p. 180. *Essai de Psych.* §§ 208, 209.

Tiedemann, *Psych.* p. 121.

Carus (F. A.), *Psych.* II. 254.

Laromiguière, II. p.

Mazure, I. p. 385.

Ernesti, *Init. Doct. Solid.* p. 131, 132.

*N.B.*—That exclusive Attention to one thing constitutes  
Absence to others. Examples of Carneades and Cardan (Steeb,  
II., 671), Tiedem. *Unt.* I. 59, 103.

##### 3°. Reflection.

Wolf, *Psych. Emp.* § 257 (R. to W. not merely on self).

Denzinger, *Log.*

Ernesti, I. D. S. 130 (and Consideration).

##### 4°. Observation.

Thurot, II. p.

##### That Attention involves Will and active faculty.

Occam in *Sent.* L. ii. qu. 15.

Augustin, *De Trin.* L. ii. c. 2 (Fromondus, 558).

Wolf, *Psych. Emp.* § 256.

**Attention.***(Ref.—Obs.)*

- Darjies, *Metaph.* II. p. 8, 78.  
 Gruyer, *Ess.* iii. p. 334.  
 Daube, *Idéol.* p. 23 (against Condillac).  
 Laromiguière.  
 Mazure, I. pp. .  
 Cousin on Laromiguière in Biran's *Œuvres*.

That Attention involves desire and passive power.

- Brown, *Lect.* p. .  
 Destutt Tracy, *Idéol.* I. p. 425, 441, &c.  
 Bonnet, *Ess. Anal.* I. 38, 133.

That Attention the condition of genius, &c.

- Garve in Scheidler *Hod.* p. 186, sq.  
 Stewart, *Elem.* I. p. 107.  
 Gérusez, p. .  
 Ponelle, p. 370.  
 Cuvier in Toussaint, p. 218 (= Patience).  
 Reid, *A. P.*, p. 81.  
 v. Dr Simpson's Address to Students (1842), p. 11.  
 Bonnet, *Essai Anal.* I. *Préf.* p. viii.  
 My Lectures (*Met.*)

*[Slip stuck in.]*

Attention made a sep. fac. by giving it a bit of Consciousness  
 and a bit of Will.

Must distinguish the will and the consciousness.

We do not walk without will, but who ever makes will in ana-  
 lysing the locomotive fac. except as a preliminary condition?

Make a power out of an impotence of the mind.

**Expectation of Constancy of Nature.**

(See above, pp. 35, 157, 215, Adv. Log. 32 b.\*)

Founded on—

1. Habit (
- v. infra*
- Association, No. 5).

Wolf, Phil. Pract., § .

Hobbes, H. N. ch. 4, p. 26.

2. Conclusion of Reasoning.

- a. Conscious one.

Damiron, Psych., I. 165 (result of generalisation).

Princ. Campbell (*v. Stewart*, Essays, 75, 76); (from  
analogical experience and generalisation.)

- b. Unconscious confused one (= Association?).

Wolf, Pa. Emp. § 503–508, *v. Canzii* Psychol. p.

Jacob, Psychol. p. 192.

3. Original Principle.

Reid—Inq. c. vi. § 24 (inductive principle); Ess. I. P. p.  
603.

Stewart, El.

Ess. p. 78.

Brown, Lect. p. 34, 51, 53.

4. Effect of Imagination.

Wetzel, Psychol. II. p. 64.

Fries, N. Kr. I. p. . Gesch. d. Ph.

5. Association of Ideas (
- v. supra*
- Habit, No. 1).

Hume (*v. Stewart*, Ess. p. 75).

Priestley, 86.

? Leibnitz, Monadol. § 26.

Kirwan, Metaph. Essays, p. 390.

Fries, Anthropol. I. p. 70, 2d ed.

E. Reinhold, Lehrb. d. prop. Psychol. p. 87.

\* Another of his commonplace-books.

**Expectation of Constancy of Nature.**

Recognised as a Principle or Law by—  
Aristotle.

Names given to it :

“Expectation or Presumption of the Future.”

Hobbes, H. N. ch. 4.

On this Principle, *v.*

Leibnitz (on Nizol.), Opera, iv. p. i. p. 62.

Monadol., § 26 (Poley on L. p. 146).

Royer Collard.

Krug, Lex. II. 460.

Lossius, Lex. *v.* Erfahrung.

Stewart's Elem. II. p. 220, *alibi*.

*N.B.*—Berkeley, Siria. §§ 252 sq. (Reiffenberg, Log. p. 207.)

Mendelssohn, Morgenstunde, p. .

This *opus magnum* was his constant companion ; in the end it became to him almost an object of affection. It was a part of the man, as far as any object that did not participate in his own sentiency could be. Is there any wonder that he prized the old folio, and prized it increasingly as life waned ? It was to him the symbol of the unresting energy of a whole life ; of physical and mental powers such as are seldom granted to man, spent nobly, ungrudgingly, self-sacrificingly, delightedly. Days, nights, years, had poured their contributions into this treasure-house. It was with him when he was young, and his powers went forth in the abounding delight of their first fresh vigour ; it carried with it the memories and associations of youth and of manhood down through the declining years of life. Its pages bear the record of a course of reading as varied, inquisitive, and resolute, as was ever accomplished by any man in the history of literature or philosophy. There are indications in this folio of the thoughts of the men of nearly all times and nations, who have risen above the common routine of life to an interest in the great questions of speculative philosophy. In a true, though not a literal sense, we may say of him :—

Πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα, καὶ νόον ἔγνω.

There is no part of the world of speculation which seems to have been unvisited ; no height of Greek or German metaphysics is unscaled ; no forest - brake of tangled medieval logic untrod. Self-reliant, unwavering, courage, belief in his work, had sustained him in many a solitary arid track, where he had gone, beyond the sight and sympathy of men, in search of the far-away fountain-heads of knowledge—as little known or visited as the sources of the Niger or the Nile. And here he had before him the tracings of his explorations. Magician-like, he had but to turn the wizard page of his “Book of Might,” and the forms of the dead of two thousand years rose before his vision ; he heard their words and read their thoughts ; and what to most men were simply names



—the mere shadows of the past—entered with him into living and intelligible communion on every high problem of human interest,—on every point of subtle questioning which human thought had pursued for the sake of the effort, or had wrestled with for the sake of the truth,—from the formal niceties of logic to the realities of psychology and metaphysics—the mind, the world, and God.

In the same letter to Mr Chandler, Sir William alludes to another mode of reference to his reading which he practised very extensively. “I must confess,” he says, “that I have been very lazy about my commonplaces, having latterly [chiefly after his illness] adopted the mode of distinguishing the more important passages in any author worthy of the trouble. This I generally do by scoring with red ink, so as to obtain for the eye a good analysis of the treatise. If you choose to be more particular, differently coloured inks may be employed for different kinds of notation. This supposes that you have the book in property.” He was also in the habit of jotting on the fly-leaves and on the margin of the printed pages of a book the subject of particular passages, but especially references to parallel or apposite passages, in the same and other books. Many of the volumes in the library bristle with such references. This, added to the frequent motley appearance of the text, the result of the application of “differently coloured inks,” hardly leaves need for the overt suggestion made above, that, should any one put in practice these memorial devices, the volume to be operated upon should be his own.

Besides the Commonplace-Book, his mechanical skill found other means of preserving the results of his reading. His MSS. had a tendency to multiply at an enormous rate, and the problem was to keep them in order and available for reference. His contrivances for this purpose were various and admirable. “Sometimes the MSS. were distributed in *pockets* of strong paper, very neat and convenient in their construction; sometimes in trays of pasteboard, which served the purpose of drawers. In each case labels—frequently two, one

general and one particular—were attached to tell the nature of the contents; and this was also done when the drawers of a cabinet were used as receptacles. Sometimes written papers were preserved and arranged by being pasted into books of no value. The complicated yet orderly way in which a number of slips, containing insertions, additions, &c., were pasted together, often excites admiration.”

The number of references which Sir William made to authors and their opinions, and the abundance of apt quotations with which he usually illustrated, sometimes overloaded, his compositions, are marked peculiarities of his style. His wide reading and careful noting of passages which struck him, contributed to the general stores from which he drew his quotations. He was, however, greatly aided by books of reference, of which he made constant use. These contained summaries of opinions on philosophical and other questions, quotations of pregnant passages, and sayings in prose and poetry. The works of this class most frequently consulted by him were the ‘*Florilegia*’ of Langius,\* Gruter,† and Magirus,‡ the ‘*Adagia*’ of Erasmus,§ and the ‘*Encyclopædia*’ of Alstedius.||

To these books of reference should be added the lexicons, medieval and modern, of which he had a large collection and made much use. Among these may be mentioned the following: Goclenius (‘*Lexicon Philosophicum Latinum*’); Chauvin (‘*Lexicon Philosophicum*’); Faber (‘*Lexicon Eruditionis Scholasticæ*’); Hofmann (‘*Lexicon Universale*’); Walch and Krug (‘*Philosophisches Lexicon*’); the ‘*Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*’; the ‘*Allgemeine Encyclopædie*’ of Ersch and Gruber; above all, the rare Zedlerian Lexicon.

\* Langii (Josephi) *Florilegium Magnum*. Francof., 1621.

† Gruteri (Jani) *Florilegium*, seu *Polyanthea*. Argentorati, 1624.

‡ Magiri (Tobise) *Polymnemon*, seu *Florilegium Locorum Communium Ordinatum*. Francof., 1628. A great favourite with Sir William. The copy which he was in the habit of using (second ed. of 1661) is full of MS. additions.

§ The edition chiefly used by Sir William was the folio of 1629.

|| Alstedii (J. H.) *Encyclopædia*. Herbornæ Nassov., 1630.

"I well remember the delight," says Mr Hubert Hamilton, "with which the late Count Krasinski, the accomplished author of the 'History of Poland,' &c., while looking round the library, lighted upon the thirty-four vellum-clad volumes of this ponderous work. He wished to consult it on some point of historical interest, but having in vain searched for it in the public libraries of Great Britain, where the very existence of the book was at that time unknown, he little expected to find that it had a place in a private collection. There are now copies in the Edinburgh University and Advocates' libraries."

Of bibliographies there was none which he consulted more frequently than the 'Allgemeines Gelehrten Lexicon' of Jöcher, of which Mr Hill Burton says: "As to bibliographies of the present century aiming at universality, the 'Allgemeines Gelehrten Lexicon' of Jöcher—when accompanied by Adelung's Supplement, which is its better half—for scholarship and completeness casts into shade anything produced either in France or here. It is a guide which few people consult without passing a compliment, either internally or aloud, on the satisfactory result. That it contains an account of every or nearly every book is at once contradicted by its bulk; yet it is often remarked that no one appeals to it in vain—a speciality which seems to have arisen from the peculiar capacity of its editors to dive, as it were, into the hearts of those likely to seek their aid."\*

Collecting books was a habit of Sir William's life second only to the reading of them—a relation between the two habits that does not, however, always prevail. The foundation of his library was laid at Oxford; but the really valuable and characteristic part of it was not acquired until a subsequent period—from about 1820 downwards. With Nestler and Melle of Hamburg he kept up a correspondence from about 1818, getting from them at least one large parcel every year. He was also in the habit of sending orders, though less frequently, to booksellers at Augsburg, Leipsic, Frankfort, and Leyden.

\* Book-Hunter (2d ed.), p. 231.

He was probably the only person in Britain at the time who had any systematic acquaintance with the current philosophical literature of Germany, or who kept up a regular correspondence with the booksellers in this department. In Edinburgh second-hand book-shops were places of pretty constant resort; and of course he was ever and anon, with the true book-hunter's complacency, getting most wonderful bargains at public auctions. When the purchase happened to be a larger one than usual, and he was put on his defence for "extravagance," of course the rarity and value of the tomes rose so greatly as he defended his purchase, that he would end by declaring he had really "got quite a present of them." Considerable additions were made to his collection during the first four or five years of his occupancy of the Logic Chair. At his death it numbered from 9000 to 10,000 volumes.

Occasionally friends or old students would send him books which they knew would interest him. One acquisition made in this way was a collection of MSS. (in fifty-eight volumes) from the library of the Carthusian Monastery at Erfurt, which he owed to the kindness of a former student, Mr John Broad. These MSS. (which for the most part consisted of medieval sermons and theological treatises by writers of no great fame, together with some of the works of Aquinas) had a somewhat curious history. From a short notice prefixed to a catalogue of them by Mr Broad, we learn that "they were preserved at Erfurt until 1805, when the library was broken up and dispersed on the occupation of the city by the French army, who stabled their horses in the place where the books were deposited, and burned many of them for fuel, while others were carried away and secreted with a view to their safety." Some of the latter were bought by the Count de Buelow, on whose death they were purchased from the subsequent possessors by Mr Broad. After Sir William's death they were presented to the Bodleian Library, where they now are.\*

The books were disposed in two rooms on the second floor

\* Macray's *Annals of the Bodleian Library* (1868), p. 285.

of the house, the larger of the two being the back drawing-room, facing the north, the smaller, a sort of recess from this room. There was also a considerable number of volumes, chiefly historical, in the large front drawing-room. In a small room down-stairs, which Sir William usually occupied as a study, were about 300 volumes, being books in more constant use. The room which contained the main part of the library was filled from floor to ceiling. The volumes were arranged mainly according to subject, and subordinately according to size—from folio through the various gradations to duodecimo.

His mechanical skill, which was very remarkable, and which showed itself readily in repairing a damaged article of furniture or a broken toy of the children, found full scope in providing accommodation for his books. He set about this, as was his habit with everything he took in hand, whether mental or mechanical, in a very elaborate way, and on a large and comprehensive scale. The size and structure of the bookcases, their order and position, were entirely of his own devising. A great deal even of the manual work was done with his own hand.

“In the mending and renovating of his books he found both amusement and occupation. On the arrival of a new purchase, his first care (after ascertaining that each volume was complete) was to make a thorough examination of the binding, and if it betrayed any signs of weakness, the glue-pot and other apparatus were got out, and the defect was at once made good. Sometimes the process of restoration was very elaborate, and would form the work of a whole day; one of us youngsters generally assisting in the best way we could, and glad if we escaped without being scolded for our awkwardness and stupidity. The neatness with which he executed such repairs, and the ingenuity with which he turned all kinds of materials to use, was very remarkable. Paper to match that of old books was always kept in store; old leather chair-covers were carefully preserved; even pieces of dark-coloured

silk or velvet were rescued from destruction, and (it might be) used to adorn the back of an Aristotelian commentator.”\*

A large number of the volumes in the library have titles written or printed with Sir William's own hand, and with exceeding neatness. Where several treatises were bound together in a single volume, or where the contents of a volume were well marked off as referring to distinct subjects, the commencement of each treatise or new subject was usually indicated by a narrow strip of coloured paper pasted on the leaf.

“An operation with which he sometimes occupied a leisure day, was that of sizing—to enable him to write upon—the unbound books which he got over every year from Germany. The size was made by boiling down glue, and adding a little alum. While still hot, this liquid was put into a large stoneware jar or greybeard, where it soon congealed, and by means of an antiseptic (corrosive sublimate) was kept for years. From time to time, as required, a small quantity of the gelatine was taken out, and mixed and diluted with warm water in a common foot-pan. In this the books were one by one immersed, care being taken to let the size soak thoroughly through the paper; they were then put under a moderate pressure, and the extra size squeezed out. Before being sent to the binder the sized sheets were spread on a rack to dry.”\*

Sir William's library had the peculiarity of being not simply the result of his tastes as a book-collector, but the reflex of his various mental tendencies and favourite studies. His intellectual and moral interests led to the collection, and this, in its turn, nourished the likings which had formed it; for no man could possibly make a more thorough use of his books than Sir William did; and in his library there was a certain completeness of character that gave an insight into the whole life-studies of the man.

The following heads, being titles of drawers containing

\* Mr Hubert Hamilton.

unbound tracts, give a good idea of the contents of the library generally, and of Sir William's system of arrangement:—

- I. Philosophia in genere: cum Hist. Philos.—Propæd.—Bibliogr.
- II. Philosophia Theoretica.
- III. Philosophia Practica.
- IV. Theologia Positiva, cum Hist.  
Eccles.—Patrum Doctr.
- V. Historia et Antiquitates.  
Polit.—Artium.—Morum, &c.
- VI. Biographia.
- VII. Paedagogia *a*) Superior.  
Universitates Litterariae, &c.
- VIII. Paedagogia *b*) Inferior.  
Gymnasiae—Scholae triviales, &c.
- IX. Quodlibetica—Farrago ad Epist. Obs. Vir.
- X. Grammatica: Generalia.  
Graeca—Latina—Barbara.
- XI. Philologia:  
*a*) Comment. in Auctores Veteres.  
*b*) Auctores Ipsi.

Naturally, the department in which the library was most rich was that of Philosophy. In particular, there was a great number of the older metaphysical works, and of modern psychologies, German and other. The collection of logics was probably unequalled in this country. It numbered over 400 volumes, and, in addition to the older and rarer treatises (of Hispanus, Duns Scotus, Blemmidas, Agricola, Ramus, Valla, Melanchthon, &c.), included every logical work of importance that had recently appeared in Germany or elsewhere abroad. Very many of the volumes contain MS. notes and red-ink markings by Sir William, showing how thorough had been his study of their contents. Of works on *Æsthetics* and the History of Philosophy there was also a large number.

Befittingly placed in a central compartment of the room which contained the principal portion of the library, several rows of folios, in picturesque old bindings, attracted the eye;

these were the early commentaries on Aristotle—with Hamilton, the greatest name in philosophy, and the greatest power in moulding his thought—to whom he most appropriately applied the line:—

“Ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis.”

The principal of these works had been purchased by him at Heber's sale in 1834. The collection was very full—probably the most complete in Britain. Glancing along the shelves one could readily note the names of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Joannes Grammaticus, Simplicius, Ammonius Hermiæ, Eustratius, &c. A more careful examination showed that the collection under each name was wellnigh complete, and that the editions were, with few exceptions, Venetian and Aldine.

Of other departments a very large space was occupied by the Ancient Classics, and by works on the Greek and Latin language and literature. Most of these books were acquired while Sir William was a student at Oxford; but the collection was constantly being added to, for to the last he retained and indulged his scholarly tastes. The collection of modern Latin poets has already been noticed.

The Latin authors of the classical period whom he preferred were Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca. His other favourite authors of antiquity were Galen and Hippocrates, and, among the fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, St Chrysostom, and St Augustine. Of more modern authors, Bacon, Sir Thomas Browne, Pascal, and Ancillon, were greatly prized. In English poetry, among his preferences were, besides Milton and Shakespeare, Sir John Davies, Butler, Pope, Prior, and Gray. Wordsworth and Scott, also, came in for a large share of his liking.

His interest in educational matters was shown in the collection of works known as Pædagogics, which, especially the department that related to the educational systems of Germany, was peculiarly rich and valuable.

Then there was the historical collection, civil and ecclesi-



astical, one of considerable bulk, the tracts relating to the Reformation period being of special value and interest.

Of works in Medical literature and in Theology there was a tolerable gathering.

Biographical works, especially those relating to men whose lives had left a mark on the literary or philosophical history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, formed a noticeable feature in the library. Sir William's interest in this period was a good deal connected with his inquiries regarding Buchanan and the Scaligers. He at one time meditated a work, 'De Vita, Genere, et Genio Scaligerorum.' In Barclay, also, the author of 'Argenis,' he took a keen interest.

Another department of reading, analogous to the biographical, in which Sir William had a strong interest, and for which he was known among his friends, was that of the *Ana*, or books consisting of the table-talk or gathered opinions of men of note—generally pointed and sententious. Of this class of works he had a large selection. Along with the *Ana* may be noticed a curious collection of letters of men of note, among others of Petrarch, Melanchthon, Clenardus, Camerarius, Muretus, Roger Ascham, Joseph Scaliger, Erasmus.

The library was also rich in miscellanies, including 'Disertationes Academicæ,' 'Orationes,' 'Mélanges,' &c., out of which he gathered curious and interesting biographical facts, and hints of the origin and history of philosophical and general opinions—unknown often to professed biographers and historians.

Sir William was at all times enamoured of *Acute Dicta*. To him the interest of a thought was greatly enhanced if it were embodied in a terse, lucid, and pointed form. This arose from his appreciation of force in thought and word, his very remarkable sense of harmony between a thought and its expression, and his love of symmetry in style. His collections of *acute dicta* are very large—I should think in this country unique. The choice of mottoes for his own writings was always a matter of consideration and interest; and any friend

who chanced to want a motto, was sure, on application to Sir William, to be provided with something appropriate. His own composition, which has a tendency to run in a strongly antithetical groove, shows the great, sometimes lavish, use which he made of his stores of *acute dicta*.

At one time Sir William seems to have thought of indicating the value which he attached to particular books in the library, by means of a printed label, to be pasted on the title-page of each, bearing, in addition to the name "Gulielmi Hamiltonii," the words "Liber servandus," "Liber rarus, bonus, servandus," or "Adnotationibus manuscriptis," as the case might be. Of these labels a great many were thrown off, but beyond this, unfortunately, the design was not carried into execution; and thus we are deprived of what would have been an interesting record of Sir William's opinion in regard to the value of the contents of his library. So far as can be discovered, the only book to which the label "Liber servandus" is attached, is the edition of the 'Organon' by Pacius, which was his favourite companion from his Oxford days, and with which he was so familiar, that, when fatigued by arduous reading or thinking, he would frequently take it up merely for relaxation.

The great public libraries of the city—the College and Advocates'—were laid by him under constant contribution. Books which no other person read were taken out by him, and on many of them the dust has lain undisturbed since his death. If tradition is to be credited, the number of volumes which he sometimes had out of the Advocates' Library was quite unparalleled in its history. He was also familiar with the rarer works in the College libraries of St Andrews and Glasgow, and occasionally obtained books from them for purposes of consultation.

From what has been said, it is obvious that there have been few men at any time who have united so great width and variety with so much minuteness and accuracy of learning,

or brought such intensity and penetrative power to bear on so vast a field of research. "The demon of energy," says one who knew him, "was powerful within him ; and had it not found work in the conquest of all human learning, must have sought it elsewhere. You see in him the nature that must follow up all inquiries, not by languid solicitation, but hot pursuit. His conquests as he goes are rapid, but complete. Summing up the thousands upon thousands of volumes upon all matters of human study in many languages which he has passed through his hands, you think he has merely dipped into them, or skimmed them, or, in some other shape, put them to superficial use. You are wrong ; he has found his way at once to the very heart of the living matter of each one ; between it and him there are henceforth no secrets !" \*

When to these capabilities of acquisition we add his marvellous powers of thought,—his acuteness, his comprehensiveness of grasp, his force and lucidity—an individuality of intellect which, amid all his familiarity with the opinions of others, ever stood out clear-cut and persistent—the fervour, the native force of will and purpose, little sustained and as little deflected by outward circumstances, which inspired and directed the course of his life-studies,—the profound and catholic nature of the subjects of his speculations, and the mark which he has left on them, we may fairly claim for Sir W. Hamilton, without considering how far the conclusions of his philosophy are to be accepted as final, a position among the thinkers of metaphysical Scotland at once high, peculiar, and permanent.

No man in this century has lived more completely in the realm of past thought than Hamilton, and at the same time set more conspicuously in the light of historical reflection questions that in themselves are of an interest to man too pressing and constant to have only a past. He has entered the order of abstract thinkers, taken up the course of their thought, and continued their work ; and his name will go down to posterity

\* Mr Hill Burton—Book-Hunter, p. 119, 2d ed.

with the best known of them. No one could more truly than he have appropriated to himself these words, to indicate what he was when he lived, and what he would be in memory :—

“ My days among the dead are past ;  
 Around me I behold,  
 Where'er these casual eyes are cast,  
 The mighty minds of old :  
 My never-failing friends are they,  
 With whom I converse day by day.

“ My hopes are with the dead ; anon  
 My place with them will be,  
 And I with them shall travel on  
 Through all futurity ;  
 Yet leaving here a name, I trust,  
 That will not perish in the dust.”

Nine years after Sir William's death, a subscription was commenced with the view of raising a fund to found a Philosophical Fellowship in honour of his memory. This movement was mainly carried through by Dr John Muir of Edinburgh, to whom our universities are indebted for the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship, and to whose zeal the cause of the higher education in Scotland owes much. The sum raised, along with the amount added to it by the Association for the Better Endowment of the University of Edinburgh, has been set apart to form the fund of “The Hamilton Philosophical Fellowship.” The annual proceeds of it are given to the Master of Arts of the University of Edinburgh of not more than three years' standing, who passes the best competitive examination in Logic, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy. The competition takes place once in three years.

Out of the fund collected for the Fellowship a sum was set apart for providing a bust of Sir William. The execution of this work was intrusted to Mr William Brodie, R.S.A. The bust, which is considered to be an excellent likeness, was, on its completion, presented by the subscribers to the *Senatus Academicus* of the University, and was placed in the Senate Hall of the College in December 1867.

## APPENDIX.

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### NOTE A.

ON THE REVIEW OF COUSIN ; AND ALLEGED CONTRADICTION IN  
SIR W. HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY.

THE nature and limits of the present work do not permit of any adequate consideration of the philosophical doctrines of Sir W. Hamilton, or extended examination of the criticisms to which they have been recently subjected by Mr Mill and others. These criticisms, even when most adverse, may fairly be taken as evidence of the strength of the impulse which Hamilton has given to speculative thought in eminently materialistic times. I cannot, however, even in the present work, omit referring generally to what appears to me the gross, even ludicrous, misrepresentation of Hamilton's doctrines—especially on the subject of the review of Cousin—which Mr Mill has given to the world.\*

It was obvious, from the first edition of the 'Examination,' that Mr Mill's acquaintance with the questions which Hamilton discussed in the review of Cousin did not extend beyond what he obtained from the author he was criticising, and that he had not reached any adequate conception of the real drift of the Essay. The alterations and modifications, avowed and silent, of the third edition, still show the same perfervid eagerness to demolish ; but they do not evince any increased acquaintance with the real points of the philosophy assailed.

\* In regard, indeed, to the doctrine of the Conditioned, a minute examination of these criticisms is the less called for after the admirably clear, acute, and powerful exposure of Mr Mill's misconceptions of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines by Mr Mansel, in his 'Philosophy of the Conditioned.'

Thus we find him persistently representing the main question of the article as being whether we have, or have not, "an immediate (!) intuition of God."\* The truth is, that it is nothing of the sort; the question is not primarily or mainly this at all. The nature and limits of our knowledge of Deity are, no doubt, points involved; but only indirectly. But the question as to whether our knowledge of Deity is or is not immediate, is irrelevant to the real question of the article. That question is, Does the alleged notion of the Infinito-absolute, or the notion of the Absolute, or the notion of the Infinite, afford us a knowledge of any object possible or real? Can we realise in thought a concrete object that shall be at once infinite and absolute, or either the one or the other? This question, in so far as it relates to Deity at all, refers not to the process or mode by which we know Deity—whether immediate or inferential—but to the nature and degree of our conception of Deity. The question, What is the amount of our knowledge of God? still remains to be asked, whether we hold that our knowledge of Deity is obtained by intuition or by inference; for the process by which we reach the reality of Deity does not necessarily determine the extent of our knowledge of His nature and attributes; that is, whether we know Him in the fulness of His being, or, only partially, in certain of His manifestations.

Further, the central question of the discussion does not necessarily refer to Deity at all. We may settle it, even affirmatively, without conceiving an object that is identical with Deity. For suppose we found and proved, as Mr Mill thinks he has proved, a positive conception of time without end, or of space and time as absolutely completed, we should have determined affirmatively the question of the capacity of the mind with regard to an object infinite or absolute, but surely not with regard to an object convertible with Deity. Or, to refer to other aspects of the question, we may maintain such a knowledge of self, of our own being, or of the world around us, as is altogether independent of their phenomenal manifestations—that is, an *absolute* knowledge, in the strict historical usage of the word. Theories of this nature were implied in the dogmatic systems of metaphysics before Kant; and they have been explicitly held since his time. In discussing such doctrines we are dealing with the question as to the nature and extent of our knowledge of reality, finite and infinite, but not properly or directly with the reality of Deity.

\* Examination, p. 43, 3d ed.

Then, again, we may hold with some philosophers that it is competent for the human mind to reach a conception of what is called pure being—being above space and time,—that is neither one nor many—out of all relation, above every form or mode in which our ordinary consciousness contemplates finite or relative existence,—*i.e.*, the Unconditioned or Absolute, as it has been called. We actually have in this one form of answer to the question of the Essay on the Unconditioned; yet we should hardly regard this as identical with the notion of Deity, or think that we were now discussing any question about our knowledge of Him or His reality.\*

No doubt the decision of the question of the article in the negative affects by implication the view we take of the nature and extent of our knowledge of Deity; for if we cannot conceive any object of thought as infinite or absolute, Deity as an object of thought cannot be conceived as either infinite or absolute. And this is really the way in which the decision of the general question of the discussion is brought to bear on M. Cousin's alleged notion of the Absolute, which he identifies with God. M. Cousin not only maintains that we are able, under the laws of our ordinary thought and consciousness, to conceive God as absolute, but holds also that He is directly presented to us as absolute in our conscious experience. Hamilton maintains, on the other hand, that M. Cousin's Absolute is not a genuine conception of an absolute object—that no such conception is possible in human consciousness—that he mistakes what is merely a relative notion for the idea of an absolute object, and consequently that he deceives himself in supposing that any object corresponding either to the Absolute or the Infinite is directly given as a reality in our conscious experience.

The confusion on this point has arisen chiefly from Mr Mill and other critics not keeping in view the twofold application of the terms, "the Absolute" and "the Infinite," when employed in a wider and narrower meaning—an application which it was one special merit of Hamilton to detect and unfold. "The Absolute" and "the Infinite" may each be employed to indicate the alleged union of two contradictory notions, or alleged notions. These opposite notions, or, as Hamilton calls them, "counter-imbecilities of the

\* See Schelling's treatise, 'Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, oder über das unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen.' Schelling, speaking of this treatise, says:—"Die erste zeigt den Idealismus in seiner 'frischesten Erscheinung, und vielleicht in einem Sinn, den er späterhin verlor. Wenigstens ist das Ich noch überall als *absolutes*, oder als *Identität des Subjectiven und Objectiven schlechthin*, nicht als subjectives genommen."—Vorrede, p. v.

human mind,"\* he distinguishes as "the unconditional negation of limitation"—the Infinite proper,—and "the unconditional affirmation of limitation"—the Absolute proper.† The fictitious union of these two opposites he names "the Unconditioned," or, as in the title of the essay, "the Infinito-absolute." Now, what Hamilton alleges against Cousin and others is, that they did not observe this twofold application or extension of the terms *Absolute* or *Infinite*, when used as they are by them as synonymous with "the Unconditioned;"—that the terms *Absolute* or *Infinite* which they used to indicate one supposed notion, really indicated the sum of two contradictions—an Infinito-absolute—and, therefore, a mere zero, which is incapable of being the predicate of anything in the sphere of reality. What can be more explicit on this point than the following?—"It is the crowning irrationality of the Infinito-absolutists that they have not merely accepted as objective what is only subjective, but quietly *assumed as the same* what are not only different but conflictive, not only conflictive but repugnant."‡ Again:—"The Unconditioned is *self-contradictory*, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus of negations—negations of the Conditioned in its opposite extremes. . . . (The Unconditioned is merely a common name for what transcends the laws of thought—for the *formally illegitimate*.)"§ Such a pseudo-conception can of course be predicated neither of God nor of any real object. This is an important point, which Hamilton was the first to apprehend and analyse. The gist of Mr Mill's complaint against him is that he did not perceive that the expressions "the Absolute" and "the Infinite," when used as synonymous with "the Unconditioned," were unmeaning.|| Hamilton certainly did not perceive them to be unmeaning, and that for the simple reason that they are not so; for we have an intelligible conception of what are their requisites as notions—*i. e.*, of their meaning—as we have of what would form the notion of a square circle, though such a conception is not actually realisable by us; but they are, or rather the Unconditioned is, as Hamilton has shown, inconceivable—unthinkable as a notion—for the simple reason that it would involve contradictory predicates in one object of thought.

But leaving this sense of the Unconditioned, or fictitious union of two contradictories—the Infinite and the Absolute—we may ask whether either of these by itself is possible to thought?—for

\* Discussions, p. 21, note.

† Ibid., p. 28.

‡ Ibid., p. 21, note.

§ Ibid., p. 17.

|| Examination, p. 70, compare p. 21, note.



though both cannot be united in one notion, one or other may possibly be conceivable. It is here that the salient point of Hamilton's doctrine comes out. He maintains that while an Infinito-absolute is an impossibility, because a contradiction in thought, an infinite or an absolute object is, while inconceivable, yet not an impossibility in thought on the ground of contradiction. Each inconditionate is by itself simply inconceivable as violating the law of Relativity, which is a mere restraint on our thought, preventing us from comprehending how a thing can be otherwise than in some particular relation. Now, this mere inconceivability of each Infinite or Absolute does not prove it to be really impossible as the contradictory nature of the Infinito-absolute does. For, according to Hamilton, the non-fulfilment of the law of Relativity only shows that we from our constitution are unable to think the possibility of an object, which nevertheless may really be.\* Hence an absolute commencement, or an endless regress, may be predicable of existence in time, though we may be unable positively to conceive the possibility either of the one or of the other; while we may have independent grounds for supposing the one to be credible rather than the other.

The doctrine of the Conditioned, as taught by Hamilton, is not without its difficulties, but thus to misrepresent it does not help us in any way to a solution of them.

How very far Mr Mill is from getting at anything like a conception of the nature of the discussion is further shown by his references to the terms "Conditioned" and "Unconditioned," which Hamilton employs, and which are to be met with everywhere in German philosophy since the time of Kant.

In Hamilton's use, "the Conditioned" is a more general term than "the Finite" or "the Relative," as including both; and "the Unconditioned" embraces the two extremes, "the Infinite" and "the Absolute"—the latter as indicating "what is out of relation, as finished, perfect, complete, total," being diametrically opposed to, or contradictory of, "the infinite."† Mr Mill, utterly neglecting to seek the historical meaning and application of these terms, yet complains that Hamilton has given us no "definition" of them. Hamilton, he says, "tells us what (in logical language) the terms denote, but not what they connote.‡ An examination of things called by

\* Discussions, p. 603, and Appendix I. (A.) *passim*.

† Discussions, p. 14.

‡ That is, in Mr Mill's perverted sense of the term *connote*, to express the

a name is not a definition."\* "The Conditioned," as employed by Hamilton, indicates the element common to every conceivable proposition or notion—in a word, to every positive thought; and this in his view is some kind of relation between a plurality of terms. This differs in no essential way from Kant's conception of the Conditioned (*das Bedingte*) as that which depends on something else for its being; for if there be no object of thought apart from a relation to another—no not-self without a self—no attribute without a subject—no *now* without a *then*—no *here* without a *there*—no *this* without a *that*,—then is the thinking of the one term—*i.e.*, its being as a thought—dependent upon or conditioned by the other. It is obvious, also, how the Conditioned necessarily involves limitation, or restriction. As thus: the *summum genus* of the conceivable, the Conditioned, is incapable of logical definition, and can be shown to be what it is, only, as in the case of the notion *being*, and others of the same class, by pointing to individual propositions or classes of propositions which embody it—that is, by referring to the things which the term denotes, not to what it connotes. And this Hamilton has done partly in the essay on the Unconditioned, but especially in a full and explicit manner in the 'Discussions,' Appendix I., 'On the Conditions of the Thinkable.' He there develops and classifies the essential forms or relations in which existence is conceivable by us—*e.g.*, those of subject and object, of subject and attribute, of cause and effect, &c., which make up the Conditioned for human thought. If the Conditioned be thus in strictness indefinable, so also must be the Unconditioned; for this is an expression for the negation of relation—*i.e.*, it is not a conception at all—has no subjective reality—but is "a name for two counter-imbecilities of the human mind, illegitimately transmuted into properties of the nature of things."† To desiderate a "definition" of such terms is simply to request a logical impossibility, and to show that the person who seeks it has not even a rudimentary conception of the nature of the matter with which he is dealing.

Mr Mill, besides misconceiving the true question of the essay, misrepresents the scope of the argument. He alleges that Hamil-

comprehension as distinguished from the extension of a notion. On this see Mr Mansel's Aldrich, 'Artis Logicæ Rudimenta,' 3d ed., p. 16. On the various meanings of *denotative* and *connotative*, see Arriaga, 'Cursus Philosophicus,' Dis. I. In Summ., § iv.

\* Examination, p. 67.

† Discussions, p. 21, note.

ton's proof is only directed and valid against the abstractions, "the Absolute," "the Infinite," but fails when viewed in relation to the concrete—*something* infinite or absolute. The first part of the statement is an assumption that is wholly groundless, and in the very face of the facts. Hamilton's proof is directed against the positive comprehension alike of a concrete Infinite and Absolute; and he tests the question of the conceivability of both by reference to concrete reality, more particularly space and time. Any other course of argument would have been totally idle and irrelevant. The expressions "the Absolute" and "the Infinite," which Mr Mill thinks to be especially "meaningless" and "self-contradictory," and therefore not requiring to be proved "unknowable," are used by Hamilton with perfect propriety as compendious expressions to indicate negations of different fundamental relations in which objects stand to the intelligence, just as the expressions "the Relative" and "the Finite" are used to indicate the various relations in or under which objects are conceivable by us.

"The Absolute" and "the Infinite," as thus employed, are as necessary and proper expressions as "the Relative" and "the Finite;" and the former no more necessarily mean only one thing or being, because of the article prefixed, than do the latter—just as we may speak of "the unknowable" and "the knowable" without being lawfully held to mean only one thing of either sort. Nor is any one of the former terms a whit more self-contradictory than either of the latter. We cannot, as Mr Mill says, conceive one object answering to "the Absolute," for it would necessarily involve contradictory predicates; but we cannot any more conceive one object answering to "the Finite," for it too must contain contradictory predicates—seeing that the Finite takes in the mental and the material, the organised and the unorganised, the vertebrate and the invertebrate, &c. This proves nothing against the possible application of the terms in succession to the different relations or negations of relations which they may happen to represent. The real question still remains: Whether we can think or imagine an object or attribute that is Infinite or Absolute, or both, as we can an object that is Finite or Relative? Can we, for example, conceive "the Infinite" in time or space as we can "the Finite" in those quantities? This is the main question to which Hamilton addresses himself in the review of Cousin. The further and higher ontological inquiries—viz, whether there can be conceived one being with attributes *infinite* or *absolute*, and whether, if we can conceive such a being, it is exclusive of all others—are,

of course, points which will be settled in accordance with the conclusion to which we may come regarding the conceivability of the Infinite or Absolute, in the case of the alleged relations to which these terms are considered applicable.

The only thing in the shape of an argument by which Mr Mill attempts to establish against Hamilton the actual cognition of the Infinite in the concrete is the merest trifling. "To know space," says Mr Mill, "as greater than anything finite, is not to know it as finite;" we can know it as such, therefore we can know infinite space. As is the case with most of his metaphysical premises, this is ambiguous; and it is not sufficient to prove that we actually or in point of fact conceive or represent to ourselves space without end, or infinite space. "To know space as greater than anything finite" may mean that we can actually represent space without end in the concrete, in which case the point to be proved is assumed; or it may mean that we believe that space always extends beyond any finite part of it which we may realise in conception, in which case we have proved nothing to the point. This only shows that there is an infinite of space to be reached; it does not prove (what is the only point at issue) that we have, in our conception, actually grasped its infinity. Space is thus thought merely as that which cannot be finished—as the unfinishable—and this so far from being actually conceived is necessarily known or thought by us only as that which passes the bounds of comprehension. It is obvious, from what Mr Mill says on this whole matter, that, notwithstanding the confident asseverations of his third edition, he has not mastered the distinction between the Infinite and the Indefinite. His definition of the Indefinite as "that which has a limit, but a limit either variable in itself or unknown to us," is entirely beside the point. It is utterly unessential to the indefinite whether the quantity in which we find it actually has a limit or not; what is essential to the indefinite in any thing or quantity is that we do not actually reach a limit, and can still add to the sum of what we conceive or represent. In a word, the indefinite expresses the relation of our thought to an object or quantity, when conception merely fails to grasp it in its entirety, or leaves something of it beyond what we compass in the single act of thought. There is therefore with the indefinite the possibility of addition. The infinite, on the other hand, refers to the character of the thing, as actually without end or limit; and, therefore, from its nature incapable of addition either in reality or in conception. The indefinite indicates a subjective failure to grasp

that which may or may not have a limit in reality ; the infinite indicates that which has no limit objectively or in fact, and which, therefore, always appears in positive thought not as it actually is, but as an indefinite. Besides, if the indefinite be "that which has a limit, but a limit either variable in itself or unknown to us," how can we think either time or space as indefinite? For these quantities are surely supposed and believed by us to be without limit ; if, however, the indefinite be that which has a limit, there can be for us no indefinite of space or time. The fact that the limit is said to be variable in itself or unknown to us will not help us in this case, for these qualifications must, from the definition, be held to apply only to the limited—which space and time are not.\*

The burden of Mr Mill's 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy' is the contradictory nature of Sir William's philosophical opinions. After what we have seen of the character of Mr Mill's representation of the most fundamental point in Sir William's philosophy, we may well doubt his capacity to exhibit truly any inconsistencies or contradictions which it may contain. The first requisite to the judgment that two opinions are inconsistent or contradictory, is to be able to apprehend each by itself. It will be found that, while Mr Mill has misrepresented Hamilton's doctrine of the Absolute, he has as thoroughly missed the point of the doctrine which he regards as inconsistent with it—that of Natural Realism.

The principal charge which Mr Mill makes against Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy is that his doctrine of the Absolute, and that of Natural Realism, are inconsistent or contradictory—that in the one he denies, and in the other affirms, a knowledge of more than the relative. Let us look at the matter for a little. The gist of Mr Mill's proof of this point is to be found in the following passage. Referring to what Sir W. Hamilton calls our *immediate* knowledge of the qualities of the external world, Mr Mill says :—"What, according to Sir W. Hamilton, is this knowledge? Is it a knowledge of somewhat in the thing *merely in its effects on us*, or is it a knowledge of somewhat in the thing *ulterior to any effect on us*? He asserts in the plainest terms that it is the latter. Then it is *not a knowledge wholly relative to us*. If what we perceive in the thing is something of which we are *only aware as existing and as causing impres-*

\* On Mr Mill's confusion of the infinite with the indefinite, see some pointed remarks by Mr Mansel in the 'Contemporary Review' for September 1867, xxi. p. 24 *et seq.*

sions on us, our knowledge of the thing is only relative. But if what we perceive and cognise is *not merely a cause of our subjective impressions, but a thing possessing in its own nature and essence a long list of properties—Extension, Impenetrability, Number, Magnitude, Figure, Mobility, Position—all perceived as ‘essential attributes’ of the thing as ‘objectively existing’—all as ‘modes of a not-self,’* and by no means *as an occult cause or causes of any modes of self,* then I am willing to believe that, in affirming this knowledge to be entirely relative to self, such a thinker as Sir W. Hamilton had a meaning, but I have no small difficulty in discovering what it is.”\*

Further, he tells us that, if what Sir W. Hamilton says of the direct knowledge of the primary qualities of matter be true, “our faculties, *so far as the primary qualities are concerned,* do cognise and know matter as it is in itself, and not merely as an unknowable and incomprehensible substratum; they do cognise and know it *as it exists absolutely, and not merely in relation to us;* it is known to us *directly, and not as a mere inference from phænomena.*”†

We may note, first of all, in regard to this passage, that Sir W. Hamilton would not have applied the term *immediate* to the knowledge of an occult cause, gained simply from its impressions on us; he would have regarded, and properly so, the impression as the object immediately known—the supposed or inferred cause as known mediately, or in and through the effect on us. Mr Mill might therefore have saved himself the trouble of assuming, even for a moment, the possibility of Sir W. Hamilton meaning by immediate knowledge any inferential knowledge of a cause from its effects. As regards the second alternative, Sir W. Hamilton nowhere asserts, as Mr Mill alleges, but would have explicitly denied, that immediate knowledge is “a knowledge of somewhat in the thing ulterior to any effect on us.” Such a statement is simply in flagrant contradiction with Sir W. Hamilton’s definition of immediate knowledge, and with his express illustrations of it; and it shows that Mr Mill has a very confused apprehension of the distinction between immediate and mediate knowledge.

But, secondly, while Mr Mill is wrong in his premise, he is not less astray in his inference. “A knowledge of somewhat in the thing ulterior to any effect on us,” even if asserted, does not necessarily imply a knowledge other than relative to us, as Mr Mill infers. This proceeds on the assumption that the only notion of relativity which is proper or allowable is that of our being “only aware of an

\* Examination, p. 21, 3d ed.

† Ibid., p. 25.

object as existing and as causing impressions on us." If this be the extent of our knowledge of the object, then, according to Mr Mill, "our knowledge of the thing is only relative." Now this is not the sense in which the expression is generally employed by Sir W. Hamilton; it is not the only, or the proper, or the primary, sense of the relativity of knowledge; and it is not the only important sense. In fact, Sir W. Hamilton has expressly repudiated this narrow sense of the term relative, which is common to Reid and Brown, from the latter of whom Mr Mill no doubt borrowed it. Hamilton has censured Reid for so employing it, when he restricts it to our knowledge of the secondary qualities, as the occult causes of impressions on us. Referring to Reid's statements, Hamilton says:—"By the expression '*what they are in themselves*' in reference to the primary qualities, and of '*relative notion*' in reference to the secondary, Reid cannot mean that the former are known to us *absolutely and in themselves*—that is, *out of relation* to our cognitive faculties; for he elsewhere admits that all our knowledge is relative."\* Again, when Reid remarks that "our notion of body or matter, *as distinguished from its qualities*, is a relative notion," Sir W. Hamilton says:—"That is, our notion of *absolute* body is *relative*. This is incorrectly expressed. We can know, we can conceive, only what is relative. Our knowledge of *qualities* or *phenomena* is necessarily relative, for these exist only as they exist *in relation to our faculties*. The knowledge, or even the conception, of a substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in relation, and therefore cognisable or conceivable by our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such we can form only a *negative* notion—that is, we can merely *conceive it as inconceivable*. But to call this *negative* notion a *relative notion*, is wrong: 1st, Because all our (positive) notions are relative; and, 2d, Because this is itself a negative notion—*i.e.*, no notion at all—simply because there is no relation. The same improper application of the term relative was also made by Reid when speaking of the secondary qualities."†

These passages alone clearly show that Sir W. Hamilton's sense of relative was very much wider than that in which it is employed by Mr Mill. The latter seeks to force on Sir W. Hamilton the meaning which he has beforehand expressly repudiated. Whatever the import of relativity with Hamilton may be, it is at least not that which Mill assumes that it is, and on which he grounds his

\* Reid's Works, p. 313, note\*.

† Ibid., p. 322-3, note.

charge of contradiction. Sir W. Hamilton holds, and holds properly, that knowledge may be relative, although we know more of the object than that it is the occult cause of impressions on the mind.\*

In its proper and primary sense, the phrase "relativity of knowledge" indicates a relation (of various kinds) between the mind knowing and the object known. Whatever relations between these—the mind and the object—can be shown to be necessary or essential to the act of knowledge—to be its conditions, in fact—are, properly speaking, the relations of knowledge, and constitute the relativity of knowledge. No relation can properly be regarded as constituting the relativity of knowledge, in the absence of which knowledge would be possible. Now, measured by this test, Mr Mill's view of the relativity of knowledge is neither primary nor essential. It is not primary; for in supposing an object to be known as the cause of impressions, it supposes the prior relation of mind and object; it supposes also the conceptions of one and many, of self and not-self, of cause and effect, and of many similar relations. It is a secondary or derivative relativity, which supposes and is rendered intelligible only by the assumption of deeper and prior relations—that is, of a more essential relativity. It is these deeper and essential relations which Hamilton indicates by the expression relativity of knowledge. But, further, Mr Mill's relativity is not essential to knowledge. There may be, and is, knowledge, by us, in the absence altogether of the relation between an unknown or supposed cause and its impression on the mind. And this knowledge is still properly called relative. We know the acts and states of our own mind; but these are known not as occult causes of impressions on our consciousness, but as the forms of our consciousness itself—not through the medium of an effect or impression which they cause in us, but directly, immediately—in themselves. Yet our knowledge of mind is relative, and is declared to be so by Hamilton, as expressly as is our knowledge of matter, and in the very same sense; so that either there is a true relativity of knowledge which is not comprehended in Mr Mill's sense of these words, or our knowledge of our own minds is not a relative but an absolute knowledge. The alternatives are obvious; either we have an absolute knowledge when we directly know the states of our own mind, or Mr Mill's definition of relative know-

\* On the true import of the term relativity in Hamilton, Mr Mansel has some very pertinent remarks. See, especially, 'Contemporary Review,' No. xxi. p. 21.



ledge is narrow and misleading. Must our knowledge of our own mental phenomena be absolute, or more than relative, if we know them otherwise than as the causes of impressions on the consciousness—if we know them directly or immediately? If not, why should our knowledge of material phenomena be held to be absolute, or more than relative, when it is spoken of in the same language as direct or immediate, or as a knowledge of the thing in itself? The obvious inference is, that Mr Mill's measuring-line stops far short of the depths which he seeks to fathom.

In fact, Mr Mill's relativity of knowledge is not in any fundamental or crucial sense a relativity at all. For there may be knowledge and thought of objects apart altogether from the particular relation—that of supposed cause from known effects. To think or know objects as merely the occult causes of known impressions is not essential to thinking or knowledge. We may think and know apart altogether from this particular mode of thinking. To suppose an occult cause is only necessary in particular circumstances, or as one out of several relations; and while, in these circumstances, we are constrained to think it, we may think and know objects apart altogether from this relation, and yet think and know them in essential relations. There are relations apart from which we cannot know or think an object, but that fixed on by Mr Mill is not of them. His relativity is neither primary nor essential.

But Mr Mill further maintains that Hamilton explicitly contradicted his doctrine of relativity by holding that we have a "direct" or "immediate" knowledge of the qualities of body—a knowledge of these qualities "as they are in themselves"—a knowledge of them as "essential attributes," as "modes of a not-self." He interprets these and similar expressions as implying that we "know matter as it is in itself, and not merely as an unknowable and incomprehensible substratum," "as it exists absolutely and not merely in relation to us," "as known directly and not as a mere inference from phenomena."

But this interpretation is utterly unwarranted. It is putting into words a meaning which they do not naturally bear. To allege that Hamilton maintained a doctrine of Natural Realism on the subject of material existence is entirely irrelevant to establish the charge of abandoning the relativity of knowledge. In order to prove this, it must be shown that his doctrine implied that sensible reality—reality as we perceive it by any one of the senses, is identical with super-sensible reality—*i. e.*, reality *per se*; for in this case sensible or

perceived reality would have an existence, whether we perceive it or not, and as we perceive it. In other words, our relative knowledge of it would be convertible with its absolute existence, or being *per se*. The lawfulness of asserting the convertibility of sensible and super-sensible reality, while directly opposed to the whole scope of Hamilton's philosophy, is besides denied by him whenever he chances to come across the doctrine. Hamilton has beforehand repudiated Mr Mill's interpretation of his words, both implicitly and in express terms.

Reid, as already noticed, asserts that our knowledge, both of mind and matter, is relative, and at the same time he speaks of a "direct knowledge" of the primary qualities—a knowledge of them "as they are in themselves." And, curiously enough, Hamilton notices the apparent inconsistency, and says that Reid cannot here mean that things are known "absolutely and in themselves"\*—that is, "out of relation to our cognitive faculties"—and, therefore, as apart from and above their conditions of knowledge in time, space, &c., or as the things might appear to other intelligences not subject to such conditions. Hamilton thus perceives and admits that the term "absolute," or "in themselves," cannot be applied to any knowledge which we have of qualities or objects in time and space, in the sense of importing that the knowledge is of the object *per se*—or of the object as it exists apart from our perception, if it have such an existence.

He has, moreover, expressly repudiated the doctrine that, between knowing things in time and space merely through the impressions which they make on the mind—*i. e.*, "merely as a cause of subjective impressions"—and perceiving or knowing "a thing as possessing in *its own nature and essence* a long list of properties," there is no intermediate position. "When," he says, "I perceive a quality of the non-ego, of the object-object, as in immediate relation to my mind, I am said to have of it an *objective* knowledge, in contrast to the subjective knowledge I am said to have of it when supposing it only as the hypothetical or occult cause of an affection of which I am conscious, or thinking it only mediately through a subject-object, or representation in, and of, the mind."† Again, he tells us that he uses the expressions "immediate knowledge" of a quality or object, and a knowledge of the quality "as it is in itself," as convertible; he tells us expressly that knowledge is regarded as immediate, "in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation or mediately;" and he denies that it means a know-

\* Hamilton's Reid, p. 313, note \*.

† Reid, p. 846.

ledge of the object "in its absolute existence—that is, out of relation to us."\* He thus denies *in toto* that to perceive properties as "essential attributes" of the thing as "objectively existing"—as "modes of a not-self," and "by no means as an occult cause or causes of any modes of self"—at all implies that the thing possesses, or is known to possess, in its own nature and essence, these properties. His doctrine is, that of the nature and essence of the thing *per se* we know nothing, and that these properties are the forms in which the thing is *known* by and *exists* for us as a finite object—*i.e.*, an object of time and space. On the nature of its existence or properties *per se*, or apart from its appearances to our faculties, he refuses to dogmatise. With regard to absolute existence—*i.e.*, being that is not temporal or spatial—Hamilton would say that we have reasons for believing or supposing that it exists; but that we have no warrant for attributing to it temporal or spatial properties. In fact, the absolute, the positive knowledge of which Hamilton denies, is that which negates time, or space, or both—which transcends them; and the error he points out is the confusion of thought which, while it deludes itself with the belief that it has reached this absolute, yet clothes it in finite—*i.e.*, temporal or spatial, qualities.

Now what precisely does he mean by saying that the thing is known immediately or in itself, and yet not absolutely, but relatively to us, the knowers? In regard to external objects, he explains this by saying, "On this doctrine an *external* quality is said to be known in itself, when it is known as the *immediate* and necessary *correlative* of an *internal* quality of which I am conscious. Thus, when I am conscious of the existence of an inorganic volition to move, and aware that the members are obedient to my will; but, at the same time, aware that my limb is arrested in its motion by some *external* impediment;—in this case, I cannot be conscious of myself as *the resisted relative*, without at the same time being conscious, being *immediately* percipient, of a not-self as the resisting correlative. In this cognition there is no sensation, no subjectivo-organic affection. I simply know myself as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter-force in energy."†

From this passage, which contains his most matured doctrine of the perception of an external reality, taken along with the statements before quoted, we gather:—

1°, That by the apprehension of a thing in itself, as applied to external reality, Hamilton means an immediate (non-representative)

\* Reid, p. 866.

† Ibid., p. 866.

knowledge of the thing,—*i. e.*, as he elsewhere explains, the apprehension of the thing as existing now, or now and here,—in time, or in time and space.

2°, That this existence of the thing in itself, in time, or in time and space, is not identical with the absolute existence of the thing, whatever that may mean. That while the thing may have an absolute reality, this, its immediately apprehended existence, is not forthwith to be identified with that absolute existence.

3°, That nevertheless the quality of an external object may be and is apprehended by us—*i. e.*, something more than a mere *sensation* or form of our consciousness,—or “impression on the mind.” And that the apprehension or immediate knowledge of this quality, or knowledge of it in itself—*i. e.*, not in and through any mode of the mind—is a knowledge of a reality different from the mind, from any one of its sensations, and, generally, its modes of being.

4°, That our knowledge of such a quality is always *relative*—is the correlative of some consciousness on our part of a state of the mind,—in this case an effort of locomotion, which is found to meet with resistance.

There is thus in our knowledge relation between a quality in time and space, such as a resisting force, and another quality in time, such as a resisted mental effort or *nisus*. And further, this quality known in time, or known in space, will in itself be relative; for time is a relation of succession, as space is a relation of coexistence; so that there may be and is, in perfectly intelligible language, a twofold relation, even if the quality known be supposed to be an existence or reality in space and time. There is the relation between the quality perceived and the percipient—the relation, to wit, of resistance—and there is the relation in the quality itself as succeeding other qualities in time, and as existing along with other qualities in space. Our knowledge is thus relative, and of the relative. These relations are altogether independent of that supposed to hold between (unknown) objects and the impressions which they make on the mind or consciousness—*i. e.*, consciousness may embrace more than its mere impressions; while our knowledge is still only of the real and of the relative.

Our knowledge, accordingly, or experience as we find it, is made up of a *real* which is not ourselves, and of a *real* which is ourselves. We do not know the real which is not ourselves apart from the real which is self or ourselves as modified—*i. e.*, our knowledge of the ex-

ternal real, as of the internal real, is relative, or a relation. Hamilton's relative is not opposed to the real, as has been well remarked; it is opposed to the absolute of certain speculators, such as Schelling and others. The absolute knowledge against which Hamilton contends is the knowledge of an object that transcends time and space, that transcends the conditions of human thought and consciousness;—the knowledge which is claimed by Schelling in his intellectual intuition, and by others of the absolutist school, and made by them the basis of deductive theories of knowledge and being—in Hamilton's view at once presumptuous, visionary, and illegitimate.

Mr Mill's parade of "contradictions" in regard to this and other parts of Hamilton's philosophy may, in the great majority of cases, be shown to arise from the critic's misconception of the doctrines with which he is dealing, from his overlooking the nature of the higher speculative questions, which necessarily present apparently contradictory aspects, and from his extracting meanings from statements which they do not contain. Mr Mill's method of destruction by "contradictions" reminds one of the savage war instrument known as the boomerang, which when it hits its object is exceedingly deadly, but when unskillfully employed is not less fatal in its rebound on the person using it. Of Mr Mill's remarks on the philosopher I shall say nothing, except that they are, in general, very happy specimens of the art of disparagement, which consists in damning by praise for second-rate feats, when higher were attempted and accomplished, and that they are worthy of the writer who regards Brown and Hartley as possessing an insight "into the heart of great psychological questions which had never been fathomed before,"\* while Hamilton had none; who even rates Whately as a thinker above Hamilton, and whose canons of philosophic merit lead him to rank the latter with Mr Dugald Stewart.

\* Examination, p. 620.

## NOTE B.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF SIR W. HAMILTON'S WRITINGS  
IN AMERICA.

THE following interesting communication on the influence of Sir William Hamilton's writings in America is by Noah Porter, D.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College :—

"Sir William Hamilton was first known in the United States by his articles in the 'Edinburgh Review,' particularly by the two entitled 'Philosophy of Perception' (October 1830), and 'Logic, &c.' (April 1833). The article published previously on 'The Philosophy of the Unconditioned,' &c. (October 1829), did not at first attract general attention, because the writers to which it refers were as yet scarcely known, even to our best scholars, and the subjects treated of were strange to our speculations—at least in the form and phraseology in which they are there presented. This article was afterwards often referred to and read with great interest. The two articles named were extensively read in this country, and were considered the most remarkable contributions to the history and criticism of metaphysical science which had appeared in the English language for that generation. The astounding erudition, the vigorous thought, the masterly analysis, the acute criticism, and the self-relying independence by which they were distinguished, made a profound impression upon the many readers whom they at once excited and astonished. There were not a few of these—many more than the writer himself would have suspected, or any person who was not intimately conversant with the tastes and tendencies of our thinking men, or had founded his conclusions upon the amount of philosophical learning possessed by those who gave instruction in philosophy, or upon the knowledge possessed by their most advanced pupils. Ill-provided as our country was at that time with learned philosophers, it was furnished with a considerable number of thinkers, who were prepared to accept with gratitude these solid contributions of Hamilton to philosophical knowledge—

who could follow with interest his novel and subtle analyses, and were competent to criticise his boldest positions. The fact is unquestioned that Hamilton was not obliged to train among us an interested audience or appreciating critics, but he found already provided many readers who were prepared to study his speculations with a keen interest, and to profit by the stimulus and instruction which he so freely imparted. . . .

“Nearly up to the time when the writings of Hamilton began to be read, the English and Scottish writers had been our only teachers from abroad. The German and French metaphysicians were almost unknown and unread. The ancient philosophers were known only here and there to a classical student, and read in parts chiefly for purely linguistic or philological purposes. The logicians of the scholastic period rested in quiet on the shelves of a few old libraries. The chief interest in speculative questions was excited by their direct application to current theological discussions and controversies. The principles recognised and the authorities referred to were derived from the school of Locke and the Scottish metaphysicians. Reid was known familiarly by some of our philosophical teachers. Dugald Stewart had been very generally studied in our leading colleges for a few years, and was admired for his cautious prudence and his careful elegance of style. The lectures of Dr Thomas Brown had passed through several editions, and their author had excited a temporary *furor* of admiration by his subtle ingenuity, his confident criticism, and his affluent declamation. His treatise on Cause and Effect had both puzzled and aroused our theologians. For several years previous a very active and earnest controversy had been agitating the entire New England school of theology, which turned entirely upon the application of certain mooted psychological and philosophical principles to the received evangelical doctrines. This controversy continued for nearly thirty years, beginning about 1820, and effected some important ecclesiastical changes. It was incidental to this controversy that the Presbyterian organisation was rent in twain. The discussions of this controversy were conducted with great earnestness, and excited the minds of thinking men of all classes to look closely at the foundation principles of all faith and all philosophy. In 1830, about the time when this controversy was rising to its fever-heat, the philosophical writings of Mr S. T. Coleridge were introduced to our country by a very earnest advocate, James Marsh, D.D., one of our very best scholars and profoundest thinkers. Dr Marsh was an earnest and patient student of the

ancient philosophers, and had thoroughly acquainted himself with the later German philosophy. Cousin's critique upon Locke's *Essay* was translated by Dr Henry, and published in 1833. Rev. George Ripley, then a Unitarian clergyman in Boston, had introduced some novel philosophico-theological opinions into the very cultivated circles of that always active-minded city. These were but the result of his very strong interest in the modern speculations of Germany, of which he was an earnest student. The discussions connected with this controversy served to increase the rising interest in speculative studies, and prepared the way for the translation of important philosophical papers, and some very earnest philosophical criticism. Mr R. W. Emerson began at this time to express his dissent from the received philosophies, and to advance opinions or to give expression to utterances which served at least to increase the general excitement in respect of the loftiest and the most difficult themes of theological inquiry and philosophical speculation. It was just beginning to be the fashion with us to study the German language, and many an ardent youth looked forward with eagerness to the time when he should be able to read Kant in the original, or penetrate the secret of Schelling and Hegel, by hearing these writers interpreted through a German professor.

"There was probably never a time in our history which could more truly or appropriately be termed a period of fermentation and almost of revolutionary anarchy in our philosophical thinking, than the time when the articles of Sir William Hamilton began to be read among us. It was most opportune for a truly great teacher to gain a hearing, and to produce a strong and lasting impression. Each of these articles treated of a special topic, it is true, but each of the topics was fitted to interest many earnest thinkers; while the learning, acuteness, and strength which were so lavishly expended on the discussion of each, could not fail to be responded to by the appreciating regard of many youthful students who were just waking to the sublime but critical attractions of philosophical inquiry. The first article, on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, was, as has been explained, a year or two before its time for American readers, for Cousin was known only to a few before his criticism of Locke was translated by Dr Henry. The article on the Philosophy of Perception attracted attention among all our philosophical students, and established at once the highest reputation for its then unknown author. There were hundreds—teachers and students—who had studied this subject very carefully in Reid, Stewart, and Brown,



and the reputation of Dr Brown was too recent and too dear with many to permit so bold and damaging an attack upon his accuracy and acuteness to pass by without the closest scrutiny. This article became at once a classical treatise on the subject, which it was necessary for every thorough student to read and master. The brief exposure of the defects of Johnson's translation of Tennemann's Manual (1832) was very timely in America, for just at this time the attention of our students in philosophy was directed to German authors, and the double caution was greatly needed not to confide in the competence of every translator, and especially not in every case to interpret what might be the sound sense of the original by the bad sense or the non-sense which a translator made of his meaning. The article on Logic also made a strong impression, for Whately was beginning to be our popular idol, and his treatise on Logic had been generally regarded as comprehending all that was attainable or desirable in the art of all arts. The critic who could so readily expose his limited knowledge of the history of the science which he expounded, and who elaborated the results of his own surprising erudition with such power of critical judgment, was placed highest among English logicians. Henceforth Hamilton was regarded as the greatest writer and teacher among living Englishmen. It was not at all surprising that his reputation should be fixed at once with a people of so decided an interest in speculative studies, but of limited reading, whose teachers had been accustomed to look to Scotland and Edinburgh for their authorities in philosophy, and who had no local traditions or prejudices to prevent them from accepting, as the most worthy of their confidence, the writer who could best instruct them. Henceforward all the writings of Hamilton were eagerly sought for. His edition of the works of Dr Reid was well known, though never reprinted. The notes and dissertations in the Appendix, so far as they were complete, as well as the most important of Hamilton's philosophical articles, were collected into a volume by Mr O. W. Wight, and edited with notes, &c., by him in 1853, under the title of 'The Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton.' In 1853 the 'Discussions on Philosophy and Literature' were reprinted, with an Introductory Essay by R. Turnbull, D.D. The 'Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic' were promptly reprinted in the years 1859 and 1860, and have been very extensively circulated and read. They were adopted as text-books in many of the colleges and higher seminaries. Both these works have been abridged for the special uses of instruction—

the 'Lectures on Metaphysics,' by Professor Francis Bowen of Harvard University (1861), and the 'Lectures on Logic' (1863), by Professor Henry N. Day, formerly of the Western Reserve College in Ohio. Not a few articles have been published in our reviews and literary journals, for the exposition and criticism of Hamilton's philosophy.

"The influence which Hamilton has exercised in America has been almost exclusively by means of his writings. Very few, if any, native Americans are known to have been his pupils, certainly none who have been at all conspicuous as teachers or writers upon philosophical topics, or who have been ardently devoted to the propagation of his opinions. And yet there is no part of the country where his writings have not produced a deep and permanent impression, and where he is not revered as one of the greatest thinkers of our times. He has greatly enlarged the knowledge of multitudes in regard to the reach and importance of the discussions which are recorded in the history of philosophy. He has redeemed the history itself from the contempt and reproach under which it had fallen, as being but a dry catalogue of the disputes of learned triflers and the subtleties of pedantic logomachists. Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown had all taught their readers the same lesson, and that was to despise the researches and results of the great philosophers of antiquity and of the middle ages, as occupied about questions which were either entirely beyond the reach of the human intellect, or as fatally embarrassed by defective methods. The study of them, in their view, was only an investigation of the curiosities of the human intellect, promising little solid utility to the enlightened scholars of the nineteenth century, who had been trained in the school of Bacon after the maxims of the inductive method. Hamilton taught us just the opposite, and he enforced his lesson by the splendid example of the value of historical studies which he furnished in himself. He showed us most clearly that the questions which still stimulate our curiosity and baffle our efforts to resolve them were the same which at once excited and disappointed the great thinkers of other generations; and that some of them had been more justly conceived and more wisely answered by them than by those who boasted of their training in the school of Bacon and of Locke. He has, in fact, done more than any and than all of the writers of his time to waken the historic spirit among our philosophers. At the same time he has guided it most wisely and to the most solid results, teaching it to be critical as well as curious, to be self-reliant as well

as reverent. The clearness of his own judgment, the candour of his temper, the sagacity of his interpretations, the vigour and independence of his own critical estimates, as they were constantly exemplified in his treatment of the writers to whom he so often referred, and from whom he so largely quoted, were most salutary to his American readers, who were in danger of being blindly credulous or ignorantly self-reliant—either too contemptuous or too irreverent of the past—either excessively conceited or excessively partisan. He was also most useful as an example of what a philosopher should be, at a time when such an example was greatly needed, in the then forming period of our philosophy. The clearness and strength of his own thinking were at once an example and a reproof to not a few who were tempted to substitute imaginative vagaries for discriminating analysis. The conciseness and strength of his diction acted like a charm upon those who affected rhetorical diffuseness and ambitious declamation. The moral tone and spirit of his writings were invariably pure and invigorating, and the impression of these characteristics could not but be felt, although his treatment of ethical questions and his recognition of moral truth were only incidental and indirect. His simple love of truth and his frank and outspoken utterance of his convictions were of themselves an efficient ethical discipline. His believing spirit was never called in question, though many of his readers belonged to a class who are proverbially suspicious of the influence of all metaphysics as necessarily anti-Christian. His very decided assertion that Faith is required by men as the supplement and condition of philosophy, went far towards making favour with many for his doctrine of the Unconditioned.

“If it was Hamilton’s distinguishing merit to have reanimated philosophy in Great Britain, when it was near to breathing out its life under the hands of its guardians and devotees—if it will be remembered to his honour that he restored it to a position of higher dignity than it had enjoyed for centuries before, and this at a time when the prevailing devotion to material interests had wellnigh materialised philosophy itself, and when the splendid triumphs of physical discovery might naturally render men indifferent to those less obtrusive metaphysical truths on which all discovery depends,—it was his privilege in America to act upon the rising philosophical spirit which had never been discouraged or suppressed, and at a critical moment when it most needed wise direction, and a stimulating as well as a safe example. Hamilton found us just as we

were becoming interested in what the French and Germans could teach us, and when not a few were ready to be dazzled by systems that were largely imaginative and fantastic, provided that erudition and genius made them plausible. Hamilton was so learned that he could not but command respect. He was critical enough to inspire confidence. He was daring enough to satisfy the aspirations of the most adventurous. He was wise and solid enough to quietly displace pretentious assertion by well-reasoned truth, and to effectually set aside ambitious rhapsody by discriminating logic. While he has not by any means been the only teacher of this generation—while his own writings have directed and encouraged us to study the philosophers of the Continent—yet his influence has been most potent to repress what might otherwise have been magniloquent pretension, and to stimulate those who but for him would have been discouraged by uncertainty and bewildered by scepticism.

“Some of the peculiar opinions of Hamilton have not been generally accepted among us. There have been no very earnest advocates, though there have been a few faithful adherents, of his doctrine of the Unconditioned and the necessary limitations of religious thought. His doctrines on these points have not been canvassed or criticised in our journals so earnestly and often as would be desirable. But there are thousands living at this moment who cherish a grateful and reverent sense of the service which he has rendered in their training, and who feel as greatly indebted to him as to any writer living or dead. Indeed it may be asserted with truth, that the intellectual and moral respect which his writings have inspired cannot be weakened by the efforts of critics to expose inconsistencies in his doctrines or flaws in his reasonings. His opinions must of course be subjected to the ordeal of criticism and of time. Whatever results, however, this trial may evolve, it cannot shake the esteem of his American pupils for his eminent intellectual power, for his sincere faith in and hearty love of philosophical truth, and for his earnest devotion to the higher interests of man.

“I may add that I have used his ‘Lectures on Metaphysics’ ever since they were published, as a text-book for daily examination or recitation in my classes; and though I have not always been able to agree with him, and have greatly regretted that some of the more important topics for an elementary course of instruction were treated so briefly, yet I have preferred this to any other book for its stimulating and invigorating effect upon the minds of my pupils. Of more than 1000 pupils whom I have conducted through this course,

many have failed to master all his doctrines or to appreciate all his thought ; but I believe the number to be very small of those who, however stupid and negligent, have not been impressed by his mental superiority. I am confident that the number is large of those who have been excited and instructed by his comprehension of the aims of philosophy, by his liberal culture, and by the strength and acuteness of his arguments and elucidations. His influence in all these respects will long live, as I trust. I am confident that no critic can weaken these impressions in the mind of any earnest student of Hamilton ; and however successful any such critic may seem to be in setting aside any of his teachings, he will not add force to his own arguments by attempting to depreciate his surpassing excellence, or to lower the estimate of his distinguished services to philosophy and to man."

Among those who in America have come under the influence of Hamilton, and by their writings have contributed to spread the knowledge of his doctrines, Dr Samuel Tyler, the well-known jurist, is especially deserving of notice. Dr Tyler is the author of a work, 'The Progress of Philosophy in the Past and in the Future,' in which he gives an able account of the philosophical opinions of Hamilton, and manifests a remarkable insight into the logical coherence of his philosophy.

## NOTE C.

## SIR W. HAMILTON ON HUME, LEIBNITZ, AND ARISTOTLE.

As Mr Mill refers particularly to Sir W. Hamilton's notices of the systems of Hume and Leibnitz, in support of the charges mentioned in the text, a few words are needed to show at once the worthlessness of his criticism and the groundlessness of his inference.

First, with regard to Hume. It appears to Mr Mill that Sir W. Hamilton "has misunderstood the essential character of Hume's mind." "Respecting the general scope and purpose, the pervading spirit, of Hume's speculations, Sir W. Hamilton does give an opinion, and, I venture to think, a wrong one. He regards Hume's philosophy as scepticism in its legitimate sense. Hume's object, he thinks, was to prove the uncertainty of all knowledge. With this intent he represents him as reasoning from premises 'not established by himself,' but 'accepted only as principles universally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy.' These premises Hume showed (according to Sir W. Hamilton) to lead to conclusions which contradicted the evidence of consciousness; thus proving, not that consciousness deceives, but that the premises generally accepted on the authority of philosophers, and leading to these conclusions, must be false."\* "This is certainly the use which has been made of Hume's arguments by Reid. . . . That Hume had any foresight of his arguments being put to this use, either for a dogmatical or a purely sceptical purpose, appears to me supremely improbable. I think that Hume sincerely accepted both the premises and the conclusions."†

Where, it may be asked, does Mr Mill obtain proof of this statement regarding Sir W. Hamilton's opinion of Hume's philosophy?

In the passage of the 'Discussions' to which Mr Mill more immediately refers, Hamilton says:—"Scepticism is not an original or

\* Discussions, p. 87, 88, and elsewhere (Mr Mill's reference).

† Mill, p. 626, note, 3d ed.

independent method, it is the correlative and consequent of dogmatism ; and, so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises only from a false philosophy, as its indication and its cure. . . . The sceptic must not himself *establish*, but from the dogmatist *accept* his principles ; and his conclusion is only a reduction of philosophy to zero, on the hypothesis of the doctrine from which his premises are borrowed. . . .

"*As a legitimate sceptic*, Hume could not assail the foundations of knowledge in themselves. *His reasoning is from their subsequent contradiction to their original falsehood* ; and his premises, *not established by himself*, are accepted only as principles universally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy. *On the assumption that what was thus unanimously admitted by philosophers must be admitted of philosophy itself*, his argument against the certainty of knowledge was triumphant." \*

Hamilton elsewhere censures Reid for criticising Hume as a dogmatist—as positively laying down certain principles, and for blaming him for not doubting of his premises—"a part altogether inconsistent with his vocation." †

Hamilton is here, and elsewhere, speaking and speaking only, of Hume's system or mode of establishing the conclusions at which he arrived—in a word, of the nature and method of his general argument. It is easy to adduce ample proof of the points that Hume so borrowed the principles from which he reasoned, that he showed that those principles led to conclusions inconsistent with the alleged instincts of sense and with the instincts leading us to believe in our own personality and identity, &c.—in a word, with the testimony of consciousness, and, consequently, that on those principles we have no reasonable certainty ; and it may be further shown, on the assumption that these are the only possible principles of philosophy, that our intelligence, as self-contradictory, is not to be trusted. ‡

Hume himself thus sums up his reasoning regarding the notion of external reality : "The first philosophical objection to *the evidence of sense*, or to *the opinion of external existence*, consists in this, that such

\* Discussions, p. 87, 88.

† Reid's Works, p. 129, note \* ; compare p. 444, 457, 489.

‡ See Hume's statement in a letter to Reid, Burton's Life, ii. p. 154, or in Stewart's Life of Reid, Reid's Works, p. 8 ; Treatise of Human Nature, Part ii., § 26 ; iv., § 26 ; Essay on the Academical Philosophy, p. 369, 370, 372, ed. 1758.

an opinion, *if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason; and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct*, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it. . . . The second objection goes further, and represents *this opinion as contrary to reason*, at least *if it be a principle of reason* that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object."\*

Thus, what instinct prompts us to hold, reason rejects; and what reason counsels, instinct repudiates. There is, therefore, no satisfactory ground of the opinion. We are under the necessity of acting on the belief, but we cannot rationally vindicate the grounds of our belief.

That the hypothetical form of scepticism was the mode in which Hume presented the results of his reflection to the world, there can be no question. Hamilton, in the above passage in the 'Discussions' and elsewhere, refers, with perfect accuracy, to this fact. The question as to whether Hume believed or was convinced that his borrowed premises were the only principles of philosophy, or the principles which we must accept if we reason on the matters to which they refer, is wholly irrelevant to that of the manner in which he deals with the principles themselves, and the nature of the inferences which he draws from them. To maintain that Hume held the principles from which he reasoned—"the common ones," as he himself says—to be the only possible—the principles of reason itself—is, of course, to allege that he veiled an absolute scepticism regarding reason under the form of a relative or hypothetical scepticism grounded on the principles of philosophers. Even if Hume did dogmatically accept those principles as the true and only principles of philosophy, the question as to the personal or social considerations that led him to adopt the hypothetical way of putting them is not less irrelevant to the nature of his argument than the supposed fact itself. At any rate, Sir W. Hamilton does not pronounce on this point, as for any pertinent appreciation and criticism of Hume's system of thought he was not required to do. And most certainly Hamilton nowhere says, as Mr Mill represents him, that Hume believed that he had proved "not that consciousness deceives, but that the premises generally accepted on the authority of philosophers, and leading to these [contradictory] conclusions, must be false." Hamilton, indeed, says that "Hume could not assail the foundations of knowledge in themselves. *His reasoning is from their subsequent contradiction to their original falsehood.*" This is a statement simply of the way in which Hume invalidates the prin-

\* Acad. Phil., p. 369, 4to ed.



ciples of reason. The meaning is, not that Hume held these premises to be false, because they contradicted instinct or consciousness, but that his reasoning ended in showing that instinct and reason were, as contradictory of each other, alike incapable of yielding certainty or a satisfactory ground of conviction. Mr Mill's groundless interpretation of Hamilton's words makes him represent Hume as maintaining the trustworthiness of our instinctive beliefs in an external world, and in our own personality, and thus as being no longer a sceptic, but a dogmatist—*i.e.*, not as denying the certainty of all, but as affirming the certainty of some knowledge—*viz.*, that portion of it which is instinctive. If we take Mr Mill's account of Hamilton's view of Hume's opinions, Hamilton must regard Hume as seeking to prove "the uncertainty of all knowledge," and at the same time as doing the reverse, in having discovered by his method the falseness of the received principles of philosophers, and, therefore, found for true the opinions (opposed to those principles) that are based on the instinctive feelings of mankind. But this account of Hamilton's view of Hume's philosophy is not even self-consistent; and it is entirely opposed to Hamilton's repeated statements that Hume's position is that of a sceptic, not of a dogmatist.

Hamilton further says that, in order to prove human knowledge absolutely or in itself uncertain, it must be assumed that the principles of the philosophers borrowed by Hume are also the only principles of philosophy. If Hume maintained an absolute scepticism, this was the assumption which he must be regarded as tacitly maintaining. Hamilton may perhaps be regarded as inclining to the view that this was the real conviction of Hume, though he cannot be held as having definitely asserted it.

Mr Mill thus entirely fails to show that Hamilton has misunderstood "the essential character of Hume's mind"—a point which was really not in question. He only shows that he himself has mixed together two totally different points, and has misunderstood a perfectly distinct view (be it a right or wrong one) of Hume's system of thought.

It may be added with regard to the personal question of Hume's relation to his system, that a good deal might be adduced to show that Hume had at least "a foresight" of the use in a dogmatic interest to which his system might be, and actually was, put. First of all, he pronounces absolute scepticism, or the doctrine of the "absolute fallaciousness of the mental faculties," to be in itself not less absurd and contradictory, not less suicidal, than the

reasonings of the dogmatism to which this scepticism is opposed. "Reason," he says, "must remain restless and unquiet, *even with regard to that scepticism* to which she is led by these *seeming* absurdities and contradictions. . . . Nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation than this scepticism itself." \* And he shows a way out of the contradictions that lead to this universal scepticism. "It seems to me *not impossible* to avoid these absurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted that there is no such thing as *abstract* or general ideas," &c.†—that is, in other words, if the principles of the philosophers be abandoned.

Secondly, there are the practical lessons which he draws from Pyrrhonism, as teaching us to abjure dogmatism on many questions, and the need for "the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of the human understanding."‡ If there be a sphere in which the exercise of human intelligence is illegitimate, there is necessarily a sphere in which the operation of the same faculty is legitimate, and yields reliable results.

Thirdly, there are his letters to Reid and Hutcheson, in which he expressly forecasts the use which has actually been made of his speculations. Hume, writing to Reid regarding the 'Inquiry,' says:—"I shall only say that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and important subjects, instead of being mortified, I shall be so vain as to pretend to *a share of the praise*; and shall think that my errors, *by having at least some coherence*, had led you to make *a more strict review of my principles*, which were the *common ones*, and to perceive their *futility*." § Again, writing to Hutcheson (1740), Hume says:—"I assure you that *without running any of the heights of scepticism*, I am apt, in a cool hour, to suspect in general, *that most of my reasonings will be more useful by furnishing hints and exciting people's curiosity, than as containing any principles that will augment the stock of knowledge* that must pass to future ages." ||

Several other statements to the same effect might readily be adduced. But nothing further is required to show that Mr Mill entirely fails in his assault on Hamilton, and is himself wrong in supposing that Hume had no "foresight" of his arguments being possibly turned to the use to which they were actually put. Hume's system, hypothetically taken, has led to all the important develop-

\* Essay on Academical Philosophy, p. 370. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid., p. 373.

§ Stewart's Account of the Life and Writings of Reid, Reid's Works, p. 8; Burton's Life, ii. 154. || Burton's Life, i. 118.

ments of philosophy since his time; the same system, absolutely taken, is the preliminary requirement of Comtism,—that without which thoroughgoing Comtism is impossible, and from which such a system is legitimate and necessary. Hume, in this aspect, may be held as having done for Comte and his followers what they have never succeeded in doing for themselves.

But, according to Mr Mill, it is in the case of Leibnitz that Sir W. Hamilton has shown his marked deficiencies in dealing with philosophical systems. The charge is given thus: “He [Sir W. Hamilton] never seems to look at any opinion of a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher’s other opinions. Accordingly, he is weak as to the mutual relations of philosophical doctrines. He seldom knows any of the corollaries from a thinker’s opinions, unless the thinker has himself drawn them; and even then he knows them, not as corollaries, but only as opinions. One of the most striking examples he affords of this inability is in the case of Leibnitz; and it is worth while to analyse this instance, because nothing can more conclusively show how little capable he was of entering into the spirit of a system unlike his own.

“If ever there was a thinker whose system of thought could, without difficulty, be conceived as a connected whole, it was that of Leibnitz. Hardly any philosopher has taken so much pains to display the filiation of all his main conceptions in a manner *at once satisfactory to his own mind and intelligible to the world*. And there is hardly any one in whom the filiation is *more complete*—these various conceptions being *all applications of one common principle*. Yet Sir W. Hamilton *understands them so ill* as to be able to say, after giving an account of the Pre-established Harmony, that its ‘author himself probably regarded it more as a specimen of ingenuity than as a serious doctrine.’\* And again, ‘It is a disputed point whether Leibnitz was serious in his Monadology and Pre-established Harmony.’† To say nothing of the injustice done by this surmise to the deep sincerity and high philosophic earnestness of that eminent man, it is obvious to those who study opinions in their relation to the mind entertaining them, that a person who could thus think concerning the Pre-established Harmony and the Monadology, however correctly he may have seized any particular opinions of Leibnitz, had never taken into his mind a conception of Leibnitz himself as a philosopher. *These theories were necessitated by Leibnitz’s other opinions*. They were the only outlet from the difficulties of the

\* Lectures, i. 304.

† Footnote to Reid, p. 309.

*fundamental doctrine of his philosophy*, the principle of Sufficient Reason."\*

The proof, then, of this conspicuous inability of Hamilton to enter into the mind of Leibnitz and the spirit of his system—to apprehend the filiation of his doctrines, &c.—is made to rest on the two sentences here quoted. The first question that occurs is, Do they prove, or even really illustrate, this striking defect?

With regard to the note quoted from Reid's Works, it contains a statement simply of a matter of fact, and it would be quite relevant to prove it to be inaccurate, which Mr Mill does not do, and does not attempt to do. The statement is perfectly accurate, as any one may satisfy himself by referring to the '*Leibnitii Vita*' of Brucker (Opera, ed. Dutens, t. i. p. 128); to the '*Præfatio Generalis*' of Dutens himself (Opera, i. p. 7-12); and to '*Pfaffii Dissertationes Anti-Baylianæ*,' Tubingæ, 1720, Dissert. iii. p. 9; to say nothing of Gibbon's '*Antiquities of the House of Brunswick*,' p. 779, ed. 1837, and Stewart's '*Dissertation*,' p. 130, ed. 1855, where the controversy is referred to. That Hamilton was aware of the controversy, and noted the fact of its having taken place, is a very astounding proof of his inability to enter into the mind of Leibnitz!

But the other sentence, in which Hamilton says that Leibnitz "probably regarded the theory [Pre-established Harmony] more as a specimen of ingenuity than as a serious doctrine," is perhaps more to the point.

This sentence, be it observed, is from the Lectures; but, as usual, it is quoted by Mr Mill as of co-ordinate authority with the note in Reid, which was published by Sir William himself. No allowance whatever is made for the fact that the sentence is an isolated one, that its substance is nowhere repeated in the author's writings—that, in fact, it is a casual expression of opinion written on the spur of the moment, and under the exigency of getting up a lecture for delivery next morning, when he was not himself discussing the doctrines of Leibnitz, but merely giving from Laromiguière an account of the scheme of Pre-established Harmony, along with other hypotheses. An expression of opinion in this manner on a point so important, though qualified as a mere probability, is certainly not to be approved. But it is one thing to censure this, and quite another to treat a sentence so given as if it were the writer's deliberate and conclusive utterance on the subject to which it refers.

I have little doubt that when Hamilton wrote the sentence in

\* Examination, p. 627, 628.

question, he was thinking of Leibnitz's letter to Pfaff, who had said to Leibnitz himself that he supposed him not to be serious in his *Monadology* and *Pre-established Harmony*. Leibnitz in reply to Pfaff—who would seem to have been a theologian of the respectable but dull type—wrote, but, as has been shrewdly surmised, ironically, or as we now should say, in chaff:—"Ita prorsus est, vir summe reverende, uti scribis, de Theodicea mea. Rem acu tetigisti, et miror, neminem hactenus fuisse, qui sensum hunc meum senserit. Neque enim Philosophorum est rem serio semper agere; qui in fingendis hypothesibus, uti bene mones, ingenii sui vires experiuntur. Tu, qui theologus, in refutandis erroribus Theologum ages."\*

The evidence appears to me to show that Leibnitz regarded the *Pre-established Harmony* as more than a specimen of ingenuity—as, in fact, a serious doctrine. And accordingly, I think Sir William's statement is not accurate, and unfortunate in its phraseology. It should, however, be observed that Sir W. Hamilton's words do not imply that he concurred with those who believed and said that Leibnitz secretly agreed with Bayle while professing to reply to him.† What Hamilton really meant to convey was probably that Leibnitz proposed his theory rather as a plausible hypothesis—as an ingenious possible solution of the difficulties of the problem—than as convinced of its being the actual or only possible solution. This view of Hamilton's meaning is confirmed by what he says elsewhere when referring, among other theories, to the scheme of *Pre-established Harmony* as devised to meet the difficulty of a doctrine of *Representative Perception*—that is, to explain how it is possible that the mind can represent or mediate know a real world which it does not, in the first instance, apprehend. "The mind," he says, "either blindly determines itself, or is blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause. . . . The absurdity of this supposition [the former alternative] has constrained the profoundest cosmothetic idealists, notwithstanding their rational abhorrence of a supernatural assumption, to embrace the second alternative. To say nothing of less illustrious schemes, the systems of *Divine Assistance*, of a *Pre-established Harmony*, and of the vision of all things in the Deity, are only so many subsidiary *hypotheses*—so many attempts to bridge, by supernatural machinery, the chasm between the *representation* and the *reality*, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural means, to be insuperable. . . . The hypothetical realist," he

\* Leibnitii Opera, Præfatio Generalis, Dutens, i. 8.

† Gibbon's *Antiquities of the House of Brunswick*, p. 779.

adds, "in his effort to be 'wise above knowledge,' like the dog in the fable, loses the substance in attempting to realise the shadow." "*Les hommes*" (says Leibnitz, with a truth of which he was not himself aware)—"*les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils cherchent.*"\* This is Sir W. Hamilton's deliberate opinion of the theory of Pre-established Harmony and of the ground which led to its adoption. Had Mr Mill pondered this passage, he might have got both a truer view of Sir W. Hamilton's opinion on the point, and also a more correct appreciation of the necessity out of which the scheme of Pre-established Harmony arose, than, as we shall show, he has reached. Sir William's view of the theory, as now stated, is not very far from what Leibnitz himself says of the Pre-established Harmony, being all that he claims for it—viz., that it was "a very possible hypothesis," i.e., conceivable, not self-repugnant, and that it rises to "something more than an hypothesis," by serving to explain, better than any other theory, the facts of the case.†

But supposing Hamilton did hold it to be probable that Leibnitz gave forth the Pre-established Harmony "more as a specimen of ingenuity than as a serious doctrine," must he, therefore, be held not to have apprehended "the connection of this doctrine with the other opinions of Leibnitz," and to have failed "to enter into the spirit of the system," and "take into his mind a conception of Leibnitz as a philosopher"?

Between having doubts of a philosopher's seriousness, and not apprehending his system as a whole, or the relations of its parts, there does not seem to be such a connection as to render the latter an inevitable corollary from the former. The supposition of want of seriousness may do injustice to the philosopher as a man—it may even prevent a proper insight into the relation between the man and his opinions; but it is surely compatible with an understanding of the filiation of his system of opinions—of the logical connection of any particular opinion with all the others held by the same person, if there chance to be such a connection. This ground is but a sorry foundation for such an inference, even regarding Hamilton's view of Leibnitz; to say nothing of the wide conclusion which we are invited to draw regarding his catholic incapacity of entering into the minds of philosophers generally.

\* Discussions, p. 67, 68.

† See *Système Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances*, § 15-17.

Sir W. Hamilton has nowhere given a general exposition of the system of Leibnitz, and we have therefore no complete data for gathering his view of it, and pronouncing on the point as to whether he rightly comprehended it as a whole or not. But we have in the notes to Reid a few isolated references to the main opinions of Leibnitz; and it might have been to the point had Mr Mill fairly collected and noticed these statements, and shown from them, if he could, how badly Sir W. Hamilton understood the connection of the system of Leibnitz. He might possibly have found there some statements of Hamilton's views on parts of the system, which would have afforded material more relevant to the conclusion he was seeking to draw than the scraps he has quoted. Sir William there refers to the principle of Sufficient Reason, and to the Pre-established Harmony. His views differ considerably from those of Mr Mill, both on the nature of the principle itself, and on the relation of the Pre-established Harmony to what Mr Mill regards as "the fundamental principle" of the philosophy of Leibnitz, and in both instances Hamilton, as appears to me, approaches the truth precisely in degree as he differs from Mill.

Let us see how the matter stands. According to Mr Mill, Leibnitz's "system of thought can, without difficulty, be conceived as a connected whole."\* "He has taken pains to display the filiation of all his main conceptions in a manner at once *satisfactory to his own mind and intelligible to the world*. And there is hardly any philosopher in whom the filiation is *more complete, these various conceptions being all applications of one common principle*."—"These theories [Pre-established Harmony and Monadology] were *necessitated* by Leibnitz's other opinions. They were *the only outlet* from the difficulties of the *fundamental doctrine* of his philosophy, *the principle of Sufficient Reason*."† Mr Mill then proceeds to expound the philosophy of Leibnitz as an evolution from this so-called fundamental principle. The exposition may be taken as a specimen of what can be done by one who, unlike Sir W. Hamilton, can really enter into the mind of a philosopher.

Now there are a few points that fall to be noted here. In the first place, it is not the fact that the principle of Sufficient Reason is "the fundamental doctrine of the philosophy" of Leibnitz. The principle of Non-Contradiction is a doctrine of the philosophy of Leibnitz—it is expressly laid down as such along with the principle of Sufficient Reason—and, from its nature, it is more fundamental

\* Examination, p. 628.

† Ibid.

in that philosophy than the principle of Sufficient Reason ; for while the violation of the law of Contradiction gives what is impossible in thought and in reality, and its fulfilment only the possible, the law of Sufficient Reason comes after this to determine what is real among the possibilities. “Duobus utor in demonstrando principiis, quorum unum est : *falsum esse quod implicat contradictionem* ; alterum est : *omnis veritatis* (quæ immediata sive identica non est) *reddi possi rationem*.”\* The law of Contradiction thus stands at the gateway of the knowledge of reality ; and Leibnitz by it marked off the bounds within which, according to his view, a science of reality is possible, and in so doing gave a distinctive character to his philosophy, before even the law of Sufficient Reason came into operation at all. And Leibnitz expressly excepts from the operation of the principle of Sufficient Reason all immediate or identical truths, thus pointing to a body of knowledge that is of a more essential and fundamental character than the derivative truths determined by the principle of Sufficient Reason.

Secondly, Leibnitz recognises another principle of philosophy, co-ordinate with that of the Sufficient Reason, which may fairly be regarded as not less influential in determining his principal opinions, and even several of his subordinate doctrines, than the latter. This is what he calls the *Law of Continuity*. This principle he explains in a letter to Bayle, an extract from which is given in Erdmann's edition, p. 104, entitled ‘Sur un Principe Général, utile à l'Explication des Lois de la Nature.’ He regards himself as the discoverer of the principle.† He expressly places it on the same level with the principle of Perfection, one of his names for the Sufficient Reason. “Les phénomènes actuels de la nature sont ménagés et doivent l'être de telle sorte, qu'il ne se rencontre jamais rien où la loi de la Continuité (que j'ai introduite, et dont j'ai fait la première mention dans les Nouvelles de la République des Lettres de M. Bayle), et toutes les autres règles les plus exactes des Mathématiques soient violées. Et bien loin de cela, les choses ne sauroient être rendues intelligibles que par ces règles, seules capables, avec celles de Harmonie, ou de la Perfection, que la véritable Métaphysique fournit, de nous faire entrer dans les raisons et vûes de l'auteur des choses.”\*

While the principle of Sufficient Reason led Leibnitz to reject

\* De Scientia Universali, Erdmann, p. 83.

† Theod. § 348, Opera, Dutens, i. 366.

‡ Réplique aux Reflexions de Bayle, Erdmann, p. 189.



the Cartesian notion, that the essence of body consists in extension, because extension is not sufficient to render a reason of all the properties of body — particularly natural inertia, or resistance to motion—the principle of Continuity led him to the positive conception of the Monad as a self-developing power, and also to the conception of the subordinate gradations among the Monads themselves. One principal point in the theory of Monadology, as laid down by himself, is “Que chacune de ces substances contient dans sa nature *legem continuationis seriei suarum operationum*, et tout ce qui lui est arrivé et arrivera.”\* To the law of Continuity we owe, besides, his doctrines of the impossibility of atoms or perfectly hard bodies—of latent mental modifications—and that the soul always thinks. A celebrated disciple of Leibnitz no doubt attempted, what he himself did not think of, to deduce the law of Continuity from that of the Sufficient Reason. But the only effect of this was to render the principle of Sufficient Reason somewhat more vague and elastic, and therefore more useless, than it was even in the hands of Leibnitz.

The truth is, that it was only such specific principles as the law of Continuity that made the application of the law of Sufficient Reason possible, and put a definite meaning into it.

Thirdly, to say that the philosophical opinions of Leibnitz flowed from the one common principle of the Sufficient Reason, is to state an utterly barren and unimportant commonplace, that throws no real light on his opinions or their connections. And, further, to maintain that these opinions were “necessitated” by this principle, and were “the only outlet” from its difficulties, and therefore were connected by it with a true logical coherence, is to maintain what can be shown not to be the case.

The truth is, that the principle of Sufficient Reason, in the hands of Leibnitz, is as vague and indefinite a conception as possibly can be. Nay, it is not a single principle; it is employed by him in meanings which virtually render it at least two different principles, one of which an opponent may admit, and, at the same time, fairly deny the other. It is used, moreover, in such a sense by Leibnitz in the so-called deduction of his opinions, as on the most essential points to involve a *petitio principii*. It is, therefore, utterly useless as the basis of any demonstrative system of philosophy; it does not afford any true filiation of a system, and does not help us to conceive such, or to make it “intelligible.”

\* Lettre à M. Arnauld, Erdmann, p. 107.

Reid, Stewart, Hamilton—to say nothing of others—have all noticed the vagueness of the principle of the Sufficient Reason.\* Leibnitz himself tells us that it applies to the existence of things, the occurrence of events, and the notion of a truth.† It is thus a real or metaphysical principle—that is, there must be a sufficient reason or cause of each thing and of each event; and it is a logical principle—that is, there must be a reason or ground of every truth that is not immediate or identical. In each case the reason is such as, if known, to render intelligible or conceivable to us *how* the thing, event, or truth is, and is as it is. This is the element in the principle common to all the various cases or applications of it. But Leibnitz did not maintain, as Mr Mill makes him do, that “the antecedent ground in reason” is always “cognisable by reason,” if by reason is meant human reason; for Leibnitz expressly allows the existence of sufficient reasons of theological mysteries—reasons which, if known, would render their *how* intelligible or conceivable—but holds, at the same time, that these are cognisable by the Divine Reason alone.‡

It is pretty obvious, however, that a principle so general as this could hardly give a distinctive character to a philosophical system, beyond requiring it to be a reasoned one. The principle might be admitted by entirely opposite thinkers, and might give rise to entirely opposite conclusions on essential points—such as the connection of the mind and body, and the nature of Divine action; for the essential point to be settled is as to what ought to be regarded as *a* sufficient reason in any given case, and this would fall to be determined by the other distinctive philosophical principles or canons which each party might hold. It was thus that Clarke could allow to Leibnitz the principle of Sufficient Reason, and yet legitimately dispute his inferences.§ In a word, it is the principles which regulate the application of the law of Sufficient Reason which must necessarily make a difference in the conclusions drawn from it. As a major premise, it is thoroughly vague and colourless, and may be made to guarantee conclusions of the most conflicting character regarding the reason or cause deemed sufficient. Hence it is that the distinctive theories of Leibnitz—the Monadology and the Pre-established Harmony—arose directly not from the principle of Sufficient Reason, but from the assumptions of the law of Continuity—of what is Perfect

\* Reid's Works, p. 624, n.†. Stewart, Dissertation, p. 130.

† Monadologie, § 32-36.

‡ See Theodicée, § 60 *et seq.*

§ Troisième Réplique de Mr Clarke, Erdmann, p. 753.

and Imperfect in Divine action—and from other subordinate laws that regulated the applications of the principle of Sufficient Reason.

Negatively, the law of Sufficient Reason yielded no fair logical result. Supposing it admitted that we cannot conceive the *how* or *possibility* of physical influence, and of the action of mind on body, it by no means follows that that action is to be denied as a fact. Positively taken, it does not necessarily lead to the theory of Pre-established Harmony—for, as Hamilton has well remarked, “this opinion of Leibnitz [Pre-established Harmony] stands apart altogether from his doctrine of the Sufficient Reason. That doctrine is equally applicable in the theory of Malebranche, who viewed the Deity as the proximate efficient cause of every effect in nature; and to the theory of Leibnitz himself, who held that the Deity operated in the universe once and for all.”\* And why? Obviously because Divine Power may equally well be conceived sufficient to produce the effect in question, whether the action itself is single, as with Leibnitz, or plural, as with Malebranche. It is the same agency in both cases, and therefore equally sufficient for the effect; and so far as our being able to conceive the how or mode of the action is concerned, the general and single action is not a whit more conceivable or intelligible to us than the special and repeated action. So far as the principle of Sufficient Reason is concerned, we are perfectly free to adopt either hypothesis. Now it is here that the fatal ambiguity of the principle of Sufficient Reason comes out, which leads not to the demonstration but to the begging of the point at issue. “This hypothesis” [Occasional Causes or Divine Assistance], says Mr Mill, “as it supposed nothing less than a standing miracle, was wholly inadmissible by Leibnitz. It was inconsistent with the idea which he had formed to himself of *the perfections* of Deity. . . . Leibnitz could not find in God any Sufficient Reason why so roundabout a mode of governing the universe should have been chosen by Him. He was thus thrown upon the hypothesis of a Pre-established Harmony as his only refuge; and there can be no doubt that he accepted it with the full conviction of an intellect accustomed to pursue given premises to their consequences with all the vigour of geometrical demonstration.”†

If this be the reasoning of Leibnitz, the principle of Sufficient Reason has been made to assume a character that is not implied in its terms, and a character, moreover, that leads directly to the complete begging of the point at issue. The mere sufficiency of the

\* Reid's Works, p. 626, note.

† Examination, p. 730-31.

cause or reason is equally fulfilled on the scheme of Divine Assistance as on that of Pre-established Harmony. The conceivableness of the one scheme is neither greater nor less than that of the other. But the assumption is made that the hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony gives us a conception of greater perfection in Deity, or in the Divine mode of action, than the other. The idea of *greater perfection*, or of a *more perfect mode of action*, is tacitly assumed to be identical with an adequate or sufficient mode of action, reason, or cause; and the Sufficient Reason thus disguised, or converted into the reason of greater perfection, is made the basis of the inference that the scheme of Pre-established Harmony is the true one. And thus the real question at issue between the upholders of the hypothesis of Divine Assistance and those of the Pre-established Harmony—viz, as to which shows more fully the perfections of Deity—is begged. The point begged is paraded as the Sufficient Reason, and we have “the necessary corollary,” “the only outlet from the difficulties of the principle of the Sufficient Reason,” in the theory of Pre-established Harmony. If this be “the filiation of the system” of Leibnitz—if this be “the one common principle” from which his whole philosophy flows—alas for the connection of the system and for the logic of its expounder! Any critic of the system of Leibnitz who does not distinguish the really opposite meanings involved in the principle of Sufficient Reason, and holds it to be more than nominally the one and fundamental principle of the system, has but a sorry insight into the merely verbal coherency of the system itself.

One point more, and we shall leave Mr Mill and his ‘Examination,’ at least for the present. It refers to the subject of this note, —Sir W. Hamilton’s “inability to enter into the mind of another thinker,”—which of course means Mr Mill’s view of the thinker’s mind—a view which is often quite peculiar to himself. Sir W. Hamilton held that, “considered as ends, and in relation to each other, the knowledge of truths is not supreme, but subordinate to the cultivation of the knowing mind.” By “knowledge,” he tells us, is meant “the mere possession of truths;” and by “cultivation”—“intellectual cultivation”—he means “the power, acquired through exercise by the higher faculties, of a more varied, vigorous, and protracted activity.”\* He maintained this view in a practical interest—that of the higher education. “According to the solution [of this question] at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or the lower rank to certain great departments of study; and, what is

\* Lectures, i. 8, 9.

of more importance, the character of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method which an enlightened science of education must adopt.”\*

Mr Mill represents Sir W. Hamilton’s opinion as being “that not truth, but the search for truth, is the important matter; and that the pursuit of it is not for the sake of the attainment, but of the mental activity and energy developed in the search.”†

This statement leaves out the important qualification, that in regard to practical knowledge or truth—moral, religious, and political—Sir W. Hamilton makes its value depend, not on the mental exercise involved in its pursuit, but on its being put into exercise or practice.‡

But even in regard to speculative knowledge or truth, the statement is not correct. Sir W. Hamilton never said that “not truth, but the search for truth, is the important matter,” as if truth were unimportant; what he says is, that of the two the latter is the more important. Nor does he say “that the pursuit of truth is not for the sake of the attainment, but of the mental activity and energy developed in the search.” For this would imply that the attainment is not to be a motive for the pursuit—that truth is not to be sought for its own sake, but for the sake of a certain accompaniment—viz., the mental exercise. What he does say is, that of the two ends, the attainment or possession of truth is not so important as the activity elicited by its pursuit. His statement is comparative, not absolute. To use his own words—“Knowledge is itself *principally* valuable as a means of intellectual education.”§

Sir William cites Plato and Aristotle in support of the view which he takes. Mr Mill sees in this only another instance of his “inability to enter into the very mind of another thinker.”|| To discuss the whole question here raised would lead us much too far. With regard to Plato, Hamilton’s view is substantially that countenanced by Mr Grote, whose authority on such a point may, to say the least of it, be very fairly set off against any mere *ipse dixit* of Mr Mill.¶

With regard to Aristotle, it would not be at all difficult to show that, apart from any express statement by him on the subject, the opinion which Sir W. Hamilton attributes to him, is in harmony with the general tenor of his philosophy. The principles, psychological and metaphysical, of Aristotle, are quite in the line of the alternative which Hamilton attributes to him. There can be no doubt that, according to Aristotle, energy or actuality (*ἐνέργεια*) is

\* Lect. i. 8, 9.

† Examination, p. 632.

‡ Lect. i. 9, 10.

§ Ibid. i. 7.

|| Examination, p. 632.

¶ See above, p. 205.

higher than power, capacity (*δύναμις*). In fact, the conception of the superiority of *ἐνέργεια* over *δύναμις* is at the root of his whole metaphysical system. Energy is superior to and more excellent than potentiality; for what is potential may develop in either of two contrary modes, whereas the actual must subsist in one of the two at the same time.\* Then he is at pains explicitly to distinguish between perfect and imperfect energy. The energy or activity which contains its end in itself is energy proper, as vision or cognition; and it is higher than that activity whose end is external to itself, as the act of learning or motion. There is the difference here between what is completed and what is simply in the way of completion—the becoming.† As knowledge, or “the possession of truth,” is not necessarily more than simply a *δύναμις*,—for we may not always actually realise, or have present before the mind, the truths which we possess,—as the contents of memory,—the actuality or energy of cognition will be the higher perfection of the two.

That, as Hamilton quotes, “the intellect is perfected by activity,” may be regarded as even explicitly stated by Aristotle, for in the following passages he makes both the reality and the perfection of intelligence consist in actuality or energy. *Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετὰ-ληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θηγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων.‡* ‘*Ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκείνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίος.* § ‘*Ὅτι δ’ ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνεργεία).* ||

Then his doctrine of the pleasurable in our mental life is compatible only with the view that activity is superior to the simple possession of truths, even when we are actually conscious of the truth possessed. For if, as he maintains, the intellect reaches its reality and perfection in energy—in the actual cognition of an object; and if, as he further maintains, the power of cognition energises perfectly which is well disposed with respect to the best of all the objects that fall under it; and if perfect energy be that accompanied by the greatest feeling of pleasure, it will follow that the perfect condition of our intellectual life is that which avoids the pains of imperfect or overstrained energy. ¶ But cognitive energy continued beyond a certain period, however valuable the knowledge it may hold, will cause pain. Consequently, it will always be more desirable—will conduce more to the perfect state of our

\* Met. viii. 9.

† Ibid. viii. 6.

‡ Ibid. xi. 7. Compare xii. 9.

§ Ibid. xi. 7.

|| Ibid. xi. 6.

¶ Nic. Ethics, x. 4, 5.

intellectual life—that we should have a change of energy, than that an energy, whatever it may be cognisant of, should remain constantly with us. A mere change, therefore, or series of successive energies, will be superior, as a state of our intellectual life, to the continuance of the same energy—in other words, activity will be more desirable as a condition of intelligence than the mere possession of knowledge.

But, be the Aristotelic doctrine as it may, the point is chiefly interesting as illustrating Mr Mill's remarkable style of criticism, and showing what weight is to be attached to his premises, even when they relate to matters of fact.

With reference to the circumstance that Hamilton cites Aristotle as supporting his view of the relative superiority of the quest of truth to the actual possession of it, Mr Mill remarks :—" In Aristotle's case, the assertion rests on a mistake of the Aristotelian word *ἐνέργεια*, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility—*actus to potentia*." \* The obvious inference from this statement is, that Sir William Hamilton regarded *ἐνέργεια* as signifying something different from *actus*—in fact, power or forcible activity, the popular and abusive sense of the term energy. Now the truth is, that Sir William Hamilton interpreted *ἐνέργεια* in no such sense, and was probably the first in Britain, in this century, at least, to point out its true Aristotelic significance. Take only the following passage :—" *Power, faculty, capacity, disposition, habit*, are all different expressions for potential or possible existence ; *act, operation, energy*, for actual or present existence. Thus the *power* of imagination expresses the unexerted capability of imagining ; the *act* of imagination denotes that power elicited into immediate, into present, existence. The different synonyms for potential existence are existence *ἐν δυνάμει*, *in potentia*, *in posse*, *in power* ; for actual existence, *ἐν ἐνέργειᾳ*, or *ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ*, *in actu*, *in esse*, *in act*, *in operation*, *in energy*. The term *energy* is precisely the Greek term for act or operation, but it has vulgarly obtained the meaning of forcible activity." †

The person who makes this statement is represented as mistaking " the meaning of the Aristotelian word *ἐνέργεια*, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility—*actus to potentia* " !

This is Hamilton's explicit statement of the meaning of the term ; nor is there a single word in the whole of the discussion relative to the comparative superiority of the quest of truth over the possession

\* Examination, p. 632.

† Lectures, i. 180.

of it, which implies that the term *ἐνέργεια* is understood in any other sense than that here given to it. Mr Mill adds in a note:—"The very passage quoted in support of this representation of him [Aristotle] shows that he was using the word in his own and not in Sir W. Hamilton's sense. *Τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται . . . καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν (ἔχουσιν) ἵνα θεωρῶσιν· ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦσιν ἵνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν.*" Now, in the first place, this passage is not "quoted" at all by Sir W. Hamilton, but by his editors; and, in the second place, the passage does not prove what Mr Mill says it proves. Sir W. Hamilton is using the word *ἐνέργεια* precisely in Aristotle's sense. "Every power," he says, "exists for the sake of *action*"—i. e., not of forcible activity, but of an actual realisation of the power. It so happens that, in the case of contemplation, the present existence of the capability is also a state of activity; and Mr Mill confounds this accidental coincidence with the essential meaning of the term. It may be added that the term "fact," by which Mr Mill translates *ἐνέργεια*, is about the most inappropriate word in the English language that could have been selected.

But Mr Mill proceeds:—"One hardly knows what to say to a writer who understands *Τέλος οὐ γινῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις* to mean 'The intellect is perfected, not by knowledge, but by activity.'"\* Now there is absolutely no warrant for saying that Sir W. Hamilton understood these words in this meaning. Sir W. Hamilton quotes, as from Aristotle, the words,—“The intellect is perfected, not by knowledge, but by activity.” But he himself gives no reference to the original, or to the words *Τέλος οὐ γινῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις*. The words are adduced by the editors of his Lectures in a note to the text, for which Sir W. Hamilton was just as little responsible as Mr Mill; a fact which is patent to any one who exercises ordinary fairness in dealing with the materials before him. The note appended to Sir W. Hamilton's statement is as follows:—"Said of moral knowledge, Eth. Nic. i. 3. *Τέλος οὐ γινῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις*; Cf. Ibid., i. 7, 13; i. 8, 9; ix. 7, 4; xi. 9, 7; x. 7, 1; Met. xi. 7: 'Ἡ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζώη.—ED." This is a purely editorial statement. It does not amount to saying that the original of the quotation from Aristotle had been discovered; it contains merely references to passages in Aristotle that bear on the statements of the text regarding the two points of moral or practical and speculative truth. It was perfectly open to Mr Mill to show that there is no passage in Aristotle that can fairly be

\* Examination, p. 632.



translated as Sir W. Hamilton's text implies; that the editors were wrong in their statement regarding the import of the passage quoted; and that the other references had no relevancy: but it is an utterly unwarrantable and gratuitous proceeding to charge Sir W. Hamilton with understanding words which he does not quote, and to which possibly enough he did not even refer, in a sense opposed to their obvious meaning.

I have nothing more to add on Mr Mill and his criticism. I have simply to ask—How are we appropriately to characterise such criticism as that of which the foregoing is an average specimen? Far be it from me to suggest that Mr Mill is consciously and deliberately unfair in his representation of Sir W. Hamilton's opinions. But I shall say, what I think has been proved, that Mr Mill is from some cause, perhaps constitution of mind and habit of thought, a conspicuous example of what he is so ready to charge upon the person whom he criticises—that is, “inability to enter into the mind of another philosopher.”

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